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Abstract: 
By using the political career of the leading Conservative Douglas Hogg, 1
st
 Viscount 
Hailsham, as a prism, this thesis explores important aspects of inter-war British politics. 
Considering that Hailsham held key posts during the 1920s and 1930s, his career has 
attracted less historical coverage than one would expect. By charting his important role in the 
policy-making process, this study sheds light upon the major challenges facing Conservative 
leaders and enhances our understanding of British politics during this turbulent period. 
Hailsham helped shape the moderate form of Conservatism that asserted itself at this time and 
became intimately involved in formulating Britain’s imperial, defence and foreign policies.  
Hailsham’s contribution to the Conservatives’ response to the rise of the Labour Party 
during Britain’s newfound age of mass democracy emphasises the intricacies of inter-war 
Conservatism. Notwithstanding the overwhelmingly working class electorate, the 
Conservatives were the dominant party at the polls and this study demonstrates that Hailsham 
played no small part in the Conservatives’ highly successful inter-war appeal. By the end of 
the 1920s, he had assumed such a prominent position that a number of high-ranking Tories 
regarded him as Stanley Baldwin’s likely successor. During the 1930s, Hailsham confirmed 
that he was a committed imperialist. He was amongst those who defined Britain’s policy as 
the Empire was transformed into the Commonwealth. He also made important contributions 
to the interplay between the National Government’s foreign and defence policies. He was one 
of only a handful of ministers whose continued presence allowed them to make interventions 
in Britain’s disarmament, rearmament and appeasement policies during the era of the 
European dictators and the rise of militaristic Japan. Hailsham’s contribution is even more 
significant because he has strong claims to being the first cabinet minister to express disquiet 
over the mounting German menace.  
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Introduction  
During the years 1922-38, Douglas McGarel Hogg, 1st Viscount Hailsham, sat almost 
continuously on the Conservative front bench in the House of Commons or the House of 
Lords. He was twice Attorney-General (1922-4 and 1924-8), twice Lord Chancellor (1928-9 
and 1935-8), Leader of the House of Lords (1931-5), Conservative Leader in the Upper 
Chamber (1930-35), Secretary of State for War (1931-5), Lord President of the Council 
(1938), acting Prime Minister during the summer of 1928 and regarded as Baldwin’s 
potential successor as Tory leader between 1927 and 1931. As one obituary concluded, 
Hailsham ‘held many important offices in his brilliant career. He was one of the mainstays of 
the Conservative Party’.1 Yet his career has attracted little attention from historians. This 
longstanding historiographical neglect should not be taken to indicate Hailsham’s relative 
insignificance. This thesis will show that Douglas Hailsham was a politician of the first rank 
and a leading force in the Conservative party, and in Conservative and National governments. 
An examination of unpublished primary sources enables Hailsham’s career to be used as a 
prism, through which fresh details are revealed over a range of important aspects of inter-war 
British politics. Hailsham made significant interventions in domestic policy, imperial policy, 
grand strategy and foreign policy. Even during his two periods on the Woolsack, he 
remained, first and foremost, a politician and a vocal figure within the cabinet and its relevant 
sub-committees. His career sheds fresh light on the challenges facing leading Conservatives 
during the inter-war period and adds a new dimension to on-going historical debates. A man 
so close to the nation’s leaders and so involved in the key policy issues of the day deserves a 
comprehensive study of his own. 
 
                                                 
1
 Sunday Times, 20 Aug. 1950. 
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Literature Review
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Secondary Sources 
Forty years after the death of Douglas Hailsham his son complained: ‘I wish he were 
better remembered now than he is. He deserves to be.’3 But two decades further on, little has 
been done to satisfy this wish. The relative neglect of Hailsham’s political career is clear in 
any survey of the literature. No methodical examination of his important contributions to 
British politics exists and, granted the vast and growing number of publications relating to 
inter-war British politics, his career represents a curious gap in the literature. Notwithstanding 
the tendency of political historians to focus disproportionately upon Prime Ministers and 
party leaders, historical discussion concerning this major figure was not encouraged by his 
own determination to be absent from the historical record and his refusal to produce memoirs. 
Unlike his son who wrote frequently both during and after his career, Douglas Hailsham 
seemed keen to ensure that he would not figure prominently in historical accounts of the 
period. Shortly after his retirement in 1938, he noted: 
I have had no less than four publishers anxious for me to write my reminiscences; but 
I have explained to them that if I wrote what I really knew I should be very indiscreet 
and very embarrassing to the [National] Government, and if I didn’t include 
indiscretions the reminiscences would be very dull... When the lives of the Lord 
Chancellors are brought up to date, all they will find to say about me is that I am 
believed to have been educated at Eton, that I was twice Lord Chancellor, once 
                                                 
2
 Overviews of the literature relating to the key themes of this thesis, ‘Conservatism’, ‘Imperialism’ and 
‘Appeasement’, will be provided in the relevant sections. This review concerns Douglas Hailsham’s political 
career more generally.  
3
 Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, A Sparrow’s Flight (London, 1990), pp.261. 
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Secretary of State for War, and subsequently Lord President of the Council, but that 
further details of my life are wrapt in obscurity.
4
  
But Hailsham’s attempts at achieving anonymity were less successful than he expected. 
However inadequate the existing literature may be, he is not completely absent from the 
historical record.  
As Hailsham anticipated, he received an entry in R.F.V. Heuston’s Lives of the Lord 
Chancellors. Although this 45-page account is nearly half a century old, it remains the most 
comprehensive study of Hailsham to date. With Heuston focusing predominantly upon 
Hailsham’s career in the law, he offers only limited insights into his political activities. While 
Hailsham’s rise through the Conservative ranks and awareness of the German menace is duly 
noted (but not properly explained), Heuston lacked access to the full collection of Hailsham’s 
private papers, and those of his son and peers. Writing before the enactment of the thirty-year 
rule, Heuston could not consult the mass of government records now available. Forty years 
later, John Ramsden produced a useful article in The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography [ODNB], charting the main events in Hailsham’s career in the law and politics. 
Although this was more detailed than John Simon’s original Dictionary of National 
Biography [DNB] entry, Ramsden provided a brief summary and his essay fills just three 
pages. Apart from short entries in Who’s Who, Who was Who and encyclopaedias covering 
twentieth century British politics, the only remaining sketch of Hailsham was published in 
1924, less than two years after his political career began and with almost 15 years of frontline 
politics ahead of him.
5
 While useful for outlining Hailsham’s early political convictions and 
his motives for entering politics, it has obvious limitations. These works are helpful, but there 
remain substantial gaps in the coverage of Hailsham’s career.  
                                                 
4
 Heuston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940 (Oxford, 1964), p.451. 
5
 H. Begbie, The Conservative Mind (London, 1924).  
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Although Hailsham figures in literature concerning members of his family, these 
accounts divulge few details of his political activities. The biography of his father, Quintin 
Hogg, and the books on the Regent Street Polytechnic that his father founded, were written 
by Hailsham’s sister, Ethel Wood. These studies reveal details of Hogg’s childhood, and his 
intense involvement with the Polytechnic and the working-class boys that the institution 
supported.
6
 Geoffrey Lewis’s biography of Hailsham’s son, also named Quintin Hogg, 
subsequently Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, provides some insights into Douglas 
Hailsham’s political role. But Lewis’s focus, understandably, is on Douglas’s influence over 
his son’s political beliefs and Douglas’s acceptance of the Woolsack and the accompanying 
hereditary peerage in 1928, with its inevitable impact on Quintin’s later political career. 
Quintin Hogg’s memoirs do discuss his father’s political career and retirement, but his 
commentary is principally concerned with his father’s acceptance of a peerage and his 
influence over his own decision to become a Conservative.
7
 In any case, these reminiscences, 
like all memoirs, must be read with caution. Despite Quintin Hogg’s ‘formidable memory, 
there are inaccuracies’.8 One important example concerns the apparent unity of purpose 
between his father and Neville Chamberlain in constructing Britain’s defence strategy during 
the first half of the 1930s.  
Granted Hailsham’s prominence in the Conservative ranks and his position as a senior 
minister in a number of governments, it is surprising that he does not figure more frequently 
in the reminiscences of his colleagues. His peers were well aware of his important role. When 
Hailsham retired from the cabinet in 1938, the leading Conservative, Samuel Hoare, informed 
him that  
                                                 
6
 E.M. Wood, Quintin Hogg: a Biography (London, 1904); The Polytechnic and Quintin Hogg (London, 1932); 
A History of the Polytechnic (London, 1965). 
7
 Lord Hailsham, Door Wherein I Went (London, 1975); Sparrow’s Flight.  
8
 G. Lewis, Lord Hailsham (London, 1977), p.365. 
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I must write to say how grieved I was to lose you as my neighbour at the cabinet. For 
you and I have the same cabinet age, and upon many questions much the same cabinet 
view. Your great services make our loss very conspicuous...
9
 
Another leading Tory, Lord Halifax, similarly informed his retiring colleague: 
This is only one line... to tell you how much we shall miss you... You and I have 
worked so long and so closely that I shall particularly feel the gap that your going 
makes... We all owe you very much.
10
  
Maurice Hankey, the influential cabinet secretary and later wartime minister, witnessed 
Hailsham’s contribution over a sixteen-year period. He informed the out-going minister that 
‘I was very sorry to read... that you have retired: Sorry because I know from first-hand 
experience how great your contribution has been ever since you came into office.’11  
But despite Hailsham’s presence at the heart of a number of Conservative or 
‘National’ governments, he is either forgotten or afforded only passing mentions in the 
recollections of his political contemporaries. Hoare makes only a solitary reference in his 
memoirs. Halifax does not provide any insights into Hailsham’s political career and Hailsham 
does not figure at all in Hankey’s published recollections.12 He was omitted from Winston’s 
Churchill’s The Gathering Storm (London, 1948) and is also absent from Lord Vansittart’s 
The Mist Procession (London, 1958), despite the two men drawing similar conclusions as to 
Britain’s international and strategic predicaments and their shared involvement in shaping 
Britain’s grand strategy during 1933-4. Notwithstanding their long association in the law and 
politics, John Simon provided only three passing references to Hailsham in Retrospect 
                                                 
9
 The Papers of 1
st
 Viscount Hailsham, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge [CAC], HAIL 1/4/20, Hoare to 
Hailsham, 3 Nov. 1938. 
10
 HAIL 1/4/21, Halifax to Hailsham, 31 Oct. 1938. 
11
 Ibid., Hankey to Hailsham, 3 Nov. 1938.  
12
 Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954); Viscount Halifax, Fullness of Days (London, 
1957); Baron Hankey, Politics, Trials and Errors (Oxford, 1950).  
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(London, 1952).
13
 Granted Simon’s explanation of why he accepted Quintin Hogg’s 
invitation to write Hailsham’s entry in the DNB, this is surprising: 
Writing a biography for the D.N.B. is the most laborious work, as I know from having 
written biographies of Rufus Isaacs and Crewe. I have just refused to do some 
others… the burden is too heavy. But I have such abiding regard and affection for 
your father’s memory that it is a different case…14 
Somewhat ironically, the most detailed coverage of Hailsham’s career in his colleagues’ 
memoirs comes from men who served with him for relatively short periods. Lord Maugham 
and Malcolm MacDonald provide useful insights into Hailsham’s thinking on Britain’s Irish 
policy in the late 1930s from different perspectives.
15
 
Memoirs, of course, are inherently self-centred and self-serving and strict rules 
concerning cabinet discussions and ministerial papers were in operation during the 1930s.
16
 
Consequently, many of the leading actors’ reminiscences were unexciting and unrevealing. 
Neville Chamberlain, who wrote a great deal about Hailsham during their political careers, 
might have offered some retrospective thoughts but he died before he had the chance to 
produce any memoirs.  
Despite the ever-growing literature in the biographies, monographs and articles that 
cover increasingly specialist areas of inter-war British history, no adequate coverage of any 
                                                 
13
 For occasional references to Hailsham’s career see: L.S. Amery, My Political Life vol.2 (London, 1955): Earl 
Avon, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962); D. Cooper, Old Men Forget (London, 1953); Lord Swinton, I 
Remember (London, 1948); Sixty Years of Power (London, 1966); Marquess of Londonderry, Wings of Destiny 
(London, 1943); Earl Winterton, Orders of the Day (London, 1953); A.C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery 
of Europe (London, 1938). Hailsham appears in some the memoirs produced by junior ministers and backbench 
MPs. See, for example, Baron Croft, My Life of Strife (London, 1948); Viscount Mersey, A Picture of Life 
(London, 1941); Lord Brabazon, The Brabazon Story (London, 1956); O. Mosley, My Life (London, 1968). 
14
 CAC, Papers of Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, HLSM 8/2/4, Simon to 2
nd
 Viscount Hailsham, 18 July 
1951. 
15
 Viscount Maugham, At the End of the Day (London, 1954); M. MacDonald, Titans and Others (London, 
1972).  
16
 For Londonderry’s battle with the cabinet office regarding his wish to publish letters he had sent via Hailsham 
to a cabinet sub-committee concerning German rearmament in 1934 see N.C. Fleming, The Marquis of 
Londonderry (London, 2005), pp.160-1; 199. 
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of the component parts of Hailsham’s political career exists. Notwithstanding Hailsham’s 
central role in important matters, historians largely conformed to the pattern set by those who 
produced memoirs. Hailsham usually receives only fleeting reference. His roles in passing 
controversial legislation, his proximity to the Conservative leadership and his connection 
with the celebrated ‘Agreement to Differ’ of 1932, are usually mentioned in the biographies 
of leading Conservatives.
17
 David Marquand’s Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977) provides 
relevant extracts from MacDonald’s diary, while biographies of King George V contain 
intermittent but useful references to the subject of this thesis.
18
 Hailsham usually figures in 
general histories of the period,
19
 monographs concerning high politics and the inter-war 
Conservative party,
20
 and in accounts of grand strategy and foreign policy.
21
 But this 
literature offers only brief snapshots of Hailsham’s career. There is little detailed explanation 
of how he became a leading Tory and almost no recognition of his long-term role in policy-
making. 
The most detailed coverage of Hailsham’s political career relates to his conduct 
during 1930-1 when the Conservatives were out of office and then when they joined the 
National Government. The best account of Baldwin’s often inadequate Opposition leadership 
is provided by Stuart Ball’s Baldwin and the Conservative Party: the Crisis of 1929-31 (New 
                                                 
17
 G.M. Young, Stanley Baldwin (London, 1952), provides no references to Hailsham. Limited coverage of 
Hailsham’s career can be found in K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London, 1969); H. 
Montgomery Hyde, Baldwin: the Unexpected Prime Minister (St. Albans, 1973); K. Feiling,, The Life of Neville 
Chamberlain (London, 1946); I. Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (London, 1961); D. Dilks, Neville Chamberlain 
vol.1 (Cambridge, 1984); R.C. Self, Neville Chamberlain (Aldershot, 2006); N. Smart, Neville Chamberlain 
(Abingdon, 2010). 
18
 See, for example, H. Nicolson, King George V (London, 1952). 
19
 C.L. Mowat, Britain between the Wars 1918-40 (London, 1955); W. McElwee, Britain’s Locust Years, 1918-
1940 (London, 1962); A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1965). 
20
 M. Cowling, Impact of Labour (Cambridge, 1971); Impact of Hitler (Cambridge, 1975); P. Williamson, 
National Crisis and National Government (Cambridge, 1992); Lord Butler (ed.), The Conservatives (London, 
1977); J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London, 1978). For studies that do not note 
Hailsham’s interventions see R. Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970); A. 
Seldon and S. Ball (eds), Conservative Century: the Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford, 1994); J. 
Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics 1900-1996 (London, 1996); J. Ramsden, An Appetite for Power: a 
History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London, 1998). 
21
 See below, pp.10-12. 
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Haven, 1989).
22
 While charting Baldwin’s fortunes, Ball makes several references to 
Hailsham’s leadership claims. But with Baldwin the main focus, the entire story is not told as 
far as Hailsham is concerned. In other literature concerning 1930-1, Hailsham is portrayed as 
a potential conspirator who might have ousted Baldwin in 1931 and brought down the 
National Government soon after its inception.
23
 These charges, however, run against 
unpublished primary evidence and will be reassessed. The understanding that Hailsham lost 
influence ‘never to regain it’,24 when he was excluded from office in August 1931, will also 
be challenged through the exploration of Hailsham’s role in imperial policy, grand strategy 
and appeasement during the 1930s. 
Hailsham’s influence and often hard-line stance are reasonably well-documented in 
accounts of Britain’s policy towards Southern Ireland during the 1930s. But the existing 
literature, suggesting that Hailsham’s Ulster descent and unionist convictions made him an 
inevitable ‘Diehard’, crudely over-simplifies his position.25 In Britain’s wider imperial 
policy, Hailsham’s role in the 1932 Ottawa Conference and in the process of enacting Indian 
Constitutional Reform has attracted little coverage.
26
 Though usually listed as a delegate to 
the Ottawa Conference, his conduct during the discussions has never been explored.
27
 
Hailsham’s important role in the National Government’s passage of the Government of India 
Act (1935) has been almost completely ignored – even by the leading authorities on the last 
years of the British Raj.
28
 
                                                 
22
 G. Stewart, Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party (London, 2007). 
23
 A. Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931 (Oxford, 1991); Williamson, National Crisis; J. Ramsden, 
‘Douglas McGarel Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham’, ODNB, vol.60 (Oxford, 2004). 
24
 Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party, p.208. 
25
 D. McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists (New Haven, 1984); P.M. Canning, British Policy towards 
Ireland 1921-1941 (Oxford, 1985). 
26
 J. Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1980); M. Beloff, Dream of 
Commonwealth 1921-42 (Basingstoke, 1989); R. Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire (Cambridge, 2006).  
27
 I.M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939 (London, 1974); D. Abel, A History of British Tariffs 
1923-1942 (London, 1945); R.C. Self, Tories and Tariffs (New York, 1986). 
28
 Hailsham is not listed in the index of one recent study although he appears briefly in the main text: A. 
Muldoon, Empire, Politics, and the Creation of the 1935 India Act (Farnham, 2009). His significance is also 
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In terms of domestic policy, a number of Hailsham’s interventions during the 1920s 
are covered in Andrew Lax’s unpublished PhD thesis and in Anderson’s short article 
concerning trade union reform.
29
 Hailsham’s important role in shaping electrical development 
policy is identified in Leslie Hannah’s Electricity before Nationalisation (London, 1979). 
These studies acknowledge the Attorney-General’s role in formulating isolated government 
policies during the 1920s, but there is no analysis of his motivation and no broad explanation 
is provided for his often multifaceted response. Elsewhere, Hailsham’s enthusiasm to restore 
the powers of the House of Lords and his role in constructing Conservative policy from 1929-
1935, are outlined in Ramsden’s The Making of Conservative Party Policy (London, 1980) 
and in William Frame’s unpublished doctoral thesis that covers the development of 
Conservative policy before the 1935 General Election.
30
 Yet, despite the usefulness of these 
studies, Hailsham’s sustained contribution to inter-war Conservatism remains largely 
unrecognised.  
One of the most glaring gaps in the literature relates to Hailsham’s role as War 
Secretary – notwithstanding the growing number of studies of Britain’s arms limitation, 
rearmament and strategic policies during the 1930s. From 1932-5, Hailsham helped shape 
Britain’s disarmament policy and he supervised the Army during the initial stages of 
rearmament after Hitler became German Chancellor. In the literature considering arms 
limitation, Hailsham is usually dismissed as an anti-disarmament reactionary.
31
 The 
judgement of Dick Richardson, found in his – perhaps subjective – critique of Britain’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
overlooked in more dated accounts: R.J. Moore, Crisis in Indian Unity (Oxford, 1974); C. Bridge, Holding India 
to the Empire (London, 1986). 
29
 A.J. Lax, ‘Conservatives and Constitutionalism: The Baldwin Government’, PhD thesis, University of 
London (1979); A. Anderson, ‘The Labour Laws and the Cabinet Legislative Committee of 1926-27’, Bulletin 
of the Society for the Study of Labour History, vol.23 (1971), pp.37-54. 
30
 W.R.G. Frame, ‘The Conservative Party and Domestic Reconstruction 1931-35’, PhD thesis, University of 
London (1999).  
31
 P. Noel-Baker, The First World Disarmament Conference (Oxford, 1979); C. Kitching, Britain and the 
Problem of International Disarmament 1919-1934 (London, 2003). 
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disarmament policy during the 1920s, that Hailsham was a conservative sceptic,
32
 has been 
endorsed by other historians of disarmament policy during the 1930s.
33
 In terms of defence 
preparations, brief references acknowledge that Hailsham advocated a commitment to send 
British troops to the continent in the event of a European war and accelerated rearmament. 
But existing works do not create a coherent image and his very real perception of the 
potential German menace is not linked to his conduct.
34
 This neglect of Hailsham’s role is 
also evident in accounts of Britain’s wider rearmament programmes,35 considerations of the 
impact of Britain’s limited financial resources on defence preparations,36 and assessments of 
Neville Chamberlain’s influence over defence policy during the first half of the 1930s.37 Even 
recent articles on the Defence Requirements Committee and the transition of Britain’s 
disarmament policy to a rearmament programme, fail to do full justice to Hailsham’s pivotal 
role.
38
 Often little more is revealed than the fact of Hailsham’s ministerial portfolio and his 
inclusion in important cabinet sub-committees.
39
  
Another omission from the literature is Hailsham’s sustained involvement in Britain’s 
foreign policy in the 1930s. This is surprising granted the size of the historiography with its 
                                                 
32
 D. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London, 1989). 
33
 C. Kitching, Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference (Basingstoke, 2003). 
34
 N. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, vol.1 (London, 1976); B. Bond, British Military Policy between the two World 
Wars (Oxford, 1980); P. Dennis, Decision by Default (London, 1972); M. Howard, The Continental 
Commitment (Ashfield, 1989).  
35
 S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars vol.2 (London, 1976). Roskill’s studies of Maurice Hankey also 
discuss Britain’s defence policy and offer limited details of Hailsham’s role: Hankey: Man of Secrets vols 2 and 
3 (London, 1971-4). 
36
 G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury (Edinburgh, 1979); R. Shay, British Rearmament in the 
Thirties (Princeton, 1977). 
37
 P. Bell, Chamberlain, Germany and Japan 1933-4 (Basingstoke, 1996); D.J. Wrench, ‘The Influence of 
Neville Chamberlain on Foreign and Defence Policy 1932-35’, Royal United Services Institute, vol.125, no.1 
(1980), pp.49-57. 
38
 K. Neilson, ‘The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee: British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville 
Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement’, English Historical Review, vol.118, no.477 (2003), pp.651-684. 
B.J.C. McKercher’s articles also downplay Hailsham’s role in maintaining a continental commitment and 
advocating accelerated rearmament: ‘From Disarmament to Rearmament: British Civil-Military Relations and 
Policy-Making, 1933-1934’, Defence Studies, vol.1, no.1 (2001), pp.21-48; ‘Deterrence and the European 
Balance of Power: The Field Force and British Grand Strategy, 1934-8’, English Historical Review, vol.123, 
no.500 (2008), pp.98-131; ‘National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 
1930-1939’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol.19, no.3 (2008), pp.391-442. 
39
 Gaines Post Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence 1934-7 (Cornell, 1993). 
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increasingly nuanced interpretations of the policies of the so-called ‘appeasers’ and their 
opponents.
40
 When Chamberlain formed his first administration in May 1937, Hailsham was 
one of only five survivors from the 1931 cabinet and his presence continued until his 
retirement after the Munich Agreement. Apart from the second half of 1936, Hailsham was 
ever-present in the cabinet and its sub-committees. Even though government and private 
records have been open to researchers for several decades, the existing secondary literature 
relegates his role in the foreign policy-making process to occasional interventions.
41
 Well-
known accounts such as F.S. Northedge’s Troubled Giant (London, 1966), John Charmley’s 
Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London, 1989) and R.A.C. Parker’s Chamberlain and 
Appeasement (Basingstoke, 1993), provide a combined total of just nine references to 
Hailsham. His role in the cabinet’s refusal to accept Hitler’s Godesberg terms in September 
1938 has been noted by several authors but has not yet been contextualised or linked to his 
earlier views on the German menace. Had Hailsham been included in Cato’s venomous 
Guilty Men (London, 1940), historians might have explored his role in greater depth. But 
Hailsham was lucky not enter the pages of Cato’s polemic. His legal and sinecure portfolios 
and his declining health in the key period after 1935 probably explain his exclusion. 
Hailsham did not even feature in his son’s riposte to Cato – although the main thrust of this 
work was in line with Hailsham’s own views of the political left’s alternatives to 
                                                 
40
 N. Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers (London, 1971); D. Dutton, Anthony Eden (London, 1997); N.J. Crowson, 
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appeasement.
42
 A thorough examination of Hailsham’s impact on British foreign policy 
during the years 1932-8 constitutes a much needed addition to the existing literature.  
Published Primary Sources 
Douglas Hailsham figures more prominently in archival sources and published 
primary material than in secondary accounts. This suggests that although historians have 
overlooked his political career, his role was far from peripheral. The most valuable published 
material concerning Hailsham’s career can be found scattered across the edited collections of 
diaries and letters. These reveal some of the inner thoughts of Hailsham’s cabinet colleagues, 
Conservative whips, backbenchers, political opponents, well-connected journalists, military 
figures and high-ranking civil servants. While it is impossible to build a complete picture of 
Hailsham’s role from these sources, they offer informed, albeit sporadic, contemporary 
commentary from the beginning of his political career to his retirement and help confirm his 
central involvement in British politics. 
The most important published primary source for this study is provided by Robert 
Self’s edited collection of Neville Chamberlain’s diary letters.43 These letters sent from 
Chamberlain to his spinster sisters who lived in Odiham, Hampshire, run from 1915 up to 
Chamberlain’s death in 1940. The multi-volume diary letters are most valuable for political 
historians of the period – particularly those interested in the Conservative party. Hailsham’s 
spectacular rise through the Conservative ranks was mirrored – and eventually surpassed – by 
Chamberlain’s own progress. The latter was in all the administrations of which Hailsham was 
a member and, like Chamberlain, Hailsham was involved in Conservative policy debates 
during the late 1920s and 1930s. Chamberlain’s letters offer an insider’s account of 
Hailsham’s performance. Important moments in Hailsham’s career, including his acceptance 
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of a peerage in 1928 and the crisis in Baldwin’s leadership during 1930-1 receive detailed 
coverage. Hailsham also figures in a host of other published collections of diaries, journals 
and letters, of which the most useful are Self’s edited Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters 
(Cambridge, 1995) and the two volumes of Barnes and Nicholson’s edited Leopold Amery 
Diaries (London, 1980 and 1988).
44
  
Unpublished Primary Sources  
This thesis makes extensive use of Hailsham’s private papers held at the Churchill 
Archives Centre, Cambridge [CAC]. The papers were deposited there by his son in 1977, but 
remained ‘indefinitely closed’45 until they were bequeathed to the centre in 2003. The 
collection, which consists of 38 archive boxes, is now catalogued and open to researchers. 
The author of this study was amongst the first users of the collection and is perhaps the only 
person to have examined all the files relating to Hailsham’s political career. The collection 
consists of a limited assortment of genuinely private papers, and few government documents, 
official correspondence or crown-copyright material are included. Hailsham’s career fell 
conveniently within the ‘age of letter-writing’ when written correspondence, not the 
telephone, was the normal form of communication between individuals who were 
geographically separated.  
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In comparison with the papers of many of his contemporaries, the Hailsham collection 
is relatively small. At the same repository, Winston Churchill’s papers account for 2,185 
boxes, Leopold Amery’s papers fill 423 boxes and Hailsham’s elder son’s collection consists 
of 1,300 boxes. Hailsham kept no diary and the surviving letters do not provide a 
comprehensive coverage of his political career. It seems that he destroyed many of his papers 
and he occasionally requested his correspondents to do the same. ‘Burn this’ was the 
instruction that accompanied a letter sent to Samuel Hoare berating Baldwin for his 
sluggishness when appointing whips in the House of Lords in late 1931.
46
 As a result, 
Hailsham’s papers must be used in conjunction with other sources, not least the collections of 
his contemporaries. But his attempt to remain anonymous at least ensures that what does 
survive was not written with one eye on posterity. The correspondence reflects his sincere 
views at the time of writing. This material offers valuable insights into Hailsham’s thinking 
and motivation.  
As with other archival collections, personal (rather than official) correspondence was 
usually produced only when face-to-face contact was not possible and when letter-writing 
was the most convenient form of communication. This depends upon confidants being 
geographically separated, and explains why little correspondence survives between Hailsham 
and his closest colleagues. He was almost always present in the ranks of leading 
Conservatives and he met his colleagues regularly. The separation that necessitated putting 
pen to paper was often absent. Yet, despite the limitations of the Hailsham collection, it is 
certainly more useful than was implied in one early survey which suggested that ‘all that 
survives are [Hailsham’s] fee books and letters of congratulation and condolence, sometimes 
with his replies’.47 The papers include letters to and from Stanley Baldwin, Neville 
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Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Edward Halifax, Lord Londonderry, Hailsham’s sons, 
Quintin and Neil, overseas correspondents and a collection of press cuttings charting his early 
career.  
While the Hailsham collection is somewhat disappointing for the period 1922-34, 
important correspondence survives from the closing years of his career and the months 
following his retirement. The strength of the surviving letters derives from the combination of 
intimacy and geographic separation.
48
 Hailsham’s younger son’s posting overseas in Britain’s 
diplomatic service from 1936 necessitated letter-writing to remain in contact. Neil Hogg was 
aware of the political realities of the day and of Britain’s international predicament. He was a 
trusted confidant to whom Hailsham could reveal his inner thoughts. The intimacy and 
separation factor ensures that the papers of Hailsham’s elder son, also held in the CAC, are 
useful. The bulk of the correspondence between father and son survives in Quintin’s rather 
than Douglas’ collection. Hailsham wrote to Quinitin on a weekly basis while the latter 
studied at Oxford during 1926-30. Quintin was active in Oxford’s debating society, interested 
in the political affairs of the day and these letters often disclose details concerning political 
matters. Furthermore, Hailsham’s stroke in 1936 and his resulting physical disability 
necessitated dictated and typed replies to correspondents. Copies of these letters survive.  
A considerable amount of material survives in the private papers of fellow cabinet 
ministers and leading Conservatives of the inter-war years. Many of these collections have 
been utilised in this thesis, the most useful of which are the papers of Neville Chamberlain 
held in Birmingham University Library. Although little direct correspondence between the 
two men survives, Chamberlain’s diary and his correspondence with other political figures 
often highlight Hailsham’s importance in the Conservative party and the Conservative and 
                                                 
48
 For more details see D.J. Dutton, ‘Private Papers: The Case of Sir John Simon’, Archives, vol.31 (2005), 
pp.73-83. 
17 
 
‘National’ governments of the time. Although Hailsham was reluctant to figure in the 
historical record, he could not control what his colleagues and political opponents privately 
wrote about him. Chamberlain’s letters to prominent Conservatives overseas, such as Lord 
Irwin, the Viceroy of India, are particularly illuminating.  
Hailsham’s letters to Lord Londonderry held in the Public Record Office of Northern 
Ireland are also revealing. The latter’s abrupt removal from the cabinet in late 1935 meant 
that Hailsham had a close friend who resided at Mount Stewart across the Irish Sea. Before 
Londonderry was dropped by Baldwin, Hailsham informed him that ‘you have always been 
to me such a considerate and loyal colleague and there is no one else to whom I can unburden 
myself’.49 Significantly, once Londonderry’s cabinet career had ended, Hailsham continued 
to confide in him, using private letters to do so. Here he divulged his inner thoughts about the 
government’s overseas policy. The private papers of many other leading Conservatives and 
non-Conservative figures housed in archives across the UK have also been utilised. A 
comprehensive list can be found in the bibliography. 
This thesis also draws extensively upon primary material in official government 
records. Hailsham sat in the cabinet for over 11 of his 16 years in active politics. In addition 
to the use of the recently digitised cabinet minutes and cabinet memoranda, a host of cabinet 
sub-committee papers have been consulted, along with official and private office papers from 
the Dominions Office, the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Prime Minister’s Office and 
the War Office. These sources have been supplemented with correspondence and committee 
meeting minutes found in the Conservative Party Archive at the Bodleian, which provide 
important information about Hailsham’s role in policy debates while the Tories were both in 
and out of power. The source base has been widened by extensive use of Hansard’s 
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parliamentary debates and the contemporary press. Hailsham’s often frank and controversial 
public speeches are well documented in newspaper reports. As well as chronicling his career, 
the press offered contemporary assessments of it. The use of the Conservative press is 
balanced by that of the Liberal-leaning Manchester Guardian. Although more than enough 
material can be collated to understand the importance of Hailsham’s political career, the 
author is aware of the frustrating reality that much of what took place at the top of British 
politics occurred in private and was unrecorded. While the cabinet and its sub-committees 
may have been the venues where many policies were formally initiated, the manoeuvrings 
behind the scenes which helped shape these decisions often remain obscured.  
This brief review demonstrates that no secondary study has sufficiently examined the 
political career of Douglas Hailsham, or adequately covered any of its component parts. The 
fragmented nature of the material in the existing literature fails to construct a comprehensive 
portrait. Hailsham’s importance is often acknowledged, but has yet to be explained. Through 
the use of a range of primary sources combined with the existing secondary literature, this 
thesis will reconstruct the most important elements of Hailsham’s political career.   
Methodology  
This thesis is not a biography. It does not discuss Hailsham’s career in the law, nor 
offer a detailed survey of his early life unless this had implications for his political career. 
Little information is revealed about his family. His father is only briefly mentioned and no 
information is provided about his first or second wife. His sons, Quintin and Neil, only enter 
the analysis when their lives impact upon Hailsham’s political career. His ill-fated stepson, 
Edward Marjoribanks, barely figures in the narrative. The thesis only touches on Hailsham’s 
intellectual prowess, although his analytical powers are clear throughout. 
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But although this thesis is not, strictly speaking, a political biography, it does focus 
around three main aspects of a single man’s political career. The value of using the political 
careers of individuals to further historical knowledge has been questioned. Patrick O’Brien 
suggests that the biographical approach is not ‘a serious enough genre to engage the attention 
of academic historians’.50 Graham Stewart observes that ‘understanding a political career 
purely through biography is like watching the actions of a footballer without following the 
simultaneous movements of the other players on the pitch’.51 Yet a study of specific aspects 
of the career of Douglas Hailsham furthers historical understanding, not just about Hailsham 
himself, but about important themes of inter-war British politics and the challenges that the 
nation’s leaders faced. Several recent studies have followed a similar approach in relation to 
Britain’s appeasement policy.52 This thesis suggests that well-researched and properly 
contextualised studies of the political careers of important individuals can provide a 
manageable prism which furthers historical knowledge and contributes to historical debate. A 
biographical study almost inherently runs the risk of exaggerating the intrinsic importance of 
the individual concerned, but care has been taken not to overplay Hailsham’s impact on 
events.  
Structure 
Part 1: Hailsham, Conservatism and Conservative Politics 1922-35  
This section charts Douglas Hailsham’s meteoric rise through the Conservative ranks 
and his role in re-shaping Conservatism at the beginning of the democratic age, a period 
marked by the rise of organised labour and the appearance of an avowedly socialist party 
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capable of competing for a parliamentary majority. Highlighting the multifaceted nature of 
inter-war Conservatism, it provides examples of Hailsham’s central involvement in shaping, 
presenting and implementing policy. His career helps explain what made Conservatism 
popular. New light is shed on the crisis in Baldwin’s leadership following the 1929 General 
Election and on-going debates concerning the Conservative party’s role in the formation of 
the National Government in 1931. Hailsham’s support for tariff reform, his involvement in 
Conservative efforts to defend the constitution and his failed attempt to strengthen the powers 
of the House of Lords are explored. Hailsham’s portrayal as a reactionary ‘Diehard’ is 
reassessed throughout the section – particularly granted his active support for state 
intervention geared to reduce unemployment. 
Part II: Hailsham the Imperialist 1932-8 
This section identifies Hailsham as a committed imperialist and demonstrates that he 
was a major player in Britain’s imperial policy during the period when the British Empire 
began its transformation into the Commonwealth. His presence in the National Government 
from 1931-8 shows that not all the leading imperialists of the inter-war period were excluded 
from power. He made significant – at times decisive – contributions to the National 
Government’s imperial policy. He assumed a leading role at the Ottawa Conference and his 
contribution to Indian reform helps explain how the Government of India Act (1935) reached 
the statute book in the face of determined Conservative opposition. While historians of 
Anglo-Irish relations are already aware of Hailsham’s intimate involvement in shaping 
Britain’s policy, this section reconsiders existing assumptions about his motivation in 
advocating an uncompromising line. Hailsham had no concept of an imminent retreat from 
Britain’s imperial obligations, but by charting his participation in policy-making, it becomes 
clear that his approach was far more nuanced than that of a reactionary ‘Diehard’. Imperial 
unity was to be fostered through economic unity and, in the end, based upon consent. The 
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sanctity of existing agreements, pledges and treaties were at the heart of his thoughts – 
whether or not he intrinsically approved of them. 
Part III: Hailsham and Appeasement 1932-8 
Challenges to Britain’s international position in the 1930s were not confined to the 
component parts of the Empire. This section explores Hailsham’s role as an architect of 
British defence and foreign policy in the era of the European dictators. It reassesses his 
supposed obstructionist role in Britain’s disarmament policy and shows that Hailsham was 
amongst those ministers determined to quicken the pace and widen the scope of Britain’s 
defence preparations after Hitler’s rise to power. It highlights Hailsham’s understanding of 
the threat posed by Nazi Germany. This acute perception underpinned his response to a 
variety of policies including disarmament, rearmament and appeasement. As War Secretary 
from 1931-5, he urged a firm line towards Hitler’s Germany. As the decade progressed, 
however, he was driven to support the government’s appeasement policy in the face of a 
potentially three-pronged challenge from Germany, Italy and Japan. Although he forecast the 
near inevitability of the Second World War, he could not devise a viable alternative to the 
policy of appeasement. An examination of Hailsham’s experience contributes to the on-going 
historiography of appeasement and to our understanding of the distinctions between so-called 
‘appeasers’ and ‘anti-appeasers’. 
The focus of the thesis is on the years 1922-38, but a brief outline of Douglas Hailsham’s 
background and pre-parliamentary career is now provided. 
Early Life, Career in the Law and Political Beginnings 
Douglas McGarel Hogg was born in London on 28 February 1872, the eldest of the 
three sons of Quintin Hogg, the philanthropist and sugar merchant, and Alice Anna Graham. 
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Douglas was a grandson of Sir James Weir Hogg and of William Graham, both of whom 
were Liberal MPs. In the mid-19
th
 Century, James Hogg rose to become Director of the East 
India Company. Douglas Hogg was educated at Cheam School and Eton College. His ability 
and intellect were soon clear at Eton where he achieved the distinction of becoming Captain 
of the Oppidans – the most academically distinguished member of his house. Dr Warre, 
Eton’s Headmaster, described him as the ‘most efficient boy who had ever passed through his 
hands’.53 It was with some foresight that Warre predicted that ‘if Douglas entered the legal 
profession... he would become Lord Chancellor’.54 This was, however, no sheltered 
upbringing. Hogg was aware of the challenges facing the working class. He spent his 
holidays with the boys from his father’s Polytechnic in a ‘most familiar intimacy with some 
of the hardest nuts from the London slums’. He played football against these boys and 
enjoyed debating with them in the institution’s society.55 
Perhaps as a result of his father’s parsimony,56 Douglas did not continue to university, 
although he did receive a number of honorary degrees in later life. Instead, he spent the next 
eight years with the family merchant firm, Hogg, Curtis, Campbell and Co, in the West Indies 
and British Guiana. He studied sugar growing on the plantations and managed the company’s 
interests. Hogg returned to Britain in 1899 to volunteer for the Boer War. Despite initially 
being refused because of defective eyesight, he was accepted by the 19
th
 Lothian and 
Berwickshire Yeomanry. He served as a Trooper, thoroughly enjoyed the fighting, was 
wounded, decorated and eventually invalided home with dysentery. He only evaded one 
particular Boer bullet thanks to a silver spirits flask kept in his inside pocket.
57
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After returning from South Africa he embarked on a highly successful career in the 
law when he joined a firm of City solicitors and began reading for his Bar examinations. So 
impressive was the twenty-nine year-old’s performance that he was granted a scholarship 
from which he was – strictly speaking – disqualified because of his mature age.58 At the Bar 
Hogg displayed a natural talent. He had, as the leading barrister and Liberal politician, John 
Simon, recalled:  
an accurate grasp of complicated facts, a clear view of the principles of law which had 
to be applied to them, a sturdy attitude in the face of the situation with which he had 
to deal, and a manner which was genial and conciliatory with a persuasive force 
behind it well calculated to win assent from the tribunal he was addressing. He was 
never at a loss, and no counsel was more adept at preparing the way to meet the 
difficulties of the case.
59
  
These characteristics, as Hogg’s early political career demonstrated, were easily adapted to 
the House of Commons. Hogg was called to the bar by Lincoln’s Inn in January 1902 aged 
30, and his professional progress was ‘extraordinarily rapid’.60 He worked mainly in the 
commercial court where his business experience was a great advantage. In 1905 he married 
Elizabeth Brown by whom he had two sons, Quintin and Neil. Following Elizabeth’s 
untimely death in 1925, he married Mildred Margaret Dew in 1929. 
Although it would not be until late 1922 that Hogg’s political career finally began, he 
was adopted by the East Marylebone Conservative and Liberal Unionist Association in the 
summer of 1909. As a committed convert to Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff 
reform, he was their chosen protectionist candidate for the next general election. Hogg looked 
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set to stand in opposition to the sitting free-trade Unionist member, Lord Robert Cecil, and he 
had hesitated before accepting the task as there was ‘obviously unpleasantness and difficulty 
in fighting a Unionist in his own constituency’. But he concluded that  
the tariff reformers in East Marylebone have made reasonable effort to avoid a split in 
the party, and that if... they look upon me as the best man to champion their cause, I 
don’t think I am justified on any grounds of personal convenience in shirking the 
responsibility.
61
  
Hogg’s candidature attracted significant support, as one well-attended meeting in East 
Marylebone demonstrated,
62
 but in the end he did not stand in the general election held in 
January 1910. In November, amidst confusion as to whether the constituency’s Constitutional 
Union or the Conservative and Liberal Unionist Association appointed Conservative 
candidates, Hogg withdrew. By this stage, Cecil had reached an agreement with the 
Conservative leadership regarding tariff reform and the appearance of another anti-Cecil 
candidate meant that Hogg’s standing was not required.63 He may have calculated that it was 
unwise to embark on a career in the Conservative party by upsetting the House of Cecil.
64
 
After this abortive attempt, it was over a decade before he stood for parliament. 
Hogg waited for his chance at Marylebone and it seemed that his entry into politics 
depended upon the availability of this seat. He lived in the constituency, it was near the 
Polytechnic and Westminster and it would allow him to continue his legal practice after 
becoming an MP. In the meantime, Hogg’s career in the law went from strength to strength. 
In 1913 he assisted in the Select Committee’s inquiry into the conduct of leading Liberals 
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following the ‘Marconi Scandal’ and he took silk in 1917.65 Although Lord Haldane, the then 
Lord Chancellor, had decided at the outbreak of the First World War that no new K.C.s 
should be created during the conflict, Hogg, who was medically unfit to fight, was one of 
only four exceptions. During the First World War, he became group adjutant of the London 
Volunteer Regiment and continued his legal practice. His career prospered although his 
private life was marred by the death of his brother and two brothers-in-law on the Western 
Front.  
In the post-war years, Hogg was appointed a bencher of Lincoln’s Inn in 1920 and he 
served as the Prince of Wales’ Attorney-General during 1921-2. With annual earnings often 
in excess of £40,000, he became ‘Britain’s leading lawyer in commercial and libel cases’.66 
In the financial year before Hogg entered politics, he received payments totalling a staggering 
£46,541.
67
 This ensured that by the early 1920s Hogg was already well-known in 
Conservative circles. The impression that he was not recognised until Lord Derby drew the 
Conservative leadership’s attention to a lawyer called ‘Pig’ in late 1922 is apocryphal.68 So 
successful was Hogg’s legal practice that his entry into frontline politics had already been 
foreseen. In early 1921 one periodical anticipated that if Ernest Pollock, the Attorney-
General, chose to accept a judicial appointment, Hogg would be made a Law Officer and be 
returned for Marylebone.
69
  
The following year Hogg spoke regularly to Marylebone’s Conservative and 
Constitutional Union and ensured that it was all but inevitable that he would be the 
Conservative candidate at the next general election. He made it clear that he was a 
Conservative and not a coalitionist. If returned to parliament, he would act as ‘a Conservative 
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and nothing else’. If the coalition introduced measures that were inconsistent with 
Conservative principles, he would vote against them.
70
 He advocated Conservative solutions 
to Britain’s problems. In one address he raised a theme which he would repeat into the 1930s. 
He called for the government to undertake only ‘necessary expenditure’ so as to reduce 
taxation on British industry and foster employment.
71
  
With his understanding of the grievances of the working classes, evidenced by his 
intimate involvement with the Polytechnic, he made it clear that he wanted to enter politics 
because he was sure that a Labour government would result ‘not in improving the condition 
of the working classes, but in damaging not only them but the Empire’.72 Two years later he 
reiterated his conviction that ‘the Labour Party was a serious menace’ to Britain and its 
Empire. Like his philanthropic father, he ‘was anxious to see improvement of the conditions 
under which the working classes lived [and] to see the fear of unemployment removed’.73 But 
while sympathising with the problems of inequality, he did not believe that socialism was the 
solution. He was convinced that a majority Labour government would ruin the lives of the 
people it was supposed to help. This fear conditioned Hogg’s response to a range of issues 
throughout his political career.  
While circumstances had been unfavourable in 1909, an ideal opportunity for Hogg to 
begin his political career presented itself in October 1922. His opening, like that of many 
prominent inter-war Conservatives, came with the collapse of the Lloyd George-led Unionist-
Liberal Coalition. It ‘broke some careers and elevated others, creating a new set of figures 
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who owed their eminence to the outcome of that crisis’.74 It was Hogg’s political watershed 
and from this moment, politics, not the law, became his priority. 
As Hogg’s speeches at Marylebone had implied, dissatisfaction with the coalition was 
widespread in Conservative quarters and had been simmering almost since the 
administration’s conception in 1918. Once 332 Conservatives were returned to the Commons 
in the ‘Coupon Election’, parliamentary arithmetic suggested that coalition was unnecessary. 
It was also questionable whether an anti-socialist alliance was the best means to keep Labour 
out of power. Many Conservatives were alarmed by the prospect of ‘fusion’ between Lloyd 
George’s followers and the Unionist party and by the Welshman’s iniquitous sale of honours 
and his signing of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. Criticism of the government’s handling of the 
Chanak Crisis led to a Conservative party meeting at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922. A 
motion in favour of fighting the next General Election as an independent party was carried by 
a large majority. The decision of Andrew Bonar Law, the former Conservative leader, to join 
the dissenters who included Stanley Baldwin was significant, and Lloyd George’s 
government resigned later that day.  
With many senior Conservatives staying loyal to Lloyd George, Bonar Law became 
Prime Minister and assumed the Conservative leadership. Thirteen Conservative members of 
the coalition refused to serve in his administration. Austen Chamberlain, Robert Horne, 
Arthur Balfour and Lord Birkenhead were amongst the political heavyweights who remained 
out of power. The Law Officers, Ernest Pollock and Leslie Scott, also declined office. Only 
Curzon, Baldwin and Griffith-Boscawen of the leading ministers made themselves available. 
Lloyd George’s cabinet numbering twenty was replaced by a cabinet of sixteen that included 
seven peers, with former ministers such as Lord Derby and the Duke of Devonshire helping 
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to fill the vacuum. Contemporary critics described Law’s administration as the ‘second 
eleven’ with ‘second class brains’. But the government included two future Prime Ministers 
and three fellows of All Souls. 
This situation presented an excellent opportunity for the political advancement of 
junior figures. Hogg was amongst the most spectacular beneficiaries. A week before his 
appointment as Attorney-General, The Times described him as ‘the predestined successor’ to 
Marylebone’s retiring Conservative MP and envisaged that he would be appointed to Bonar 
Law’s legal team. Hogg was recognised as a distinguished advocate ‘with a long record of 
professional success’.75Although his subsequent election at Marylebone was a formality with 
neither the Labour party nor the Liberals standing, Hogg was appointed Attorney-General 
before he secured a seat in parliament. Bonar Law’s Conservatives duly won the general 
election held in November returning 344 MPs to the Commons. Labour secured 142 seats 
whilst the fragmented Liberals won a combined total of 115. Within the space of a single 
month Hogg became the government’s chief legal advisor, an MP, a Privy Councillor and a 
Knight. This was no short-lived success. Although the former coalitionists believed that they 
would soon be recalled to office on their own terms, those inexperienced figures who were 
given their first important posts – including Hogg, Leopold Amery, Neville Chamberlain, 
Samuel Hoare, Edward Wood, Philip Lloyd-Graeme and Thomas Inskip – formed the 
backbone of Conservative and National cabinets during the next two decades.  
Although Hogg entered politics at the age of fifty, his contemporaries anticipated his 
future success. The Attorney General’s uncle prophesied:  
Some day when your life is written as a past Lord Chancellor, the author will say of 
you that he rose to be Attorney-General purely from ability, industry and character in 
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the legal profession without help either from influence outside or from previous 
distinction in the House of Commons.
76
 
These expectations were soon justified. Hogg quickly became one of the government’s most 
capable and versatile ministers.
77
 One colleague remembered how Bonar Law had found ‘one 
new-comer of first rate ability in Douglas Hogg’.78 While his appointment without political 
experience was noteworthy, his subsequent rise through the party’s ranks was almost 
unparalleled.  
 
  
                                                 
76
 Heuston, Lord Chancellors, pp.463-4. 
77
 R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955), p.463.  
78
 Amery, Political Life, p.122. 
29 
 
Part I: Douglas Hailsham and Conservatism 1922-35 
British party politics entered a new era in the aftermath of the First World War. The 
passing of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 created a truly mass democracy 
which incorporated an overwhelmingly working-class electorate. This offered a stage upon 
which a parliamentary socialist party could realistically compete for power. In this situation 
thinking Conservatives feared that the enfranchised working man would become a natural 
Labour voter. The stark reality was that, if the country voted on class lines, the Conservatives 
might never again hold power.
1
 There was a genuine fear that the electorate would accept 
‘soak the rich’ socialist measures geared to redistribute wealth regardless of the potential 
consequences.
2
 As a result, Conservatives had to reinvent themselves if they were to appeal 
to the new democracy and to remain serious contenders in the political game. 
The party proved remarkably successful in equating the Labour party with a 
significant threat to the country’s existing institutions and way of life and in projecting itself 
as the only effective means of resisting this challenge. But Labour’s rise was not the only 
party determinant of the new politics. In 1922 the Liberals lost the status of Official 
Opposition. Thereafter, their decline was remorseless, notwithstanding a few moments of 
short-lived revival. The next three decades saw the party reach a point of near extinction. 
These two developments – Labour’s rise and the Liberals’ simultaneous decline – required a 
subtle, nuanced and progressive Tory response. In addition to the largely negative stance of 
anti-socialism, the Conservatives, especially under Baldwin’s leadership, sought to present a 
constructive non-socialist alternative.
3
 Rhetoric calling for industrial peace and national unity 
was accompanied by moderate social reform and a commitment to uphold established 
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institutions. Conservatives sought to emphasise policies and attitudes that could unite the 
nation rather than divide it. This approach was also designed to attract as much of the still 
considerable ‘Liberal vote’ as possible and to draw its parliamentarians into the Conservative 
ranks.  
This was the political environment which greeted Douglas Hogg at the start of his 
parliamentary career. Yet, though he made important contributions to inter-war 
Conservatism, his name barely figures in works that address that party’s highly successful 
inter-war appeal. The role of Tories such as Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain and 
the importance of effective party organisation are now well established.
4
 Seemingly pre-
occupied with legal matters while serving as Attorney-General, a series of parliamentary 
successes and the temporary exclusion of many of the Conservatives who had served in 
Lloyd George’s coalition nonetheless ensured that by 1924 Hogg was already a leading party 
figure. He became intimately involved in shaping party policy and his continued debating and 
legislative achievements ensured that by 1927 he was being touted as Baldwin’s successor. 
Despite accepting the Lord Chancellorship and an accompanying peerage in 1928, he almost 
succeeded Baldwin as Conservative leader in 1931. 
Hogg’s early parliamentary career well illustrates the complexities and different 
stands of inter-Conservatism. A 1924 sketch described him as a ‘Tory democrat’ who had 
accompanied Neville Chamberlain, the Minister of Health, during ‘many days and nights’ to 
craft a scheme to remove the ‘cruel conditions of our industrial slums’. Hogg’s Conservatism, 
the portrait claimed, was 
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the kindliest and most humane form of politics... [N]o success in foreign markets can 
justify inhumanity in our workshops... He has a certain sympathy with the bottom-
dog, and is always ready to lend a hand to the hindmost before the devil takes them.
5
    
As the son of Quintin Hogg, the fondly-remembered philanthropist, Douglas had seemingly 
inherited his father’s concern for the lower classes and he became a Conservative after 
studying the works of Disraeli.
6
 Such an outlook would fit neatly into Baldwin’s temperate 
and reformist brand of ‘New Conservatism’, which properly asserted itself after the loss of 
the 1923 General Election. But, somewhat paradoxically, Hogg is usually remembered as a 
‘man of the traditional right’,7 often described as a ‘diehard’.8 He vigorously opposed what he 
regarded as socialist measures, believing that they would worsen the conditions of the very 
people they were supposed to help. His role in passing the Trade Disputes Act in 1927 and 
his devastating attacks on the Labour party seemed far removed from the consensual politics 
associated with Baldwin’s Conservatism. Furthermore, as a constitutional lawyer of twenty 
years standing, his defence of Britain’s existing institutions could easily be interpreted as a 
rigid defence of the social and political status quo. 
Notwithstanding these right-wing traits, a thorough analysis of Hogg’s domestic 
political career reveals his pragmatic and constructive contribution to inter-war 
Conservatism. He supported state intervention when private enterprise had failed and 
advocated measures which were condemned by reactionary Conservatives. Like Baldwin, he 
desired to prevent class conflict and facilitate social reform, and continued to display these 
characteristics long after the ‘New Conservatism’ of Baldwin’s second government. Hogg’s 
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political vision represented a blend of pragmatic reform and mild state intervention within the 
existing framework of Britain’s established institutions. His ardent defence of the constitution 
was no aberration from the ‘New Conservatism’. It held an appeal for the cautious working 
man, suspicious of change and anxious to return to ‘normality’ after the upheavals of the First 
World War.  
Rising Star 
Following his appointment as Attorney-General, Hogg was immediately drafted into 
discussions concerning the government’s response to hunger marchers who demanded a 
meeting with Bonar Law, the Prime Minister, after refusing an audience with the Ministers of 
Health and Labour. This was Hogg’s first contact with labour protests and his response 
typified his approach to similar issues in the future. His fear of encouraging revolutionary 
socialism consistently overcame his sympathy for the plight of the working class. In 
November 1922, Hogg attended a ministerial meeting which decided that Law should refuse 
the marchers’ demands on the grounds that the appropriate people to see them were the 
ministers at the head of the departments concerned. It was also agreed that ‘the Communist 
character and record’ of the unemployed marchers’ leaders should be publicised . Along with 
Viscount Cave, the Lord Chancellor, and Neville Chamberlain, the Postmaster-General, Hogg 
took a ‘leading part’ in drafting the Prime Minister’s ‘courteous but utterly uncompromising’ 
response that ‘had the desired effect’.9 
The Attorney-General was also thrown into the deep-end of parliamentary debate. 
Without most of the former coalitionist ministers, Law’s administration was notably short of 
debating strength and Hogg was drafted in to help pilot the controversial Irish Free State 
Constitution Bill through the Commons. This enacted the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiated 
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between British and Irish leaders in December 1921 and conferred dominion status on 
Southern Ireland. For a committed Unionist of Ulster descent, this was a testing introduction 
to his parliamentary career. Yet, in terms of the Irish question, his views were more 
pragmatic than those of many government supporters. Although he privately ‘abominated’ 
the treaty, he regarded it as binding because Britain’s leaders had pledged their word to it.10  
Even before his election at Marylebone he had admitted that he disagreed with many 
Conservatives on the ‘Irish Question’, promising ‘to do his best to make the [1921] Treaty a 
success’. He was not, however, advocating surrender to Irish nationalism. The Treaty, he 
insisted, ‘must be carried out, on both sides, not only in the letter, but in the spirit’.11  
Hogg accepted that the bill was not ideal, but claimed that the consequences of 
rejecting it would be worse than its implementation. This approach typified ‘New 
Conservatism’. In what became a guiding principle throughout his political career, he told the 
Commons that the vital consideration was ‘whether we... are going to carry out the pledge 
which has been given’.12 He warned that  
there could be no better way of fomenting disorder and of playing into the hands of 
those who wish to see the Treaty annulled than to fail to pass this Bill... [T]hose who 
opposed the Treaty in Ireland would be able to say that the British Government had 
once again played false with them.
13
 
The Attorney-General’s performance was applauded on both sides of the Irish Sea. A former 
Conservative whip congratulated the Attorney-General on his 
great success last night. I knew [sic] well how difficult it is even for practised lawyers 
like yourself to catch the atmosphere of the House and you just did it at once and 
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apparently quite naturally and without effort... [T]he manner, tone and substance of 
what you said, knocked the stuffing completely out of the opposition.
14
   
The Irish Times noted that the Attorney-General was ‘adapting himself to his novel position 
with remarkable felicity’. Hogg performance 
would have done honour to an old parliamentary hand... The diehards felt bound to 
criticise some articles of the constitution... but the Attorney-General replied to their 
criticisms with the utmost candour and politeness, and steam-rolled their opposition.
15
   
Despite the opposition of around 50 diehard MPs, the bill safely passed. Hogg’s own 
contribution led the Daily Mirror to conclude that he ‘stands out radiantly as the most notable 
success’ of the parliamentary session.16 After the Christmas recess, the Daily Express 
predicted that, alongside the Prime Minister, Hogg would ‘dominate... the stirring and 
strenuous session before us’.17 While piloting the Rent Restriction Bill through the Commons 
in the spring of 1923, Hogg was described as ‘the great Front Bench “find” of the 
Government’.18 By April 1923 he had already ‘captured the ear and the respect of the House’ 
and Lloyd George felt that Hogg was ‘the only man of quality on the front bench’.19 These 
were remarkable accolades for a man who had so recently entered parliament. 
Hogg’s successes were not lost on Bonar Law. In January 1923 the Prime Minister 
noted that Hogg was ‘a real discovery’. He had an ‘exceptionally good brain’ that Law 
intended ‘to utilise a great deal’. Accordingly, Hogg was immediately appointed to cabinet 
committees considering domestic and overseas policy.
20
 Years later the press baron, Lord 
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Beaverbrook, informed Hogg that Law had ‘told me you would be Prime Minister’. Hogg, 
aware of the high regard in which the Prime Minister had held him, had ‘always suspected 
Bonar Law’s plan’.21 Although Law’s Premiership was cut short by the throat cancer that 
eventually killed him, Hogg’s immediate impact pointed to a bright future.  
Despite this promising start to his political career, the Attorney-General was soon 
caught up in legal controversy. In March 1923 William Bridgeman, the Home Secretary, 
ordered the arrest and deportation to the Irish Free State of Irishmen residing in Britain who 
were suspected of plotting terrorist activity to assist in overthrowing the Free State 
Government to establish an Irish republic.
22
 As Hogg told the Primrose League, the 
government faced a  
conspiracy under which rebellion in Ireland was being actively fermented... with men 
and arms, artillery and money, and under which there was going to commence a 
campaign in England... to assist the so-called Irish republic. 
 The government’s response, he continued, was the seizure of 119 of the suspected rebels 
who were ‘shipped... to where they can do no harm’.23 Although Hogg had privately warned 
Bridgeman that a habeas corpus action could be taken for deporting the suspects without trial, 
the Home Secretary chose to act, risking his own reputation rather than endangering many 
lives.
24
  In response to questions in the Commons on 12 March, Bridgeman explained the 
government’s action. It was 
more agreeable to Irish sentiment for Irishmen to be dealt with by the Irish Free State 
Government, than by the British Government. There is still... considerable prejudice 
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against Great Britain in Ireland. That prejudice would have been used by the 
Irregulars in Ireland to try to get sympathy with them if these men had been interned 
in England – sympathy which they do not deserve.25 
Yet, although Bridgeman’s intentions were entirely honourable, his actions were 
probably illegal.
26
 After challenges from the Labour party, Hogg mounted a stout defence of 
his colleague, claiming that he would have been ‘guilty of a very grave dereliction of duty’ if 
he had acted otherwise. To criticism from Patrick Hastings, Labour’s legal spokesman, Hogg 
insisted that Bridgeman’s actions had his entire approval. He hoped that Hastings would 
‘apply to himself... the principle which I have tried to adopt, of saying to the House what he 
really thinks, and not what he thinks it would pay him to think’.27 The Times reported that 
Hogg was an easy victor in this exchange: 
There has rarely been a more general and sustained cheer than greeted Sir Douglas 
Hogg’s indignant reply and the cheering did not only come from the government 
benches, for the Attorney-General has already established himself as a firm favourite 
with all parties.
28
  
Notwithstanding Hogg’s oratorical success, this was a difficult episode for the 
government. The court judgement in favour of the deportees’ appeal ensured that an Act of 
Indemnity was required to absolve Bridgeman and Hogg of responsibility.
29
 Nonetheless, 
both men remained unrepentant and the appeal court’s judgement was not universally 
accepted. The eminent barrister and former Liberal Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, 
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concluded that the ministers had acted lawfully.
30
 While this episode may have been a factor 
in Labour’s electoral success later that year,31 it did nothing to damage Hogg’s blossoming 
reputation.
32
 Marylebone’s Conservatives even used his name as an acronym for ‘Has Our 
Genuine Gratitude – for crushing the Irish conspiracy’.33 His firm response to seditious 
behaviour anticipated Hogg’s opposition to subversive communist activities and industrial 
disputes later in the decade. 
Hogg built upon his early parliamentary successes by establishing himself as a useful 
platform speaker. He also revealed his pronounced anti-socialist instincts and willingness to 
attack political opponents. In mid-1923 he claimed that the Conservative party was ‘making a 
very great mistake’ in calling the Opposition ‘the Labour party’: 
It was a very useful thing to the Opposition to be called that, because the man who 
heard the two parties described as “Labour” and “Conservative” was liable to assume 
that the Conservatives were what their opponents would like them to think they were, 
capitalist and anti-labour. 
Hogg, like other leading Conservatives, preferred to call Labour the ‘Socialist Party’ as its 
main objective was ‘the suppression of the capitalist state by the socialist state’.34  
Notwithstanding the moderate image fostered by Labour leaders, for Hogg the Labour party 
and revolutionary socialism were synonymous. He was amongst the generation of 
Conservatives who believed that they should expose the supposed inherent links between 
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Bolshevism and the Labour party.
35
 Labour was presented as a narrow-minded faction 
dominated by Moscow that was incapable of governing in the national interest. 
When ill-health forced Bonar Law’s resignation in May 1923, Hogg was ‘alarmed and 
perturbed’.36 Although the established figure of Lord Curzon was passed over and Stanley 
Baldwin, the little-known Chancellor of the Exchequer, became Premier, Hogg told his new 
chief that he was ‘very glad that His Majesty has chosen you’. In accordance with convention 
Hogg offered his resignation.
37
 But, even at this early stage, the Attorney-General’s re-
appointment was a formality. His association with Baldwin was to last for the next fourteen 
years and would prove to be an important axis within the on-going evolution of 
Conservatism.    
During the autumn of 1923 Hogg was embroiled in another General Election 
campaign. It seems that Baldwin called for an election because of his government’s inability 
to find a solution to high levels of unemployment without a mandate to introduce tariff 
reform.
38
 On 25 October, with reparations damaging international trade and with economic 
uncertainty overseas,
39
 Baldwin announced at Plymouth that, if unemployment was to be 
cured, industry must be protected from unfair foreign competition. Other explanations for the 
dissolution, constructed after the election defeat, include Baldwin’s fear that Lloyd George, 
hoping to detach the former coalitionists from the Conservative party, intended to adopt tariff 
reform.
40
 But Hogg’s public pronouncements before the dissolution support the view that 
                                                 
35
 Begbie, Conservative Mind, p.9. 
36
 Barnes and Nicholson (eds), Amery Diaries vol.1, 20 May 1923, p.327.  
37
 Cambridge University Library [CUL], Baldwin Papers, vol.42, Hogg to Baldwin, 23 May 1923.  
38
 For the debate regarding Baldwin’s decision see  R.C. Self, ‘Conservative Reunion and the General Election 
of 1923’, Twentieth Century British History, vol.3, no.3 (1992), pp.249-73; N. Smart, ‘Debate: Baldwin’s 
Blunder? The General Election of 1923’, Twentieth Century British History, vol.7, no.1 (1996), pp.110-39; R. 
Self, ‘Baldwin’s Blunder: A Rejoinder to Smart on 1923’, ibid., pp.140-55.   
39
 W.R. Garside, ‘Party Politics, Political Economy and British Protectionism, 1919-1932’, History, vol.83, 
no.269 (1998), p.50. 
40
 T. Jones, Lord Baldwin: A Memoir (London, 1947), p.8; Ramsden (ed.), Bayford Diaries, 11 Oct. 1923, 
p.209. 
39 
 
growing unemployment was the deciding factor. While he professed no inside knowledge, he 
told his constituents in early November that an election might be coming. Akin to Baldwin’s 
Plymouth speech, he claimed that in order to combat unemployment, Britain must increase 
‘the number of consumers who were able and willing to take our goods’. The government 
‘could not sit with folded arms and wait patiently’.41  
  Conservative leaders calculated that protectionism would give Britain bargaining 
power with protectionist nations, protect the home market, develop the Empire’s resources 
and create fresh markets in the Dominions.
42
 Hogg, like many Conservatives, had fallen 
‘under the personal spell of [Joseph] Chamberlain’ and his adoption at Marylebone during 
1909 confirmed his long-standing support for tariff reform.
43
 Significantly, protectionism was 
an example of the Conservatives’ rejection of negative anti-socialism and showed a 
willingness to contemplate state intervention. This approach would ‘inevitably extend the 
economic role and power of the state’.44 Hogg became a leading advocate of protectionism in 
the Conservative ranks and this form of state involvement was entirely consistent with his 
brand of Conservatism: it was a non-socialist alternative geared to improve the welfare of the 
nation and foster imperial unity.  
After the dissolution of parliament, Hogg and Baldwin appeared together at the 
Queen’s Hall on 20 November. Alluding to their growing ties, the Prime Minister said that 
Hogg was ‘a joy to work with and there is no one who has made such a position in the House 
of Commons as he has in so short a time’.45 Hogg was active in the Conservatives’ campaign 
before voting took place on 6 December. He spoke around the country, maintaining that 
protectionism was ‘a buoy which would keep them afloat’. Sheltering depressed industries 
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would ‘benefit the people of this country and the Empire at large’. Hogg expected that, rather 
than the cost of living rising as free traders maintained, a secure market would allow British 
industry to become more efficient. ‘If the deadweight of unemployment was taken off the 
shoulder of manufacturers’, he argued, ‘they would increase production and so lower 
prices.’46 He attacked Labour’s proposals for nationalisation and the Liberals’ suggested 
relief schemes. The former, Hogg claimed, amounted to replacing the incentive of the private 
owner with a salaried civil servant, while relief schemes were ‘palliatives’ and would ‘never 
be a cure’.47   
Despite these arguments, the electorate once again rejected tariff reform and the 
Conservatives lost the election, at least as far as protectionism was concerned. Their majority 
of 75 became a deficit of 99. Labour amassed 191 MPs, while Asquith’s re-united Liberals 
numbered 158. Although there was a free trade majority in the Commons, the Conservatives 
were still the largest party and the leadership decided to remain in office and place the 
responsibility for installing a Labour government on the Liberals when parliament re-
assembled in January 1924.   
The election setback did nothing to harm Hogg’s growing reputation. Before 
parliament reconvened, John Simon claimed that Hogg had ‘established a reputation as one of 
the great attorneys-general in history’.48 It was in recognition of his growing stature that 
Hogg was given the important task of winding up the debate on the motion of confidence 
when parliament met. On 18 December Asquith had announced that he would turn the 
Conservatives out, believing that the Liberals’ interests would be best served by putting 
Labour into office. Although probably reconciled to defeat, Hogg ostensibly sought to 
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convince enough Liberals to vote for the survival of Baldwin’s government and keep Labour 
out of power.  
In a ‘forthright and hard-hitting speech’,49 the Attorney-General recalled that during 
the election campaign the Liberals ‘were as anxious as we were to expose all the elaborate 
fallacies of Socialism’. He asked the Liberals some searching questions, ‘Do you believe in... 
the establishment of a Socialist Commonwealth by a class struggle, or do you believe... in the 
co-operation of all classes in the State?’50 Like Labour, the Conservatives were, he said, 
anxious to improve the condition of the working classes, but Hogg pointed out the clear 
differences between socialist methods and those advocated by the Liberal and Conservative 
parties. Anticipating a bleak future for the Liberals, he resolutely concluded: 
we will meet [socialist] principles with the most unrelenting and bitter opposition 
which we can set up... We have heard a great deal about suicide [of the Liberal party] 
during this Debate. We believe this act which most of you are promising to do this 
evening... is going to destroy your party. It matters not to us whether history will 
record it as felo de se or whether it will merely say, ‘suicide during temporary 
unsoundness of mind’. To my own friends, I would desire to say there is no reason 
either for panic or for discouragement.
51
 
The speeches of Baldwin, Austen Chamberlain and Hogg ‘made a great impression 
and heartened up our party immensely’.52 After Baldwin and Hogg had spoken, Duff Cooper 
noted that the ‘Liberals looked thoroughly ashamed of themselves’.53 Although the 
Conservatives were voted out of office and Ramsay MacDonald formed the first Labour 
government, the Liberals were exposed at their fault line. Ten of their supporters voted with 
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the Conservatives. As Hogg and other Tories had predicted, the disintegration of the Liberal 
party was under way. 
The country’s rejection of tariffs meant that a new response to the rise of Labour had 
to be found. This led to ‘a new phase of the Conservative Party’s history’.54 The party 
‘surrendered its bolder, brasher tone in favour of Baldwinism’ which was ‘ordinary, moral, 
unprovocative, English and professional’.55 Conservative leaders judged that the party could 
not succeed without a constructive policy. In February 1924 Baldwin called for ‘a new style 
of Conservatism’ now that Labour had emerged as the party’s chief electoral opponent.56 
Pointing to measures of moderate reform embodied in the policy document Looking Ahead, 
the Conservative leader was keen to capitalise on the party’s record of social reform. In the 
spirit of Disraeli’s ‘One Nation Toryism’, he asked his party to look forward and not back. 
The Times tellingly concluded that the Conservatives would rely on constructive social 
reform to beat Labour at the polls.
57
 As a result, the party moved away from the partisanship 
of the past, adopted a moderate character, emphasised its reformist tradition and made 
important changes to its organisation.
58
 Baldwin demonstrated a readiness ‘to sacrifice policy 
and ideology to the quest for power’. He accepted that ‘a “liberal” or “semi-socialist” 
Conservatism was better than the full programme of the other side’.59 Although critics 
condemned this strategy as ‘disguised socialism’,60 it involved a careful blend of pragmatic 
reform within the parameters set by the British constitution. Evolutionary peaceful change 
would be used to block a socialist revolution.  
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It was during this period that Hogg consolidated his position as a leading 
Conservative, renowned for his oratorical successes. He made significant contributions to this 
‘New Conservatism’ – the most important being the creation and passage of the Electricity 
Supply Bill in 1926. Then, shortly after receiving a peerage, he assisted the passage of the 
Equal Franchise Act through the Lords in the face of determined opposition from right-wing 
Tories. But ‘New Conservatism’ was a double-edged sword and Hogg, consistent with his 
early interventions in politics, also became a leading advocate of another plank of 
Conservatism: constitutionalism. This amounted to upholding established laws and 
institutions. Parliamentary democracy, capitalism and the social order would be maintained, 
while revolution and socialism would be avoided. Baldwin frequently expressed a 
commitment to protect democracy against revolutionary threats, for it set the framework 
within which constructive reform could take place. This ‘ordered freedom’, as Williamson 
notes, was as ‘progressive in appearance as it was conservative in practice’.61 Hogg’s 
prosecution of revolutionary communists, his contribution to trade union reform and his 
desire to reinforce the powers of the House of Lords, all shed light upon this important strand 
of inter-war Conservatism.  
With MacDonald’s first Labour Government installed, Hogg retained his front bench 
seat and, as he had promised, he vigorously opposed socialist measures. His most notable 
attack came in May during the debate on the Nationalisation of the Mines and Minerals Bill. 
This, he argued, was ‘an absolutely bad Bill, and one which no reasonable and honourable 
body of men ought to accept.’62 Convinced that it contained all the negative aspects of state 
intervention, he boldly undermined its rationale: 
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Whatever inefficiency there may be in the management of mines... whatever waste 
and extravagance there may be in their administration, whatever political pressure 
may induce the Mining Council to do... whatever loss may be sustained by ruinous 
experiments in retail trade or in export trade, by people who have no experience of it 
– all these matters... are thrown upon the taxpayers of this country, who are asked to 
foot the bill.
63
 
The Liberals joined the Conservatives in opposing the legislation and the Commons rejected 
the bill by a majority of 96.  
The Conservatives’ return to office was not long delayed and Hogg played a leading 
part in Labour’s fall from power. While the attempt to ratify the Russian Treaty might have 
ended MacDonald’s government before the close of 1924,64 the Campbell Case triggered its 
downfall in November. The government collapsed after it decided against invoking the law 
regarding seditious conspiracy. This occurred after J.R. Campbell, the editor of the Worker’s 
Weekly, the official newspaper of the Communist party of Great Britain [CPGB], published 
an article on 25 July calling upon the armed forces to rebel and to turn their weapons on to 
their ‘oppressors’.65 
Hastings, the Attorney-General, began a prosecution for sedition in August but, after 
the cabinet considered the case, it was abandoned. Such a decision rested, constitutionally 
speaking, with the Attorney-General, but it was unclear whether he had been pressured by the 
cabinet to abandon the case. It seems that Hastings agreed with the cabinet that the 
prosecution should be dropped to prevent publicising subversive Communist activities.
66
 Yet 
the popular press accepted the Communist party’s allegation that the government had 
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surrendered to its own left wing and pressure from the labour movement.
67
 These claims 
played into the Conservatives’ hands. They were keen to demonstrate, as Hogg suggested, 
that the government had ‘interfere[d] with the... administration of justice in this country’.68  
At the end of September, Hastings was forced to explain to the Commons why the 
prosecution had been dropped. He failed to satisfy the opposition parties. The Conservatives 
tabled a motion of censure and the Liberals demanded an inquiry. On 8 October the 
Commons considered the administration’s actions and Hogg was, once again, asked to play a 
leading role for the Conservatives. He wound up in what was the best speech of the debate.
69
 
Claiming that responsibility for dropping the case did not rest with the Attorney-General, he 
removed any underlying sympathy for Campbell, which the government had used as a 
justification for abandoning the prosecution. Although Campbell was a maimed and 
decorated ex-serviceman and only the temporary editor of the Workers’ Weekly, Hogg 
asserted that he   
had long been editor of the sister publication carrying on in the same interest... We 
know now that this publication... [was] composed by Campbell’s express direction... 
and was noted in his own handwriting in the copy which was found by the police... 
[S]o far from his not being responsible for the control of the paper, he was actually a 
member of the Political Bureau, which controls its policy, and that he had been made 
such a member by direct instructions of the Communist central body at Moscow... 
[A]lthough his military record was excellent, his political record was vile. He was a 
member of the Central Executive of the Communist Party of this country.
70
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The result of the debate was not a foregone conclusion, but Hogg’s ‘devastating’ criticisms 
proved important.
71
 Neville Chamberlain noted that his ‘summing up was a real tour-de-
force. I confess to having been rattled by the special pleading on the other side and only when 
I heard Hogg did I realise how strong the case against the government still remained.’72 A 
downbeat MacDonald recorded that ‘the personal triumph that beamed from Douglas Hogg... 
[was] difficult to behold’.73 The Government was defeated by 364 votes to 198 after Baldwin 
had instructed his party to vote with the Liberals for an inquiry. The cabinet had already 
decided that it would treat the Liberal amendment as a vote of confidence and MacDonald 
dissolved parliament the following day. There was to be a third general election in two years.  
Before the end of 1924, consistent parliamentary successes had given Hogg the 
reputation of being ‘the finest, most convincing [Conservative] speaker’.74 Despite his 
political career being less than two years old, he was included in a study of the leading 
Conservative figures that claimed: ‘It is doubtful... whether there is any man now in the 
Conservative party who can address the House with more power or with greater effect’. If 
Hogg ‘had possessed twenty years ago Mr. Winston Churchill’s appetite for public life, he 
would now be a Gargantuan figure’.75 The 52 year-old had achieved new-found popularity. 
When Baldwin opened his election campaign at the Queen’s Hall in October, the audience 
insisted on hearing Hogg, although he was not scheduled to speak.
76
 
The former Attorney-General was again active in the campaign and so busy speaking 
around the country that he almost neglected his own constituency.
77
 With protectionism 
buried, his three-pronged message, couched in the rhetoric of the ‘New Conservatism’, was 
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simple: ‘the way to secure peace at home and abroad, to stamp out class hatred, and to 
cement the Empire closer than before’, was to vote Conservative. Constructive assertions 
went hand in hand with his anti-socialist rhetoric and derision of the Liberal party. He warned 
of the ‘red peril’ that lurked within the Labour party, while he argued that it was ‘manifest’ 
that the Liberals could not provide a stable government.
78
 He claimed that the Labour party 
chose to put the country through an election rather than face an inquiry ‘because inquiry 
meant exposure and exposure meant disgrace’.79 Labour, he suggested, wanted a 
‘constitutional revolution’, was ‘out for nationalisation of everything’ and ‘for lending British 
taxpayers’ money to Bolshevik Russia’. Socialists, he argued, ‘could not prove that socialism 
was going to make things better’. Rather than destroying the capitalist system which had 
facilitated enormous social advances, the country should ‘build on the foundations which our 
fathers had made’. In Disraelian tones, Hogg confidently asked the electors ‘Which 
programme is best calculated to improving the welfare of the people?’80  
The campaign around a constructive policy combined with anti-socialism and attacks 
on the Liberal party was a great success, particularly after the release of the ‘Zinoviev 
Letter’.81 The Conservatives won 415 seats, Labour 152 and the Liberals, who fielded only 
340 candidates, were reduced to 42 MPs. This marked the effective end of a Liberal party 
capable of winning a general election and the Conservatives’ landslide proved that they did 
not need an anti-socialist alliance to defeat Labour at the polls.
82
 They had succeeded in 
presenting themselves as the only serious alternative to socialism.
83
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When Baldwin formed his second government Hogg gained the unusual distinction of 
serving as Attorney-General with a seat in the cabinet. This gave him the chance to influence 
wider government policy. Notwithstanding his well deserved promotion,
84
 there was 
disappointment that he had not been appointed Home Secretary instead of William Joynson-
Hicks, the former Minister of Health. Austen Chamberlain felt that ‘Jicks [was] probably 
equal to the H.O. though Hogg would have been a much stronger appointment’.85 King 
George V shared this conclusion. His Private Secretary notified Baldwin that  
His Majesty is sorry that you have not been able to appoint Sir Douglas Hogg to the 
Home Office, where in these times the... difficulties in the internal government of the 
country necessitate an exceptionally able and strong administrator and one who has 
held a pre-eminent position at the bar. The fact also that the Home Secretary is the 
King’s principal Secretary of State and in fact constitutionally His Majesty’s Private 
Secretary is a reason... for the King’s special interest in his appointment.86  
The Prime Minister had considered appointing Hogg Leader of the House of Commons and 
Lord Privy Seal, but, after the return to the fold of the former coalitionists including Austen 
Chamberlain, Birkenhead and Churchill, Baldwin found himself with ‘too many powerful 
men’.87 Nevertheless, Hogg became a cabinet minister and his career in Baldwin’s second 
government was ‘one of uninterrupted success’.88 In 1925 he was responsible for the 
Administration of Justice Act and the Honours Prevention of Abuses Act and he assisted the 
passage of Neville Chamberlain’s Pensions Act that lowered the age of retirement to 65 from 
70. By August 1925, he was recognised as ‘one of the major figures of Conservatism’.89 
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As the King had implied, Baldwin’s second administration faced an explosive 
industrial situation and an increase in communist activity that intended to incite class war and 
overthrow Britain’s parliamentary system. It was for this reason that Hogg’s predecessor 
recalled that ‘Being Attorney-General... in those days is my idea of hell.’90 The subversive 
activities of communists were first on Hogg’s agenda. In various public speeches he drew 
attention to ‘a very small’ but ‘very active’ group  
who do not desire to see things get better; who see in every difficulty and trouble a 
chance of making things [worse]... whose one ideal is the overthrow of civilisation as 
we know it today, and who, under the orders of their Moscow paymasters, are 
determined... to destroy the British Empire.  
He wanted to see ‘this accursed doctrine of class warfare stamped out’, describing it as a 
‘foreign poison’ which sought ‘to infect our British body politic’.91 To combat this threat, the 
Attorney-General sought to use existing laws and investigated the possibility of extending the 
government’s powers. 
For all that, Conservative leaders were wary that a heavy-handed response could 
create communist martyrs and Hogg’s difficultly lay in deciding which seditious acts should 
be punished. But, when the communists’ campaign was injected with a new vigour in mid-
1925, it became increasingly likely that the Attorney-General would act.
92
 During August 
treasonable posters were displayed outside Army barracks throughout England.
93
 Hogg, at 
this moment, judged that more evidence was required before the perpetrators could be 
successfully prosecuted for sedition. Then, on 14 August, the Workers’ Weekly claimed that 
14,000 copies of a statement repeating Campbell’s ‘Appeal to Soldiers’ had been 
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distributed.
94
 This development was discussed at a meeting attended by Hogg, Joynson-
Hicks, and the Director of Public Prosecutions. Although the documents were considered 
seditious, caution prevailed. The meeting concluded that it was best to wait until the 
Communist party was further committed.
95
 The possibility of a failure to convict was the 
restraining factor, but Hogg’s patience was wearing thin and he soon proved his willingness 
to use existing laws to protect the constitution. 
The government’s response soon came and it was at Hogg’s instigation. This was no 
surprise. On 1 October he had publicly stated that ‘if and when it became necessary to act in 
the public interest, [the Government] would... vindicate the majesty of the law and if further 
powers were needed to suppress sedition they would not be slow to ask Parliament’.96 On 7 
October Joynson-Hicks informed the cabinet that he, Hogg and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions had made arrangements to keep the activities and speeches of British 
Communists under observation, with a view to taking appropriate action.
97
  
At the following week’s cabinet there were two significant developments. First, Hogg 
presented a memorandum: ‘The Present Law in regard to Sedition and Strikes’. He 
complained that considerable discontent might be stirred up in the armed forces without 
infringing the existing law on sedition embodied in the Incitement to Mutiny Act of 1797. 
This law was archaic and it was difficult to ascertain  
whether any particular language does or does not amount to sedition and... the 
necessity of a jury trial involves very considerable delay before a conviction can be 
obtained. But... any amendment to the law must be very carefully considered. It is 
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essential to avoid any undue interference with the liberty of speech; and any proposal 
which avoids trial by jury is bound to be very jealously scrutinised. 
Hogg desired legislation along the lines of a 1921 draft bill designed to outlaw ‘direct and 
explicit incitement to the unlawful use of force or violence’ and to provide a statutory 
definition of sedition. At Hogg’s request the cabinet established the Public Order Committee 
[POC], a cabinet sub-committee to consider the merits of legislation regarding sedition, the 
legality of a general strike and the legal position of trade unions.
98
 
The Attorney-General then informed his colleagues of the second key development. 
He believed that sufficient evidence had now been gathered to arrest nine leading 
Communists, that a prosecution would result in convictions and that arrests should be made 
forthwith.
99
 The arrests went ahead. While Joynson-Hicks received the plaudits, Neville 
Chamberlain recognised that Hogg had laid all the groundwork. ‘Jix’, he noted, 
brags so much of what he is going to do that the credit is generally given to him. But... 
he had nothing to do with it. Prosecution is the affair of the Attorney-General and 
even the cabinet has no power to order it as we heard in the Campbell Case. Hogg has 
been working on this for some time and... he believes he has sufficient evidence to 
convict. I believe the decision has been warmly welcomed by our people and... I 
suspect that moderate labour men are rejoicing.
100
  
Following the arrest of the nine men and another three conspirators charged with 
seditious conspiracy, Hogg conducted the prosecution under the Incitement to Mutiny Act at 
the Old Bailey in October. Those arrested included Campbell, Tom Bell, editor of the 
Worker’s Review, Albert Inskip, the Communist party’s Secretary, and William Gallagher, 
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the well-known Communist. In all, eight out of the ten members of the CPGB’s political 
bureau had been arrested.
101
 Although this was a legal matter, the trial had political 
repercussions. Henry Slesser, a Labour MP and KC, was purposefully chosen to defend ‘the 
twelve’ to involve the Labour party.102 
The claim that the prosecution’s case was based on a ‘motley collection of 
documents’, as the official historian of the CPGB suggests, does not withstand 
examination.
103
 Hogg’s exposition occupied nearly four hours and was packed with evidence. 
It highlighted the illegal nature of the CPGB, its links to the Kremlin, its doctrines and its 
activities. It was so effective that it was published by ‘The Anti-Socialist & Anti-Communist 
Union’. Hogg alleged that Communist leaders had attempted to subvert the existing order of 
society through an armed insurrection to replace it with a communist state.
104
 All the accused 
were found guilty by a unanimous jury which took a mere 20 minutes to decide. Five of the 
men were sentenced to 12 months imprisonment while the remaining seven were jailed for 
six months. 
Despite the jury’s unanimity, on 1 December Ramsay MacDonald moved to censure 
the government in the Commons. He claimed that the arrests and prosecutions had violated 
free speech. Before Hogg spoke, Joynson-Hicks pointed out that the government’s action had 
been vindicated as twelve citizens had already found the prisoners guilty.
105
 Hogg then rose 
‘amid the loudest cheer of the day’ and spoke in uncompromising terms. Without ‘any spirit 
of contrition or of apology’,106  he stated that  
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I formed the view that the facts laid before me disclosed a criminal conspiracy against 
the State. I laid the documents before the best criminal counsel whom I could find... 
which entirely confirmed my opinion.
107
  
He highlighted the difference between the rights of free speech and seditious conspiracy: 
‘You may persuade people to vote for a different form of Government’, but it was illegal to 
attempt to stir up your fellow citizens whom you know you cannot persuade in 
sufficient numbers to vote for the changes you advocate... [and] to attempt forcibly to 
overthrow the rule of the majority and the Government as by law established... 
The defendants, he claimed, were ‘advocating the forcible overthrow of the Government, and 
as a necessary preliminary, the seduction of the King’s Army and Navy from their allegiance, 
loyalty, and obedience’.108 The government, Hogg concluded, would have been guilty of a 
dereliction of duty had the campaign been allowed to continue unchecked.
109
 With Liberal 
support the vote of censure was easily defeated and Hogg had achieved another debating 
success. 
Meanwhile, the merits of strengthening the existing law in relation to sedition were 
considered by the POC. It included barristers, Cave (chairman), Birkenhead, Hogg and Cecil, 
and solicitors, Joynson-Hicks and Worthington-Evans. It first met in October. During its 
early meetings, Hogg maintained that it was ‘very desirable... to strengthen the law by 
providing a summary remedy for sedition and by enacting a statutory definition’.110 
Ultimately, however, no amendment was recommended. Although the committee’s report 
concurred with Hogg’s view that the sedition law needed codifying and strengthening, it 
concluded that the successful prosecution of the Communist leaders had ‘obviated any 
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necessity’ for immediate legislation. The packed parliamentary session and the industrial 
situation also weighed against action.
111
 Although no amendments to the existing law were 
made, there were no further prosecutions for sedition in the remainder of the parliament.
112
 
Hogg’s firm response to ‘the twelve’ appeared to deter seditious acts. 
Over the next two years Hogg continued to play a prominent political role, piloting 
two important pieces of legislation through the Commons: the Electricity Supply Bill and the 
controversial Trade Disputes Bill. These measures, along with the Equal Franchise Act of 
1928 and the Local Government Act of 1929, were among the most important legislative 
achievements of Baldwin’s second government. The Electricity Bill marked the acceptance of 
pragmatic state intervention and, although the Trade Union Bill has sometimes been seen as 
conflicting with ‘New Conservatism’, Hogg’s moderating influence proved important. His 
intimate involvement in drawing up both pieces of legislation began early in 1925.  
The Electricity Bill was a particularly challenging measure. It was questionable 
whether Baldwin’s administration could enact ‘such an ambitious scheme of state 
enterprise’.113 Lord Weir, a successful industrialist, chaired a committee that investigated 
Britain’s electrical supply during 1924-5. It found that Britain lagged behind its industrial 
competitors in electrical development, concluding that ‘courage and possibly considerable 
financial investment’ were needed to create an up-to-date electrical energy system.114 Weir 
confirmed suspicions that private enterprise had failed to solve Britain’s electrical 
backwardness.
115
 The existing structure was so uneconomical that Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the 
President of the Board of Trade, was surprised that the first Labour government had not 
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attempted to nationalise it.
116
 Government intervention was, therefore, deemed necessary if 
electrical supply was to be made efficient, as electrification on a national scale was beyond 
the capacity of any private power company or municipality. In 1925 there were 17 different 
frequencies in operation across Britain and, out of a total of 438 generating stations, 322 
supplied only 11 per cent of the total energy. In addition to centralising the production of 
electricity, standardising frequency was essential to reduce expenditure.
117
  
The government sought to produce a cost-efficient and co-ordinated supply of 
electricity without creating a state monopoly that carried the stigma of nationalisation. 
Therefore, while the newly created Central Electricity Board [CEB] would direct the building 
of new power stations, link suitable stations together and own the ‘Gridiron’ system, other 
assets would remain in private hands. While maintaining the incentives of private enterprise, 
the government followed Weir’s proposal which sought ‘partial subordination of vested 
interests... for the benefit of all’.118 With an improved electrical system geared to enhance 
Britain’s industrial competitiveness, reduce unemployment and raise living standards, this 
approach fitted neatly with Baldwin and Hogg’s vision of Conservatism. However, a bill 
along the lines of the Weir Report would meet serious opposition in Conservative circles. The 
delicate situation was not helped by Wilfred Ashley, the Minister of Transport and 
technically responsible for electrical development. He lacked ‘the political stature to drive 
through a bill so offensive to the prejudices of many of the Cabinet and most Conservative 
backbenchers’.119 Hogg, now a leading parliamentary performer, was brought in. But he was 
not simply the government’s mouthpiece in the Commons. He chaired the cabinet’s 
‘Electrical Development’ sub-committee, which was established in May 1925, charged with 
formulating a bill. The Attorney-General, therefore, was principally responsible for the 
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government’s proposals. Unsurprisingly, he had a firm grasp of the subject matter. ‘I can 
really answer questions about this Act without very much research’, he later told his son, who 
debated its merits at the Oxford Union.
120
  
The sub-committee aimed to create a bill that would reduce the price and extend the 
availability of electrical energy to the consumer, ‘from the largest industrial user to the 
artisan in his home’.121 Hogg understood that isolated stations needed to be interconnected to 
enhance reliability and efficiency. This depended on standardising the frequencies of the 
various franchises. ‘Standardisation’, he later told the Commons,  
will at once cheapen the cost of electricity. It will render possible that mass 
production which is one of the secrets of reduced expenditure, and therefore will 
benefit all those parts of the country which are using... the standard frequency.
122
  
The sub-committee broadly accepted Weir’s report, but, as Hogg recognised, the most 
important departure was the decision on who should pay for the scheme. Unlike Weir, Hogg 
and his colleagues concluded that no financial grant should be made from state funds: 
We think it undesirable that the scheme should be open to the charge that the 
electrical industry is being subsidised by the State and so enabled to compete unfairly 
with rival sources of power; further we think that the cost of producing cheap 
electricity should be borne by those consumers who profit by it.
123
   
The committee concluded that there should be no financial grant from the state.
124
 The 
Treasury accepted an alternative plan that involved a £33,500,000 government guarantee of 
private investment to raise the necessary capital. Although moderate Conservative opinion 
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judged that the guarantee was a preferable expedient to prevent the taxpayer footing the bill, 
Hogg expected much opposition from right-wing Conservatives but, he defiantly asserted, 
‘we must not be afraid of it’.125 
 With the cabinet’s approval, the final proposals, embodied in the Electricity Supply 
Bill, were set to be presented to the Commons in March 1926. After 33 Conservative MPs 
signed a motion rejecting the bill, Hogg and Wilfred Ashley found it necessary to speak at a 
Conservative party meeting on 25 March. Addressing over 250 party members, the ministers 
illustrated that the bill was not socialism. The scheme, Hogg claimed, commanded the 
support of expert opinion and was necessary to reduce the cost of electricity, facilitate its 
wider use, promote greater trade and reduce unemployment. To charges that it would make 
nationalisation easier, Hogg replied that if the government did nothing critics could say that 
private enterprise had failed. If this scheme was a success, however, there would be no 
justification for nationalisation.
126
 Hogg suggested that rigid adherence to the failing status 
quo would undermine stability. This was ‘New Conservatism’, reforming to conserve the 
existing order. His ‘most convincing speech’ helped clear the air and the hostile motion was 
dropped.
127
 Nevertheless, the bill still had a difficult passage through the Commons.  
When he presented the second reading of the bill on 30 March, he attempted to silence 
Conservative critics by claiming that the Labour Opposition were ‘quite right to say that the 
bill is not socialism, and that it did not bring nationalisation any closer’. In the non-partisan 
rhetoric of the ‘New Conservatism’, Hogg claimed that the right attitude was ‘not to discuss 
whether or not it assists the political nostrums of one side or the other... but whether or not 
the Bill is designed to improve the conditions of the people’. He pointed out that the existing 
position was unsatisfactory. Britain could not use electricity as cheaply or to the same extent 
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as other industrialised countries. Under the new scheme, electricity would, he claimed, be 
generated at the lowest possible cost.
128
 Asking government supporters not to be scared by 
the bogey word ‘nationalisation’, the Attorney-General urged them to 
vote for a scheme which... will not only benefit the people whom we are here to 
serve, but will in fact make nationalisation more difficult by removing some of the 
very difficulties and criticisms which consumers to-day can level against the supply of 
electricity.
129
  
Hogg’s espousal was widely applauded. ‘No one in parliament’, one newspaper claimed, ‘can 
make a rallying speech like the Attorney-General’.130 Yet, although it had passed its second 
reading, one Conservative backbencher still noted that ‘a good many people on our side are 
much opposed to the Bill’.131  
The committee stage proved arduous. As John Moore-Brabazon, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Transport, recalled: ‘We sat in committee for three months... 
morning and afternoon, three times a week, with many amendments put in on every 
clause’.132 As late as November even one moderate government supporter was still asking 
himself ‘is it a “socialist measure” [?] – [T]hat is the question.’133 Many revisions were 
proposed by the Conservatives George Balfour, Dennis Herbert and Joseph Nall. Balfour 
even congratulated ‘the Socialist benches, because... the leaders of all political parties are 
degenerating to the level of their aspirations’.134  
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The most contentious measure proposed was the government guarantee. Hogg was 
confident no call would be made upon the taxpayer, but he appreciated that ‘unless we had 
the taxpayer behind us we should never be able to raise the money in the first instance’.135 
The guarantee would thus ensure the scheme’s success. The nation’s credit, the Attorney-
General felt, was ‘not to be buried like a talent in a napkin, but to be used’.136 He anticipated 
that state funds would not be required because this was an investment opportunity which was 
difficult to refuse. After five years he estimated that the CEB would have spent £18.5 million 
with a saving of £21 million. Thus the scheme would cost ‘£2.5 million less than nothing’. 
He reckoned that the figures would ‘be very much better when the scheme was completed in 
the mid-1930s.
137
 Outside parliament, Hogg told his constituents that the bill was justified 
because British industry would be better placed to compete with its rivals. The scheme ‘was 
calculated infinitely to benefit the whole of the people of this country – to make them richer, 
happier and better off than if the government had not had the courage to pass it’.138 This 
pragmatic reforming measure, geared to improve the welfare of the nation and block 
nationalisation, exemplified the ‘New Conservatism’. 
Winding up the third reading in November, Hogg alluded to the level of opposition 
and the allegations he faced from the government’s own supporters:  
I have been told that ‘Socialist’ is too good a word for me; I am a Communist. I have 
been told that I have degraded the office of Law Officer of the Crown, that I have 
betrayed the party which has done me the honour of allowing me to be one of its 
leaders...
139
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Yet, for Hogg there was a difference between blanket socialism and constructive state 
assistance. He believed that the capitalist system was the best guarantee of industrial 
efficiency and trusted that the principles upon which Britain’s economic development had 
been founded would be preserved in the bill. The government, he pointed out,   
employ[ed] no wage-earners and the individual station is still operated by the 
individual. We take no part away from the incentive of gain, because the cheaper the 
station runs the cheaper will be the current. We create no kind of bureaucracy, 
because we simply co-ordinate the supply.
140
 
The CEB would only operate stations if no one else would and, with the government virtually 
guaranteeing the scheme’s success, Hogg expected that this would never happen.141  
The bill had been ‘admirably handled’ by Hogg and was safely enacted. At the end of 
its Commons journey, he and Moore-Brabazon made excellent speeches.
142
 The latter 
remembered that Hogg’s ability to ‘make the most polished little speech’ in response to 
unforeseen amendments to the bill’s convoluted clauses was ‘nothing short of miraculous’.143 
The bill received royal assent in December and stood as a tribute to Hogg’s ability to carry a 
sizable and controversial measure through the Commons. It created the National Grid System 
that became operational within a decade and which has been the basis of Britain’s electrical 
supply ever since. This was no mean feat. Baldwin’s 1929 election address maintained that 
‘There has been no more remarkable achievement in recent times than the reorganisation of 
the generation and transmission of electricity in Great Britain’.144 During a Lords debate on 
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industrial rationalisation in October 1934, Hogg, by then Viscount Hailsham, looked back on 
what had been achieved: 
 Some twenty years ago Great Britain hardly counted in electrical engineering... [It] 
has now brought itself fully up to the level of its foreign competitors and is able to 
hold its own in competitive enterprise, not only in supplying the home market but also 
in securing its fair share of foreign orders...
145
  
By the outbreak of the Second World War output had increased fourfold and consumers of 
electricity had risen from three-quarters of a million in 1920 to nine million in 1938. This was 
amongst the most important pieces of legislation passed during the inter-war years.
146
 
While the Electricity Bill progressed through parliament, the coal dispute escalated 
into the General Strike of 1926, the greatest industrial dispute in British history. Although the 
quarrel was at heart between mine owners and miners, the strike was widely interpreted as a 
challenge to Britain’s constitution and parliamentary democracy.147 In the wake of this 
challenge, Hogg piloted through the Commons the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 
1927. This measure was bitterly contested with scenes of disorder in the Commons 
comparable with earlier debates on Irish Home Rule.  
The Conservative party had officially opposed Liberal trade union legislation since 
before the First World War. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 granted unions immunity from 
liability for damages sustained through strikes. Conservatives argued that this placed trade 
unions above the law. The Trade Union Act of 1913 allowed union fees to be used for 
political ends via the ‘political levy’ unless workers ‘contracted out’. This fund provided the 
Labour party with its major source of income. Conservatives claimed that, while many 
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workers might vote Conservative or Liberal and could theoretically ‘contract out’, the levy 
took advantage of human apathy and encouraged intimidation.
148
 As Hogg’s ministerial 
career began, Conservative leaders were repeatedly reminded of the case for amending trade 
union law. Backbench discontent was demonstrated through a number of private member’s 
bills designed to hasten government action. During Baldwin’s second administration, 
Conservative pressure culminated in the Macquisten Bill of 1925 that aimed to substitute 
‘contracting in’ for ‘contracting out’. It was, however, dropped after Baldwin’s ‘Man of 
Peace’ speech instructed his party to vote against the measure. In typically conciliatory 
fashion he concluded his speech: ‘Give peace in our time, O Lord’.149  
Despite Baldwin’s prayer, the industrial situation remained unstable throughout 1925. 
The coal industry continued its decline and, once Britain returned to the gold standard at the 
pre-war rate, exports effectively became 10 per cent dearer. Convinced of the inefficiencies 
of nationalisation, the government presented itself as an honest broker between the miners’ 
union and the mine owners, favouring the voluntary rationalisation of the industry through 
closing or merging uneconomic pits.
150
 The situation, however, deteriorated and the cabinet 
heard on 30 July 1925 that ‘Unless some action could be taken to avert it, a miners’ strike 
would begin at midnight’.151 With the likelihood that the strike would involve other key 
industries, the cabinet granted the miners a temporary £10 million subsidy to maintain wages 
at their existing level, while an inquiry was held by a commission under the chairmanship of 
the leading Liberal, Herbert Samuel. The subsidy was sanctioned to demonstrate to the 
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country that ‘every expedient had been tried’,152 although Hogg was amongst those in the 
cabinet who regarded this step as submission to blackmail.
153
  
While a solution to the coal dispute might have been found during the interim period, 
the subsidy, in practice, only delayed the General Strike and allowed the government to 
finalise its provisions for widespread industrial action.
154
 Throughout this whole affair, Hogg 
showed little sympathy for the miners’ plight. His conviction that the Trade Union Council’s 
threat of industrial action in industries that were not concerned with the dispute was 
unconstitutional motivated his actions. This helps explain why neither he nor his son, 
Quintin, was ‘moved by the fact that it was... hunger which drove the miners back to 
work’.155  
Once the enquiry was under way, Hogg was keen to remove the justification for 
future strike action. He wanted the scope of Samuel’s enquiry to be as wide as possible. 
Concerned that nationalisation was not under the commission’s consideration, he informed 
Baldwin that 
a principal object in appointing the commission is to enable us to satisfy the miners 
and the country... that the government is right hereafter if it has to resist a strike; we 
want to be able to say that the miners are unreasonable in refusing to discuss the 
matter of lower wages or longer hours. 
While perfectly satisfied that nationalisation would not enhance the industry’s performance, 
Hogg asked the Prime Minister ‘how can we expect the miners, or the country to accept a 
conclusion that there is no alternative... if the commission has been debarred from 
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considering the one alternative which the miners claim to be possible?’156 The impact of 
Hogg’s intervention is difficult to ascertain, but Samuel’s commission did go on to consider 
nationalisation and, as the Attorney-General had expected, it was ruled out as a feasible 
alternative.  
Although leading Conservatives followed the Prime Minister’s lead in publicly 
expressing their desire for industrial peace,
157
 Hogg and the POC investigated the possibility 
of amending trade union law and forestalling a General Strike by declaring it illegal. In his 
October 1925 memorandum, Hogg had stated that ‘I should like to render illegal any strike 
which is directed against the State and not against the employers’. Although he had yet to 
‘find a satisfactory form of words’ which would not unduly interfere with industrial 
disputes,
158
 he had decided before the events of May 1926 that general strikes should be 
outlawed.
159
 As regards the repeal of earlier legislation, Hogg struggled to frame a solution as 
political considerations complicated the picture. Although many government supporters 
demanded the repeal of the Trade Disputes Act, he recognised that this piece of legislation 
was 
regarded by all the Trade Unions as their Magna Charta and any attempt to repeal it 
would be considered... as an attack upon the Trade Unions and would rally all trade 
unionists to support the extremists.
160
 
By December 1925 Hogg decided that legislation should be postponed ‘to allow the industrial 
situation to develop’,161 and in March 1926 the POC agreed that legislation ‘should be 
reserved for immediate consideration on the happening of the next industrial emergency’. 
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Public opinion would then ‘be in full sympathy with and would actively support the 
Government’.162  
This cautious approach shaped the cabinet’s response to the coal dispute. The 
government was determined that, if a widespread strike should follow, it would not be held 
responsible. After the Samuel Commission recommended temporary wage reductions and 
colliery amalgamations in March 1926, the cabinet was willing to accept the report and 
concluded that the ongoing negotiations ‘must not be allowed to break down through any 
fault... of the Government’.163 The coal owners reluctantly agreed to the report, but the 
Miners’ Federation refused to accept a temporary wage cut. When the state subsidy expired 
on 1 May, the miners withdrew their labour. 
The government offered to extend the subsidy for two weeks if the miners, or the 
Trade Union Congress [TUC] on their behalf, accepted a temporary reduction in wages in 
principle.
164
 But miners’ leaders refused to entertain such a plan. The General Strike formally 
began after the TUC issued strike notices and the cabinet received news of an incident in the 
Daily Mail office on 3 May. Printers refused to publish an editorial that condemned the 
forthcoming strike as a ‘revolutionary move’. Hogg, along with Churchill, Neville 
Chamberlain, Balfour and Bridgeman, judged that the strike had already begun and agreed 
that ‘the best thing to do was to bring the uncertainty to an end and face the issue’.165 
Consequently, Baldwin intimated to the TUC that the government required an unconditional 
withdrawal of the strike threat before negotiations were resumed.
166
 On 4 May workers in the 
transport, docks, iron and steel, printing, gas, electricity and other industries, joined the 
miners on strike. The TUC pledged not to allow the miners to suffer as a result of the re-
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organisation of the industry.
167
 The strike lasted until 13 May, but it failed to compel the 
government to accept the miners’ demands.  
Hogg’s public statements about the strike were typically robust. Like many 
contemporaries, he was keen to portray the General Strike as an attack upon Britain’s 
established institutions. In the government-edited British Gazette, he placed responsibility for 
the strike entirely upon the TUC. By  
issuing notices on Saturday calling a general strike they had challenged the whole 
principle of free and constitutional government, and had rendered negotiations almost 
impossible. In spite of that threat the government, in its anxiety to avoid disaster... 
continued to seek a peaceful solution until the very last moment, when by the action 
taken in consequence of these notices, all hope of a voluntary settlement was 
destroyed.
168
   
In similar terms, he told his constituents that the conflict 
was not intended to affect the merits of the dispute between the miners and the mine 
owners, but... to coerce the government, to compel it to do what it thought wrong in 
the national interest... It was an attempt to overthrow the whole constitutional 
government... and substitute for it the tyranny of one particular section of the 
population...
169
 
While Hogg – perhaps deliberately – overplayed the revolutionary threat, the TUC had 
always aimed to compel the government to act, as it was the only body capable of providing 
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the subsidies which would maintain the miners’ wages while reorganisation took place.170 
Attempts to coerce the administration to change its course, Hogg judged, were 
unconstitutional and should not be entertained by a democratic government.  
As Hogg had anticipated, the industrial emergency presented the government with an 
opportunity to legislate. Granted the enthusiasm for a quick response from inside the cabinet, 
Conservative backbenchers, Conservative associations throughout the country and 
employers’ associations, it was surprising that legislation was not immediately introduced. In 
fact, unbeknown to the public, who listened to Baldwin’s broadcast that promised a ‘square 
deal’ to both sides of the dispute, the government ‘came within a hair’s breadth of 
introducing legislation’.171 Inside the cabinet, Hogg was the principal advocate of an 
immediate legislative response.  
On 6 May the Attorney-General was appointed to a cabinet sub-committee to consider 
introducing legislation to ‘strengthen the powers of the government’. He expressed his desire 
to outlaw general strikes and protect those who had stayed at work. He also presented 
Baldwin with a draft bill to amend the Trade Disputes Act. Neville Chamberlain, who found 
Hogg ‘a perfect tower of strength’, agreed with this approach. Like Hogg, the Minister of 
Health felt the bill 
offer[s] a means of hitting our adversaries in a vital spot and the sooner we can do that 
the better... I am convinced that the time for parleys and listening is past; the best 
thing now is to strike quickly and hard.
172
  
Baldwin, however, preferred to wait for events to take their course. Hogg was only allowed to 
bring his draft bill before the cabinet after he had pressed the Prime Minister ‘for some days’. 
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But, rather than reflecting a difference in political outlook between Baldwin and Hogg, this 
highlighted the contrast in temperament between the two men. Hogg was, and would 
continue to be, a more dynamic force than the Prime Minister. He advised Baldwin to warn 
union leaders that a bill would be introduced unless the strike was promptly halted. In 
response, the Prime Minister ‘snapped his fingers a great deal but said nothing’.173 
Nevertheless, despite Baldwin’s delaying tactics, the draft reached the cabinet on the evening 
of 8 May. Support for Hogg’s bill was ‘practically unanimous’ and the cabinet ‘were all quite 
clear’ that it should be presented to the Commons.174  
Consistent with his earlier ‘Sedition and Strikes’ memorandum, Hogg’s three-clause 
‘Illegal Strikes Bill’ aimed to prevent the use of trade union funds in strikes directed against 
the state. To honour the government’s pledge, non-striking trade unionists would not be 
expelled from their union or be deprived of any rights or benefits. Courts would be allowed to 
freeze union funds and employers permitted to bring actions for damages against the unions. 
Sympathetic strikes would also be placed outside the protection of the 1906 Act. The draft 
bill maintained that  
it is illegal to commence or continue... any strike which has any other object than the 
maintenance or improvement of conditions of labour in the industry or the branch of 
the industry in which the strikes are engaged, and which is intended or calculated to 
intimidate or coerce the government or the community...
175
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Significantly, this was not a reactionary attempt to crush trade unions. Hogg’s primary 
objective was to undermine the TUC’s ability to co-ordinate the strike and bring industrial 
action to an end.
176
 The cabinet agreed that the draft bill should be introduced on 10 May.
177
  
 At the eleventh hour, however, Baldwin’s government postponed the bill’s 
consideration for two days. Hesitations were apparent in influential quarters but, most 
importantly, the cabinet was presented with evidence suggesting that the strike was already 
collapsing.
178
 Baldwin had succeeded in shifting attention away from the miners’ plight to 
‘portraying himself as the defender of the constitution and parliamentary democracy... against 
a misguided TUC’s blackmail tactics’.179 In this situation legislation would have appeared 
provocative and Baldwin urged that ‘we should hold our hand for a few days longer’. The 
King had also warned Joynson-Hicks and Hogg that ‘anything done to touch the pockets of 
those who are now only existing on strike pay might cause exasperation and serious 
reprisals’.180 Baldwin’s moderating influence prevailed and Hogg was not amongst the 
cabinet dissenters who included Amery, Neville Chamberlain, Churchill, Cave and 
Balfour.
181
 The Attorney-General ‘showed his dislike for delay’, but ‘could not advise 
proceeding if we were not unanimous’.182 This interval effectively ruled out an immediate 
legislative response.  
Unfolding events rendered legislation to end the strike unnecessary. On 11 May 
Justice Astbury ruled that no trade dispute could exist between the TUC and the government, 
that the General Strike was not protected by the Trade Disputes Act and that it had flouted 
union rules. If this view was upheld, the unions would be liable for incitement to breach of 
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contract and faced the seizure of their assets. This judgement, accompanied by John Simon’s 
speeches on the 6 and 11 May that concurred with Astbury’s conclusion, made it easier to 
postpone legislation. If the strike already defied the established law, as two legal authorities 
maintained, legislation was unnecessary.  
The strike ended on 13 May with an outright victory for the government. Baldwin’s 
‘calm statesmanship’ appeared to be a key factor in the government’s success and his stature 
in the country reached its zenith.
183
 Although Hogg had favoured action, he accepted 
Baldwin’s conciliatory approach and, after the collapse of the strike, he claimed that ‘the 
prestige of this country with foreign Governments and foreign peoples has been placed on a 
higher level than perhaps it had ever been before’.184  
Although the General Strike had collapsed, it had proved that the government’s 
attempt at industrial reconciliation had failed. Legislation dealing with trade union powers 
and general strikes was all but inevitable. The cabinet decided that action was necessary to 
protect the constitution and the community against future ‘general’ strikes. Churchill 
concluded that the government was ‘bound to have a bill’ after the trade unions had 
challenged Britain’s constitution.185 Hogg believed a bill was necessary because the legality 
of general strikes remained ambiguous. While he regarded Simon’s opinion as ‘a great public 
service’,186 that view was not shared universally. Henry Slesser, the Labour party’s former 
Solicitor-General, claimed that the strike was perfectly legal and Arthur Goodhart, academic 
lawyer and fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, agreed.
187
 In addition to legal 
clarity, legislation would also assuage discontent among Conservative backbenchers and 
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Conservative associations throughout the country.
188
 Gervais Rentoul, founding chairman of 
the 1922 Committee, summed up general Conservative opinion: ‘it is difficult to defend or 
excuse the present state of affairs under which trade unions are placed above the law’.189   
In the interval between the strike and legislation, Hogg adopted a cautious approach. 
Although the government was considering the position of the trade unions, he wanted to 
‘clear the misconception that the government wanted to smash [them]’. He accepted the right 
to strike, but maintained that a general strike was ‘a treasonable conspiracy’, ‘an attempt... to 
coerce the community into doing something which it does not desire to do by a process of 
starvation and ruin... [T]hat is not a right; it is a crime.’190  
While there was a broad consensus that reform was necessary, there was considerable 
disagreement over the particulars of legislation. Hogg complained that ‘It is an awfully 
thorny problem; we must do something and yet it is very difficult to know how far to go... 
without justifying a charge of persecution and undue interference.’191 Amending the trade 
unions’ privileged position without appearing hostile to the working class was important. 
Any bill that seemed punitive would undermine ‘New Conservatism’ and efforts to eradicate 
class conflict. Hogg was very aware of this. Notwithstanding his popular right-wing image 
and strong constitutionalist impulses, he was amongst the more moderate Conservative 
leaders during the deliberations over legislation. He eventually presented to the Commons a 
bill which did not have his full agreement. His thoughts on legislation were remarkably 
consistent. While the strike might have justified his belief that a bill was required, the 
proposals he advocated after May 1926 were based on his early conclusions. There ‘was a 
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clear line of continuity running from Hogg’s memorandum of October 1925, through... to the 
Act of 1927’.192 The legislation was not just a reaction to the General Strike. 
A week after the strike collapsed, a cabinet sub-committee, the ‘Legislation 
Committee’, was appointed to consider trade union legislation. Cave, Churchill, Hogg and 
Steel-Maitland, the Minister of Labour, formed its ‘effective core’.193 Like Cave, Hogg 
suggested that legislation should be ‘introduced immediately’.194 As with his ‘Illegal Strikes 
Bill’, he wanted the legislation to outlaw general strikes, fulfil the government’s pledge to 
protect workers who had refused strike orders and make trade union officials and funds liable 
if a jury held that a strike had occurred for a ‘political or malicious end’.195 Unlike Cave, 
however, Hogg was concerned about the consequences of a reactionary course. He ‘doubt[ed] 
the wisdom’ of amending the political levy, warning that it would lay the government open to 
a considerable risk of misrepresentation.
196
 He advised against repealing Section 4 of the 
1913 Act which gave trade unions immunity against actions for tort. Although employers’ 
associations demanded its repeal, Hogg recognised that it was ‘too late merely to reverse’ as 
even moderate trade unionists regarded this clause as a ‘charter of protection’. Such a 
punitive step, he anticipated, would result in a future Labour government reversing the 
legislation. More broadly, it was 
important that the legislation which we introduce shall command the support of the 
great mass of public opinion, and that it shall not be capable of being represented as 
an attempt by the Conservative Party to use the present situation to exploit any 
political end.
197
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Despite Cave favouring action on both the political levy and Section 4, the committee 
initially followed Hogg’s advice. 
The sub-committee reported to the cabinet on 7 July, concluding that a bill should be 
introduced ‘while the memory of the strike was fresh in the public mind’.198 Although the 
cabinet accepted the report, it postponed legislation through requesting further inquiry into 
torts and picketing.
199
 In the interval, the committee drew upon suggestions from 
backbenchers, employers’ associations and the party in the country. Regrettably, trade unions 
were not consulted.
200
 These opinions proved ‘mutually contradictory’.201 Amid this 
uncertainty, Cave, seeking to reverse the Committee’s earlier conclusions, presented his own 
draft bill in November. It included the repeal of the 1906 Act, repeal of Section 4 of the 1913 
Act and reform of the political levy.
202
 Hogg, once again, argued against following such a 
course.  
Consistent with his remarks to the POC in 1925, he said that he objected ‘as strongly 
as anyone to the... Trade Disputes Act [1906]’, but the Attorney-General felt that  
the Act was regarded by all Trade Unionists as their Magna Charter [sic], and that any 
attempt to interfere with it... would rally moderate Trade Union opinion to the side of 
the extremists. [I]t would be politically unwise to attempt to repeal...
 203
  
On this issue, Hogg’s caution prevailed. Determined that the bill should be welcomed by 
moderate opinion, he carried his colleagues. Although Cave and Churchill dissented, the 
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committee concluded that ‘the political and other objections’ to repealing Section 4 
‘outweigh[ed] any advantage’.204 
The Attorney-General could not, however, resist pressure to reform the political levy. 
Cuthbert Headlam, MP for Barnard Castle, typified a broad swathe of Conservative opinion, 
when he explained to Churchill that ‘we must do something to stand up for our own people – 
unless we do so... we shall lose much of our “working man” support.’205 Churchill informed 
Hogg that a bill which did not modify the political levy would be regarded as ‘a farce’.206 But 
the latter noted the ‘extreme difficulty of finding out the real facts of working opinion’. He 
had met Sandeman Allen, Conservative MP for Liverpool West Derby, who reported that 
Lancashire’s workers ‘would bitterly resent’ any alteration to the political levy.207 Hogg 
disliked the system in which a worker had to ‘contract out’, but he was moved by the political 
effects of amending the law. Nevertheless, the majority of the committee backed Cave and 
the decision was settled in his favour in the cabinet.
208
 Despite Neville Chamberlain and 
Steel-Maitland joining Hogg in opposition, Baldwin, usually credited with being the main 
force for moderation, ‘was inclined to include it on grounds of political expediency’.209  
The constructive aspects of reform, as advocated by Hogg and Chamberlain, were 
largely excluded from the bill. The Attorney-General had called for the inclusion of 
compulsory strike ballots before strikes began, believing that a strike should not occur 
‘without the approval of the men affected by it’. He expected that this measure would be ‘a 
valuable safeguard’, noting that the only union which had held a ballot before the General 
Strike had recorded a majority of two to one against industrial action.
210
 But this proposal 
                                                 
204
 CAB 27/326, 3 Dec. 1926.  
205
 CAC, Churchill Papers, CHAR 21/51/45, Cuthbert Headlam to Churchill, 16 Feb. 1927. 
206
 CHAR 21/51/4, Churchill to Hogg, 22 Feb. 1927. 
207
 Ibid., Hogg to Churchill, 19 Feb. 1927. 
208
 CAB 27/326, 10 Nov. 1926; CAB 23/54, 30 March. 
209
 Chamberlain Diary, NC 2/22, 16 March 1927.  
210
 Hogg memorandum, 31 May 1926. 
75 
 
was dropped and the only minor change was the granting of free postage to unions that 
voluntarily adopted the scheme.
211
 Hogg had also desired to protect trade unionists from fear 
of expulsion and the loss of their financial contributions if they resisted future strikes.
212
 
Loathing the potential for workers to be subjected to unreasonable pressure, he noted the 
hypothetical case ‘of a trade unionist who having contributed for many years to the provident 
funds of his union is expelled for refusing to participate in a strike with the object of which he 
is not in sympathy’.213 He proposed that if workers were expelled from a union for refusing to 
strike, they ‘should be entitled to recover from the union the surrender value of their 
contributions’.214 Yet Section 2 of the final bill only permitted individuals to pursue the issue 
at their own expense. The contributions of non-strikers were protected only if a strike was 
declared illegal. But, although the bill lacked constructive clauses, Hogg’s participation was 
not futile. Without his moderating influence it would have contained more restrictive 
measures. 
In February, Baldwin was still arguing that ‘the draft Bill required further 
consideration’.215 Hogg, who had been keen to press ahead with legislation eight months 
earlier, was ‘indignant’ at the lack of progress. He had instructed Hankey, the cabinet 
secretary, ‘to call the P.M.’s attention to the position and say if the P.M. did not raise it at the 
cabinet he [Hogg] would’. After Chamberlain had also complained to Baldwin about the 
‘outrageous’ delay,216 the cabinet approved the final draft of the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Bill on 30 March 1927. 
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The bill was regarded by many Conservatives as the most important legislation passed 
by Baldwin’s second administration.217 With the Labour party vehemently against alteration 
of the existing situation, Cave anticipated that the Commons debate would be ‘a battle 
royal’.218 When the bill received its first reading in April 1927, Chamberlain judged that it 
‘had a very good reception from our party... who find it much stronger than they had 
expected’.219 The second reading was billed as the ‘greatest contest [the Government] have 
yet had to face’.220 Hogg was appointed the minister responsible for the bill in the Commons 
and was the first to face the Labour party’s onslaught. With considerable foresight, the Daily 
Express predicted that if he ‘acquits himself well... he will place himself in the running for 
the ultimate succession to Mr Baldwin’.221  
Hogg, making a strong case for the bill, opened the debate on 2 May. He began by 
outlining its four basic principles. The first maintained that a ‘general strike’, or any strike or 
lockout designed to coerce the government or inflict hardship on the community, was illegal 
and that no person should be deprived of union membership or their financial contributions if 
they refused to take part in an illegal strike. The second outlawed intimidation. The third 
substituted ‘contracting in’ for ‘contracting out’ to ensure that no one would be compelled to 
subscribe to the funds of a political party. The final stipulation held that, unlike the situation 
in 1926, the State should have ‘the loyal and undivided service’ of the Civil Service.222 Civil 
servants were not to be affiliated to trade unions of non-government employees and public 
authorities were prohibited from making it a condition of employment that workers must be 
trade union members.  
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Hogg also commenced an attack on the bill’s opponents, suggesting that much 
criticism was unjustified because the bill had been condemned even before the government’s 
plans were announced. This, he claimed, showed 
a complete misapprehension of the objects and effects of the Bill, so complete as to 
lead one almost to suspect that they may be the result of a preconceived determination 
to resist the Bill whatever it contains, rather than a considered disapproval of its 
terms.
223
 
Although Hogg had identified ‘a much more moderate section of Socialist and Labour 
opinion [that regarded]... the general strike is a tragic blunder, a menace to the community 
and a blow against the masses of our people which spells ruin to trades unionism’, he was 
disappointed that they were unwilling to admit ‘the unlawfulness of the policy which they 
regard as so foolish’.224  
Hogg challenged the assumption that the General Strike’s failure had shown the 
labour movement that its effects were exaggerated and would never again be utilised.
225
 The 
Attorney-General believed it would be irresponsible for the government to gamble that 
industrial peace would be secured because some labour leaders had apparently learned their 
lesson. He noted that  
it is not true to say that the Labour party or the TUC have declared that there shall be 
no General Strike again... The more responsible, the more thoughtful leaders may 
have said it, but there are numbers of others who take just the opposite view.
226
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Hogg quoted the Chairman of the Executive Council of the TUC who had claimed that ‘more 
intense and formidable’ general strikes were inevitable. Albert Purcell, the former President 
of the TUC and a sitting Labour MP, had also asserted that ‘The class struggle itself, the 
inexorable urge of economic forces, is going to create the conditions for other and more 
formidable general strikes’. Hogg could 
multiply quotations from numerous other prominent members of the party opposite... 
which show that... so far from the general strike being put aside as a weapon which 
will ruin trade unionism, which is a delusion and a madness and a menace to the State, 
it is regarded as one which they intend to use in the years to come. 
Granted the uncertainty surrounding the legality of the General Strike, he then claimed that if 
the government believed that it was ‘a wicked crime against the State’, it should be clear that 
it was illegal.
227
  
Herein, Hogg felt, lay the justification for outlawing ‘general strikes’. This was not 
legislating against trade unions under the guise of protecting the population. Despite claims 
that all sympathetic strikes would be illegal under the bill, Hogg insisted that such industrial 
action would remain ‘perfectly legal, so long as it is a strike directed against the employer 
and not against the Government or the community’.228 Although this was presented as a 
reasonable objective, critics pointed out that the government or the community could 
indirectly suffer at the hands of a strike aimed at an employer. This was one of a number of 
grey areas in the bill. It was difficult to ascertain when a strike would begin to have a wider 
impact.  
As regards intimidation, the Attorney-General made it clear that any picket could 
peacefully persuade any person to abstain from work. He could appeal to his sentiments or 
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use an argument addressed to his intellect. But Hogg realised how effective it could be to 
warn a worker ‘that if he dares to continue work his family... will be ostracised, his children’s 
lives will be made intolerable... and he himself will be driven out of work and hounded out on 
the street’.229 Despite his private misgivings about the reform of the political levy, he 
shrewdly pointed out that, on the one hand, Labour MPs claimed that substituting 
‘contracting in’ for ‘contracting out’ was unnecessary, because it was very easy to secure 
exemption. Yet, on the other hand, Opposition members declared that such a step would 
cripple the trade unions. This offered easy pickings for the Attorney-General: 
It cannot be true to say that nobody is at present subscribing except those who desire 
to subscribe, and, in the same breath, to say that if you limit the subscriptions to those 
who desire to subscribe, you will seriously diminish their funds... [T]hose who use 
methods of intimidation, or raise difficulties against their members, will no doubt be 
affected, and may be seriously affected. But... I can hardly suppose that the 
Parliamentary party which sits on the Opposition benches would desire to find 
themselves supported... [by] people who do not desire to pay them.
230
  
Notwithstanding the vagueness of some of the bill’s provisions, Hogg had constructed 
a compelling argument. The national press applauded his performance. The Daily Telegraph 
claimed that he had ‘achieved a rhetorical success of the first magnitude’.231 The Daily 
Mirror concluded that although Hogg faced 
a fierce and almost constant fire of interjections, unmannerly interruptions and shouts 
of mocking laughter... not once did he lose his self-control. Clear, direct, forceful, he 
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presented his case for the Bill in one of the most masterful speeches ever heard in the 
House.
232
  
Although the Liberal Manchester Guardian accused him of ‘a looseness of grip upon the 
subject matter’, it conceded that  
whatever may be said of the speech itself, at the end of it he stood before the House a 
stronger and more respected statesman through having under the severest ordeal 
maintained an example of parliamentary dignity and good manners.
233
    
Hogg’s composed delivery, consistent with the rhetoric of ‘New Conservatism’, was 
designed to imply that the bill was not a retaliatory attack on the trade unions. 
Hogg’s exposition of the bill met significant criticism from the Opposition.234 The 
Labour party’s response was obstructive and aggressive. Several Labour members were 
warned by the Speaker and the party was obliged to deny that the disturbances were pre-
arranged.
235
 Indicative of the violation of parliamentary rules was the contribution of Jack 
Jones. After being warned by the Speaker, Jones repeatedly interrupted Hogg and claimed 
that the Attorney-General was ‘a liar from the top of his head to the sole of his foot’.236 He 
described the Conservatives as a ‘Dirty lot of Dogs’ and branded the legislation as a ‘Hogg 
Bill and he [Hogg] is well named’.237 After the Speaker had instructed Jones to withdraw, he 
continued his insults as he left the chamber: ‘’Ogg’s yer name and ’ogg yer are, ’ogg ’ogg 
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’ogg – bloody pig’.238 In the debates that followed Baldwin and Worthington-Evans received 
similar, albeit less provocative, treatment. Hogg told his son:  
The only attempt to debate the Bill, as apart from denouncing it and barracking... was 
on Thursday when Snowden and Thomas both made good speeches, the former 
especially made the Socialists forget their inferiority complex... 
Anticipating that enacting the bill would prove to be a long battle, Hogg expected that ‘I shall 
have used all my strength in the next 2 months’.239 Three weeks later he noted:  
It’s been Trade Disputes all the way! The House was very good tempered on the 
whole and even hilarious at times. But of course there was no progress; and the 
Socialists delay divisions... and indulge in all the familiar tactics of obstruction.
240
 
The bill’s journey through its various stages continued until the end of July. A timetable and 
the guillotine were necessary after the Opposition tabled over two hundred wrecking 
amendments and resorted to disruptive tactics to hold up progress. 
With the parliamentary battle on-going, Hogg attempted to dispel misrepresentations 
of the bill in the country. He appeared on cinema newsreels and published a pamphlet to 
expound the bill’s merits.241 Responding to one Labour party pamphlet which claimed that 
‘practically all stoppages of work may be declared illegal’, he suggested that ‘the men who 
published it must have known they were lies when they did so’.242 This was not just public 
rhetoric. Although unsure about some of the bill’s provisions and disappointed that 
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constructive proposals had been omitted, the Attorney-General believed in its fundamental 
justice. When his son was about to debate the bill at the Oxford Union he advised him 
to concentrate mostly upon attack and on the four principles which the Socialists have 
never yet accepted or rejected, and on the necessity for legislation in view of the 
experience of last year and the declaration of so many Socialists that they intend to 
repeat the experiment.
243
 
If Hogg could justify the aims of the bill, criticism relating to its drafting was valid. It 
was for this reason that the Manchester Guardian claimed that his motives were ‘rather 
different from what he would have us believe’. One Labour MP similarly noted that the 
Attorney-General  
knows how to draft a bill, if he wants to draft it, so that the people who read it can 
understand it... I suggest that this bill in its drafting is quite deliberate for the purposes 
of making the trade unions a cote of pigeons for the lawyers to pluck.
244
 
While it is tempting to agree with these statements and conclude that certain clauses were 
deliberately vague to restrain trade union activities,
245
 the cabinet’s procrastination led to the 
last-minute cobbling together of the bill. Nobody knew until the last moment who would take 
charge of it, no minister was asked to look at the entire draft and no one was asked to accept 
or reject amendments.
246
 Furthermore, after Hogg had admitted the difficulty of finding 
suitable formulae in his 1925 memorandum, it is unsurprising that some found the bill’s 
wording unsatisfactory. When introducing it, he appealed to the Commons to assist with 
amending its phraseology, so long as its principles remained intact. Many amendments were 
                                                 
243
 HSLM 8/2/2, Hogg to Quintin Hogg, 14 June 1927. 
244
 Manchester Guardian, 6 May 1927; H of C Debs, vol.205, col.153. See also Thomas Jones Dairies vol.2, 2 
May 1927, p.99.  
245
 Anderson, ‘The Labour Laws’, p.39. 
246
 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, p.509. 
83 
 
accepted and one backbench Conservative recorded in June that the bill was ‘infinitely 
better... than when it was first introduced’.247 
It would not have surprised Hogg that the impact of the Act proved to be something of 
an anticlimax.
248
 He expected that the average trade unionist would find that it did not 
prohibit strikes, or cripple trade unions.
249
 Hogg had found that ‘the trade unionist did not 
object to the Bill if he was told what was in it’.250 He was confident that trade unions would 
‘soon learn by practical experience that any fears which may have been engendered by ill-
considered assertions of extremists are absolutely groundless’.251 Even critics admit that the 
Act’s effects ‘do not appear to have been great’ and that it was important only as a symbol.252 
It did not lead to court decisions unfavourable to organised labour, or radically weaken 
collective bargaining, and trade unions still enjoyed immunity from actions in tort.
253
  For the 
remainder of the inter-war period, Britain’s industrial relations were relatively peaceful. The 
Act’s main clause was never invoked.  
Nonetheless, in Labour demonology the Act was presented as an attack on the trade 
unions, ‘an outrageous assault’ upon the working class, and ‘a show of bad temper’ by the 
Conservatives.
254
 Historians have generally viewed it as a divergence from ‘New 
Conservatism’. Baldwin’s authorised biographer suggested that it marked the moment when 
‘the Disraelian make-believe rolled away like a morning mist’.255 Yet the bill was not a 
complete aberration from Baldwin’s or Hogg’s political vision and it was probably ‘the 
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minimum retribution’ acceptable to the cabinet and the Conservative party and ‘a good deal 
less draconian than some lobbies had wanted’.256 The rejection of a stronger line was, in fact, 
‘a typical product of Conservatism’.257 The Act had been inspired by earlier Liberal 
legislation and Hogg’s own consideration of the position of trade unions and the legality of 
strikes predated the General Strike. The events of May 1926 merely confirmed suspicions 
that trade unions could not responsibly exercise their power.  
Hogg stood fast to the legislation throughout the remainder of his career. When the 
second Labour government attempted to repeal it in 1931, he wrote a number of newspaper 
articles to expose the ‘manifest wickedness’ of this initiative.258 For Hogg the Trade Disputes 
Act defended the institutions which allowed democracy and freedom to flourish and he 
sincerely believed that it was ‘a right, a just, and a necessary measure’.259 When Attlee’s 
Labour administration repealed the entire Act following the Second World War, Hogg’s elder 
son mounted a spirited but unsuccessful opposition.
260
    
While the Trade Disputes Bill progressed through the Commons, Hogg supported the 
expulsion of the Soviet trade delegation from London and the termination of the Anglo-
Russian trade agreement in May 1927. In March he had investigated the Soviet Union’s 
suspected subversive campaign in Britain. He had informed the cabinet that documentation, 
supplied by the Foreign Secretary, that suggested Soviet interference in Britain’s domestic 
affairs, was authentic but could not ‘be produced in a court of law or published’.261 While this 
report might have persuaded Joynson-Hicks and the cabinet that action was necessary, Hogg 
was not intimately involved in the expulsion of the Soviet delegation. The Arcos Raid on 12 
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May confirmed the cabinet’s conviction that the Soviet delegation used its London trade 
mission as a cloak for disseminating hostile propaganda. Although a missing War Office 
document – the pretext for the raid – was not recovered, over 250,000 incriminating 
documents were found.
262
 For Hogg, enough was enough: 
There was a time when the self-respect of a great empire demanded that we should 
put an end to a hospitality which had been persistently abused, and that we should 
turn out people who had shown themselves to be enemies of the country with which 
they professed to be friends.
263
  
Although this may have seemed like surrender to the Tory right, who had unremittingly 
called for a severing of relations with Soviet Russia, Hogg believed that the government had 
acted in spite of his party’s right-wing. Highlighting the government’s moderate vision, he 
told his son that: 
With all the Bolshie intrigues and wickedness it takes a little cool thinking to see that 
this expulsion is not the logical sequence to that indignation... We all have our die-
hards and extremists but... [the] difference between us and the Socialists is that we act 
in spite of our extremists (Soviet expulsion and Electricity Bill) and they always give 
in to theirs (Campbell prosecution and Russian Treaty).
264
  
Hogg made his final appearance on the floor of the Commons in March 1928 and 
enjoyed another personal triumph after the Labour party requested an enquiry into the 
publication of the Zinoviev letter.
265
 Ramsay MacDonald alleged that his party had been the 
victim of ‘political fraud’ after the letter was leaked from the Foreign Office and printed in 
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the Daily Mail ahead of the 1924 General Election.
266
 Hogg wound up the debate on behalf of 
the government and turned the Opposition’s case on its head. MacDonald’s sincerity rather 
than that of the civil service came under scrutiny. The Attorney-General repeatedly asked the 
Labour leader when he had intended to publish the letter and, in the process, implied that 
MacDonald had deliberately meant to withhold it until after the election. Hogg reminded the 
Commons that ‘fraud does not consist only in misstatement of fact but equally in the 
concealment of it’. He then pointed out that if Labour had been returned in 1924, the Russian 
Treaty, which included a £44 million loan to the Soviet Union, would have been ratified. 
Hogg suggested that the Zinoviev letter confirmed ‘the danger which we had been pointing 
out... that this Russian Government... were going to use this money to produce a revolution in 
this country’.267 Although MacDonald’s hostile motion was doomed to failure, Hogg 
‘pounded Ramsay to a jelly’.268 The Liberal MP, Leslie Hore-Belisha, claimed that Hogg had 
made ‘one of the most terrific onslaughts in recent memory’.269 Even Lord Irwin, the Viceroy 
of India stationed in Delhi, recognised that 
The Labour Party must surely have had a thoroughly humiliating day on the Zinoviev 
letter. I couldn’t help feeling sorry for Ramsay, first for having allowed himself to be 
pushed into asking for the debate... and, in the second place, at his merciless battering 
by Douglas Hogg.
270
 
Hogg’s vigorous advocacy of the Conservative cause assisted his continued rise through the 
party’s ranks. The venomous and confrontational nature of many of his attacks, however, 
often hid his moderate vision while providing apparent evidence that he was a figure of the 
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extreme right. This conflicted with his contributions to government policy made in the 
cabinet and its sub-committees.  
Heir not Apparent 
The day after Hogg’s fifty-fifth birthday the Daily Mirror noted that he had ‘made 
good in astonishing fashion’. He had established himself as one of the government’s best 
debaters, while the Labour Opposition lived in fear of his ‘remorseless analytical logic’.271 
Although he had never occupied a major office of state and had spent less than five years in 
parliament, the Daily Express recognised that he had become a leading Conservative 
figure.
272
 Neville Chamberlain had already characterised Hogg as ‘one of the best, straight & 
loyal and possessed of a wonderful brain. Moreover he is a first class fighting man.’273 Hogg 
was beginning to be seen as a possible future leader of the Conservative party. 
During 1926 and 1927, Neville Chamberlain, in a series of revealing letters to Lord 
Irwin, considered who might succeed Baldwin. In August 1926, Hogg was not listed amongst 
the potential heirs. What was notable, however, was Chamberlain’s dismissal of the potential 
candidates.
274
 Except for one crucial difference, by August 1927 the position of possible 
successors was unchanged. ‘Winston’s admirers still distrust his judgement’, Austen 
Chamberlain, Neville’s half brother, was now ‘an elder statesman’ with no ambitions for the 
Premiership, Birkenhead lacked ‘the sense of responsibility’, Amery ‘carries less and less 
weight in cabinet’, ‘Jix is not taken seriously’, Steel-Maitland ‘begins to emerge as first and 
foremost a bore’ and Philip Cunliffe-Lister ‘does not go down very well in the House’ and it 
seemed likely that he would accept a peerage and retire to his wife’s estate. Unlike his letters 
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of 1926, Chamberlain provided an assessment of the Attorney-General. He had ‘the greatest 
possible respect for Hogg’s opinion’, noting that his colleague  
had charge of the TU Bill and carried it with consummate skill, tact and firmness. But 
besides the addition he thereby made to his parliamentary reputation, he has become 
one of the most influential Members of the Cabinet by sheer force of character... 
People are beginning to talk of him as a possible leader in the future, and so far as I 
am concerned, I believe he would make a great one.
275
 
In September 1927 Baldwin confirmed Chamberlain’s impression of likely heirs, noting that 
‘the best men are Neville and Hogg, and I think on the whole the second would be chosen. He 
needs more political experience, but he is first rate and stuffed with character.’276 After a 
spectacular rise, Hogg was in the running to succeed Baldwin. 
Yet in March 1928, ill-health forced the retirement of Viscount Cave from the Lord 
Chancellorship and Hogg was promoted to the highest legal position in the land. This 
necessitated a peerage and a seat in the Lords as the Lord Chancellor acted as Speaker in the 
upper house. Once Hogg was banished to the unelected chamber, his chances of becoming 
Conservative leader were considerably reduced. Bearing in mind Baldwin’s recognition that 
Hogg would probably succeed him, Dilks describes the Prime Minister’s decision to send him 
to the Lords as ‘mysterious’.277 While it was not impossible for a peer to lead a political party 
in the inter-war era, a peerage was a significant handicap in an age of mass democracy.
278
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The change was one Hogg and prominent Conservatives viewed without enthusiasm. 
When it seemed probable that the fifty-seven year-old would be asked to succeed Cave, he 
confessed to the outgoing Lord Chancellor: 
Whoever has to take your place will have a very difficult task to live up to it. For 
myself I have a selfish cause of regret in being compelled to face up to a decision 
which I was most unwilling to take... Everyone wants to see you back again and no 
one more than me.
279
  
When it was clear that Cave would resign, Baldwin ‘sent at once for Douglas and told him he 
wanted him to take the Woolsack’. The Prime Minister pressed upon Hogg the importance of 
taking the position, pointing to the lack of suitable alternatives. Hogg approached 
Chamberlain, ‘saying that quite certainly he did not want to leave the Commons now’.280 In 
‘considerable distress of mind’, the Attorney-General confessed that ‘only now that I am face 
to face with the decision have I fully realised that I don’t want to take the Woolsack’. The 
‘real difficulty’ was his fear that a peerage would end his claim to the Premiership. This did 
not concern him from the perspective of personal ambition. ‘I don’t know that I have any 
ambition that way’, he insisted, but ‘I don’t want to see W. Churchill Prime Minister. I have 
the greatest respect for his brilliant abilities but none for his judgment.’281 Hogg, however, 
feared ‘that his desire not to shirk his duty’ meant that ‘he might have already committed 
himself’.282 
Chamberlain was ‘deeply distressed’ and sought to prevent Hogg’s accession to the 
Woolsack.
283
 He was ‘filled with consternation at the news, for I regarded it as a disaster for 
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the party if D.H. had gone to the Lords’. He planned to tell the Prime Minister that 
Birkenhead, the India Secretary, should return to the Lord Chancellorship. As he informed 
Irwin:  
I went at once to search for the Prime Minister but he had left the House, and I had to 
leave it over till next morning when there was a cabinet. I arrived a minute early 
meaning to tackle the Prime Minister at once, but Douglas, looking very miserable, 
told me it was too late.
284
    
At the cabinet meeting on 28 March the new law officers were announced and Hogg 
became Lord Chancellor. When Chamberlain finally met Baldwin, the latter insisted that 
Hogg’s promotion was ‘inevitable’. He could not appoint the erratic Birkenhead for fear that 
the latter ‘might be found drunk in the street’. A despondent Chamberlain noted: ‘It is 
lamentable. I wonder what Winston thinks? “One more obstacle removed?”’ Chamberlain 
judged Hogg’s apparent exclusion from the leadership ‘a real calamity’.285 The new Lord 
Chancellor was ‘the best man we have for such a position’ and the man ‘who might well 
stand between us and a Churchillian domination’.286 The Minister of Health was aghast that 
S.B. did not consider the fortunes of the party to be so dependent on D.H as I did and 
do. I think he has all the qualities of a great leader and with him available there would 
have been no question of a possibility which he and I both consider very dangerous 
viz the acceptance of Winston as leader.
287
 
Hogg’s position in the party had become so important that prominent Conservatives 
overseas were shocked at these developments. Lord Stonehaven, Governor General of 
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Australia, deplored Hogg’s removal from the Commons,288 while Irwin informed Baldwin 
that he  
was much surprised to see Hogg had taken [Cave’s] place. Somehow I had plotted 
Hogg’s course out differently, but no doubt a layman is always apt to underestimate 
the magnetic attraction to a lawyer of the highest professional prize.
289
  
The Viceroy had sent a similar message to Neville Chamberlain.
290
 The latter’s reply, 
however, got to the root of Hogg’s transfer:   
[Y]ou are mistaken in thinking that Douglas Hogg was tempted out of politically 
active life by the glitter of the Lord Chancellorship. No doubt he was dazzled by it 
and indeed wanted it – some day. But when the moment came he realised that it 
meant the sacrifice of his chance of succeeding S.B. and he had no doubt which of the 
two courses had most attraction for him. The whole thing was really a tragedy.
 291
   
Hogg’s acceptance was motivated by loyalty to his leader and the Conservative party and by 
a sense of duty – principles that he held throughout his political career. ‘I have no doubt’, his 
elder son recalled, ‘my father genuinely believed that it was his patriotic duty to accept the 
Woolsack.’292  
Hogg received his peerage for the newly created barony of Hailsham and took his 
place in the Lords.
293
 He felt that he had been ‘unduly hurtled by the P.M. who never gave 
him a second chance and consulted no one’.294 Baldwin had lined up the Attorney-General on 
25 March. ‘I am pretty sure it will be Hogg’, he wrote to the dying Cave, ‘He would carry on 
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your great tradition.’295 The Prime Minister then appointed Inskip as Attorney-General before 
Hogg had accepted the Woolsack, which left the latter with little choice but to accept.
296
 
Hogg found it difficult to hide his disappointment, noting that ‘my thoughts are rather of the 
past than of the present; but the office is a very great one and I shall have to do my very best 
to justify the confidence of my friends’.297 This move also ended his practice at the Bar. He 
lamented: ‘I liked the House of Commons and the Bar, and I felt that I understood and was 
understood by them both. But in the end there seemed no alternative choice.’298  
But, despite occupying the most senior legal position in the land, this was not the end 
of Hailsham’s political calling. As Attorney-General, he had been unusually politically-
focused and, after his promotion, he hoped to continue in like vein. Speaking at the by-
election necessitated by his elevation to the Lords, he insisted that he would continue to play 
a political role. When asked ‘Is it etiquette for a Lord Chancellor to take part in party 
politics?’ Hailsham replied ‘Most Certainly. The Lord Chancellor is a member of the cabinet, 
and in every election that I can remember... has been as active as his abilities allowed.’299 
Hailsham duly retained his membership of cabinet sub-committees that shaped government 
policy,
300
 continued to give ‘priority to political duties’ and made significant contributions to 
British politics over the next decade.
301
  
Granted Hailsham’s prominent role in Baldwin’s constructive brand of Conservatism, 
it was fitting that his first major contribution in the upper chamber came during debates on 
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the Equal Franchise Bill in May 1928. This measure extended the franchise to women aged 
21 and over on the same conditions that men enjoyed. Although the Commons passed the bill 
by 377 votes to 10, the ‘flapper vote’ met determined opposition from members of the Lords. 
This derived from uncertainty regarding the impact that the bill would have on future election 
results. Many contemporaries mistakenly feared that it would act in the Labour party’s 
favour.
302
 Six months earlier Hailsham had admitted that  
Equal Franchise is an experiment... Whether or not it will be a success depends on the 
spirit in which the vote is exercised. If the elector in the future regards the vote as a 
means of getting some selfish advantage... then indeed the state will be in grave 
danger. But if the vote was regarded as a responsibility, if the voter trained himself or 
herself to study political problems with a single eye to the welfare of the State, then 
the extension of the franchise would raise the whole standard of the people.
303
  
In the Conservative-dominated upper chamber with its strong reactionary component, 
Hailsham largely dropped the confrontational tone that he had displayed in the Commons and 
adopted a conciliatory style, attempting to convince the second chamber of the merits of 
progressive policies rather than attacking the Opposition. Moving the second reading of the 
Equal Franchise Bill, he claimed that it ‘ought not to require any lengthy argument to support 
its justice’. The debate in the Commons, Hailsham observed, had found not ‘ten just men but 
just ten men’ who had registered their opposition.304 
The Lord Chancellor maintained that it was wrong to deny women the franchise ‘by 
reason of their sex alone’. To arguments that the bill would give the vote to more women than 
men, Hailsham found that this was not ‘a ground for depriving women of the same vote’. He 
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dismissed charges that the bill would have disastrous effects upon the fortunes of the 
Conservative party, and ‘utterly decline[d] to discuss this question from the point of view of 
Party expediency’. The issue went beyond party politics. Throughout his political career 
Hailsham believed that past pledges, however inconvenient, must be honoured. A pledge to 
women had been given and he expressed the government’s determination  
to carry out the administration of the country according to the principles which we 
hold and which those who returned us share, and we should regard it as nothing less 
than a betrayal of the national trust if we were to use that power to carry out some sort 
of gerrymandering of the Constitution so as to ensure a permanent political 
ascendency for the particular side to which we belong.
305
 
This was ‘New Conservatism’ and governing in the national interest in action. Hailsham had 
the rhetoric to match. He rejected the notion that the extended franchise depreciated the 
quality of the electorate, noting that since universal male suffrage began in 1918, the 
Conservatives had always polled the largest vote.
306
  
During the bill’s passage, Hailsham helped reject ‘a gallant but unsuccessful’ 
amendment proposed by Lord Newton.
307
 This proposal was intended to increase the voting 
age for men and women to 25 without disenfranchising men aged between 21 and 24 who 
already had the vote. Lords Sumner, Gainford and Halsbury spoke in support of the 
amendment. Hailsham felt the proposal would deny ‘the country something which every 
Party in the State desires’.308 He pointed to the amendment’s regressive nature, since men 
expecting to receive the vote at 21 would be denied it for another four years. The Lord 
Chancellor then made a decisive point, appealing to the imperialist instincts of Conservative 
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peers. The voting age, regardless of other qualifications, had always been 21 across the 
English-speaking world.
309
 Newton’s plan, therefore, would be out of step with the rest of the 
Empire. The government avoided embarrassment and the amendment was defeated by 87 
votes to 41. 
During the summer recess Hailsham’s continued political role was clear when he 
accepted responsibility to lead Britain’s ‘Empire Parliamentary Delegation’ to Canada to 
consider Empire trade, economic development and migration.
310
 Yet, almost as soon as 
Hailsham’s trip across the Atlantic was announced, it was cancelled. Baldwin, longing for a 
summer vacation, wanted Hailsham to act as Prime Minister in his absence. He informed the 
Lord Chancellor that ‘There is nothing I dislike more than putting a friend to such 
inconvenience and causing him such disappointment... But I must ask you to give up your 
visit to Canada and act as my deputy’. Austen Chamberlain, who had deputised for Baldwin 
before, was ill and the Prime Minister noted that ‘for obvious though different reasons’, 
Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Joynson-Hicks, the Home Secretary, were 
both unsuitable. Baldwin had advised the King that Hailsham was the only man for the job. 
When the Prime Minister told Hailsham that ‘it is clearly your duty to your country’, the Lord 
Chancellor had no option but to accept.
311
 Baldwin expected that no problems would arise in 
his absence, but he told Hailsham that if it was ‘necessary to call ministers together, you will 
act’.312 While the Lord Chancellor was a surprise choice, his nomination was welcomed.313  
During Baldwin’s absence Hailsham visited 10 Downing Street ‘to see what it was 
like there as P.M.’ and remained in contact with his colleagues. He spent one day at Newick 
Park with Joynson-Hicks and, ‘in order to preserve the balance of the cabinet’, he enjoyed ‘a 
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very pleasant evening with Winston’.314 Baldwin observed ‘how delicate and diplomatic your 
calls [were] on Jix and Winston!’315 Although the summer passed without incident, this 
appointment was significant for three reasons. First, Hailsham had reached the necessary 
standing to act in Baldwin’s absence after less than six years in politics. This was a signal 
achievement. Second, it emphasised his continuing political role. Third, by appointing 
Hailsham, Baldwin had avoided promoting the leadership claims of either Churchill or 
Joynson-Hicks.
316
  
Before the Conservatives were swept out of power by the General Election of May 
1929, Hailsham continued to make political interventions, advising Neville Chamberlain on 
the Local Government Bill. This was the government’s main piece of legislation for 1929, 
designed to improve state relief and remove inefficiencies in local government.
317
 Granted 
the enormity of the proposed legislation, Hailsham suggested that Chamberlain should ‘lay 
down any principles as he had done with the Trade Disputes Bill’. The Minister of Health 
accepted Hailsham’s advice which he spelt out ‘in the five main defects of Local 
Government’.318 Chamberlain’s presentation of this complicated bill is regarded as one of his 
finest parliamentary performances.
319
 In the Lords, Hailsham argued that the bill would 
improve the efficiency of the social services and, by removing ‘injustices which have pressed 
too long upon productive industry’, it would ‘do more to cure unemployment than any... 
wild-cat schemes’.320 This was yet another example of his support for non-socialist 
constructive reform. 
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With the parliament coming to an end, the Lord Chancellor, following precedent, 
chaired the Conservatives’ Emergency Business Committee [EBC] that included his fellow 
cabinet ministers Joynson-Hicks, Salisbury, Worthington-Evans, Hoare and Cunliffe-Lister. 
This was belatedly established to draft the party’s manifesto for the forthcoming election and 
answer questionnaires from candidates during the campaign.
321
 Hailsham also crafted the 
introduction to Baldwin’s election address. In typically temperate tones, this held that the 
Government had 
fulfilled pledges given in 1924, to an extent which no government has equalled, and 
as a result... the Empire is more firmly united, the prestige of the country stands 
higher, the prosperity and welfare of our people is greater than ever before.
322
     
Although the Conservatives ultimately lost the election, Hailsham’s committee performed as 
well as circumstances permitted and he would again fill this role during the 1931 and 1935 
election campaigns. From its inception just five weeks before polling day, the EBC faced a 
difficult task.
323
 Samuel Hoare, the Air Secretary, blamed Baldwin for his lack of initiative 
which, he felt, played no small part in the election loss: ‘The Prime Minister in accordance 
with his practice left it almost entirely to his colleagues’. Hoare, alluding to the EBC, 
continued: 
You cannot draw up a political manifesto in a committee and all that can be said of 
our manifesto is that it was better than might have been expected... [O]ur whole 
campaign lacked the effect of concrete proposals...
324
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In less than 24 hours, Hailsham and Davidson, the Party Chairman, ‘pulled together’ the 
‘rather haphazard’ efforts of various ministers to formulate the manifesto which was then 
presented to other ministers for inspection. Although Baldwin had not attended a single EBC 
meeting, the cabinet accepted the manifesto after some minor revisions. This ‘demonstrated a 
total lack of preparation for the election during five years of power’.325 
The election produced a hung parliament. The increased number of Liberal candidates 
in comparison to 1924 split the anti-socialist vote and facilitated the return of more Labour 
candidates. Although the Conservatives polled more votes than their opponents, Labour 
became the largest party in the Commons for the first time. As news of Conservative losses 
filtered through, Hailsham told Baldwin that his ‘splendid fight all through the election’ had 
‘set us all an example’. He assured his leader that the result would have been worse without 
‘the quiet confidence you inspire in the people’.326 Nevertheless, Hailsham was disappointed 
to lose office. He received a viscountcy in the King’s birthday honours, but noted that ‘I 
should have been better pleased if I had not become a Viscount and stayed as Lord 
Chancellor’.327 Neville Chamberlain was less sympathetic towards his leader. The election, 
he noted, ‘has come and gone in disaster’: 
S.B. dallied so long with reconstruction [of the cabinet] that it never came... [H]e 
lacks the qualities of a leader in that he has no power of rapid decision and 
consequently no initiative.
328
 
The defeat marked Baldwin’s second rejection by the electorate. The prominence of 
his name in the campaign had obvious ramifications when his party lost 140 seats. 
‘Conservative faith in the “Baldwin legend” was shaken, and his leadership... became highly 
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vulnerable.’329 The defeat ‘heralded almost two years of stress, diminishing confidence, and 
apparent failure’.330 The Conservative leader found the task of opposition ‘constitutionally 
repugnant’ and the vigour he had shown during the campaign quickly evaporated.331 
Baldwin’s opposition leadership discouraged Conservatives throughout the country and 
Hailsham became increasingly frustrated. While the political outlook of the two men 
remained fundamentally united, Hailsham’s conduct in opposition and treatment of the 
minority Labour government was far removed from Baldwin’s conciliatory style. The first 
difference concerned the timing of the resignation of the outgoing government. Hailsham, 
seeking to repeat the tactic of January 1924, ‘felt very strongly that we should meet the 
House of Commons and leave it to the Liberals to turn us out’.332 Parliamentary arithmetic 
did not demand that the Conservatives relinquish office but Baldwin decided that the 
government should resign before parliament met. 
General unease over Baldwin’s leadership and discontent over the election result were 
compounded by the press barons’ damaging attacks. Speculation about who should succeed 
Baldwin was soon rife and in a field of four possible successors, Hailsham, notwithstanding 
his peerage, had remained in the political frontline and continued to be considered as a 
potential successor. Without an obvious replacement in the Commons, Baldwin’s successor 
could have been found in the Lords. Of the four candidates, Churchill aroused much 
opposition because of his coalitionist past and his supposed erratic judgement. His continuing 
commitment to free trade left him at odds with the party’s growing support for tariff reform. 
Robert Horne, the former Chancellor, derived strength from his ‘City’ connections, but had 
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lost his seat in 1922 and did not promote his claims.
333
 That left Hailsham and Neville 
Chamberlain as the front-runners. Once Chamberlain became party chairman in June 1930, 
however, he was in no position to succeed Baldwin, leaving Hailsham the man most likely to 
become Conservative leader if Baldwin fell – which was not unlikely in late 1930 and early 
1931. Hailsham’s strength emanated from his ability to appeal to both the centre-right of the 
party and the diehards. These sections of the party were encouraged by his vigorous attacks 
on the Labour government, his past record of upholding the majesty of the law and defending 
the constitution and his public support for tariff reform.  
Baldwin’s fortunes ebbed and flowed during the lifetime of the Labour government, 
but his position was never secure until after the spring of 1931. By contrast, Hailsham 
thrived. After returning from a tour of the Far East and India during late 1929 and early 1930, 
he provided a foretaste of the sort of opposition leadership he might offer. When the slump in 
the West Indian sugar trade was debated in the Lords in March 1930, Hailsham attacked the 
government for refusing to act. Having a firm grasp of the subject matter as a former overseer 
to a sugar planter in Demerara, he claimed that ‘the cause of the disaster is due to tariff action 
and can only be met by tariff means’.334 He was also active in the country, telling a meeting 
in Bradford in May 1930 that ‘no government in history had made so many mistakes in such 
a short time’. He again associated himself with the party’s newfound enthusiasm for 
protectionism by declaring that he had always been a convinced tariff reformer.
335
 In May 
and June he attacked the government’s imperial policy or, as he claimed, its complete lack of 
one.
336
 Hailsham offered a dynamic example for Baldwin to follow, but the latter seemed 
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reluctant to respond. Baldwin’s failure to elevate the importance of ‘Empire trade’ and 
protectionism during his public speeches in May ended the party’s truce with Beaverbrook.337  
By the autumn of 1930, lack of confidence in Baldwin’s leadership was widespread. 
The ‘grass-roots of the party were within a hair’s breadth of breaking out into open revolt and 
the control of the leader and Central Office was on the brink of complete collapse’.338 The 
press barons’ campaign continued and their sponsorship of candidates at by-elections against 
official Conservatives resumed after a failed rapprochement in the summer between 
Chamberlain and Beaverbrook. The pressmen opposed Baldwin’s acceptance of Labour’s 
policy toward Indian constitutional reform and his failure to embrace their policy of ‘Empire 
Free Trade’. But, on 8 October, during the Imperial Conference in London, Baldwin was 
thrown an unexpected lifeline. Richard Bennett, the Canadian Prime Minister, declared that 
he was willing to begin a preferential trading system throughout the Empire.
339
 As one 
Conservative MP penned to Baldwin, this ‘provide[s] us with a happy issue out of all our 
party afflictions’.340 It allowed the Conservatives to accept the principle of imperial 
preference without surrendering to the press barons’ Empire Crusade.341 Yet this did not end 
the disquiet over Baldwin’s leadership.342 Tory diehards forced a vote of confidence at the 
Caxton Hall meeting on 30 October and only days before this meeting Lord Derby, the 
veteran weather-vane of the party’s mood, told Baldwin that he should resign.343  
At the Caxton Hall Baldwin presented the ‘free hand’ policy to introduce tariffs after 
the next election. This was quickly adopted. When the meeting moved on to the question of 
the leadership, Baldwin withdrew, leaving Hailsham as his chief defender. Confronting a 
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group of determined diehards which included his own stepson, Edward Marjoribanks, he 
frankly admitted to the assembled MPs, peers and candidates that there would be drawbacks 
if Baldwin remained leader. The party would ‘continue to face the unremitting hostility of a 
very powerful press’, and he conceded that ‘Mr Baldwin is not a spectacular leader in 
opposition’. But Hailsham questioned whether there was a better man in waiting and 
concluded his defence amid cheers: ‘Unless you are prepared to choose a leader who will 
take his orders from the owners of this press you are no better off – you will have the same 
vendetta against the new man.’344 Even Baldwin’s opponents conceded that Hailsham had 
made a brilliant speech.
345
 To revealing cries that he rather than Baldwin should lead, 
Hailsham replied emphatically ‘No.’346 The meeting voted 462 to 116 in Baldwin’s favour. 
Yet, underlying problems persisted. That same day the official Conservative candidate was 
beaten by a Beaverbrook-Rothermere ‘Empire Crusader’ in the South Paddington by-
election.   
With the Labour government failing to respond to Bennett’s initiative at the Imperial 
Conference and with the Conservatives’ ‘free-hand’ policy in place, Hailsham was given the 
opportunity to mount another attack. In December he moved a resolution in the Lords 
deploring the government’s refusal ‘to respond to the advances made by the Prime Ministers 
of the Dominions’. The government had ‘thrown aside... a golden opportunity of improving 
the markets for British manufacturers’.347 He delivered the sort of denunciation that was 
lacking from Baldwin in the Commons: 
Dominion Premiers had come thousands of miles to attend this Conference… in the 
hope of carrying forward some practical step for the closer economic association of 
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the Empire. That... they went back disappointed and disillusioned, is due to one thing 
only – that is, to the obstinacy, to the lack of vision and to the lack of preparation by 
the government.
348
  
If the recovery in Baldwin’s fortunes should prove only temporary, Hailsham was 
inadvertently advertising himself as the Conservative leader’s replacement.  
In the absence through ill-health of Lord Salisbury, the Conservative Leader in the 
Lords, Hailsham stepped in as his temporary replacement in December 1930. In this new 
role, his belief in the innate value of the upper chamber was revealed. He was willing to use 
the Lords’ residual powers to delay Commons’ legislation. With the government unlikely to 
survive for a full term, the Lords’ delaying power amounted, in practice, to a veto on 
legislation. With Hailsham at the helm, Conservative peers were ‘more prepared to insist 
upon their amendments, defying the Commons majority’.349 This contrasted with Baldwin’s 
sometimes supine leadership in the Commons.    
After the Christmas recess Hailsham resumed his attacks on the Labour 
administration. He berated the government’s unemployment record. After 20 months in office 
unemployment had doubled to reach ‘a figure which had never been reached in the history of 
this country’. ‘We know now’, he claimed, ‘that any socialist party, which claims to be able 
to deal immediately and drastically with unemployment is making a claim which it knows to 
be false.’350 Days later the government’s Education Bill was considered by the Lords. 
Hailsham opposed the bill, informing the incapacitated Salisbury that ‘We are all for 
throwing it out on the 2
nd
 reading’.351 In the Lords, Hailsham, the son of the founder of the 
Polytechnic, explained that he disagreed with the bill, ‘not because I have not sympathy with 
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the average or under-average child’, but because the bill did not consider ‘the education of 
the average or under-average child in the right way’. He claimed that 
to keep everybody in school until the age of fifteen, whether they are learning 
anything or not, or capable of learning or not, is a mistaken view of education. You do 
not improve the education of the whole, but you hinder the education of those who 
can take advantage of it.
352
 
The bill was rejected by a majority of 146, triggering the resignation of Charles Trevelyan, 
the President of the Board of Education.
353
  
While Hailsham continued to enjoy parliamentary success, confidence in Baldwin’s 
leadership approached a new nadir in early 1931. While this latest crisis was not entrenched 
in the local Conservative associations as in the previous October, it was arguably more 
serious because ‘party managers had turned against [Baldwin] and... collective leadership had 
cracked’.354 When another Beaverbrook-Rothermere nominee intervened at a by-election held 
at East-Islington in February, Hailsham, who had a long-term distrust of what he regarded as 
the unconstitutional powers of the press,
355
 again defended his leader. In ‘one of the most 
vicious attacks... that has ever been made in British political history’, he informed an 
audience at East-Islington that 
Lord Beaverbrook... is compared to an elephant trumpeting in the jungle, or a man-
eating tiger. I am inclined to compare him to a mad dog running along the streets and 
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yapping and barking, and would remind his lordship that the best way to treat a mad 
dog if you can’t muzzle him is to shoot him.356  
Notwithstanding Hailsham’s efforts, the by-election result was humiliating. The 
Beaverbrook-Rothermere candidate secured a larger vote than the official Conservative, 
while the split Conservative vote enabled the return of the Labour candidate. Baldwin was 
again vulnerable. Derby recorded the gravity of the situation: 
I am aghast at the feeling that there is with regard to Baldwin... There was always a 
certain amount of feeling last summer but it is nothing compared to what it is now... 
we shall never win the election under his leadership. He... has got absolutely no 
drive.
357
  
Neville Chamberlain confessed that ‘things were much worse than at the time of the Caxton 
Hall meeting... [with] a general feeling that the party could not win the [next] election with 
S.B. as leader’.358  
Who then could lead the Conservatives to victory? With Chamberlain trapped in an 
office that made it ‘impossible’ for him ‘to make any move’, consideration turned to 
extraordinary solutions. Following a conversation with the Tory peer, Lord Linlithgow, 
Chamberlain noted: 
I was one of those whose name was mentioned as his [Baldwin’s] successor but more 
and more [Linlithgow] found people turning to the idea that after all Hailsham might 
be the best man in spite of not being in the Commons... the difficulty about a peer as 
leader was more in opposition than in office. The duties of a P.M. were becoming so 
onerous that it was increasingly difficult for him to attend the House of Commons and 
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if he was going to have a deputy there was a good deal to be said for him not being a 
member himself.
359
  
Independently, Derby reached a similar conclusion. ‘Had it’, he asked the Party Chairman, 
ever been considered whether it would not be possible to have the Prime Minister in 
the House of Lords, giving him the power to speak in the House of Commons [?] It is 
done in France with I believe success. It frees the Prime Minister from all the petty 
details of House of Commons work and gives him time to see people and really think 
about policies. If this were agreed to surely all would accept Lord Hailsham as Prime 
Minister with some energetic person like yourself as leader in the House of 
Commons.
360
     
If Baldwin was forced to resign, Hailsham was now the leading candidate to succeed him. A 
‘choice for the peerage was not impossible’.361 
On 26 February Robert Topping, General Director at Central Office, sent 
Chamberlain a memorandum.
362
 This wounding communication stated that ‘in the interests of 
the party... the leader should consider his position’.363 Senior Conservatives eventually 
presented a toned-down version to Baldwin after the favoured Conservative candidate 
withdrew from the St George’s Westminster by-election rather than defend Baldwin’s 
leadership against another Beaverbrook-Rothermere opponent. Baldwin’s initial reaction was 
to ‘face the inevitable and resign’.364 Davidson, the former Party Chairman, noted: ‘he had 
definitely made up his mind to throw in his hand’.365 Chamberlain’s discussions with leading 
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Conservatives produced the same reaction. ‘Every one I think, except William Bridgeman, 
was of the opinion that S.B. would have to resign.’366 The Times had even prepared an article 
entitled ‘Mr Baldwin Withdraws’.367 After an eleventh-hour intervention by Bridgeman, 
however, Baldwin decided that he would continue as leader and fight St George’s himself or 
find another candidate.
368
  
Although Baldwin had been spurred into action, it appeared that his leadership was on 
borrowed time. Austen Chamberlain concluded that ‘unless there is a very early election, S.B. 
cannot stay the course & that the sooner he goes the better’.369 Neville Chamberlain had also 
decided that Baldwin would ‘probably not be able to remain leader much longer’.370 His 
solution to the succession was clearer than ever before: 
The party must have a leader to fight the Election and for that purpose I think both 
Houses must be brought in. I expect the Lords would like Hailsham. The Commons I 
am told are more inclined than for some time to listen to the idea of a leader in the 
other House although there is some slight misgiving about the soundness of 
Hailsham’s judgement, there is great admiration for his vigour and determination. If 
therefore S.B. does disappear there is a strongish possibility that the two Houses 
would unite in choosing Hailsham as leader.
371
  
Austen Chamberlain expressed doubts as to the practicality of a leader in the Lords with a 
deputy in the Commons,
372
 but his half-brother ‘did not take that view as final’. ‘It depended 
on the relations between the two men.’373 With Chamberlain bound to lead the Commons if 
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Hailsham succeeded, these relations were excellent.
374
 Hailsham agreed with Chamberlain’s 
plan that if Baldwin fell either man would serve under the other, but refuse office under 
Churchill. Hailsham, consistent with his thoughts in 1928, believed that a Churchillian 
leadership would be a ‘disaster’ and he regarded Horne, as a ‘second rater’. Chamberlain said 
that he ‘would like our partnership... to be something closer than the ordinary relations of 
colleagues and that if I for instance were leader I should consult him about everything’. 
Hailsham ‘expressed similar views’.375  
With Chamberlain ensnared by the party chairmanship, Hailsham was the leading 
candidate to succeed the floundering Baldwin.
376
 Philip Cunliffe-Lister, former President of 
the Board of Trade, believed that ‘a Hailsham-Chamberlain combination’ would be met with 
general approval.
377
 Geoffrey Ellis, who had been Chamberlain’s preferred successor to 
Davidson as Party Chairman, confirmed that ‘the Hailsham-N.C. combination is what the 
City would like and... no alternative would have a chance’.378 The former Deputy Chief 
Whip, Lord Bayford, was of the same mind: ‘The only possible suggestion... is that Hailsham 
should lead the party and Neville be leader in the House of Commons.’379 On-going 
difficulties over Baldwin’s leadership thus outweighed the inconveniences of a party leader 
and potential Prime Minister operating from the upper house.  
Yet against all expectations, Baldwin survived. His Commons speech on the Irwin-
Gandhi Pact on 12 March was ‘one of the greatest in his life’,380 while his indictment of the 
press barons for seeking ‘power without responsibility – the prerogative of the harlot 
throughout the ages’, has echoed down the years. Two days later the Baldwinite, Duff 
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Cooper, comfortably won the St George’s by-election and on 24 March Chamberlain 
negotiated an agreement with Beaverbrook and the press baron fell into line with the party 
leadership. Baldwin eventually stepped down at a time of his own choosing in 1937.  
The Conservative leader reacted to speculation concerning the succession by 
informing Chamberlain that ‘he was very angry with some of his colleagues, particularly 
Hailsham, who he’d believed had been plotting against him’. Baldwin was also ‘sore’ at the 
Party Chairman, which the latter found ‘difficult to stomach without resentment’.381 Granted 
the pact between Hailsham and Chamberlain, Baldwin’s biographers claim that his ‘anger at 
Hailsham was not therefore unjustified’. Williamson similarly concludes that Hailsham was 
guilty of ‘outright disloyalty’382 and Thorpe suggests that the former Lord Chancellor had 
‘plotted’ against Baldwin.383 But the evidence shows that Hailsham did not seek to dislodge 
Baldwin. Rather than an intrigue against the Conservative leader, the Hailsham-Chamberlain 
pact was a defensive arrangement to prevent Churchill grasping the party leadership. During 
the critical days in early March Hailsham ‘had not heard anything of what took place over the 
weekend... but he agreed with [Chamberlain] that in the circumstances we ought to consider 
what might happen if there were a change’.384 The two men reacted to but did not shape 
events and, as nearly all informed participants expected Baldwin to resign, it was prudent for 
the acting Conservative Leader in the Lords and the Party Chairman to consider their options. 
Although Ramsden notes that Hailsham ‘was not prominent in support of Baldwin’, 
Hailsham had in fact shielded his political chief throughout. In July 1930 he called from the 
public platform for party unity,
385
 in October he declared that ‘We cannot hope to beat the 
Socialists unless we are united amongst ourselves’, and he defended Baldwin at the Caxton 
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Hall.
386
 In February 1931 he attacked Beaverbrook, in Baldwin’s defence, at East Islington. 
Even as late as March he protested against the press barons’ ‘constant vilification and 
misrepresentation’ of Conservative leaders and for running rival candidates at by-elections 
that undermined party unity.
387
 Austen Chamberlain was bewildered when Baldwin informed 
the business committee that he felt he ‘had not been properly supported by Hailsham in 
particular & his other colleagues in general!’ Chamberlain concluded that ‘It is difficult to be 
patient’.388   
Williamson cites Hailsham’s apparent offer of the Conservative leadership in the 
Lords to Beaverbrook as an attempt to cultivate the press baron to help oust Baldwin. Yet this 
conclusion is also wide of the mark. It rests upon Beaverbrook’s boastful remark recorded in 
the diary of the journalist Bruce Lockhart months after Baldwin’s lowest ebb and it should 
not be taken seriously. Hailsham was in no position to make such an offer and Lockhart’s 
same diary entry maintains that Hailsham ‘wanted to be Lord Chancellor in the next 
government’ and, therefore, not Prime Minister or Conservative leader.389 With Hailsham 
reluctant to lead, it is an exaggeration to conclude that he tried to oust Baldwin, particularly 
granted his dismissal of Horne’s candidature and his belief that a Churchillian succession 
would be a disaster for the party. While Hailsham shared Beaverbrook’s desire to use tariffs 
to unite the empire, he was alienated by the press lord’s blatant disloyalty and apparent 
readiness to destroy the Conservative party in order to achieve his goals. In addition to 
attacking the press barons from the public platform in the spring, Hailsham informed 
Viscount Elibank in February that there could never be any unity of purpose between him and 
Beaverbrook:  
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I want to preserve the party which he seeks to destroy, there is plainly no common 
aim between us and I propose to continue to denounce him... much as it may 
displeasure our would-be press rulers.
390
  
Hailsham never actively sought the party leadership or the Premiership. Back in 1923 he had 
‘regard[ed] the office of Prime Minister as a responsibility rather than as a prize’.391 In March 
1931 his position was unchanged. Chamberlain noted that Hailsham ‘did not want to be 
leader [and] he could not imagine anyone desiring to take on such a load’.392 Hailsham 
himself wrote that ‘I have never coveted leadership – I shouldn’t be in the Lords now if I 
had’. He hoped that the Conservatives would soon return to power and that he would serve 
the party ‘in whatever capacity I would seem most useful’. He would only take the leadership 
‘if it were to appear that [the party] wanted me to lead’.393 He would dutifully accept such an 
appointment in the same spirit as he had accepted the Lord Chancellorship. The fact that 
Hailsham’s name was being linked with the succession to an apparently doomed leader 
scarcely amounts to an act of treachery. 
After Baldwin’s resurgence, talks amongst leading Conservatives did something to 
heal the breach in the party hierarchy.
394
 Hailsham noted ‘a very difficult and disagreeable 
talk in the business committee last week, but I think the air is cleared’.395 The Conservative 
leader, Chamberlain noted, ‘had a terrible bucketing from his colleagues... [B]ut he certainly 
means to carry on’.396 It seems that Hailsham was particularly vocal at this meeting which did 
nothing to remove Baldwin’s misplaced suspicions. By early June Hailsham sensed ‘that he 
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was out of favour with Baldwin, having demanded a more vigorous leadership in Baldwin’s 
presence’.397  
Following this meeting, Baldwin accepted that forthright attacks on the Labour 
government were now in step with public opinion. Encouraged by the likelihood that 
MacDonald’s government would soon fall, there was a closing of the Conservative ranks.398 
Baldwin’s improved performances in the Commons, the latest truce with Beaverbrook, the 
broad party consensus in favour of tariff reform and support for the party’s new programme 
solidified the leader’s position.399 This new atmosphere ‘of optimism and full-scale attack’ 
suited Hailsham and his most trenchant denunciations of the Labour government came after 
the Easter recess.
400
 He ‘threatened, obstructed and mutilated [legislation] on the ground that 
the Conservative peers were more representative of the electorate than the government’.401 
He maintained that the Lords were acting in the national interest against a dangerous minority 
government, which induced Liberal votes to pass bills through the lower chamber. The 
assaults upon Labour’s legislative programme even appeared to challenge the privileged 
prerogatives of the Commons.  
This new approach was clear in April 1931 when the Land Bill returned to the 
Commons in ‘a mutilated form’.402 The Lords, with vested interests in the land, naturally 
opposed a bill which they claimed set the foundations for state farming.
403
 Hailsham 
remained ‘anxious’ to help reduce the growing numbers of the unemployed, but he was not 
‘too sanguine of the future’ granted the government’s record. Following warnings regarding 
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Britain’s national finances from the Chancellor, Philip Snowden, Hailsham concluded that 
‘we have no right to allow unlimited experiments’.404 Controversy erupted after he asked the 
government ‘whether they will or will not advise the House of Commons to waive their 
Privilege’. This was seized upon by the government spokesman, who claimed this request 
was a challenge to the rights and privileges of the Commons.
405
 Lloyd George expected ‘one 
more big fight before [he] died... the land and Lords look[ed] likely to furnish it’.406 He hoped 
that Hailsham’s tactics would enable him to inflict another defeat on the upper chamber as in 
1911.  
Although Williamson suggests that Hailsham’s tactics amounted to ‘parliamentary 
brinkmanship’ and ‘attempted blackmail’,407 Hailsham dealt with the government’s measure 
with some circumspection. He informed the ailing Salisbury that he found himself in ‘a very 
difficult situation’:  
We are in some trouble over the Agricultural Land Bill. Our backbenchers want to 
reject it on 2 reading; but all the Commoners, Business Committee and the 
Agricultural Committee alike, beg us to pass the Second Reading and amend in 
committee.
408
 
Instead of throwing the bill out as his backbenchers desired, Hailsham requested an assurance 
that, if the peers passed the Second Reading, the Labour government would ask the 
Commons to consider the Lords’ amendments on their merits.409 The floundering government 
understandably seized the opportunity to gain political capital. Christopher Addison, the 
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Minister of Agriculture, claimed that Hailsham had called for the Commons to ‘forgo its own 
rights and privileges’,410 while Prime Minister MacDonald uttered a thinly veiled warning: 
Let the House of Lords do its worst… There is such a thing as a Parliament Act, and 
if there is not there is such a thing as an election. The House of Lords, like every other 
anachronistic institution in this country, must be subject to the will, desire and 
mandate of the electors.
411
  
Viscount Brentford, formerly William Joynson-Hicks, jumped to Hailsham’s defence. It was 
only after a ‘masterpiece of argument and conciliation’, that Hailsham ‘induced the Lords to 
waive their opinions and pass the Second Reading’.412 Hailsham himself noted that ‘all our 
backbenchers were breathing fire and slaughter to me from the tea room’. They wanted to 
throw out the bill entirely because they were ‘afraid of privilege points if we are to amend’.413  
In reply to Labour’s attempt to make the issue into one of constitutional principle, 
Hailsham boldly declared: ‘It is not a case of peers versus the people – it is a case of peers 
and the people against the socialists.’414 This was another example of his determination to use 
Britain’s constitution to resist socialism. The Lords, he insisted,  
will discharge [their] duty to the electors and the people of this country... This House 
does not desire to challenge the expressed will of the people. But to say that... it is 
bound to accept any measure which a minority government [puts forward]... is a 
perversion of the truth which I do not think will deceive the electors.
415
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It was his ‘misfortune to be one of the Peers’ but, he insisted, ‘I am not against the people’. 
The peers, he maintained, ‘are not and cannot of necessity be against the people’,  
so long as they remain part of the constitution of this country, [the Lords] are bound 
to discharge their duty when they see measures brought forward which the country 
has not asked for, the country does not want, and which have only passed the House 
of Commons by virtue of a discreditable bargain between two political parties.
416
 
Such active leadership during Salisbury’s absence ensured that Hailsham was his 
natural successor when the former finally stepped down in June 1931. Salisbury informed 
Baldwin that ‘Of my colleagues on the Front Bench [Hailsham] is best fitted for the job as I 
am certain you will agree’.417 Yet this was another position into which Hailsham grudgingly 
stepped. Without a hereditary connection, he was unsure whether he would be acceptable to 
the Conservative peers. When Salisbury confided that it was unlikely that he would return to 
his former role, Hailsham expressed his concerns: 
it would presumably be for S.B. to choose a successor; and I am by no means 
convinced that he would wish that person to be myself, or that I should be willing to 
accept responsibility. It is one thing to be working as your deputy, with the knowledge 
that I have you behind me... it is quite another matter to be recognised official leader 
of the party in our House, with all the responsibility which that involves for our own 
divisions and without the prestige and long hereditary tradition that you bring.
418
 
On the eve of his appointment Hailsham ‘didn’t want the post if it could be avoided’. With 
his eyes firmly on the Woolsack, he had informed Baldwin about ‘the importance of 
continuity in leadership and the undesirability of a Lord Chancellor as Leader [of the 
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Lords]’.419 Hailsham ‘pressed Baldwin so strongly that he agreed to leave it open over the 
weekend’. But an unauthorized announcement in the Daily Express on 15 June, which 
reported that Hailsham had succeeded Salisbury, forced a decision. As with his succession to 
the Woolsack in 1928, Hailsham was compelled to accept.
420
   
National Crisis 
While Baldwin clung to the Conservative leadership during 1930-31, MacDonald’s 
Labour government found itself increasingly incapable of dealing with Britain’s 
unemployment problem and the deteriorating balance of trade. This situation was 
compounded after the effects of the Wall Street Crash reached Europe. During 1931 gold 
drained out of the City of London and sterling became exposed. Uneasiness turned into panic 
when the May Report forecast a budget deficit of £120 million at the end of July.
421
 The 
resultant ‘flight from the pound’ and ensuing financial emergency had enormous political 
implications. The Bank of England understood that it could rescue sterling only with large 
credits from New York and Paris and these loans depended on the government producing a 
balanced budget. In order to achieve this end, the May Report called for a 20 per cent cut in 
unemployment benefit. With the Labour government unlikely to achieve the necessary 
economies, it became plausible that a ‘national’ coalition government might be formed to 
introduce and share the responsibility for implementing unpopular measures. Although many 
leading Conservatives remained hostile to the coalition solution, if the government could not 
agree on an economy package, such an expedient would prove ‘difficult to avoid’.422 
The speed and the severity of the crisis of mid-1931 shocked many contemporaries, 
but Hailsham was not entirely surprised that the emergency arrived. He had been amongst the 
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most vocal Conservatives in drawing attention to Britain’s deteriorating economic position. 
In October 1930, he highlighted the fragile state of Britain’s economy,423 and in February 
1931 he told the Lords that the government was exacerbating the situation by adding ‘an 
enormous amount of taxation’.424 He warned that ‘if the expenditure on the relief schemes is 
so heavy that it is going to result in throwing more people out of work than it brings into 
temporary employment... it is not even a palliative’.425 In March Hailsham claimed that, in 
order to prevent bankruptcy, ‘we have got to retrench, we have got to cut down’.426 In June, a 
month before the publication of the May Report, he referred to the growing cost of 
unemployment insurance and calculated that, if Britain was to maintain its financial stability, 
it was ‘essential... that the insurance fund should be put on a proper insurance basis’. He 
wanted to eradicate ‘those false and mischievous ideas... that the state ought to see that 
people who do not work are as well off as those who do’.427  
Granted Labour’s inability to tackle the economic crisis, Conservatives anticipated 
victory at the next election on the scale of 1924. Once John Simon had resigned the Liberal 
Whip in June 1931 and negotiations between his followers and the Conservatives began over 
an electoral pact, ‘All the indications suggested... that the Conservatives and their Simonite 
allies would win the following general election.’428 Yet, despite these positive omens, the 
publication of the May Report led to ‘much talk... about a National Government’. With 
Baldwin abroad, on 2 August Neville Chamberlain called together Austen Chamberlain, 
Cunliffe-Lister, Hailsham and Hoare. After ‘a long and useful discussion’, he noted that 
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‘None of us want a coalition... but we agreed it might be unavoidable though only on 
condition that tariffs were accepted.’429 
In the weeks that followed, MacDonald hoped to achieve all-party co-operation if his 
cabinet agreed to expenditure cuts. But Hailsham was hostile to such an approach. He feared 
that collaboration could lead to the Conservative party joining a coalition. Very publicly 
Hailsham sought to dampen such rumours. Although his party ‘would not try to make party 
capital out of the inevitable unpopularity which economy always entailed’,430 he ‘doubt[ed] 
whether it is our proper function to go any further than to offer the most sympathetic 
consideration to any scheme the government may bring forward’.431 A week before the 
Labour government resigned, Hailsham admitted that a ‘national’ government ‘was a 
valuable device when some situation of overwhelming emergency arose’, but he saw little 
hope for such an expedient ‘when the different sections were radically divided, not only as to 
the cause of our troubles, but as to the possible remedies for overcoming them’. His rhetoric 
was not geared to facilitate collaboration. Ignoring the external aspects of Britain’s 
predicament, he maintained that the crisis ‘was the direct, inevitable and logical result of 
having tried to start socialist legislation in this country’. The Conservatives had ‘pointed out 
that if the Socialist theories were wrong they must lead precisely to these disasters’.432 At this 
stage, Hailsham, with his pronounced anti-coalitionist views, hoped that the Labour 
government would implement the necessary economies before a general election was held. 
This, he expected, would see the Conservatives and their allies returned with a mandate to 
introduce tariff reform. 
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During the height of the crisis in mid-August Hailsham was not directly involved in 
the negotiations with the party leaders, but he adopted a supportive role. With the government 
unable to agree to an economic package, he now felt it was ‘more likely to go to the country 
against the May Report’. He offered Chamberlain, who acted for the Conservatives along 
with Hoare, his assistance: 
I don’t imagine that I can be of much use to you... probably you will just want to see 
the city folk... and make up your own mind. But sometimes it is a help in making a 
decision... to be able to state the problem to someone else... I can see many difficult 
decisions which you may have to take in the next 2 or 3 days.
433
 
On 20 August Hailsham was part of a small group of leading Conservatives consulted by 
Chamberlain and Hoare. Shocked by the severity of the crisis, the group dropped its demand 
for tariffs and agreed that ‘retrenchment was the vital thing and that we must... concentrate on 
that’.434 The following day, Hailsham outlined his perception of the crisis to Lord 
Londonderry: 
the economic situation is deteriorating much faster than anyone [predicted]... and 
unless a dramatic move is made to restore confidence at once there may be a most 
appalling and irrevocable crash. I went up yesterday and spent the afternoon with 
Neville and Sam at a meeting which Bobby Monsell, Kingsley Wood and Philip C-
Lister also attended. Neville is probably seeing the P.M. again today – he saw him 
again at 5 yesterday and came back to report to us... I expect nothing will happen until 
Monday. But the trouble is the bankers don’t know if they can wait till Monday; and 
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present indications are that the government proposals will not be adequate to restore 
that confidence which is the immediately essential factor.
435
   
As the former Lord Chancellor suspected, the Labour cabinet was unable to secure 
agreement and MacDonald went to Buckingham Palace on 23 August to resign. The King, 
however, refused the Prime Minister’s request and, the following day, it was agreed that 
MacDonald would head a three-party National Government for the sole purpose of balancing 
the budget. There was to be a cabinet of just ten ministers before an election was held along 
party lines. MacDonald was joined in the new cabinet by the Labour party’s J.H. Thomas, 
Philip Snowden and Lord Sankey. Baldwin, Chamberlain, Hoare and Cunliffe-Lister formed 
the Conservative contingent, and with Lloyd George indisposed, Herbert Samuel and Lord 
Reading represented the Liberals. The short-term nature of the arrangement was clear in its 
presentation as a ‘co-operation of individuals rather than a coalition in the ordinary sense’.436 
Yet, the National Government, in one form or another, held office for the rest of the decade. 
  Much historiographical debate surrounds the administration’s formation and the role 
of the Conservative party has not escaped censure. Orthodox accounts suggest that the party 
engineered the formation of the National Government, intentionally splitting the Labour 
movement and then forcing a general election to win a ‘protectionist ramp’.437 Hailsham’s 
experience, however, confirms revisionist interpretations and the present consensus which 
suggests that the party acted defensively in what it thought was the national interest – 
particularly as the Conservatives temporarily dropped their demand to implement tariff 
reform, which Hailsham and other party leaders had earlier agreed was a prerequisite of 
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joining a coalition.
438
 Despite Hailsham’s anti-coalitionist views and the postponement of 
tariff reform, alarming circumstances meant that he accepted the formation of the 
government. He revealed to Londonderry that, although he had foreseen such a crisis as the 
‘inevitable result of socialist legislation’, the Conservative leadership were ‘all a little dazed 
at the suddenness and completeness with which it is arriving’.439 After the establishment of 
the new government, he felt that Baldwin, Chamberlain and Hoare ‘could not have acted 
otherwise than they did’.440  
Although the press included Hailsham in provisional cabinet lists, he was not offered 
a cabinet post.
441
 Despite Chamberlain’s appeal for his inclusion, Baldwin explained that 
MacDonald had vetoed him on the grounds that he was ‘particularly obnoxious to the Labour 
Party’.442 Although Baldwin and Chamberlain had hoped to persuade MacDonald that 
Hailsham should become Lord Chancellor outside the cabinet, Lord Sankey refused to take 
the India Office and retained the Woolsack. Hailsham was offered the Leadership of the 
House of Lords in conjunction with a non-cabinet portfolio as War Secretary or Lord Privy 
Seal. But the former Lord Chancellor refused these offers as he believed, with some 
justification, that he should have been included in the cabinet on merit. He was ‘very much 
hurt by the cavalier way in which SB dismissed his claim to office’.443 Baldwin ‘did not push 
the matter’ and it seems that he found it difficult to forgive and forget Hailsham’s supposed 
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intrigues of six months earlier.
444
 Hailsham and Brentford both concluded ‘that S.B. is jealous 
and afraid of Douglas as a person who has been acclaimed as an alternative leader’.445  
While there is general agreement that Hailsham was excluded because of his role in 
the passage of the Trade Disputes Act, other factors contributed to MacDonald’s 
objections.
446
 Hailsham’s leadership of the Opposition in the upper chamber, his anti-socialist 
rhetoric and his avid commitment to tariff reform provide additional justifications and help 
explain why MacDonald ‘personally detested Hailsham’.447 Nevertheless, Hailsham was 
‘furious with Baldwin’ and ‘very sore at not having been asked to be Lord Chancellor’.448 
When the Conservative business committee learned of the cabinet’s composition, Hailsham 
‘at once showed that he was bitterly annoyed by the retention of Sankey on the Woolsack’.449 
His anger was not just based on his personal exclusion from the cabinet. He informed 
Londonderry, who had accepted office outside the cabinet as First Commissioner of Works 
that ‘I don’t think our House ought to be led by someone outside the cabinet and I think I 
would be more useful as a platform speaker than as a caretaker’. The former Lord Chancellor 
hoped that ‘your official life will be short and merry and before many weeks are over I shall 
see you back in a Conservative Cabinet’. But he was aware that the Conservative ministers 
would have ‘a tough job to force dissolution’ as the Liberals ‘will seek any excuse to prolong 
your existence’ to delay an election and a Conservative victory at the polls.450 
Hailsham, of course, was not the only notable absentee from the National 
administration. No Conservative peer was offered a cabinet position and no place was found 
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for former Conservative ministers such as Amery and Churchill. This seemed to confirm the 
temporary character of the government. One periodical recorded that, ‘miracles apart, it 
cannot last’. Without Hailsham, Irwin and Simon, ‘it cannot by any stretch of the imagination 
be described as “all the talents”’.451 Cuthbert Headlam noted that the government ‘does not 
inspire me with much confidence... a good many people are out of it – Hailsham – for 
instance – who won’t be best pleased!’452  
Such was Hailsham’s significance that opponents of the National Government were 
hoping to use him as a catalyst to break the coalition. The ultra-protectionist Beaverbrook 
was ‘very contemptuous’ about the presence of Hoare and Cunliffe-Lister in a cabinet from 
which Hailsham and Amery were excluded.
453
 With tariff reform absent from the 
government’s immediate agenda, the press baron ‘strongly urged [Amery] to work closely 
with Hailsham... to keep a positive campaign going and decide when the critical moment 
should come for putting an end to the coalition’.454 Amery was ‘glad [Hailsham] is outside 
and I can look to him as an ally in helping to bring the thing to a conclusion reasonably 
soon’.455  
Yet Hailsham never considered acting without the consent of the party leadership. At 
Baldwin’s request he spoke at the Kingsway Hall on 27 August to Conservative MPs, peers, 
and candidates, allaying fears that he opposed the party’s place in the coalition. He endorsed 
the actions of the party leadership and his ‘cherubic speech’ was met with loud cheers.456 He 
assured the meeting that he ‘most heartily approved’ of the Conservative leadership’s 
decision to join the National Government. He moved the resolution because Baldwin feared 
‘that some people might imagine that the reason why I was not in the cabinet was because I 
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was not in sympathy with the policy which the party was pursuing’. He insisted that the 
reason he was not included was quite simple – he was not asked.457 In what was by now a 
characteristic call for party unity he asked 
every Conservative M.P. to attend unceasingly during the session and to record his 
vote on every measure which the Government brings forward... It would be a tragedy, 
perhaps an irretrievable disaster, if this Government were defeated in the economy 
measures.  
But he only favoured the government’s continuation during the period necessary to safeguard 
sterling and he informed the meeting that he expected that an election would be held within 
two months.
458
  
This sentiment was clear on 2 September when he became the first Conservative to 
call publicly for a general election. The National Government, he said, had been ‘formed for 
one purpose, and one purpose only, to balance the budget’. It was ‘absolutely essential to 
finish the task quickly... and to have an immediate dissolution’. Economies alone, he felt, 
would not correct Britain’s balance of trade: 
So long as the National Government lasts the Conservative Party cannot proceed with 
their constructive programme of tariffs and imperial development, for no one would 
be so foolish as to believe that the Liberals would agree to such a programme.
459
  
Significantly, Hailsham had warned the leadership that although ‘the party had responded 
positively to the call of patriotic self-abnegation, its patience was limited’.460 The same day 
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he told Amery that he hoped ‘that the leaders in the cabinet will realise... the vital necessity of 
going to the country at once’.461 
Hailsham’s call for an election has led one historian to claim that he was ‘hovering 
threateningly’ and that he ‘remained a potential source of trouble until mid-September when 
by going on holiday at a time of national crisis, he dented his image’.462 With Beaverbrook 
returning from Canada aiming ‘to spike Baldwin’s guns with Hailsham’,463 ‘the possibility of 
a Hailsham-Amery-Beaverbrook alliance emphasised the need for extreme care’.464 Yet 
suspicions that Hailsham planned to deliver a fatal blow to Baldwin are unfounded, 
particularly granted his past dismissal of co-operation with the press barons and considering 
that he left the country for a month-long holiday in Cortina. After being enlisted to represent 
the Conservative party at the Indian Round Table Conference, Hailsham wanted to gather his 
strength ‘before this wretched Indian Congress begins next month’ and return ahead of the 
dissolution.
465
 Up to this point, his speeches were in step with party opinion and he accepted 
the National Government as a short-term expedient to avoid financial catastrophe. He also 
appreciated that the coalition served to prevent the Conservatives from being single-handedly 
lumbered with implementing unpopular economies. Events, however, soon transformed the 
former Lord Chancellor’s attitude to the coalition and cut short his holiday.   
Believing that the worst of the crisis was over, Hailsham departed for the continent in 
the first week of September and parliament passed the Economy Bill on 8 September. But, 
against Hailsham’s expectations, the government’s economy measures failed to instil 
international confidence in sterling and the cabinet was forced to abandon the Gold Standard 
and parity with the dollar on 19 September. This fresh crisis prompted Hailsham’s hurried 
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return to London to take his place in the Lords to debate the suspension of the Gold Standard 
on 21 September. 
 The departure from gold, described by one historian as ‘a watershed for the world’,466 
helped prolong the existence of the National Government. A coalition made up of leaders 
from across the political spectrum, determined to put the parity of sterling first, was seen as 
the best route to stability. The ‘City’ and leading politicians alike understood that a break-up 
of the National Government could have disastrous effects. Hailsham did not depart from this 
conclusion. It was understood that the stabilisation of the currency could take months, 
perhaps years, and an election under a ‘National’ banner was now all but inevitable.467 The 
main argument against an early election – that it would threaten sterling’s position on the 
Gold Standard – was no longer applicable. The best means to foster international confidence 
was a stable majority government.  
Although Hailsham confessed that he had expected that the formation of the National 
Government would have been enough to inspire the necessary confidence and keep Britain on 
the Gold Standard, he accepted that the government’s action was unavoidable. Recognising 
that an election could not be long averted and acknowledging the growing enthusiasm for 
protectionist legislation, he highlighted another pressing economic problem facing Britain. 
He claimed that it was ‘a matter of extreme urgency’ that the country’s 
export trade shall increase, that our imports of... articles which need not be imported, 
should be reduced and that the trade balance of this country should be restored to that 
level upon which our prosperity in the past has been built up and our existence in the 
future must necessarily depend.
468
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But notwithstanding general Conservative confidence that they would win their long-
awaited mandate for tariff reform and Hailsham’s earlier bullishness, he quickly became 
‘rather timid’ about the Conservatives standing without their coalition partners.469 With more 
than party interests now at stake, he was not alone in this conversion. Despite seemingly 
irreconcilable differences between Liberal free-traders and Conservative protectionists, a 
single-party appeal seemed inadvisable when the bankers warned that such a step could 
shatter international confidence. These concerns led to the agreement of the ‘Doctor’s 
Mandate’ amongst the party groups within the government. This meant that, with avid free 
traders and protectionists campaigning under the same label despite recommending markedly 
different solutions to repair Britain’s trade deficit, the National Government went to the 
country without a coherent policy. 
After the appeal to the country was announced, Hailsham and Amery demanded that 
the Conservatives should adopt a ‘full hundred per cent tariff policy’. This set the tone for 
Hailsham’s approach throughout the campaign.470 In one address he asserted ‘I stand here 
quite unrepentantly as a Conservative and claim that the one positive policy... [is] the 
imposition... of such a tariff as will adequately protect our trade and industry.’471 Although he 
supported a combined appeal to block Labour’s return to power, this did not involve dropping 
tariff reform. He knew that if the Conservatives were returned to Westminster in large 
numbers, the chances of enacting protectionism would increase. Hailsham continued to 
regard protectionism as a constructive example of state intervention. 
As in 1929, Hailsham chaired the Conservative EBC that concentrated on issues 
confronting Conservative candidates.
472
 He also played an active role during the campaign 
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and detected a change in atmosphere in the country. There were, he noted, ‘quite a lot of 
socialists present who came to listen and not interrupt’. His meetings had been ‘packed to the 
doors... orderly and enthusiastic at the end’.473 Yet despite this favourable impression, he 
could not have predicted the scale of the victory. The election was a supreme endorsement of 
the National Government and the Conservatives recorded an unprecedented 55 per cent share 
of the vote, returning 470 MPs. With the support of the Samuelite Liberals, the Simonite 
Liberals and Ramsay MacDonald’s National Labour contingent, the government commanded 
a majority of over 500. The Labour party’s parliamentary representation was reduced to a 
rump of 46 seats. The joint electoral appeal had clearly been important and this was not lost 
on Hailsham. As he wrote to John Simon: 
Now that the battle in the constituencies is fought and won, may I just send one line of 
congratulations on the part you have played[?] Your letters were read with great 
success on more than one platform... I am sure that the lead you gave had a great 
share in the victory. I hope to see your name... in the reconstructed cabinet.
474
  
In an enlarged cabinet numbering twenty Simon became Foreign Secretary, MacDonald 
continued as Prime Minister and the Conservatives were given eleven cabinet places. While 
this did not reflect their parliamentary representation, the party had a majority in the cabinet 
and Neville Chamberlain occupied the single most important department when he replaced 
Snowden as Chancellor. Baldwin continued as Lord President of the Council, in effect deputy 
Prime Minister, and Hailsham became Secretary of State for War and Leader of the House of 
Lords. The Earl of Radnor was sure that the leadership of the upper chamber ‘could not be in 
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better hands’. Hailsham felt ‘real pride’ in his appointment, remembering the esteemed 
statesmen who had occupied the position before him.
475
 
While Hailsham was relieved at the government’s success, not all Conservatives were 
enthusiastic about the new arrangement. Amery, not invited to join the new administration, 
was concerned about the prospects for protectionist legislation. He lamented that 
the Unionists who have been put in are mostly quite hopelessly ineffective for Cabinet 
purposes. The only exception is Douglas who has been given the War Office and who 
rang me up this morning to say how vexed he was about me [being left out] and how 
little he relished the prospect of himself joining such a crowd. His view was that our 
Party’s case had been singularly badly handled by S.B.476 
Nevertheless, by accepting office Hailsham had resolved to make the arrangement a success. 
His message was very different from that issued at the Kingsway Hall three months earlier. 
Referring to Disraeli’s celebrated aphorism, he explained to the Lords his rationale for 
supporting the multi-party solution:  
It is true that this country does not like coalitions... [B]ut there are occasions in our 
national life, occasions of national peril so imminent and so overpowering, when the 
only way in which we could hope to meet and overcome them is by the union of all 
sections of the nation in the face of common danger. We believe, and the nation 
agrees, that the present situation is one of those instances, and we intend that the 
confidence which the nation has given us shall not be abused.
477
  
He called for co-operation between all component parts of the government. With fundamental 
fiscal policies undecided he publicly claimed that if his new colleagues were 
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brave enough to put aside out-worn shibboleths of party creeds, if they are determined 
to face facts not from the point of view of whether this party theory will be disproved 
or that fiscal doctrine exploded, but from the single point of view whether or not the 
national good demands it, then I think our hopes may be realised... I believe a solution 
can be found if [it]... is sought for in the right spirit and with an unprejudiced mind.
478
  
Notwithstanding almost a decade of attacking MacDonald, he quickly came to admire the 
Prime Minister for having, in Hailsham’s eyes, acted in the national interest. During the 
Christmas recess he told his former opponent: 
I hope you are getting the rest you must have if you are to carry us through the 
manifold problems of the coming year and that when next Xmas comes, you will still 
be Prime Minister of a National Government, able to look back with pride on a year 
of national and imperial achievement for the people’s good.479 
Hailsham’s conversion from an avid anti-coalitionist to the man who crafted an unlikely 
solution to prolong the government’s existence was underway. In typically pragmatic fashion, 
he had accepted the moderated or watered-down Conservatism that would inevitably result 
from coalition politics and that would weaken the influence of the Tory right.
480
  
After the governmental appointments were finalised, Hailsham moved the Abnormal 
Importations Bill in the Lords which passed through both houses on 20 November 1931. This 
allowed the government to impose duties of up to 100% ad valorem on foreign goods which 
entered Britain for the next six months. He told the Lords that the government had not 
committed itself to a concrete policy in relation to the balance of trade, but reminded them 
that if the Conservatives had been elected alone, protectionism would have been among the 
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first measures implemented.
481
 Although he was now part of a ‘National’ coalition 
government, he anticipated that the bill would ‘be replaced by a more permanent structure’ 
which would embrace agriculture and other industries.
482
 The War Secretary, therefore, had 
revealed his expectation that the government would formulate tariff proposals embracing a 
tax on foreign foodstuffs. While this did not assuage the concerns of the government’s free 
trade supporters, it reflected Hailsham’s conviction that tariffs were part of the solution to 
Britain’s imbalance of trade. He wanted to maintain the ‘National’ image of the government, 
but he did not necessarily think this prevented the implementation of a protectionist policy.  
The fiscal differences within the cabinet were initially hidden by the immediate need 
for economy, but as soon as definite proposals were considered cracks appeared. A cabinet 
committee on the balance of trade containing representatives from all the government’s 
component parts was appointed in December. Following a number of difficult meetings, 
Snowden, MacDonald’s National Labour colleague, spoke for all the government’s free 
traders when he told the Prime Minister that he could not continue ‘sacrificing beliefs and 
principles bit by bit until there was none left’.483 The committee reported in January 1932 in 
favour of introducing tariffs. Of the non-Conservative ministers MacDonald, Runciman, 
Simon, Sankey and Thomas accepted the committee’s majority report as a pragmatic attempt 
to correct Britain’s imbalance of trade.484 Samuel’s Liberals and Snowden, however, refused 
to acknowledge its necessity. Samuel, the Home Secretary, Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of 
State for Scotland, Donald Maclean, President of the Board of Education and Snowden, the 
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Lord Privy Seal, all prepared to resign.
485
 When the proposals came before the cabinet on 21 
January, agreement seemed impossible. As Samuel recorded: 
We sat morning and afternoon...  and Snowden, Donald Maclean, Archie Sinclair and 
I intimated that we should be compelled to withdraw from the government if the 
proposals of the report were adopted. The Prime Minister then said “But you are not 
going to be allowed to withdraw from the National Government like that”, and that it 
would be better to take our decision that evening. 
 At a meeting at Snowden’s flat that night MacDonald implored the dissidents not to resign. 
But neither the Prime Minister’s predicament of being left in a reconstructed and 
Conservative-dominated cabinet, nor the damaging effects their departure might have on the 
exchange rate, was enough to persuade the free trade ministers to change their minds. 
MacDonald suggested that the dissidents should remain in the government but abstain from 
voting on the Import Duties Bill. ‘This’, Samuel noted, ‘we all agreed was impracticable’. 
The dissidents decide to resign and publish a joint statement.
486
   
The free traders thus entered the next day’s cabinet meeting expecting to resign.487 
MacDonald said that ‘all present would have to face what would be the result of a break-up 
of the National Government’. Baldwin added that, although he had ‘never pretended to like 
coalitions’, he believed ‘the National Government to be a National necessity... He would 
regret its collapse as keenly as a Conservative government.’488 Thomas and Sankey made 
similar statements. Nevertheless, ‘there seemed nothing to do except say “goodbye”’.489 
Suddenly, however, Hailsham intervened. He suggested a scheme which would allow the 
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protesting ministers to remain in the cabinet, but have the liberty to speak and vote against 
the government’s bill.  
Hailsham, like Baldwin, was no admirer of coalitions but he was ‘impressed by the 
large measure of agreement that had been reached by the National Cabinet under the Prime 
Minister’s Chairmanship’. He suggested that, in the extraordinary circumstances of the day, 
some relaxation could be made in the normal rule of collective responsibility. He proposed 
that  
those who did not find it possible to reconcile their lifelong convictions with the 
recommendations... should be free to state that they did not agree... and even to vote 
against it in Parliament... [T]he Tariff issue did not overlap other questions so much 
that disagreement on this one point must force some of the members of the Cabinet to 
withdraw their help... That Government having, by its formation, provided one new 
precedent, need not be afraid of creating a second. 
Maclean immediately expressed enthusiasm and MacDonald did not rule out the suggestion. 
Simon read a statement pleading for unity and stressing that the tariff was ‘not the basis upon 
which we stand’. The cabinet then adjourned to consider Hailsham’s plan.490 After only 15 
minutes in an adjoining room, the free traders accepted the expedient.  
The press communiqué stated that ‘The Cabinet, being essentially united on all other 
matters of policy, believes that by this special provision it is best interpreting the will of the 
nation and the needs of the time.’491 The free-trade dissidents were granted the freedom to 
speak and vote against protectionist proposals and whips were not to be applied in 
parliament, thus extending this freedom to MPs supporting the government. Although the 
dissident ministers were not permitted to campaign against the legislation and would vote 
                                                 
490
 NCDL vol.3, Chamberlain to Ida, 23 Jan. 1932, p.304; CAB 23/70, 22 Jan. 1932. 
491
 The Times, 23 Feb. 1932. 
134 
 
with the government on a motion of censure, the Liberal party could run free trade candidates 
at by-elections if they supported the government’s wider programme.492 The free trade 
ministers and their followers did speak and vote against the Import Duties Bill in February 
1932, but the enormous Conservative majority ensured its safe Commons passage.   
While similar solutions had been considered by MacDonald and Chamberlain, the 
‘Agreement to Differ’ was Hailsham’s achievement. MacDonald’s claim that he had already 
suggested this expedient is misleading.
493
 Hailsham’s solution differed from the Prime 
Minister’s suggestion as the free traders were given the latitude to speak and vote against the 
proposals rather than silently abstain. Similarly, while Chamberlain has been credited with 
inventing the solution,
494
 his own record of events suggests that this was not the case. He had 
‘not thought it possible for members of the House of Commons to take such a course though I 
had contemplated that Snowden might do it. However to my astonishment McLean [sic] at 
once said that such a proposal merited careful consideration.’495 It has also been suggested 
that Hailsham, as ‘one of the most aggressively protectionist ministers’, was delegated by 
leading Conservatives to suggest the plan to emphasise their sincerity.
496
 But Chamberlain’s 
belief that this solution was not possible and his surprise that the scheme was considered 
imply that Hailsham’s intervention was not stage-managed. As Austen Chamberlain noted, 
I gathered from Hailsham that... the solution was actually proposed by H. himself. 
That it should originate with him must... have surprised all his colleagues as it 
certainly surprised me.
497
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Once again, Hailsham’s pragmatism had clearly shown that he was not a right-wing 
reactionary stuck in a diehard caste. 
The evening after Hailsham’s solution was endorsed, he shared a platform with 
Austen Chamberlain in Birmingham. Hailsham admitted that the former Conservative leader 
‘believes in coalition more than I do’, but he made it clear that circumstances justified the 
‘Agreement to Differ’. The curse of coalition, he felt, was ‘to do nothing unless everyone 
agrees’, but Britain’s economic situation ‘was threatening the very existence of our people’. 
It was,  
imperative that we shall... maintain a common front... I believe so far from 
weakening our position, nothing will so strengthen the weight of our influence abroad 
as the knowledge of the fact that even these fiscal differences... are not of avail to 
shake the solidarity of the British cabinet.  
Chamberlain concurred. It would have been calamitous if ‘national unity... had been broken 
at this hour’.498   
The ‘Agreement to Differ’ contradicted Lord Melbourne’s dictum that cabinet 
ministers must all say the same thing in public regardless of private disagreements. This was 
bound to incur condemnation. MacDonald expected that ‘the usual pundits will declare that it 
is violating [the] constitution’.499 While the Conservative reception of the measure was 
generally favourable, those who anticipated a return to office if the free traders withdrew 
berated the solution. Amery expected that ‘the whole world would rock with laughter at the 
fatuity of this proposal’.500 Historians have also viewed the agreement unsympathetically.501 
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But criticism of Hailsham’s scheme fails to take into account the contemporary fear 
that resignations would shatter international confidence in sterling, particularly as 
MacDonald’s National Labour group might well have followed the free traders out of office. 
It was for this reason that contemporary reactions to the expedient were, on the whole, 
supportive. The Times noted that ‘an overwhelming popular majority has decreed departure 
from the party system for the very reason that circumstances are not normal’.502 Neville 
Chamberlain was ‘well satisfied’ with the arrangement.503 Hoare admitted that ‘I do not like 
the arrangement, but I think that on the whole the alternatives were more objectionable’.504 
Even some ‘whole hog’ protectionists endorsed the agreement.505 Lord Cushendun, a former 
Conservative minister, described it as ‘common sense’,506 a relieved Sankey was sure that it 
was ‘The best for England’,507 and leading Liberals also supported the arrangement.508 After 
MacDonald had informed George V of the dramatic events at the cabinet meeting, the King, 
with ‘great relief’, thanked the Prime Minister for 
staving off what might have been a national crisis... [T]he greatest credit is due to you 
and Lord Hailsham for your patience and wisdom in formulating conditions which in 
the end proved acceptable to the dissidents.  
He believed that the government had followed the ‘only possible course to maintain a united 
front’ and he shared the cabinet’s fear of the potentially disastrous effects of resignations.509 
Hailsham justified the innovation to the Lords on 10 February as ‘an exception to a very 
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sound constitutional principle which can only be justified by exceptional circumstances’. The 
only alternative was the disintegration of the government.
510
  
The long-term success of the ‘Agreement to Differ’ depended, as Hoare noted, ‘upon 
the spirit with which it is worked’.511 Hailsham ‘hope[d] and believe[d] that it will be worked 
on both sides in such a spirit as will make it a success’.512 The conduct of the free traders in 
parliament, however, disappointed this expectation. Once Samuel attacked the Import Duties 
Bill ‘root and branch’ on 4 February, the ‘Agreement to Differ’ began to look absurd.513 
Churchill initially welcomed the device but, after seeing it in practice, he told the Commons 
that ‘I never imagined then that we were to be confronted repeatedly with... the indecent, and 
even scandalous, spectacle of Ministers wrangling upon the Treasury Bench’.514 
Yet critics of the expedient perhaps forgot its limited purpose. Although Baldwin 
hoped that a ‘centre’ party might be created once protectionism was established,515 this was 
never Hailsham’s intention. The creator of the ‘Agreement to Differ’ had far less ambitious 
plans. His formula acknowledged stark differences amongst the cabinet whilst rendering the 
free traders’ opposition to protectionism ineffectual.516 This was a deliberate intention. He 
aimed to keep the cabinet united until a system of imperial preference was established at the 
Imperial Conference at Ottawa. An exasperated Amery wrote, ‘Douglas confessed that the 
compromise was his suggestion and thought it necessary for the sake of the foreign situation 
and to keep the Liberals in till after Ottawa!’517 Hailsham, a convinced tariff reformer, had 
created ‘the political basis upon which the National Government’s protectionist regime was 
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launched’.518 Protectionism was enacted, the Liberals were split at their latest fault line and 
the cabinet faced the uncertainty of a floating pound without a single resignation.
519
 This was 
a real coup for the Conservative party. 
As Hailsham had anticipated, the political consequences of the Ottawa Conference 
were significant. When the agreements were set to be ratified in September 1932, the Liberal 
ministers found the agreements unacceptable.
520
 Nevertheless, the majority of the government 
were willing to implement the agreements. The dissenting ministers preferred not to apply the 
‘Agreement to Differ’, Hailsham did not repeat his call for unity and the free traders resigned 
from the government. The War Secretary saw the ministerial resignations as an acceptable 
price to pay.
521
 Importantly, and unlike the situation early in 1932, with the National 
Government firmly established and the Ottawa Agreements in place, the resignation of 
Samuel, Sinclair, Snowden and a number of junior minsters did not affect sterling. In his 
resignation letter, Snowden alluded to the changed situation: 
The circumstances then [January] were different from what they are today 
[September]. The budget had been balanced on paper, but it remained to be seen what 
the actual result would be at the end of the financial year... The position of sterling 
was at that time uncertain. Neither of these reasons for maintaining the compromise of 
last January any longer exists.
522
 
Notwithstanding these resignations, MacDonald and the other non-Conservative members of 
the government remained. The ‘national’ character of the ministry was preserved by the 
appointment of additional Simonite Liberals. 
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Owing his initial political career to the collapse of the Lloyd George coalition, 
Hailsham, a man who inherently disliked this form of government, had now formulated a 
proposal that prolonged the existence of the National Government. Although this resulted in a 
moderated tariff policy, Hailsham was willing to defend this. He regarded the Conservatives 
as a national party governing in the national interest. The fear of financial collapse and the 
unrestrained socialism of the Opposition overcame Hailsham’s loathing of coalition. The 
government was very unlike Lloyd George’s administration and Conservative anti-
coalitionists were able to participate ‘without seeing this as inconsistent or hypocritical’.523 
Remembering MacDonald’s personal contribution to unity in 1931, Hailsham continued to 
value the former Labour leader’s presence in the coalition. When the by then former Prime 
Minister lost his Seaham seat in 1935, Hailsham  
hope[d] within the next few weeks to see you once more in the House to defend the 
National cause and to strengthen the front bench. I shall not forget my 4 years of 
service under your leadership, and I hope I may remain your colleague for a long time 
to come.
524
 
Hailsham’s role in the National administration again highlighted the differences between him 
and less pragmatic Conservatives. 
Full Circle 
As the 1930s progressed, Hailsham’s career became increasingly concerned with 
overseas and defence matters. But, when given the opportunity to influence domestic policy, 
he displayed the same multifaceted traits that were apparent earlier in his career. His brand of 
Conservatism was remarkably consistent. Progressive instincts continued to combine 
with strident anti-socialism and a determination to uphold Britain’s constitution. Hailsham 
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remained willing to accept state intervention to alleviate unemployment and improve the 
condition of the people in situations when capitalism had failed. His long-held 
constitutionalism and anti-socialism were reflected in his support for constitutional reform 
designed to reinforce the House of Lords.  
Lords reform had been on the Conservative agenda ever since the Parliament Act of 
1911 reduced that chamber’s powers. After the extension of the franchise in 1918, Bonar Law 
had promised to restore the chamber’s authority and various private members’ bills drew 
attention to the subject during the 1920s.
525
 Although enthusiasm for reform in the 
Conservative ranks was not lacking, ‘no one’, as Bridgeman noted, ‘could ever agree on the 
best kind of Reform’.526 With the array of cross-party opinion embraced within the National 
Government, the cabinet was predictably divided. 
Hailsham’s involvement in this question began shortly after his own elevation to the 
upper chamber when Lord Clarendon presented a reform bill in December 1928. Although 
reform was avoided, Hailsham and Salisbury were disappointed that Baldwin’s 
administration failed to grapple with the issue.
527
 Before the General Election in 1929, 
Hailsham, as chairman of the EBC, even vetoed the subject from the Prime Minister’s 
election address. He judged that the suggested ‘very weak’ statement ‘would be much better 
omitted especially in the interests of those in favour of Reform’.528 
This, however, did not detract from Hailsham’s belief that second chamber reform 
was desirable. When the Conservatives were out of power, he supported the suggestion of 
Neville Chamberlain, then Party Chairman, that a party committee should investigate the 
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question.
529
 In December 1930, Chamberlain, aware of his colleague’s support for 
constitutional reform, hoped to persuade Hailsham to chair the committee. Although flattered 
that the Party Chairman regarded him as ‘the best man for the job’, Hailsham turned down 
the offer. After he was compelled to stand in for Salisbury, the indisposed Conservative 
Leader in the Lords, ‘the job is one I would gladly be spared’.530 Nevertheless, Hailsham’s 
support for reform remained. On returning to office in November 1931, he sensed that the 
National Government might be the vehicle for Lords reform, telling the Bonar Law memorial 
college ‘that a strong second chamber was a necessity and that reform was a task only to be 
carried out by a national government’.531 Yet, it was unlikely that the chamber’s powers 
would be strengthened. As Chamberlain noted, it was ‘just possible that the National 
Government might secure the Reform of the House of Lords, if its powers are left as they 
are’.532    
 This situation, however, changed in October 1933 when Stafford Cripps, the former 
Solicitor-General, told the Labour party conference that the next Labour government should, 
if necessary, abolish the House of Lords, pass an emergency powers bill and streamline the 
Commons’ procedure to assist Britain’s transition to socialism.533 This merely confirmed the 
suspicions of many advocates of reform. Conservative ministers now believed that the issue 
had ‘become more urgent’.534 In the following days several resolutions to safeguard and 
strengthen the second chamber were introduced at the Conservative party conference.
535
 
Bridgeman was ‘delighted’ that Baldwin, Hailsham and Cunliffe-Lister all favoured reform. 
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They agreed that ‘not only reform of its composition, but addition to the powers of the H. of 
L. were desirable & should be carried out during the 1934 session’. Although Bridgeman was 
unsure whether MacDonald would ‘take up the challenge’, the three Conservative ministers 
‘thought there was a chance of persuading him to do it’.536 Chamberlain recorded ‘a good talk 
with Hailsham... and I am glad to say that we found ourselves in substantial agreement on all 
major points’. The Chancellor had now come around to Hailsham’s line: 
the matter has taken on a new aspect, in consequence of Cripps’ public warning of 
what he intends to do if he gets his chance, his statements have made possible the 
strengthening of the power which previously I thought we could not contemplate.
537
  
Although the Prime Minister was ‘terribly nervous about it’, he did not object on principle 
and Chamberlain entertained ‘good hopes that in spite of many difficulties, we may get 
something done’.538  
Following Cripps’ threats and amid mounting restlessness amongst backbench 
Conservatives,
539
  the National Government established a ‘Cabinet Political Committee’ 
[CPC] in November to examine the issue.
540
 Chaired by MacDonald, it included the peers, 
Hailsham, Londonderry and Sankey, and MPs, Baldwin, Chamberlain, Ormsby-Gore, Simon, 
Runciman and Thomas.
541
 Yet, before the committee had met, Salisbury presented a private 
member’s bill to the Lords in December.542 The bill envisaged a reduced number of peers, 
and a more powerful chamber that could resist Commons’ legislation, consisting of a 
continuing hereditary element and an elected component.
543
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With no government policy in place, Hailsham found himself ‘in an intolerable 
position’.544 The Leader of the Lords believed that Salisbury’s bill should not be rejected on 
its first reading ‘unless there is anything inherently indecent’ in it. He intended to vote for a 
second reading without committing himself to any of its principles.
545
 During the debate, 
however, Hailsham learned that Earl De La Warr, a National Labour junior minister, intended 
to vote against the bill. He immediately consulted Sankey, the National Labour Lord 
Chancellor, who said that he would do the same. Their votes were ‘the result of a remark 
made by the P.M. at a National Labour Dinner to the effect that it would “ease his position” if 
his Labour colleagues voted against the Bill’.546 Although Hailsham had already committed 
himself to vote in favour, efforts were made to get all other ministers to abstain. The National 
Labour peers, however, refused and voted against the bill.  
This lack of unity caused some acrimony and Hailsham and De La Warr were seen in 
‘heated conversation’ after the division.547 Sankey complained that: ‘We had a very difficult 
time with [Hailsham] when De La Warr and I voted against the first reading of Salisbury’s 
Bill.’548 So frustrated was the War Secretary that he offered MacDonald his resignation. The 
Prime Minister, however, threatened that if Hailsham resigned, he would go too. Although 
Hailsham remained in office over the Christmas recess, he planned to resign if nothing was 
done.
549
  
After reassurances from MacDonald, Hailsham accepted that what had happened in 
the Lords resulted from a misunderstanding. But, with Salisbury’s bill set for its second 
reading, the War Secretary realised that 
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It may well be that the government’s attitude will either be one which I could not 
adopt, or one which your National Labour Peers would not accept... I only want to do 
whatever is best for the National Government without putting an impossible strain on 
my own conscience.
550
    
In January, he again threatened to resign after Baldwin informed a group of Conservative 
MPs that there was no time to deal with the subject in the Commons. Hailsham stayed on 
after Chamberlain had mediated and once it became clear that Baldwin was referring only to 
the present session rather than the full parliament.
551
 Yet Hailsham remained exasperated by 
the government’s lack of progress. Although the CPC had been established in November, he 
grumbled that ‘the P.M. ... did not intend to call it, being bothered by his [National Labour] 
party who had committed themselves against reform’. Chamberlain suggested that the War 
Secretary should ask the cabinet when it was to meet.
552
 This he did and the committee 
finally assembled on 29 January.  
At the committee’s opening meeting Cripps’ commitment to abolish the second 
chamber dominated Hailsham’s thoughts. Regarding the Lords as a bulwark against 
socialism, he argued, as he had during the lifetime of the second Labour government, that the 
view of the Commons would not necessarily represent the view of the people. He feared that 
the Parliament Act ‘provided no safeguard... [if] an extremist Government took office and 
proceeded to implement a revolutionary policy’. He wanted to retain a hereditary element and 
to give the upper chamber powers to call a referendum or a general election before measures 
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‘of a specifically dangerous character’ were passed.553 MacDonald expressed no views and, 
despite Baldwin’s earlier enthusiasm for reform, he now seemed reluctant to act.554 
Meanwhile, as part of a wide-ranging policy review to prevent the sort of mistakes 
made ahead of the 1929 General Election, the Conservative party established the Cabinet 
Conservative Committee [CCC]. This embraced all the government’s Conservative cabinet 
ministers and, over thirteen meetings, it formulated the party’s programme for the next 
general election.
555
 This allowed Hailsham to develop his thoughts on Lords reform. With no 
tangible government progress on the issue, he suggested that the Conservatives ‘ought to 
investigate the possibilities of laying down in statute form certain unchallengeable principles 
of the constitution’. Although Britain had an unwritten constitution, he wondered ‘whether 
something could not be crafted on to it which would prevent Cripps and his friends from 
smashing it as soon as they had the chance’.556 He even warned against improving the 
Commons’ efficiency because that carried the hidden danger that ‘if we were kept out at the 
next general election the improved machinery would enable the socialists to get busy much 
more easily’.557 Yet, with the second reading of Salisbury’s Bill approaching, the CCC had 
not formulated its plans on Lords reform. 
The cabinet committee finally considered Salisbury’s bill in February. It was agreed 
that ministers should abstain and that the government would take up the question if sufficient 
support was shown. But the committee was far from unanimous; Londonderry favoured 
action and Hailsham was ‘strongly opposed to shelving reform’.558 Yet it was Hailsham, the 
keenest man in the government to reinforce the Lords’ powers, who delivered the fatal blow 
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to Salisbury’s bill. During its second reading in May, Hailsham covered over the cracks 
within the cabinet, pointing out that there was no mandate for Lords reform because it was 
not part of the crisis which had brought the National Government into existence. He then 
declared that there was ‘little prospect’ that it would receive serious consideration in the 
Commons unless it was introduced as a government measure.
559
  
The bill comfortably passed its second reading, but was then dropped. Salisbury 
accepted that without the government’s support it would never progress through the elected 
chamber. The non-Conservative elements of the National Government, ‘anxious that the 
powers of the House of Lords, as laid down in the Parliament Act, should remain unchanged’, 
blocked reform.
560
 Although Hailsham received a more sympathetic hearing from his Tory 
colleagues, no progress was made towards reform in the CCC. In the autumn of 1934 
Baldwin’s conciliatory approach prevailed. The Conservative leader’s caution had been 
reinforced by the King, who claimed that reform ‘would divide the country and disturb... 
constitutional tranquillity’.561 The Conservative party’s 1935 election manifesto omitted the 
subject after Baldwin feared that it would become ‘a dominant feature in the election’.562 
Although Hailsham’s thirst for action remained,563 he grudgingly accepted that political 
difficulties prevented strengthening the Lords. The unity of the National Government and the 
delicate political atmosphere prevailed over Lords reform. 
The deliberations of the CCC also revealed that Hailsham’s constructive contribution 
to Conservatism continued into the 1930s. His role was not restricted to advocating tariff 
reform, constitutionalism or negative anti-socialism. He was an active participant in the 
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party’s policy review, second only to Chamberlain in his contributions.564 As the government 
struggled to alleviate mass unemployment, the CCC gave serious consideration to a state-
sponsored land settlement scheme. In October 1934, in the expectation that international trade 
would contract still further, Hailsham chaired a ministerial sub-committee charged with 
crafting proposals which would enable the party to go to the country pledged to create 
100,000 jobs on the land over the next five years.
565
 During the spring of 1934, Hailsham’s 
committee decided that this could be done through a ‘family farm policy’ and the War 
Secretary nominated retired soldiers for this work. It would be funded by placing a levy or 
duty on imported products, such as bacon, to deliver increased employment.
566
 As with the 
Electricity Bill of 1926, the necessary capital would be raised without increasing taxes or 
using taxpayers’ money. 
Hailsham’s committee advocated mild state intervention on ‘the basis of an updated 
version of one-nation Toryism’. While left-wing Tories such as Walter Elliot supported this 
course, Hailsham was also a leading Conservative advocate.
567
 This may conflict with 
popular perceptions of the Tory centre-right, but Hailsham’s support for this measure is 
unsurprising. He was always ready to accept state intervention when unbridled capitalism 
was unsuccessful. In 1933 he had praised Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture, who had 
‘promote[d] vigorously the development of a corporate relationship between the nation and 
the farming industry’.568  
But the ‘family farm policy’ collapsed in January 1935 after Lloyd George proposed 
his ‘New Deal’. Joseph Ball, the director of the Conservative Research Department, 
explained that once the Welshman had ‘come out with a proposal to place 1,000,000 on the 
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land... a National Government scheme to place 100,000 on the land in the course of the next 
five years would... sound ridiculous’.569 Hailsham concurred and his committee reported that 
‘Fantastic though [Lloyd George’s] proposal is, it nevertheless seems to preclude us 
altogether from coming out now with a policy aimed at placing only 10% of this number on 
the land during the next five years’.570 Consequently, the party’s 1935 campaign omitted the 
policy. Nevertheless, Hailsham had supported a proposal that had ‘a clear bias... towards the 
supporters of one-nation Conservatism based upon home production and upon economic 
nationalism’.571  
When Baldwin succeeded MacDonald as Prime Minister in May 1935, Hailsham 
returned to the Woolsack. As in his previous stint as Lord Chancellor, he remained, first and 
foremost, a politician. Almost immediately after assuming the Premiership, Baldwin 
considered when the next general election should be held. Once the campaign got underway 
in late October 1935, Hailsham, as in 1929 and 1931, chaired the EBC which ‘worked very 
well’.572 Hailsham was not, however, only an organiser. As an effective platform speaker, the 
sixty-three year-old’s gifts were utilised in the country. He opened the Conservatives’ 
platform campaign at Bury on 25 October and he also spoke at Darwen, Derby, Frome, 
Reading, Retford, Walthamstow and Warrington.
573
 The Conservatives’ chief organising 
officer was ‘more grateful than I can say for the meetings you have so very kindly undertaken 
to address’. The Lord Chancellor had ‘a great rallying and steadying effect’.574 
With the deteriorating international situation as Italy prepared for its attack on 
Abyssinia, Hailsham keenly defended the government’s rearmament policy. The Opposition, 
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he claimed, ‘stood for defiance but not defence’.575 The National Government’s policy, by 
contrast, was necessary if Britain were to be capable of fulfilling existing commitments. 
There was, he said, ‘no use professing that we were willing to carry out our obligations... 
when all the world knew that we were not strong enough to do it’.576   
The Lord Chancellor also drew on more familiar themes in his platform speeches. 
Granted his record of berating the Labour Opposition, his tone was predictable. Fearful of 
what ‘Cripps and his friends’ would do if Labour gained a majority, Hailsham popularised 
what he believed were the hidden perils of a Labour administration. Supporting Malcolm 
MacDonald’s re-election at Retford, Hailsham informed an audience that if the Labour party   
get the chance they are going to overthrow our existing parliamentary institution and 
substitute legislation by decree of the Cabinet. They propose to bring about the 
changes which... must result in a first class financial crisis, which, as Mr. George 
Lansbury said, would result in the collapse of the banks and a crisis in the City of 
London.   
Linking the Opposition’s extravagant spending plans to the widely-held perception of their 
economic incompetence, the Lord Chancellor claimed: 
They don’t tell you where the money is to come from, except George Lansbury. He 
tells us that... we have control of the Mint, and all we have to do is to print [money]... 
They tell the widow that instead of 10s. she shall have a pension of £1 a week. But 
they do not tell her that the £1 won’t go as far as the 10s. before the scheme was put 
into operation.
577
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This was normal platform rhetoric, but Hailsham’s concerns about Labour’s return to power 
were genuine. He had privately noted that ‘If a Socialist Government was returned... it would 
mean literally the end of the British Empire and untold misery for the inhabitants of these 
islands.’578 
Stannage observes that a week before polling day a ‘key incident’ of the campaign 
‘revolved around the unlikely person of Lord Hailsham’. The author seems unaware of the 
Lord Chancellor’s continuing political role. Consistent with his attacks on the Labour party 
during the 1920s, Hailsham ‘raised the spectre of a Moscow-dominated Labour 
government’.579 In a speech that received extensive press coverage, he highlighted the 
supposed electoral co-operation between the Communist and Labour parties. Noting that in 
57 of London’s 62 constituencies, Communists openly worked with the Labour party, 
Hailsham suggested that this was ‘curious’ granted that the Communists wanted ‘to see this 
country plunge into civil war and revolution’.580 Keen to present the electorate with a clear 
choice, Hailsham contrasted the sober leadership of the National Government with what 
might follow if Labour secured its first majority: 
If anyone wants to produce... civil war, riot, and disturbance, let him vote for the 
Socialist and Communist Parties. If anyone wants to see the... country more 
prosperous, employment increased, homes built, houses erected week by week, slums 
cleared away, factories erected, better work for better pay, then he will vote for the 
National Government which has made so much progress during the past four years.   
Hailsham’s remarks did not please all of his listeners. ‘So loud and prolonged was the 
shouting that... the chairman appealed to the section of the audience to behave as 
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Englishmen’.581 As in the 1920s, Hailsham had purposefully ‘equated Socialism with 
revolution and totalitarianism’ by drawing a simplistic assessment of the relationship between 
the Labour party, the Communist party and Moscow.
582
 Other Conservatives followed his 
lead and the press provided quotations from leading Soviet and British communists that 
apparently supported his claims.
583
  
In November, the National Government was returned with a huge, albeit reduced, 
majority of 240. Hailsham had not ‘expected quite such a good result’.584 Although he 
thought that his colleagues had ‘achieved more and are doing more than any government in 
modern times’, he had feared that the ‘perpetual misrepresentation by socialists and by 
newspapers’ could have affected the result.585 Yet the Lord Chancellor should not have been 
too surprised. Baldwin had timed the election well. Indian reform, which had haunted the 
Conservative party since 1930, was settled and Attlee had recently become Labour’s 
relatively unknown leader. In the wake of Italy’s attack on Abyssinia in October, the decision 
to fight the election in support of the League and limited rearmament was welcomed. With 
Britain’s economy slowly improving, unemployment falling and the wage cuts of 1931 
reversed, ‘Labour faced an opponent which had not clearly failed in any area of activity’.586 It 
was with some satisfaction that Hailsham told the Lords in October 1934 that there was  
no reason to be ashamed of the progress which has been made... We see that in this 
country almost alone in the world production has increased, exports have revived, and 
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unemployment has decreased. While there is still a long road to go before we reach 
our old standard of prosperity and well-being, we have no reason to despair...
587
   
Conclusion 
How, then, should Douglas Hailsham’s Conservatism be judged? According to 
Birkenhead’s assessment written during Baldwin’s second administration, Hailsham had 
‘Excellent judgement except on matters of pure politics when wrong because too diehard’.588 
Such a view is reflected in Maurice Cowling’s assessment that Hailsham was a ‘thinking 
diehard’, however paradoxical that description may seem.589 Hailsham did, as contemporaries 
recognised, have ‘a good Tory backbone’.590 This was clear throughout his career in his 
zealous determination to uphold, and if possible strengthen, the existing constitution, his 
effective employment of anti-socialist rhetoric and his persuasive condemnation of the 
Labour party.  
But, notwithstanding Hailsham’s right-wing image, he made important contributions 
to the moderate, progressive and pragmatic brand of Conservatism which flourished under 
Baldwin’s leadership. His thoughts were more nuanced than those of a pure reactionary and 
his caution in relation to the Trade Disputes Act demonstrated his opposition to knee-jerk 
politics. Although his presentation was sometimes far removed from Baldwin’s soothing 
rhetoric, the two men shared many convictions. Hailsham’s advocacy of the Conservative 
cause had more in common with that of Neville Chamberlain. The latter noted that ‘Hogg and 
I are... the only ones who really annoy the Socialists’.591 Hailsham’s vigour is a key reason 
why he was considered as Baldwin’s likely successor when the latter struggled to meet the 
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demands of Opposition leadership. Hailsham had the ability to reach out to sections of the 
Conservative right which Baldwin often lacked.  
Throughout his political career Hailsham sponsored limited schemes of state 
intervention and progressive measures. While a preferential system of Empire trade appealed 
to his imperialist instincts, this was also an example of his support for state involvement 
designed to reduce unemployment. His contribution in constructing party policy ahead of the 
1935 General Election highlighted his continued willingness to grant the state an increased 
role. His participation in a coalition government under Ramsay MacDonald, and his scheme 
to hold that administration together, reflected his ability to adapt to changing circumstances 
and act in what he believed was the national interest. Hailsham’s Conservatism followed 
Disraeli’s vision. In early 1928, he asserted that his priorities were ‘the maintenance of our 
Empire, the defence of our institutions and the betterment of the conditions of our people’.592 
In August 1927 Neville Chamberlain offered a revealing assessment of Hailsham’s outlook: 
I thought at one time that he was inclined to be too uncompromising on the extreme 
right. But I have had reason to know that this is not so. On more than one occasion I 
have had most valuable support from him in opposing Diehards or in backing what 
you might call left-wing proposals.
593
  
Hailsham’s balanced approach led Austen Chamberlain to suggest that his judgement was ‘on 
all questions... as good as that of any member of the cabinet’.594 Throughout Hailsham’s 
involvement in domestic politics, he subordinated lingering prejudices to practical solutions. 
He was, as a 1924 assessment held, a ‘Tory democrat’ but, perhaps most of all, he was aware 
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of and accepted the political realities of the day. His pragmatic realism was at the heart of the 
success of inter-war Conservatism. 
155 
 
Part II: Hailsham the Imperialist 1932-8 
Although the British Empire stood at its territorial height during the inter-war period, 
the imperial ideal came under threat during Douglas Hailsham’s political career. Britain’s 
retreat from its former glory was apparently reflected in Southern Ireland’s accession to 
Dominion Status in 1922, while the Statute of Westminster of 1931 confirmed the 
Dominions’ complete sovereignty and seemingly indicated a weakening of the imperial 
edifice. Hailsham himself accepted that there ‘was nothing left to bind the Empire together 
save allegiance to the Crown’.1 Nonetheless, he strove to maintain imperial unity and held 
high expectations of the role that Britain and its empire could still play, writing that the 
‘future of civilisation may well depend on the growing co-operation and cohesion of the 
different parts of the Empire’.2 In his dealings with imperial matters during the 1930s, 
Hailsham’s thinking was underpinned by a clear perception of Britain’s national interests, the 
Empire’s interests and, perhaps most importantly, a belief in the sanctity of existing treaties, 
agreements and declarations – whether or not he intrinsically approved of them. His 
involvement in on-going imperial difficulties well illustrates the consistency and clarity of a 
committed imperialist. 
Following the formation of the enlarged National Government in November 1931 and 
his appointment as War Secretary and Leader of the Lords, Hailsham became the 
‘Government’s maid-of-all-work’ assuming responsibilities beyond his departmental 
portfolio.
3
 The Army was ‘fortunate to get as its chief a politician of first-rate stature’, but 
Hailsham ‘was frequently employed on other government business’,4 finding a suitable outlet 
in imperial policy. He assumed a leading role in the Imperial Economic Conference held at 
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Ottawa in 1932 and he was central to Britain’s dealings with the Irish Free State. He also 
made important, but largely unexplored, contributions to the Government of India Act, which 
reached the statute book in 1935.  
In so far as Hailsham’s contribution to imperial policy has been considered, historians 
follow the judgement of some contemporaries in dismissing him as a reactionary. According 
to Malcolm MacDonald, successively (and for a period concurrently) Colonial and 
Dominions Secretary, Hailsham was as ‘dyed in the wool a Tory as ever sat on the woolsack 
or anywhere else; and his views on the Irish problem were rabid’.5 The Irish Free State’s 
delegate to the League of Nations was advised that Hailsham was ‘one of the strongest 
“diehards”’,6 while John Sankey, Lord Chancellor 1929-35, noted that Hailsham was ‘a true 
patriot but has Ulster blood in his veins and compromise is foreign to his nature’.7 When a 
cabinet subcommittee considered Indian constitutional reform during 1932-3, Hailsham was 
seemingly one of its ‘awkward customers’.8 These simplistic assessments require 
modification.  
True, Hailsham was born during Britain’s imperial apogee and belonged to a 
generation which regarded the Empire as a fact of life.
9
 He had no concept of an imminent 
retreat from Britain’s imperial obligations, sharing the view ‘that wise policy, tactful 
diplomacy and good administration could keep the system in being for a long time yet’. This 
vision may appear short-sighted, but it was widely believed that the transformation from 
Empire into Commonwealth could maintain British influence.
10
 This formed the hallmark of 
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imperial policy between the wars and underpinned the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the 
National Government’s approach to Indian constitutional reform, calculated to preserve 
Britain’s pre-eminence in the subcontinent.  
But Hailsham’s outlook was not simply reactionary; he was fully aware that the 
Empire needed to change if it were to survive. ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, he 
said in 1931, ‘is a living organism, and living organisms never stand still.’11 For Hailsham 
there was no contradiction between the extension of self-government and imperial unity. As 
he had outlined in one speech delivered in early 1927: 
 [T]he British Empire means something different from any Empire the world has ever 
known. In history empires denoted one nation or group of peoples exercising 
dominion over a number of subjected races. Today the British Empire means the free 
association of seven great, self-governing democracies, each of them autonomous and 
independent, and all of them linked together in one organic whole, none of them 
subordinate to each other, and yet all content to remain in that association...
12
  
While Hailsham conveniently overlooked outstanding issues between Britain and the 
Dominions, such as the range of safeguards embodied in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, he 
recognised that the future of the Empire was based upon consent. This conviction, however, 
did not mean that Britain could not exert its influence to foster imperial unity. During a 
House of Lords debate on the Statute of Westminster in November 1931, Hailsham claimed 
that Britain ‘should lose no possible chance of linking up the Empire permanently together’. 
Anticipating the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference, he continued: 
[T]here is an opportunity coming to us... which must be grasped quickly if it is to be 
grasped at all, of forging a more permanent link, a more material link, which will so 
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tighten up the relationship between every part of the Empire that in time to come it 
would be unthinkable for any of them, from the mere point of view of self-interest, to 
divorce themselves from the material well-being and prosperity as well as the moral 
strength which their membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations involves.
13
 
Economic bonds, he concluded, could ‘take the place of the legal ties which have been 
dissolved.’14 Long-term voluntary agreements would, he hoped, be as binding as former legal 
commitments because of the inter-dependence they would create.  
These thoughts were not original or uncommon. What, however, made Hailsham’s 
contribution to Britain’s imperial policy during the 1930s significant was the exclusion from 
power of other leading imperialists of the era. As Roberts notes ‘of the old imperialists of 
1925, only Lord Hailsham was left as Birkenhead was dead and Amery, Churchill, George 
Lloyd and Salisbury were out’.15 Yet, notwithstanding Hailsham’s prominent role, the history 
of the imperialist right during the 1930s has been told through the careers of those absent 
from power.
16
 While the Tory right bemoaned its own impotence, complaining that Baldwin 
compromised true Conservatism by an unnecessary coalition with Liberal and Labour 
politicians,
17
 Hailsham’s presence in the National Government and his intimate involvement 
in imperial policy meant that Conservative imperialists were not entirely excluded. Indeed, 
the problems of Britain’s imperial identity bore the most obvious imprint of Hailsham’s 
intervention and his contribution to imperial policy merits close investigation. Leo Amery, 
the self-proclaimed champion of the imperialist right, even feared that Hailsham was ‘busy 
                                                 
13
 H of L Debs, vol.83, cols 227-8. 
14
 Ibid., col.761. 
15
 Roberts, Holy Fox, p.46.  
16
 See, for example, R. Toye, Churchill’s Empire (London, 2009); Amery Diaries vol.2; J. Charmley, Lord 
Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire (London, 1987); Croft, Life of Strife. 
17
 D. Dutton, Liberals in Schism (London, 2008), pp.62-3. 
159 
 
trying to secure the leadership of the empire policy section’ of the party and was ‘anxious to 
push me into the background’.18  
The Ottawa Conference 1932 
Though imperial conferences had been held since the late 1880s, the Ottawa meeting 
in 1932 was of more than usual importance. The previous meeting held in 1930 ended 
without the introduction of imperial preference. However, the effects of the international 
economic crisis and the contraction of world trade gave a renewed boost to the cause of 
expanding Empire trade by means of a protective tariff against foreign competition. The 
protectionist measures taken by foreign countries ‘gave new cogency to the old argument’ 
that the development of the Empire into an economic unit would shelter it from the 
uncertainty of world markets.
19
 Consequently, The Times predicted that Ottawa would be ‘the 
most momentous conference in the history of the British Nations’.20  
Hailsham’s conduct in the 1920s had already demonstrated that he was a committed 
tariff reformer. He believed that closer economic cooperation between the self-governing 
Dominions and the mother country would serve two purposes: it would foster imperial unity 
through inter-dependence and it would reduce domestic unemployment. In 1928 he had told 
Amery that ‘so long as we... depend for our existence on foreign markets’, there was ‘no cure 
for unemployment except tariff reform’.21 By 1931, he was ready to publicly assert that 
Britain’s trade could be balanced ‘by one means and by perhaps one means only – a tariff’.22 
These hopes led Hailsham to anticipate that Ottawa would be ‘the turning point in the 
Empire’s history’.23 He was, then, a natural member of the high-powered cabinet delegation 
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which set sail for the Canadian capital in the summer of 1932. Although the Prime Minister 
remained at home, Britain’s representatives had ‘absolute powers to negotiate’. Hailsham 
joined Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Runciman, Cunliffe-Lister, Thomas and John 
Gilmour.
24
  
Following nomination by his British colleagues, Hailsham chaired the main 
committee at the Ottawa Conference charged with the ‘Promotion of Trade within the 
Commonwealth’. The appointment was greeted with acclamation.25 He also became a 
member of the committee addressing ‘methods of economic co-operation’.26 His prominence 
was no accident. Baldwin, who was only the nominal head of the British delegation, made a 
deliberate decision that the bulk of the work should fall to Hailsham and Chamberlain, two 
committed tariff reformers. He calculated that ‘if they failed, the Diehards at home would 
know it was not from half-hearted trying’.27 The Sunday Express even suggested that ‘the 
Empire’s hopes’ rested entirely upon Hailsham and the Canadian premier and conference 
chairman, Richard Bennett.
28
 
Hailsham was optimistic of success, but aware that he faced a difficult task. He 
declared that, despite ‘conflicts of interest and divergent theories... we all feel assured that all 
those with whom we are going to negotiate are... inspired by a common belief in the great 
possibilities of this Empire’.29 This hope, however, did not disguise the gulf between the 
various delegations’ demands. ‘Do not think’, the War Secretary warned one Conservative 
audience,  
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that the great statesmen of the Dominions will set aside the Dominions’ interests to 
benefit our manufacturers... The conference can only be a success if each party is 
determined to protect the essential interests of his own unit... and is determined to 
prefer the interests of the rest of the British Empire to those of any foreign nation.
30
 
This assessment matched that of Richard Bennett. Britain’s High Commissioner in Canada 
noted that Bennett was ‘at some pains to defend his doctrine of an imperial system based on 
one’s own country first and the Empire second as against the outer world’. The Canadian 
Premier ‘quoted with approval a recent speech in which Lord Hailsham had developed the 
same thesis’.31   
With this view the prevailing opinion amongst the Empire’s leaders and Bennett’s 
willingness to take Hailsham’s hypothesis to an extreme, the British had serious difficulties at 
the conference. Despite a highly successful legal career and a decade of front bench politics, 
Hailsham had ‘never worked so hard’.32 By mid-August he had assumed command of 
Britain’s delegation after Chamberlain had ‘more or less collapsed’. ‘The work of the 
Conference was... pushed on to Douglas’, noted Amery, present at Ottawa as an observer.33 
This was no easy burden to bear. On one occasion, the Canadians ‘were pretty merciless’. 
They were ‘at [Hailsham] from ten to 12.30 to get him to frame the formula they wanted on 
Russia, and then when he tried to escape caught him again and kept him till 3 a.m.’34 The 
difficult, almost impossible, negotiating style adopted by Bennett exacerbated British 
problems. His ‘wholly Canadian-orientated attitude’ meant that he pursued national interests 
regardless of the consequences.
35
 After the close of the conference, Chamberlain suggested 
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that ‘most of our difficulties centred round the personality of Bennett’.36 Thomas felt that he 
was a liar who had tried to split Britain’s delegation.37  
The Dominions held high expectations of the concessions that they might receive 
from Britain. The Canadians demanded the termination of the Anglo-Russian Treaty 
regarding Russian exports of wheat, and the Australians expected a tax on foreign meat. 
Hailsham complained that ‘Dominion demands are hopelessly unreasonable, their offer 
amounts to nothing in the way of more trade’.38 Dominion expectations were ‘preposterous’ 
and ‘likely to wreck the conference’.39 In the event, however, agreements were reached and 
contemporaries recognised that Hailsham had been ‘a tower of strength’.40  
Hailsham and Chamberlain were the key figures in securing agreements with the 
Australians and Canadians. Together, during ‘another black day’, they told the Australians 
that the British delegation could not accept a duty on foreign meat.
41
 Such a course was 
unacceptable to Runciman, Thomas and the free trade ministers in London. Consequently, the 
former Australian Premier, Stanley Bruce, threatened ‘to go home and take my delegation 
with me’.42 Baldwin, however, successfully intervened and prevented the Australians leaving. 
The Dominions, Australia included, accepted a quota to restrict Britain’s imports of foreign 
beef, veal, mutton and lamb for a five-year period, which most members of the National 
Government tolerated.
43
 
A similar arrangement was formulated in regard to Canadian wheat. This was no easy 
negotiation. Hailsham and Chamberlain feared that a permanent breach had opened up 
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between themselves and the Canadians that would ruin the conference.
44
 Bennett requested a 
British embargo on Russian wheat and the termination of the Anglo-Russian Trade 
Agreement of 1930. Hailsham was understanding and, when the Canadian press asked the 
War Secretary whether Britain could concede an embargo on Soviet wheat and lumber, he 
replied, ‘we may not be able to do all we are asked to do, but we can certainly do 
something’.45 
Hailsham’s longstanding repugnance of the communist system and ‘abundant 
evidence’ that Soviet five-year plans were designed to ‘smash’ Britain’s trade fortified his 
sympathy for the Canadian demands. Referring to the Soviet Union, he held ‘a strong 
objection on moral grounds to trading with what was virtually a slave state’.46 After 
exhausting negotiations, and notwithstanding the political repercussions in London, the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1930 was denounced as Britain accepted an anti-dumping clause 
which was unmistakably directed at Russia. The British and Canadian governments agreed to 
‘regulate, restrict or prohibit the entry’ of commodities which undercut Empire products with 
‘unduly low prices’ sustained through state action.47 This decision underlay the free-traders’ 
later decision to resign from the National Government. 
A key objective for Hailsham at the conference was the establishment of tariff boards 
to place industrial competition between Britain and the Dominions on to a fairer footing. 
Through the ‘domestic competitor principle’, he sought to end the protection of Dominions’ 
industries which had no viable future, without killing off those with clear potential. Hailsham 
felt that without the principle in place the government’s position at home would be 
indefensible. Its endorsement would make it ‘much easier for him to justify the raising of 
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prices of primary commodities’ to those who opposed food duties.48 The War Secretary 
hoped that British concessions on foreign imports could result in Australian and Canadian 
acceptance of the principle.  
This approach proved successful. Australia accepted that ‘protection by tariffs shall be 
continued or granted against United Kingdom products only to those industries which are 
reasonably assured for success’.49 Canadian acquiescence again proved difficult with Bennett 
going back on an initial statement that he ‘saw no serious objection’ to Hailsham’s plan.50 
The War Secretary found the Canadian volte-face ‘very disappointing’. It was at his 
instigation that the British demanded a definite answer from Bennett whether he was 
prepared to enter into an agreement which would embody the principle or not.
51
 After a ‘long 
and angry meeting’, Bennett agreed and the proposal was included in the final Anglo-
Canadian Agreement.
52
 It was, in Hailsham’s view, one of the key achievements of the 
Conference. ‘For the first time’, he later told the Lords, 
Canada and Australia have accepted... that no higher measure of protection shall be 
imposed as against United Kingdom products than is necessary to give a reasonable 
opportunity of fair competition between the United Kingdom manufactures and the 
domestic manufactures in the Dominions. That is... a very great advance on anything 
that has been achieved before.
53
 
Overall, the outcome of the conference rested on a knife-edge. After month-long 
discussions, conclusions were reached only at the eleventh hour. No party had secured 
exactly what it wanted and, notwithstanding Hailsham’s efforts, there were many who 
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questioned the conference’s achievements. Lord Ponsonby, Labour’s Leader in the Lords, 
demanded a general debate because of ‘the crisis which has arisen over Ottawa’.54 During the 
Lords debate which ratified the agreements, one Labour peer insisted that the conference was 
a ‘complete failure, and that it was only saved from actual breakdown by Great Britain 
making concessions out of all reason’.55  
Criticism of Britain’s delegation was not restricted to the ranks of the Labour party 
and Hailsham himself did not escape censure. Amery, angry at his exclusion from the 
National Government and extreme in his commitment to ‘Empire Free Trade’, was upset by 
the conference’s limited achievements. He felt that the British delegation’s refusal to accept 
duties on meat was ‘the greatest disappointment of the conference’.56 But granted the political 
considerations to which coalition politics gave rise, Amery’s expectations were unrealistic. 
His claims that Hailsham was ‘a weak reed’, with ‘no real courage’, ‘afraid of what 
MacDonald and Runciman will say’, and generally of ‘no real help’ were contradicted by the 
observations of those around the conference table.
57
 Amery’s criticism of Hailsham matched 
his disillusionment with the entire British delegation who, he felt, were ‘driving too hard a 
bargain’.58 Unsurprisingly, the British ministers loathed Amery’s presence. ‘I think a good 
many of us who were at Ottawa’, Hailsham recollected, ‘rather resented the part he played 
there in trying to smash the agreements.’59 He spoke ‘most bitterly’ of Amery’s conduct at 
Ottawa, while Chamberlain accused the former Dominions Secretary of ‘inciting the 
Dominions to make impossible requests’.60  
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If Ottawa had not been a total success, the British delegation deserves credit for 
delivering workable settlements. With Dominion expectations often running contrary to 
British interests, the very fact that a number of bilateral agreements were reached represented 
‘the triumph of a theory of Empire’.61 The British were not completely paralysed by the 
‘coalition atmosphere’ as Amery suspected.62 Thomas, recognising that Britain’s delegates 
had been ‘held up to blackmail and ransom’, paid tribute to Chamberlain and Hailsham ‘for 
the manner in which they had conducted the negotiations with splendid loyalty to their 
colleagues... in the face of every kind of insult and discourtesy’.63 Philip Cunliffe-Lister 
noted that ‘Neville and Douglas have had to bear the brunt of insufferable treatment in their 
negotiations with [Bennett]; and they have both been admirable. I doubt if I could have kept 
my temper.’64 Beaverbrook was ‘sorry’ that the agreements did not go ‘much further’, but 
accepted that Hailsham had ‘performed an immense public service’.65 Snowden knew that his 
former colleagues had endured ‘a hell of a time’,66 while Salisbury understood that ‘to 
reconcile British interests and Dominion claims without spoiling a great imperial policy was 
a herculean task’.67 Even Bennett appreciated ‘the distinguished services of Lord 
Hailsham’.68  
The conference had assembled not to build a new imperial system, but to mitigate 
problems created by the global depression and Hailsham had managed to extract key 
concessions from the Dominions. In addition to the ‘domestic competitor principle’, a great 
deal of groundwork for economic integration had been laid. India accepted the principle of 
preference and Britain had little difficulty in reaching agreements with South Africa. 
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Preferences were granted to Britain by the Dominions, albeit usually by increasing tariffs on 
foreign imports. As Hailsham later told the Lords: ‘We have not completed an edifice’, but 
‘we have laid foundations which will result in better trade within the Empire.’69 Chamberlain 
was also optimistic. He hoped that ‘the real liking that has sprung up among the various 
delegations... will bear fruit in future’.70 These hopes were justified. The relative share of 
imperial trade increased significantly and from 1935-39 the Empire consumed nearly half of 
Britain’s exports.71 
Hailsham remained in Canada to speak to the Canadian Bar Association where he 
stressed the conference’s achievements. He regarded the conference as an ‘emphatic success’ 
because the agreements would cultivate imperial unity. The economic agreements were a 
bonus as ‘increased purchasing power in any one part meant increased demands for products 
all round’.72 On his return to London, he informed Churchill that ‘We had a very strenuous 
time in Ottawa, but I believe that the arrangements are really a big work and a great step 
forward in Imperial unity.’73 Publicly he stressed the possibilities: ‘the Ottawa agreements 
represent a really great achievement from the Imperial as well as from the economic point of 
view’. As Leader of the Lords he demanded attendance from Conservative peers to debate the 
agreements, for ‘any possibility of the legislation being defeated would be a catastrophe for 
the whole Empire’.74  
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 When challenged by one Labour peer during the Lords’ debate on the agreements, 
Hailsham was defiant: ‘Ottawa did not fail... something big and great was achieved there’.75 
Developing his thoughts on imperial unity, his hopes for the future were clear:  
the material links which bind the Empire together had practically ceased to exist...  
[I]t was desirable in the interests of the Empire as a whole to reinforce that 
sentimental link with the material bond of a common economic interest, and we 
believe that we have found that link in the Agreements which we have made.
76
 
Hailsham was not concerned about the limited economic benefits for Britain. It was a success 
by the very fact that agreements had been reached. ‘If Ottawa had failed the results on the 
Empire at large would have been disastrous.’ Looking ahead to the World Economic 
Conference, to be held in mid-1933, Hailsham asked,  
What chance would there have been for a World Economic Conference, where there 
was no such tie of sentiment... [that] made the Ottawa Conference a far more 
promising field than any meeting between foreign peoples?
77
  
The energy, persistence and tact that Hailsham had demonstrated at Ottawa made him a 
natural selection for Britain’s delegation for the League of Nations World Economic 
Conference. He hoped to make progress on lines similar to Ottawa, proposing that the British 
delegation should again advocate the ‘domestic competitor’ principle.78 Unlike Ottawa, 
however, Hailsham did not take a prominent role and the conference proved futile. Aiming to 
revive international trade and stabilise commodity prices, ‘Roosevelt torpedoed the whole 
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thing’ after his American delegation refused to accept plans to return international currencies 
to the Gold Standard to prevent currency speculation.
79
  
Hailsham’s Irish Question 1932-38 
The Ottawa agreements were a step, albeit a limited one, in the direction of one of the 
principal goals of Hailsham’s career: imperial unity. Separatist tensions continued to menace 
the integrity of the British Empire and the Irish question occupied British statesmen 
throughout the inter-war period. A.J.P. Taylor’s assertion that Lloyd George had ‘conjured’ it 
‘out of existence’ with the 1921 Treaty is mistaken.80 Following significant gains by Eamon 
de Valera’s Fianna Fáil party in the elections of 1927, Hailsham feared that the ‘Free State 
looks like giving us more trouble in the near future’.81 This realisation contrasted with his 
assertion earlier that year that ‘there is not one of the self-governing Dominions which is not 
perfectly satisfied with the good faith of this country and... equality of status which we have 
all professed’.82 
 During the inter-war period, Ireland ‘still dominated [Conservative] party thinking 
about the appropriate way to handle imperial difficulties’ and, once de Valera’s party came to 
power in March 1932, Irish Nationalism entered ‘a revolutionary phase’.83 The Free State 
‘displayed a more strident nationalism and indulged in more unilateral actions in its dealings 
with the [British] government’.84 De Valera assumed office as President of the Executive 
Council, pledged to withhold land annuities and abolish the Oath of Allegiance given to the 
British Monarch and the Free State Constitution. He sought to ‘undermine first the 
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symbolism and later the substance of Dominion status’.85 By 1938 many of the agreements 
and safeguards established in 1921 had been discarded. The Oath of Allegiance, appeals to 
the Privy Council and the Governor Generalship were all abolished, while the role of the 
Monarch was reduced to the point of triviality. Financial obligations were not adhered to and 
led to the Anglo-Irish ‘economic war’, which lasted from 1932 until 1938. In 1937 a new 
constitution renamed the Free State ‘Eire’, which became a republic in all but name. The 
Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1938 further undermined the 1921 Treaty and emphasised 
Eire’s autonomy. With de Valera’s republicanism the very antithesis of Hailsham’s 
imperialism, the latter sought to resist what he regarded as the unreasonable demands of a 
man determined to create an all-Ireland republic. Hailsham, determined to foster imperial 
unity, emerged as a leading figure in Britain’s response to de Valera’s challenges.  
Hailsham’s religious beliefs and ancestral links with Northern Ireland added further 
dimensions to his opposition to Irish republicanism. Descended from Scottish Protestant 
settlers in Ulster during the seventeenth century, he was a committed Unionist and, ‘brought 
up in a powerfully evangelical tradition’, he could be ‘violently anti-papal in his expressed 
opinions’.86 His ill-fated stepson had produced the first volume of a sympathetic biography of 
Edward Carson, the foremost symbol of Ulster Unionism, and Hailsham regarded Carson as 
one of his ‘oldest and dearest friends’.87 Such factors no doubt played a part in shaping 
Hailsham’s response to Britain’s Irish question, but the conclusion that his reluctance to 
negotiate with the Free State was the result of reactionary views is overly simplistic.  
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Although Hailsham is generally portrayed as the Diehards’ ‘watchdog in cabinet’,88 
his response to Irish violations of past agreements was shaped by an understanding of 
Britain’s imperial interests, a belief in the sanctity of treaties, a sense of personal commitment 
to the 1921 Treaty, a willingness to support the rights of the majority in Northern Ireland and 
a recognition of de Valera’s single-minded determination to achieve his ambitions. Following 
discussions with de Valera in mid-1932, Hailsham concluded that further negotiations would 
be futile after the Irishman admitted that harmonious relations between Britain and the Free 
State could never be secured until a united-Irish republic was established. Hailsham deplored 
the idea of concessions designed to win the goodwill of an Irish leader who, he believed, 
would never be content on terms acceptable to the United Kingdom. He advocated measures 
designed to coerce the Free State government into moderating its demands. 
While Hailsham was no Diehard, the image that Heuston encourages of a minister 
who sought to re-establish negotiations between London and Dublin because Thomas, the 
Dominions Secretary, was ‘a stupid and dishonest plebeian, constitutionally incapable of 
seeing the Irish point of view’, is equally misleading.89 Thomas and Hailsham had agreed 
upon a policy of coercion towards Southern Ireland, and when the former reneged on his 
earlier position, it was the War Secretary who persuaded the cabinet to reject efforts to 
engineer a settlement. Hailsham ensured that Britain maintained economic pressure on the 
Free State.  
The key to Hailsham’s influence over Anglo-Irish policy was his membership of the 
government’s Irish Situation Committee (ISC) from its inception in March 1932 until its final 
meeting in 1938. Established to deal with the predicament created by de Valera’s accession to 
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power, it had responsibility for coming to terms with the Free State government on 
constitutional, financial, defence and economic questions – partition was not to be 
discussed.
90
 In addition to Hailsham, this powerful committee included MacDonald, the 
Prime Minister, Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Simon, Foreign Secretary and 
Baldwin, the Lord President and Conservative leader. At the outset, Hailsham assumed a 
prominent role and helped draft the government’s position on the question of the Oath and 
the land annuities.
91
 This formed the essence of the government’s Commons statement and 
tallied with the advice of Irish opposition leaders.
92
 In almost identical terms Thomas wrote 
to de Valera: 
the Oath is an integral part of the [1921]  Treaty... the Irish Free State government are 
bound by the most formal and explicit undertaking to pay the land annuities... [T]he 
failure to do so would be a manifest violation of an agreement which is binding in law 
and in honour on the Irish Free State.
93
   
Despite the National Government’s determination to defend its position, the Free 
State defaulted on land annuities and other payments totalling around £1.5 million. Hailsham 
warned his colleagues that Britain faced ‘a long and difficult dispute’.94 He was convinced 
that the Free State was legally committed to pay the annuities, while he understood the wider 
significance of the Oath.
95
 Irishmen, he maintained, as ‘natural born British subjects owe 
allegiance to the King by virtue of the fact that they are born in allegiance’. But the Free State 
‘was taking steps publicly to remove the statutory obligations binding them to observe and 
carry out the [1921] Treaty’. Repudiating the Oath would ‘constitute a breach of an 
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obligation’.96 Hailsham, who as Attorney-General had helped guide the 1921 Treaty through 
the Commons, was aware that it was only with these safeguards that Southern Ireland had 
been granted Dominion status in the first place. From this episode he drew a conclusion that 
would condition his response to de Valera for the rest of the decade: ‘No useful purpose 
would be served by... entering into negotiations or making fresh bargains with a government 
which has just shown... that it could not be relied upon to keep the most solemn 
engagements.’97  
In the hope of negotiating a settlement, the Irish leader invited representatives of the 
British Government to Dublin in June 1932 with a return visit to London scheduled two days 
later. In the first official visit to the Free State by British cabinet ministers, Hailsham 
accompanied Thomas. Suggestions that the War Secretary’s presence was designed to 
intimidate the Irish through an implied threat of military force are misplaced.
98
 One Irish 
historian even triumphantly claims that if ‘the British thought that de Valera was going to be 
intimidated into submission, they were in for a sore disappointment’.99 In reality, Hailsham’s 
attendance reflected his deep involvement in Irish policy. The sixty year-old was a leading 
constitutional lawyer, Leader of the Lords and a former Lord Chancellor, and he did not cross 
the Irish Sea brandishing his portfolio as Minister for War. With Neville Chamberlain absent 
at Lausanne negotiating war debts, Hailsham was, after Baldwin, the most senior 
Conservative in the government.
100
 As Thomas informed the Commons before their 
departure, ‘Lord Hailsham is accompanying me as a member of the cabinet’.101 Nonetheless, 
Hailsham’s involvement did not signal a change in his outlook. Before leaving for Dublin, he 
stated that de Valera ‘should not be misled into thinking that because the United Kingdom 
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Government were willing to discuss the questions at issue, they had changed their views’. He 
warned that ‘the greatest care should be taken to avoid raising expectations which could not 
be realised’.102  
After their arrival in Dublin on 8 June, it soon became apparent that agreement was 
unlikely. De Valera set out the two fundamentals for an agreement. The first was the end of 
partition; the second the recognition of Ireland as a republic. Thomas and Hailsham ‘had 
some difficulty in refraining from entering a protest’, but judged ‘it wiser to keep silence’. 
The British would not coerce the Six Counties into joining the Free State and, fearing the 
wider consequences for imperial unity, the National Government desired the Free State’s 
continued presence in the Commonwealth. The Irish leader rejected British offers to modify 
the terms of the Oath and declared that ‘there was no legal justification for demanding 
payment of the land annuities’.103 The British were determined to uphold past agreements 
while the Irish wanted to smash them.  
As a result of the negotiations, Thomas regarded de Valera with ‘considerable 
disapproval’.104 Hailsham’s position was identical. Despite their different political 
persuasions, both ministers felt that de Valera was ‘a complete dreamer... with no grasp of 
realities, though of complete personal sincerity’.105 Coogan claims that the ministers’ 
understanding of the Irishman amounted to a ‘monumental misjudgement of de Valera’s 
character’.106 Yet Hailsham’s initial impressions were remarkably perceptive. Impressed by 
de Valera’s resolve, he believed the Irishman when he claimed that ‘nothing short of an 
agreement as to fundamentals would produce permanent peace and goodwill’. Those 
fundamentals were utterly unacceptable to Hailsham and would remain so. Recognition of de 
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Valera’s ultimate aspirations guided Hailsham’s response to Irish questions and dominated 
Britain’s reaction to Irish violations of past agreements until 1935.107  
During the second meeting held in London on 10 June, de Valera went back 
‘hundreds of years in the tracing of England’s hand in Ireland’. Thomas found it ‘utterly 
impossible to negotiate with one holding the views he did’.108 The British maintained that the 
land annuities were raised from tenant purchases and were not part of the Free State account. 
They offered Empire arbitration but de Valera, remembering the recommendations of the 
Irish Boundary Commission, turned this down believing that ‘the dice would always be 
loaded in favour of the stronger party’.109 The impasse was complete. The official statement 
following the second meeting, which MacDonald, Baldwin and Samuel also attended, 
claimed that after ‘prolonged discussion... it was not found possible to reach an 
agreement’.110 Hailsham later reflected: 
de Valera and his friends do not want to negotiate... they have merely insisted on the 
repudiation of their liability. Nor do I see much hope of settling political questions... 
[W]hen we do make a generous settlement it is only used as an excuse for further 
demands.
111
  
In similar terms, the Prime Minister claimed that de Valera refused ‘to face the real facts of 
the situation’. The Irishman’s ‘generalities about goodwill have no existence in reality... [H]e 
will do nothing except what is a step to an Irish Republic and is undoubtedly a complete 
prisoner of the Irish Republican Army.’112  
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Hailsham’s report to the Lords placed responsibility for the breakdown of 
negotiations firmly on de Valera’s shoulders: ‘Unhappily it would seem that an Irishman... 
does not desire to observe the obligations which the Irish Free State has undertaken if they 
should prove in his opinion inconvenient’. The violation of past agreements – for which he 
himself shared responsibility – remained Hailsham’s primary concern: 
for a Government to allow a unilateral repudiation of obligations solemnly entered 
into for no reason except that the repudiating party preferred not to carry them out...  
is a course which is an impossible one in International Law... and is one which this 
country would not tolerate from any Government of any complexion at all.
113
 
With no agreement in sight the ‘economic war’ began and ‘heralded a return of the Irish 
question to the British domestic scene with a vengeance’.114 ‘So long as de Valera is there’, 
MacDonald lamented, ‘there is no way out.’115  
The National Government imposed a 20 per cent tariff on Irish goods entering Britain, 
designed to recoup the losses from the land annuity payments and compel the Irish 
Government to reconsider its policies. Thomas’s biographer notes that the Dominions 
Secretary and Hailsham ‘persuaded the cabinet to make its one firm stand during a decade of 
appeasement’.116 While this is an exaggeration, such an approach later in the decade would 
have put both men firmly in the ‘anti-appeaser’ camp of subsequent historiography. The Free 
State responded by imposing protective duties on British goods and no negotiations between 
Britain and the Free State took place at the Ottawa Conference. When Bennett, the 
conference chairman, offered to intervene in the dispute, Hailsham replied: ‘What is the use 
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of mediation with a man like Mr. de Valera? He told Mr. Thomas himself that he wanted an 
Irish Republic with Ulster. Obviously he is hoping for an impossibility.’117  
The impact of the ‘economic war’ was inevitably greater on the Free State than on the 
United Kingdom and the resulting hardship may have been a factor in a sudden softening of 
Thomas’s approach. In September he recommended to the ISC a financial settlement. But 
Hailsham, supported by Neville Chamberlain, became the dominant force in the sub-
committee and sought to stiffen the government’s resolve. Britain, the former maintained, 
‘could admit no compromise’.118 Until the question of the Oath was satisfactorily settled, 
tariffs should be maintained, even if the land annuities issue was resolved. ‘It would’, the 
Committee concluded, ‘be unthinkable in Cosgrave’s [the opposition leader] interests, as well 
as our own... to acquiesce in the repudiation of the financial provisions.’119 
In early October Hailsham attended another abortive conference held in London to 
discuss annuities, pensions and the apparent over-taxation of Ireland since the Union. In the 
days leading up to the conference, Thomas suggested to Hailsham that political questions, 
such as the abolition of the Oath, might also be considered. The War Secretary, however, 
warned his colleague that the consideration of political issues would provide the Irish with a 
pretext for breaking off the negotiations. Suspecting that the Irish had no real interest in 
reaching a financial agreement, he replied: 
I myself believe that de Valera does not intend to pay anything and, therefore, there is 
no chance of a settlement. I, for one, could not be a party to an agreement to tear up 
the [1921] Treaty and to let off Ireland from all her liabilities... Negotiations will 
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therefore break down and there will be no need to bring in the considerations as to the 
Oath.
120
  
When the conference met the two delegations were poles apart. From the British 
perspective, Hailsham accused the Irish of ‘bad law and bad equity’.121 To Irish claims that 
the agreements had not been ratified by the Dáil, the War Secretary bluntly replied that if 
ratification was necessary it would have been stated in the agreements themselves.
122
 As 
regards Empire arbitration, he tried to convince the Irish that they had adopted an overly 
stubborn position:  
[I]t was quite true that the losing side in an arbitration often felt the award to be 
unjust. It would not necessarily follow, however, that the grievance... [would] lead to 
repudiation... The United Kingdom had always felt that they had been unfortunate in 
arbitrations, but they had never attempted to re-open any settlements so reached.
123
 
The Irish, however, did not concur and de Valera, quite fantastically, concluded that instead 
of Southern Ireland owing Britain £5 million a year, Britain owed the Free State £400 
million, excluding interest. In such an atmosphere, the conference broke down and the Free 
State’s violation of the 1921 Treaty continued. In November 1932 de Valera marginalised the 
role of the Governor General. He replaced the King’s representative with a ‘Fianna Fail 
shopkeeper from Maynooth’ whose anonymity became a joke.124 George V’s private 
secretary noted that the new position was ‘ridiculous and derogatory to the King’s dignity’.125 
Later that month, when Thomas recommended concessions to allow an Irish republic 
to remain within the Commonwealth, Hailsham stopped the Dominions Secretary in his 
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tracks. It was ‘no use’, Hailsham claimed, offering ‘something the United Kingdom could not 
implement’. Any concessions over the Oath would represent ‘betrayal and surrender on a 
matter of vital importance’.126 So strongly did Hailsham express himself that ‘he carried the 
committee with him’.127 Even in early 1933 when the President of the Board of Trade pointed 
to disquieting trade figures, Hailsham’s defiant stance prolonged the ‘economic war’. Such a 
struggle, he admitted, could not be carried on without injuring both sides. But he insisted that 
it was impossible for Britain ‘to give in; the people... would not allow it’. Offers to modify 
the Oath, extend the timescale for the land annuities and allow arbitration, ‘represented the 
last word in our generosity’.128 Hailsham saw little point in negotiating and in March 1933 he 
even refused to meet de Valera when the Irishman passed through London on his way to 
Geneva. The War Secretary had concluded that ‘a private luncheon or dinner party... was not 
likely to be productive of good’. Dulanty, the Free State’s High Commissioner, consequently 
complained of the War Secretary’s ‘granite-like’ attitude.129  
Hailsham was at the centre of Britain’s response to Irish violations but his hard-line 
had failed to produce the desired results. If the British were hoping to see the replacement of 
de Valera’s minority government by the pro-Treaty party, they miscalculated.130 In the 
election of January 1933, de Valera’s party secured a majority for the first time. It appears 
that the National Government was misled by poor intelligence from, among others, Lord 
Midleton, a Southern Unionist and former cabinet minister. In one letter from October 1932 
Midleton informed Hailsham that ‘de Valera’s position will begin to fall by leaps and bounds 
in about a month from now’. If the British stuck to their guns, Midleton claimed, de Valera 
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would go ‘for good and all’.131 Such predictions, however, proved to be wishful thinking. 
Despite the objections of Cosgrave’s opposition party, the Dáil abolished the Oath in May 
1933. Hailsham’s response was typically based on the sanctity of past agreements: 
The [1921] Treaty is a bargain between this country and the Irish Free State. Neither... 
can by unilateral action alter the terms of the bargain... [E]ven if one party purports to 
alter the bargain, that attempt has no legal, no international effect at all.
132
 
This attitude underpinned the public image of the National Government’s policy although 
there was on-going talk of mediation throughout 1933, particularly on the part of the 
Dominions Secretary. Hailsham and Chamberlain, however, continued to block concessions 
that might lead to a settlement. Economic pressure on the Free State was maintained, but 
there was little more that Britain could do to compel de Valera’s capitulation, short of 
resorting to force.  
This was an eventuality that concerned de Valera. In the second half of 1933 he 
seemed paranoid about military reprisals and collusion between the National Government and 
Cosgrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal party. In September he announced in the Dáil that 
Hailsham and General Mulcahy, an opposition member and a former minister and Defence 
chief, had met in Glasgow for conversations.
133
 The allegations, however, were completely 
unfounded. The President’s intelligence sources proved hopelessly inaccurate. After Mulcahy 
received a public apology, Hailsham remarked: ‘I said at the time that it was untrue... I am 
glad that it is now admitted’.134  
Military sanctions were never seriously contemplated in British circles, but in late 
1933 de Valera sought an assurance that further treaty infringements would not be met by 
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force. ‘The Government of the Irish Free State’, he declared, ‘would sincerely welcome such 
a statement.’135 Thomas wanted to give a straight answer and state that Britain would not use 
force against the Free State. Hailsham, however, felt it better ‘to keep the enemy in doubt as 
to the risks he is running’. He suggested that Thomas should not rule out the military option 
but state that it would be ‘a grave mistake to suppose that the only course... [open to] the UK 
would be the use of armed force to protect their Treaty rights’.136 When Hailsham failed to 
convince Thomas, the question was put to the cabinet. When the issue was raised the War 
Secretary stated that he ‘was somewhat horrified lest the cabinet should adopt [Thomas’s] 
view’. De Valera was ‘proposing to do a very grave wrong to the United Kingdom’ and had 
shown no subtlety in pursuing his policy of a united Irish republic. ‘Was it not plain’, 
Hailsham asked, that  
 the reason why the Irish had not already dared to repudiate the Treaty was that they 
did not know whether they would be up against force or not. If there was any risk of 
force they would not run it; if there was no risk they would act.
137
 
He then outlined the circumstances in which Britain might have to use force, such as 
defending the British occupied Treaty Ports, and he alluded to the wider implications of the 
policy adopted towards Ireland: ‘If we allowed the safeguards to be broken by the Free State, 
how could anyone support a corresponding arrangement with India?’ With the Diehard 
campaign against Indian constitutional reform then in full swing, his reasoning carried the 
cabinet. Typically, on all matters Irish, he was supported by Lord Londonderry, the Air 
Secretary, who shared Hailsham’s ancestral links with the Six Counties. Britain refused to 
give de Valera the assurance he desired, but the Irish leader ploughed on.
138
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Next on de Valera’s agenda was the abolition of the right of appeal to the Privy 
Council. In November a bill passed through the Dáil that removed this safeguard from the 
Free State’s constitution. This was no trifling issue as its removal would allow the Free State 
to assert its right to secede from the Commonwealth. Enshrined in the 1921 Treaty to 
maintain a unified imperial legal system, this safeguard also ensured that British not Irish 
judges would have the final say on interpretations of the 1921 Treaty and the Free State’s 
constitution.
139
 For those in the Free State who sought judicial independence from 
Westminster, however, it ‘perpetuate[d] British interference in their country’s affairs’.140  
In a significant speech during December 1933 Hailsham told the Lords that the right 
of appeal could not be removed without the sanction of the Imperial Parliament. ‘It was 
plain’, Hailsham stated, ‘that the Free State could not consistently with the terms to which it 
owed its existence as a Dominion repeal the right of appeal which was expressly safeguarded 
by the Treaty.’141 De Valera observed that Hailsham’s was ‘the most astonishing speech he 
had ever read’.142 After suggesting that, if Hailsham was correct, the Statute of Westminster 
was a ‘fraud’ upon the Dominions, the Irishman got to the crux of his case: ‘secession ought 
to be a matter for us...  It is for the Irish people to decide what their associations with other 
countries will be... the Irish people are not going to be a slave people.’143 
Hailsham’s speech, according to the Manchester Guardian, was ‘bad law and worse 
politics’.144 General Hertzog, the South African premier, similarly told the Union parliament 
that the statement ‘implies a lack of knowledge on Lord Hailsham’s part’.145 According to the 
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latter, however, the position of South Africa and the other Dominions had changed with the 
Statute of Westminster, but the Free State’s status was subtly different:  
the Free State, unlike other Dominions, became a Dominion by accepting a treaty, 
under terms of which it agreed not to exercise certain legal rights... [I]t was... an 
integral part of the settlement that the Free State should accept and maintain certain 
obligations.
146
 
He expanded his thinking in a letter to Thomas, which was passed on to the Dominions: 
the [1921] Treaty itself laid down that the constitutional position of the Irish Free 
State was the same as that of Canada at that date i.e. 1921; and that it had been 
expressly decided with regard to the Dominion of Canada, in a series of cases that the 
right of the citizens of Canada to appeal to the Privy Council... was a right which 
could not be taken away by the Dominion parliament without the express sanction of 
the Imperial parliament.
147
 
Hailsham’s thinking was underpinned by his understanding of constitutional law and a sense 
of personal commitment. When he had helped pilot the Irish Free State Constitution Bill 
through the Commons in 1922, he had stated that the Supreme Court of the Free State was ‘in 
the same position’ as in the other Dominions. The ‘decisions of these courts are final and 
conclusive, unless his Majesty... exercise[s] his prerogative right and grant[s] leave to appeal 
to the Privy Council... [which] may review the decision’. Article 66 of the Free State’s 
constitution maintained that ‘nothing shall impair the right of the Privy Council to grant leave 
to appeal’.148 In 1922 Hogg had insisted that this was one of the most important safeguards 
which ensured that the Free State’s constitution could not be used to set up a republic. The 
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Attorney-General knew that ‘lawyers on both sides of the House... will all agree with me’ 
when he stated that  
there can be no possible doubt at all that the prerogative right of the Crown which 
exists in the case of Canada and other self-governing Dominions is preserved in the 
case of Ireland.
149
  
Eight years later, ahead of the 1930 Imperial Conference, Hailsham and Baldwin informed 
MacDonald, then Labour Prime Minister, that they could only accept an alteration to appeals 
on the basis of agreement between Britain and the Free State.
150
 
In 1933 Hailsham’s position remained unchanged. He denied that the Statute of 
Westminster had altered the situation in relation to the Free State because Article 2 of the 
1921 Treaty held that any constitutional amendment that conflicted with that Treaty was 
‘absolutely void and inoperative’.151 The Treaty gave the Free State the same constitutional 
position as Canada in 1921. It did not, however, guarantee constitutional development.
152
 For 
Hailsham, amendments to the Free State’s constitution depended upon the consent of the 
British government. Thomas Inskip, the Attorney-General, drew the same conclusion. He 
recommended that the Free State should be informed ‘that the Bill is regarded as a breach of 
the [1921] Treaty’.153 While this interpretation remains contentious, it is noticeable that 
Cosgrave had told MacDonald in 1931 that ‘we have reiterated time and again that the Treaty 
is an agreement which can only be altered by consent’.154 The Dáil’s abolition of the right to 
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appeal was met with dismay in Unionist quarters. Carson claimed that ‘every promise to the 
Irish loyalists had been broken, everything that made life and property safe was gone’.155  
Notwithstanding claims that Lloyd George had apparently threatened a ‘terrible and 
immediate war’ upon Southern Ireland if the Irish delegates did not sign the 1921 Treaty, it 
had been ratified by both parliaments. This, in Hailsham’s opinion, made de Valera’s 
demands unlawful. Hailsham told the Lords that de Valera 
seems to have a theory that, inasmuch as no one enters into a treaty completely freely, 
that is to say, that since every nation when it enters into a treaty does so under the 
pressure of surrounding circumstances... any nation can at its will repudiate the 
obligations which it has undertaken... whilst at the same time retaining the 
advantages... [T]hat doctrine is wholly untenable either in International or Municipal 
Law.
156
 
The War Minister’s personal experience of negotiating with the President merely confirmed 
his objections. The Irishman 
was so much obsessed with his own bigoted view of Anglo-Irish relations... that there 
was no common meeting ground on which any settlement with him was possible, and 
there was no use, therefore, in making a move to re-open negotiations... everything 
that I read as to the proceedings in the Irish Free State tends to confirm me.
157
    
As the Irish showed no sign of modifying their demands, Hailsham concluded that ‘from 
what I have seen of de Valera, I do not myself think that any scheme which would appeal to 
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him would be likely to be satisfactory to British opinion’.158 There was, therefore, no point 
negotiating if a long-term agreement was never going to be found.  
Until the formation of Baldwin’s last government in June 1935, Hailsham, first in 
agreement with Thomas, then without the concurrence of the Dominions Secretary, 
dominated Britain’s Irish policy. Canning suggests that ‘whenever it came to a cabinet 
decision regarding Ireland’, it ‘fell into Hailsham’s die-hard views’.159 This interpretation, 
however, does less than justice to Hailsham’s position. While he remained ‘a vigorous 
champion of Ulster’,160 the fact that he was able to carry the cabinet with him, a coalition 
which included moderate Conservatives such as Baldwin and Hoare, Liberal Nationals and 
former leaders of the Labour party, suggests that this approach does not merit the description 
‘diehard’. Defending a treaty he had helped guide through the Commons should not be 
labelled in this way. The sanctity of treaties, the wider effects that surrendering to Irish 
nationalism could have on imperial unity and a recognition of de Valera’s ultimate demands 
determined Hailsham’s reaction to Irish republicanism. Yet, although the ‘economic war’ 
continued until 1938,
161
 the Free State progressed towards republican status. In 1935 the Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act and the Aliens Act made British citizens aliens in the Free 
State. Hailsham’s unsuccessful stand against concessions encouraged a fresh approach from 
the National Government.   
With Baldwin’s return to the premiership in June 1935, Hailsham left the War Office 
and replaced Sankey as Lord Chancellor. More importantly for Anglo-Irish affairs, Malcolm 
MacDonald, son of the former Prime Minister, succeeded J.H. Thomas as Dominions 
Secretary in November. This challenged Hailsham’s dominating influence over Irish policy. 
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When Thomas retired from front-line politics the following year, Hailsham praised him for 
having ‘been a fine imperialist all his life’.162 This was not a description he applied to the new 
Dominions Secretary, whom he later noted was ‘one of the least staunch of our cabinet about 
the Empire’.163 A clash between the two men became increasingly likely. Unlike his father, 
whose attitude ‘was indistinguishable from that of Lord Hailsham’,164 Malcolm was prepared 
to make significant concessions to secure better relations with the Free State. He even 
informed de Valera that he ‘would like to see’ partition ended ‘in due course’.165 Such an 
outcome was utterly repugnant to Hailsham. ‘I don’t believe the people of this country’, he 
wrote, ‘would ever agree to hand over Ulster to the tender mercies of the Irish 
Republicans.’166 In 1936 the Irish High Commissioner hoped that liberal-leaning members of 
the National Government ‘might be able to influence the mind of the Six Counties 
Government’, but he realised that Hailsham ‘would fight to the death against any alteration of 
the present position’.167 Nonetheless, fresh approaches were made to de Valera, although the 
full cabinet was unaware that discussions were taking place. MacDonald and Baldwin 
appreciated that Hailsham’s forceful and capable resistance might have prevented this 
initiative from ever being taken.
168
   
Following this initial approach, MacDonald told his colleagues that ‘the absence of 
agreement between the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State on very important matters... 
weaken[ed] the moral authority of the British Commonwealth’.169 Hoping to achieve a lasting 
settlement, he recommended that Britain should accept a one-off token payment to end the 
land annuity dispute. If this could be realised, the tariffs maintained since 1932 could be 
                                                 
162
 HAIL 1/3/10b, Hailsham to Willoughby, 1 July 1936; Londonderry papers, D 3099/2/17/75a, Hailsham to 
Londonderry, 8 June 1936. 
163
 HAIL 1/4/27, Hailsham to Neil Hogg, 24 Nov. 1938.   
164
 DIFP, vol.4, no.294, NAI DFA Secretary’s Files S32, J.W. Dulanty to J.P. Walshe, 4 Nov. 1935.  
165
 MacDonald, Titans, p.64.  
166
 HAIL 1/1/1, Hailsham to Granard, 2 July 1934. 
167
 DIFP, vol.4, no.372, NAI 2003/17/181, Dulanty to Walshe, 14 Oct. 1936.  
168
 Fisk, Time of War, p.30.  
169
 CAB 27/523, 12 May 1936.  
188 
 
removed as the Oath was already consigned to history. MacDonald even thought it desirable 
to return the ports retained by Britain under the 1921 Treaty to the Free State, if a satisfactory 
defence agreement could be reached. Partition, however, was not to be discussed.
170
 By this 
stage the troublesome question of Indian constitutional reform was settled and Hailsham 
could no longer use it as a factor against concessions to the Free State.  
Predictably, Hailsham objected to the Dominions Secretary’s plan. One ‘onslaught’, 
MacDonald recalled, ‘was so weighty that the situation was critical’.171 Hailsham believed 
that seeking agreement with de Valera ‘could produce no good result at home, in Ireland or 
elsewhere’. It was, he held, ‘a pity to revive a dormant issue’ as de Valera was pursuing his 
‘obsession’ of an all-Ireland Republic. The failure of such discussions could re-create ‘anti-
British feeling in the Free State’. More pragmatically, Hailsham argued against the reduction 
of tariffs on Irish goods, because forthcoming trade discussions with the Dominions and 
Argentina were more likely to be a success if ‘the Free State supply was still arriving in 
reduced quantities’.172 But, despite Hailsham’s spirited opposition, the cabinet endorsed 
MacDonald’s plan. Crucially, Chamberlain, who had been ‘one of the most uncompromising 
opponents of conciliation’,173 now backed MacDonald’s line. Londonderry’s removal from 
the government in late 1935 combined with Chamberlain’s volte-face left Hailsham isolated 
in the cabinet and the sub-committee.  
While MacDonald gained authorisation to open formal discussions with the Free 
State, de Valera proposed to eliminate the Crown from Irish domestic affairs. The resulting 
legislation, Hailsham felt, would place the Free State outside the Commonwealth. This he 
regarded as a disaster. The gravity of the situation led the Lord Chancellor temporarily to 
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adjust his approach. He now felt that an effort to negotiate must be made, as ‘it was 
unthinkable that we should let the Free State go out of the Commonwealth without an effort 
on our part to keep them in’.174 When, however, it became clear that the new Irish 
constitution would remove Article 1 of the 1921 Treaty, which maintained that the Free State 
was ‘a co-equal member of the... British Commonwealth of Nations’,175 Hailsham felt that 
Britain could not accept such terms.
176
 With the consent of the other Dominions, however, 
the Free State did not leave the Commonwealth, but it seems that de Valera accepted a token 
link only in the interests of his ultimate goal of Irish unity.
177
   
Hailsham was incapacitated by a stroke in the summer of 1936. When he returned to 
his duties in January 1937, the Irish situation had moved on and developments were not to his 
liking. The abdication crisis provided de Valera with another opportunity to weaken the 
bonds of association. Although George VI was proclaimed in the Free State, de Valera passed 
two bills through the Dáil removing his powers from Irish internal affairs. This meant that the 
King could only confirm diplomatic appointments and international treaties on the Free 
State’s behalf.  De Valera’s forthcoming constitution planned to rename the Free State ‘Eire’ 
and only recognise the Monarch as the Commonwealth’s titular head. Typically defiant, 
Hailsham held that it was ‘of very great importance that the language of his legislation should 
be altered’. MacDonald, however, rejected this approach, insisting that Hailsham’s solution 
would not facilitate agreement.
178
 Before the end of 1937 the Free State was abolished and 
Eire was established, in effect, as an independent republic.
179
 More importantly, the re-
opening of conversations led to more serious negotiations and the eventual signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty in April 1938. The terms of these agreements were unacceptable to 
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Hailsham. Dissatisfied with the proposed financial and trade agreements and the treatment of 
the Six Counties, Hailsham saw Britain’s unqualified withdrawal from the Treaty Ports of 
Berehaven, Lough Swilly and Queenstown as another sticking point. The growing threat of a 
European war added a new dimension to his opposition. He now feared that an agreement 
with the Free State could undermine Britain’s potential to defend itself.  
Unlike Anglo-Irish developments earlier in the 1930s, the 1938 agreements were not a 
unilateral venture. The National Government, now led by Neville Chamberlain, voluntarily 
removed trade barriers which ended the ‘economic war’; the land annuities dispute was 
settled with a final payment to Britain of £10 million, notwithstanding previous demands for 
a sum ten times that figure; and Britain relinquished the Treaty Ports. The agreement, 
according to one backbench Conservative, was ‘an indefensible bargain’,180 while Churchill 
felt that ‘a more feckless act can hardly be imagined’.181 Britain got little, if anything, 
tangible in return. 
When the draft agreements were presented to the cabinet sub-committee in early 
1938, Hailsham, mounting a strong-willed opposition, rehearsed his usual concerns. De 
Valera, he pointed out, ‘had been quite frank and definite in warning us that there could be no 
permanent improvement in the relations... so long as partition remained’. W.S. Morrison, the 
Minister for Agriculture, echoed this concern. He did not believe that better relations could be 
secured unless Britain accepted Eire’s point of view on every issue.182 Granted that the long-
term aims of Britain and Eire conflicted, Hailsham could not understand the rationale behind 
making concessions. Downcast by the financial sacrifice, he had ‘understood that we were 
going to get a favourable trade agreement as consideration for the abandonment of the land 
annuities’. Yet, Eire wanted ‘Ottawa treatment but was not giving us a proper Ottawa clause 
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in return’.183 The only promise from Eire was that a price commission, without British 
representation, would review tariffs placed upon British goods. 
Struck by the lack of Irish compromise, Hailsham concluded that Britain was ‘getting 
next to nothing’ and that the ‘benefits of the agreement were all one way’.184 When it was 
apparent that Eire intended to maintain its tariff against Northern Ireland because its 
government ‘had shown no inclination to treat the minority justly’,185 Hailsham expressed his 
concern. He was worried that ‘Ulster manufacturers might get into such desperate straits they 
would either vote for inclusion in Eire or move their factories into Eire’. De Valera, therefore, 
would obtain ‘a lever to use against Northern Ireland in order to force the termination of 
Partition’.186 With this in mind John Andrews, Northern Ireland’s Finance Minister and 
representative during discussions in London, had already suggested that he would prefer to 
resign rather than defend the proposed agreements.
187
 While a compromise formula was not 
ruled out, the cabinet hoped that the draft trade agreement would include ‘useful concessions 
to Northern Ireland which would inure to their benefit’.188 On 8 March even Chamberlain 
suggested that unless Ulster received some trade concessions, the whole agreement would ‘go 
overboard’.189 It seemed that Hailsham and those who shared his views about the Six 
Counties, such as Samuel Hoare, had prevailed. 
Perhaps most importantly, the defence aspects of the agreement alarmed Hailsham. 
MacDonald originally insisted that Britain ‘must have the use of the ports in time of war’.190 
His hope was that the Free State would modernise the Treaty Ports and make them available 
to Britain in the event of a European war. By early 1938, however, the Dominions Secretary 
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conceded that ‘it was difficult... for [de Valera] to give that assurance’. It seemed that the 
Taoiseach would only accept a defence agreement if partition ended.
191
 Without a united 
Ireland, he promised only that the ports would not be used against Britain. In response, 
MacDonald constructed a persuasive rationale for abandoning the ports and relinquishing 
Britain’s treaty rights. Britain would, he argued, ‘obtain more by this method’. Admitting that 
there was an ‘element of gamble’ in his policy, he hoped the Taoiseach would ‘make a 
speech in which he would announce his policy which... would be very similar to that 
incorporated in the original draft agreement on defence’. The Dominions Secretary thus 
implied that de Valera would probably grant British access to the ports in a future war.
192
 But, 
legally speaking, Britain would have ‘no grounds other than wishful thinking’ to claim the 
ports in the future.
193
 At the heart of this decision was MacDonald’s belief ‘that if there was a 
war and if – or because – we had given up the ports, Eire could come in on our side’.194 Years 
later he recalled that in 
most of Chamberlain’s Cabinet’s judgment – supported by the unanimous opinion of 
the Chiefs of Staff – the very importance of those ports in the event of war threw the 
balance of argument, [to]... voluntarily resigning our Treaty right to occupy them.
195
 
He also noted that ‘nationalist susceptibilities were grossly offended’ by the British 
occupation of the ports and he feared a nationalist rising if Britain used them during 
wartime.
196
  
Notwithstanding the lack of a written understanding, Thomas Inskip, the Minister for 
the Co-ordination of Defence, agreed with MacDonald and claimed that a ‘gentlemen’s 
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agreement’ had been crafted with de Valera.197 With a hostile Eire, Inskip anticipated that it 
might take a division of troops to hold each port. With considerable expenditure required to 
bring the bases up to operational standard, they were presented as an economic burden. 
Inskip, therefore, concluded that Britain was ‘not giving up anything worth having’ because 
the bases were ‘obsolete’.198 He also pointed out that Eire, dependent on imports and overseas 
supplies, was almost bound to be on Britain’s side in a future war.199 Chamberlain similarly 
judged that despite ‘abandoning... a paper right we had secured a reasonable prospect of 
obtaining the advantages of the co-operation of the Government and people of Eire in defence 
of the ports’.200 Such an agreement would represent a real coup for de Valera. Several 
members of his cabinet had even warned him that ‘he would lose on the question of the 
ports’.201 
  In reality, Britain’s capacity to resist attacks upon its food supply was compromised in 
a gamble to buy Irish goodwill. In June 1936 de Valera had asserted that in a future war ‘We 
want to be neutral’.202 After six years of wrangling with de Valera, and defending what he 
regarded as Britain’s vital interests, Hailsham was confident that the Taoiseach would make 
further demands the very moment that Britain’s emergency arrived. These demands would 
involve ending partition and establishing an all-Ireland republic. He also questioned the 
strategic rationale behind the withdrawal. 
Here Hailsham was in agreement with the defence chiefs. MacDonald’s claim that 
they concurred with the defence proposals is open to debate as political pressure impinged 
upon defence strategy. One Chiefs’ report from 1936 was ‘contradictory’ and ‘owed as much 
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to a desire to facilitate MacDonald’s policies as it does to naval strategy’.203 It maintained 
that ‘it is not suggested for a moment... that the free and unimpeded use of these ports is in 
any way less vital to our fleet than it has been in the past’.204 But no withdrawal could be 
presented to parliament without the concurrence of the defence chiefs. Hankey deemed it 
unfair to put the responsibility for a political decision on the Chiefs, telling Inskip that ‘The 
decision ought to be taken by Ministers’ because there were ‘no new military factors: only 
new political factors’.205 The 1938 defence report, which MacDonald claimed was 
‘unanimous’, actually held that without access to the ports in wartime ‘the life of the nation 
would be imperilled’. Yet it tellingly concluded that ‘it would be preferable to waive 
insistence on a formal undertaking which might be politically impracticable’.206  
Although Inskip claimed that the Treaty Ports were redundant he also – somewhat 
paradoxically – accepted that Britain must have access to them in wartime and he even 
contemplated re-taking them by force.
207
 His rationale for such a move was that Britain might 
have to take the same action if the ports remained under British control. McMahon has used 
Inskip’s attitude to claim that Britain had no alternative.208 Hailsham, however, disagreed and 
found a fatal flaw in Inskip’s reasoning. Having made great sacrifices in the other parts of the 
agreement geared to gain Eire’s goodwill, Britain would only provoke Irish antagonism by 
illegally re-occupying the ports. Such a course made no sense to Hailsham. Always keen to 
uphold international law, he reminded his colleagues that  
If we did not hand over the ports by agreement, we had preserved our Treaty right to 
put soldiers into them. If we handed them over to Eire, and then proceeded to put 
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soldiers into them in war, we should have committed a clear breach of our 
undertaking.
209
  
If the ports were illegally re-occupied, Britain could lose the sympathy of world opinion 
which might prove decisive in a future conflict. It is also questionable whether Britain would 
have had to use force to exercise its Treaty rights. John Maffey, Britain’s representative in 
Dublin 1939-49, disputed Inskip’s assessment of Irish antagonism. He recalled that ‘the 
theory was advanced that we should have had to land forces to protect the ports. This is 
rubbish. The ports were British by treaty rights internationally recognised.’210 
Hailsham also questioned the dismissive assessments of the ports’ strategic 
importance and the judgement that Eire would hand them back if Britain needed them. 
Although he admitted that Britain’s limited financial resources did not make their 
refurbishment a peacetime priority, ‘in time of war the ports would be very valuable’. If they 
were retained they could be re-equipped at a later date. Recognising that their value lay in 
their deep-water anchorages, and remembering that Britain was almost defeated in 1917 
because of German submarine activity,
 211
 Hailsham concluded that the ports would ‘have an 
important role to play in guarding our trade routes and in the campaign against enemy 
submarines’.212  
In light of the financial sacrifice embodied in the draft agreements, Hailsham was 
unhappy with the trade and defence aspects of Britain’s proposals. He warned the ISC against 
a ‘policy of surrender’ and refused to endorse the proposals which were to be offered to 
Eire.
213
 His conviction that concessions to de Valera were futile again surfaced when the 
cabinet was asked to approve the draft proposals. Hailsham asked for his dissent to be 
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recorded for the first time in an eleven-year cabinet career, becoming the only minister to 
protest against relinquishing the ports.
214
 His isolated stand was so hopeless that he merely 
requested that the cabinet should note that he had already recorded dissent in the ISC and he 
‘would not repeat his views’.215  
But before the final agreements were signed, Hailsham opposed further British climb-
downs. On 10 March the Prime Minister put forward the so-called ‘final offer’ in relation to 
trade between Northern and Southern Ireland. With Eire achieving concessions in finance and 
defence, Britain’s proposals maintained that Northern Ireland should be granted trading 
preferences over a five-year period.
216
 But when de Valera rejected what Hailsham described 
as ‘a very handsome offer’,217 Chamberlain pressured Craigavon’s administration to accept 
an agreement that allowed Eire to maintain a tariff against the Six Counties. With the entire 
agreement hinging on this issue, Craigavon expressed his disapproval of the proposals, but 
stated that he was willing to accept the terms if Northern Ireland was compensated.
218
 In 
response to Eire’s uncompromising line, Hailsham called for an adjournment of the 
negotiations to educate the Empire about the ‘true facts of the Ulster situation’. Countering 
MacDonald’s claim that the Dominions favoured the proposals, Hailsham stated that if they 
only ‘knew the sacrifices which Ulster had made in the cause of loyalty they might be less 
ready to see a “fiscal” screw applied to her’.219 Nevertheless, on 22 March Hailsham’s fears 
were realised. MacDonald informed the cabinet that de Valera’s government had refused to 
make concessions to Northern Ireland.
220
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In this new situation, Hailsham was moved to write Chamberlain a long letter, 
pleading that ‘Ulster loyalty is not for sale!’ He complained that British policy was ‘occupied 
in trying to bribe the Ulster Government’. Convinced that fundamental principles were at 
stake, he pulled no punches: 
I realise that some of my colleagues regard Ulster as an obstinate and stubborn people 
who are wholly unreasonable in preferring their loyalty to the King and their 
inclusion in the Empire to adhesion to a disloyal Republic; but I understood that we 
are all agreed that... it would be made clear to Eire that we should not bring any form 
of pressure on Ulster on the Partition issue. 
With Eire maintaining tariffs against the Six Counties, Hailsham believed that Chamberlain’s 
administration was giving 
Eire the power to bring economic pressure on Ulster in order to compel its people to 
secede from the United Kingdom and to become part of Eire. That was why I 
supported your ingenious suggestion [in the ISC] that if we gave free entry to Eire we 
should stipulate that Eire would give free entry to Ulster...  
Hailsham did not doubt that de Valera’s desire to end partition explained his rejection of the 
British terms. After the sub-committee had concluded that, if Eire rejected Britain’s ‘final 
offer’, the negotiations should end, he could not understand why Britain was ‘occupied in 
trying to bribe the Ulster government from the British Exchequer into accepting the Treaty 
without free entry to Ulster!’ Hailsham accepted that ‘the pill can be gilded so attractively 
from the resources of the United Kingdom Exchequer as to conceal the poison which lurks 
within it’, but he did not believe that ‘the Ulster Government would have anything to do with 
the Treaty... if they appreciated that its effect would be to enable Eire to compel Ulster to 
secede from her allegiance’. The arguments against the Treaty were ‘overwhelming’ and he 
198 
 
‘beg[ged] [Chamberlain] not to agree to using the British Taxpayers’ money to... coax a 
reluctant Ulster into the stranglehold of this Treaty’.221  
This was powerful stuff, but Chamberlain now suggested that tariffs against the North 
were an ‘inevitable result of... separation’. Denying Hailsham’s charge, he claimed that it was 
‘libellous’ to suggest that he was trying to bribe Craigavon. The Prime Minister held that if 
Craigavon’s government accepted the agreement, ‘it will be entirely voluntary... and not 
owing to any pressure from us’. The impatient tone of his reply led the Prime Minister to add 
a handwritten note urging Hailsham to ‘take it as entirely friendly’. 222  
Typically defiant, Hailsham continued his attack in the ISC and the cabinet. He did 
not believe that ‘Eire would stand out... if we pressed them hard’, and it was unlikely that de 
Valera would risk the whole agreement to maintain a tariff against Northern Ireland.
223
 He 
still doubted whether the proposals were ‘sufficiently favourable... to justify us in 
proceeding... in view of the difficulty which it is causing Northern Ireland’.224 But these 
protests fell on deaf ears. MacDonald’s final proposals were accepted with Chamberlain’s 
full support. The Prime Minister appeared to be more concerned with a ‘successful 
conclusion...  than the actual terms upon which this agreement was founded’.225 Endorsing 
Hailsham’s belief that the North had been ‘bribed’, Craigavon only accepted the trade 
agreement after expressing ‘a desire to receive as large a financial bribe as possible’.226 
Britain subsequently granted the Six Counties agricultural subsidies and an increased share in 
arms manufacture to placate opinion in the province. Hailsham, anxious to protect the 
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majority in the Six Counties and British interests in the context of an ever-worsening 
international atmosphere, believed that the Anglo-Irish Treaty was an ‘egregious’ blunder.227 
Almost immediately, Hailsham’s opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement was 
vindicated. It transpired that the agreements meant different things to each party. 
Chamberlain believed that the gains for Britain were ‘intangible, imponderable, but 
nevertheless invaluable’.228 For the Prime Minister, Britain had 
only given up the small things... for the big things – the ending of a long quarrel, the 
beginning of better relations between North and South Ireland, and the co-operation 
of the South with us in trade and defence.
229
  
Yet, as Hailsham had anticipated, de Valera was still not satisfied. Referring to the agreement 
in the Dáil, he insisted that ‘when there is not in this Agreement a reference to Partition, and 
the ending of it, this... is a bad and poor document’.230 In the summer, Sean Lemass, another 
high-profile republican, promised to end partition, while de Valera’s son publicly exclaimed: 
‘we have got the Swilly, Derry is the next objective’.231 The Taoiseach duly began his ‘anti-
partition campaign’ in the autumn.232 Britain’s concessions, as Hailsham had feared, had been 
in vain. This was not the desired outcome to a treaty designed to improve Anglo-Irish 
relations. De Valera and his supporters had not been bought off.  
Londonderry assured Hailsham that ‘everything that you have said has been fully 
justified’.233 A key argument for the entire agreement was the atmosphere of goodwill that 
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the appeasement of de Valera would foster. Hailsham himself ‘wonder[ed] whether Neville 
ever sees cuttings from the Belfast Press!’ The veteran cabinet minister continued: 
I am afraid [Chamberlain] is convinced by the universal chorus of approval in this 
country and the United States that his expectation of better relations with Southern 
Ireland is being successfully achieved... I wish I had proved wrong and he had proved 
right, but I think young de Valera’s speech about the enemy going out and Derry 
being the next objective, and about the necessity of being strong so as to rescue their 
unfortunate northern brothers... is proof to the contrary. I do not believe the British 
government know the actual situation, or anything about it.
234
 
Hailsham’s warnings regarding abandoning the ports were far-sighted and hindsight 
suggests that the ports were ‘rashly surrendered’.235 When Britain and France declared war on 
Germany in September 1939, the Dáil passed the Emergency Powers Act which secured Irish 
neutrality and thwarted Britain’s access to the ports. This was despite the fact that Eire 
remained incapable of defending its own waterways and the same convoys that the Treaty 
Ports could protect carried goods destined for Eire as well as Britain.
236
 Although Britain’s 
scheme of maritime defence continued to be based around the ports,
237
 de Valera’s 
‘uncompromising answer’ to Britain’s request to use them in October 1939 ‘was a categorical 
“non possumus”’. The 1938 Agreement, Britain’s representative in Dublin protested, was ‘an 
act of faith... in the belief that in the hour of need the hand of friendship would be extended’. 
But de Valera’s response was that Britain ‘had no right to expect... advantage from what was 
not ours’.238 The Taoiseach would only consider entering the Second World War if partition 
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ended. Maffey summed up the cost for Britain: ‘Had we retained and exercised our rights, 
hundreds of ships and thousands of lives would have been saved.’239  
The verdict of Chamberlain and many of his colleagues that the ports would be of 
‘little use’ was mistaken.240 He had underestimated their value in a European war and was 
deluded in his belief that he could secure the goodwill of de Valera’s government.241 Before 
his death he confessed that ‘I did not get all that I hoped for from Mr. de Valera’.242 
MacDonald also accepted that he had ‘made mistakes... about the extent of the concessions 
[de Valera] would be prepared to make’ and that he ‘had been too optimistic in [his] advice to 
the cabinet’.243 After all, in 1936 he had told his colleagues that he expected that one day the 
King would ‘ride through Dublin to open sessions of the Dáil and read the speech from the 
throne’.244 While Hailsham’s approach lacked a constructive alternative, his recognition of de 
Valera’s objectives was, at least, realistic. His unsuccessful stand showed that he appreciated 
the important role that the ports could play in a future war and the unlikelihood of them being 
returned on acceptable terms once they were handed over.
245
 
Churchill labelled the Anglo-Irish Agreement an ‘improvident example of 
appeasement’,246 and Hailsham understood the government’s Irish policy in similar terms. He 
saw a parallel between the stance taken towards de Valera and that adopted towards Nazi 
Germany. The Germans, he told Londonderry, were ‘impossible people’ to make an 
agreement with ‘short of surrender’. In fact, ‘an agreement between us and them would be 
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just like our proposed agreement with Southern Ireland – namely a complete acceptance of 
their domination and demands’.247 Chamberlain and MacDonald also placed the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement in the context of the government’s wider foreign policy. The Prime Minister 
hoped that the agreements would convince Hitler of Britain’s willingness to negotiate a broad 
European settlement. ‘I am very anxious to get the [Anglo-Irish] agreement’, he told his 
sister, ‘as I think it would produce an excellent effect in Berlin.’248 He even used the 
‘anxieties over the international situation’ to convince Craigavon that it was ‘almost essential 
for me to show some evidence that the policy of peace by negotiation can be successful’.  He 
had  
good hopes that I shall be able to bring forward an Anglo-Italian Agreement... but if I 
can accompany that with an Anglo-Irish Agreement it would add greatly to the 
impression made upon the world. And it is very necessary that an impression of 
solidarity should be made here and not least in Berlin.
249
   
MacDonald similarly noted that ‘We have got to try and break through the suspicions and 
distrust which at present exist [between Britain and Eire], just as we are trying to break 
through the suspicions and distrust which have existed between Italy and this country’.250 
But, if the constraints on Britain’s freedom of manoeuvre in the international arena ultimately 
reconciled Hailsham to the appeasement of Germany and Italy,
251
 he believed that no such 
factors existed in relation to Eire. Put simply, Britain’s relative strength meant that in this 
instance appeasement was unnecessary. 
Hailsham’s opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not simply the knee-jerk 
reaction of a diehard imperialist. He understood that, rather than being ends in themselves, de 
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Valera’s violations of past agreements were steps towards establishing an all-Ireland republic. 
After meeting de Valera, Hailsham did not doubt the Irishman when he claimed that ‘no 
permanent settlement would ever be accepted on any other terms’.252 Determined to uphold 
the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland, Hailsham would never accept the end of 
partition. He believed that concessions short of de Valera’s ultimate goal would only lead to 
greater demands. The Anglo-Irish Agreement underlined a difference in outlook between 
supporters and opponents of Chamberlain’s overseas policy. Hailsham was not convinced 
that yielding to de Valera’s demands would facilitate acceptable agreements with the fascist 
powers. His opposition represented the first of two significant stands against the 
government’s appeasement policy in 1938.253  
Indian Constitutional Reform 1930-35 
The question of Indian constitutional reform has been described as Britain’s 
‘signature political event between the advent of the National Government... and the 
abdication crisis’.254 Yet, one recent study points out that the Government of India Act ‘has 
not received the sustained historical or scholarly attention one might expect’.255 This perhaps 
explains why Hailsham’s role in India’s constitutional development has been neglected. 
Though afforded only brief references in existing narratives of Britain’s inter-war Indian 
question, his role went much further than ‘agreement to keep quiet in public on the potential 
perils of Indian reform’.256 His prominence in the Conservative hierarchy and the National 
Government meant that he played a leading role in the formulation, presentation, and 
ultimately, the passage of the Government of India Act of 1935.  
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Although Hailsham never held direct responsibility for Indian policy, after visiting 
Lord Irwin, the Viceroy of India, in late 1929, he became involved in what was a ‘monstrous 
load upon British domestic politics’.257 Through his public support for the National 
Government’s plans for reform, he became an invaluable asset in convincing hesitant 
Conservatives to support its proposals. This was no mean feat. When the extent of the reform 
contemplated became public, the party as a whole was at best ambivalent, or at worst openly 
hostile. As Baldwin’s biographers note, ‘Nothing quite like it had been seen since the... 
Repeal of the Corn Laws’.258 Considering that Hailsham is often dismissed as a reactionary 
diehard, his contribution to a progressive solution to Indian reform that Diehards opposed is 
striking. 
The National Government came into office with the broad basis of its policy towards 
India already decided. During the First World War, the then India Secretary, Edwin Montagu, 
declared that Britain’s policy amounted to ‘the gradual development of self-governing 
institutions with... the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an 
integral part of the British Empire’. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, embodied in the 
Government of India Act of 1919, established a system of diarchy in the major provinces and 
transferred limited responsibilities to native Indians. The act laid down that within ten years a 
commission should investigate the workings of the new constitution and propose further 
reform. Such a body was established in 1927 under the chairmanship of the Liberal lawyer, 
John Simon. In October 1929, however, before Simon’s commission had completed its 
enquiries, Irwin declared that ‘the natural issue of India’s constitutional progress is the 
attainment of Dominion Status’. Although surpassing the anticipated conclusions of Simon’s 
report, this statement was accepted by the Labour Prime Minister, MacDonald, and by 
Baldwin, on behalf of the Conservatives, as the ultimate aim of British rule in India. Bringing 
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this aspiration to fruition would, however, be no easy matter as the troubled path to the 
Government of India Act revealed. Although Irwin’s declaration appeared to be a 
continuation of the Montagu-Chelmsford approach, the Statute of Westminster ensured that 
the substance of Dominion Status underwent a significant change during the intervening 
period. Irwin’s announcement even led Gandhi to conclude ‘We are now entering upon a new 
era.’259 The difficulties facing policy-makers were palpable. Nevertheless, after allusions to 
‘responsible government’ and ‘Dominion Status’, legislation was imperative.  
The whiggish view of the twilight of British imperialism holds that the Act of 1935 
was a constructive achievement that helped facilitate India’s later independence.260 Yet, while 
the legislation was used as a model for India’s independent constitution after the Second 
World War, Hailsham, and those who crafted the reform bill, shared the view that the British 
Raj would ‘last for generations into the indefinite future’.261 One of the chief aims of his 
political career was imperial unity and he did not anticipate Britain’s retreat from global pre-
eminence. Although he held doubts about the extent of the constitutional advance envisaged, 
he supported reform because he accepted that it was consistent with Britain’s past pledges, 
and because he believed that it was possible for the government to live up to existing 
promises and retain British authority on the Subcontinent.
262
 
But satisfying the demands of Indian nationalists such as Gandhi, whilst maintaining 
Britain’s interests and the support of Britain’s allies on the sub-continent, was a difficult – 
perhaps impossible – task. With several religions and four main ethnic groups involved, any 
form of Indian self-government would be complicated. Progress required a constitution that 
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could reconcile Indian autonomy with Britain’s attempts to maintain its own and minority 
interests. If proposals were too cautious, British rule could be threatened by growing 
separatist tensions, while an excessively progressive concession to Indian nationalism could 
alienate the pro-British forces in India and opinion at home.  
The prospect of Indian reform created significant tensions within the Tory party and it 
presented the Conservative leadership with a formidable challenge. Conservatives regarded 
India as the jewel of the Empire, a key symbol of British imperialism, power and prestige. 
Party opinions ranged from the liberal Conservatism espoused by Baldwin, Irwin and Samuel 
Hoare, to right-wing ‘Diehards’, led by Winston Churchill, who set their face against further 
Indian autonomy in the foreseeable future. When at a party meeting in 1929 Baldwin 
committed himself to reform without allowing a debate on the subject, ‘There was a sort of 
gasp and... no one in the party approved what he had done’.263 His approach went too far for 
many patriotic Conservatives who regarded themselves as custodians of Britain’s imperial 
heritage and believed that Britain’s rule in India was a moral undertaking and the best – 
perhaps only – means of preventing civil war. Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaigns in 1930 
and 1932 merely confirmed their opinion. What’s more, as the safeguards in the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty proved hollow, Tories readily drew upon the Irish precedent which had apparently 
proved that conciliating nationalists was counter-productive. 
Conservative opposition was so deep-seated that the balance of opinion was 
unfavourable to the party leadership. In 1933 Samuel Hoare, who served as India Secretary 
from 1931-5, suggested that amongst his parliamentary colleagues, ‘there are not thirty keen 
to go on with the India Bill... [T]he great mass is very lukewarm and a very strong minority is 
actively hostile.’264 Similarly, his under-secretary, R.A. Butler, compiled a ‘black list’ of 
                                                 
263
 NCDL, vol.3, p.160, Chamberlain to Hilda, 26 Oct. 1929.  
264
 Hoare, India Office Papers, Eur.E.240/4/1043-6, Hoare to Willingdon, 20 April 1933. 
207 
 
backbenchers which was longer than his so-called ‘white list’.265 Malcolm Hailey, the 
distinguished Indian administrator and one of Hoare’s principal advisors, noted that ‘a great 
number of people in London’ were speculating ‘on the possibility of a break-away by the 
more Tory section of the party’.266  
The ultimate passage of the India Bill in 1935, therefore, represented a triumph for the 
Conservative leadership. The achievement has largely been credited to Baldwin and Hoare. 
The Conservative leader’s willingness to turn debates on the proposed bill into a vote of 
confidence in the party leadership was important,
267
 whilst the India Secretary’s contribution, 
as the architect of the Bill, was clearly significant.
268
 His bargain with influential independent 
Conservatives, such as Austen Chamberlain and Lord Derby, was noteworthy as it helped 
provide votes at party conferences and in parliament.
269
 The inclusion in the presentation of 
Indian policy of individuals who implemented sanctions against the Irish Free State in the 
early 1930s, also helped offset ‘real Die Hard hostility’.270 Herein lay Hailsham’s importance. 
Hoare recognised that the approval of the parliamentary Conservative party was required if 
reform was to reach the statute book. Although Hailsham privately opposed the degree of 
Indian autonomy that the bill would confer, publicly he emerged as a committed supporter of 
the government’s policy. He would have preferred to play a passive role in the whole issue, 
but from 1930 he was implicated in Indian policy because the Conservative leadership 
recognised the significance of having him onside. They were determined to use Hailsham’s 
established position on the Tory centre-right and his particular influence in the House of 
Lords to their advantage. From 1932 Hailsham’s oratorical gifts and vigorous advocacy of the 
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government’s India policy at Conservative conferences, party meetings and in the Lords 
helped cajole reluctant Conservatives to back the India Bill.  
*** 
Before the close of 1929, while the Conservatives remained out of office, Hailsham 
embarked on a Far-East tour, chairing Britain’s delegation to the Institute of Pacific Relations 
at the Kyoto Conference in Japan, before visiting Lord Irwin in Delhi and spending two 
months in India.
271
 His trip to India was important as, unlike many leading personalities in 
debates over Indian reform such as Churchill, he had witnessed conditions in India after the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were initiated. This meant that his opinions on Indian 
constitutional reform were, at least in part, shaped by his perception of conditions on the 
ground. Hailsham discussed the issue of constitutional reform with Indian politicians 
representing various schools of thought, but he refused to hold discussions with the Indian 
nationalist Congress party ‘because they had declared their goal was nothing else than 
separation from the British Empire’.272  
Hailsham arrived in Delhi shortly after Irwin had made his famous declaration, and 
India’s constitutional development was at the forefront of his considerations. Irwin was ‘very 
glad to see’ him and found Hailsham ‘much more sympathetic to the atmosphere than I 
expected’.273 The Viceroy, in a long appraisal of Hailsham’s thinking, informed his brother-
in-law, George Lane-Fox, and Samuel Hoare, who led the Conservative delegation at the 
Round Table Conference [RTC] which began in late 1930, that 
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I have had a lot of talk with [Hailsham] who is very intelligent and from conversation 
with whom I have greatly benefitted. His broad view is that he would go pretty well 
the whole way in the Provinces... though he would of course give the Governor 
General personal powers. 
Specifically, Hailsham favoured a central assembly, indirectly elected from the provinces, 
which would retain existing powers relating to legislation, voting, and budgets. Although 
Hailsham believed that the Viceroy and his government must continue to be appointed by the 
British government and must not be obliged to accept the Assembly’s proposals, he hoped 
that, in matters where vital British interests were not concerned, the Viceroy’s administration 
‘would normally accept the Assembly view’. Members of the Assembly might serve in the 
Viceroy’s council although they would not be appointed or removed by the Assembly. On 
matters where British interests were most concerned, including defence, foreign policy and 
the treatment of minorities, Hailsham believed that power must stay firmly in British hands. 
The Assembly ‘would be quite free to talk and say what they thought’, but the Governor 
General could discard their advice. Hailsham, therefore, envisaged that the Assembly would 
be an advisory body. ‘When you boil it down’, Irwin surmised, 
it seems to me not to amount to much more than saying that Ministers are 
irremovable, and... there is a great deal to be said for this. Hogg’s point is something 
of this sort. You can look forward to the constitution developing much in the way in 
which power with the Crown at home has given place to responsible government as 
the popular advisory body gave advice more and more that was sensible.
274
 
Hailsham, therefore, had accepted that a central legislative body and a federation were the 
best means of advance. But he judged that the devolution of real power lay way into the 
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future. Transferring power too early, he concluded, would not serve India’s interests, 
Britain’s interests or the Empire’s interests.   
Lane-Fox, who was a member of Simon’s Commission, ‘was much interested by what 
you say of... Douglas Hogg’, noting that his ‘conclusions tally remarkably with ours, which 
rather reassures me.’275 Shortly before Simon’s Commission reported, Lane-Fox informed 
Irwin: 
You need not be afraid of finding any recommendations in our report that the 
[existing] power of the Assembly should be rudely curtailed... [W]here I meant that 
Douglas Hogg’s view seemed to tally with mine, was his suggestion that an increase 
in responsibility should come to the provinces, but that central government should not 
be weakened at that moment by being made more responsible to the Assembly.
276
 
Simon’s view was identical. Ahead of his two volume report published in June 1930, he 
informed the Viceroy that ‘We have gone a very long way in the provinces, further than some 
experienced advisors may think wise – but I must warn you that we do not find it at all easy 
to go anything like so far at the centre’.277 Hailsham’s ideas on how to advance, as Lane-Fox 
recognised, had much in common with the Simon Report. He, like Simon’s commission, 
judged that an all-India federation with real power at the centre was impracticable. During 
the years 1930-5 Hailsham’s views remained remarkably consistent. He regarded the pace of 
change sought by the Indian Congress Party as visionary, informing his son that the 
‘expectations’ created by Irwin’s Declaration were ‘bound to be disappointed’.278 He would 
not willingly accept a reduction of British influence or repudiate existing responsibilities.  
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Although there were clear limits to the extent of India’s constitutional development in 
which Hailsham would acquiesce, he accepted the need for reform. After his return from the 
subcontinent, he had read a series of attacks on Irwin. In one speech he defended the Viceroy 
and revealed his own approach to Indian reform: 
When Lord Irwin had assumed the Viceroyalty of India he was not assuming it with 
no commitments and with a free hand... For more than ten years now we have been 
committed to a particular objective, and whether it be right or wrong, when this 
country’s word is pledged, I am satisfied that no party in the State would wish to go 
back on its word so pledged. 
Concluding that ‘an Englishman’s word was his bond’, he believed that past pledges, 
however problematic, must be acted upon.
279
 While the preservation of Britain’s place in 
India was vital, Hailsham thought that this must be balanced with keeping promises given to 
Indians. 
The important role that Hailsham could play in Indian reform became clear before his 
return to office. In an attempt to reconcile competing interests over India’s constitutional 
development, Britain held three Round Table Conferences in London between 1930 and 
1932. Delegations from the three main British political parties attended and all shades of 
opinion from India were invited. In June 1930, as the opening of the first conference 
approached, MacDonald proposed that the RTC should aim to draft a ‘Dominion’ 
constitution for India. Hailsham, however, along with his colleagues in the Conservative 
business committee, blocked this approach. The Liberals, under the guidance of Lord 
Reading, a former Viceroy, shared Conservative concerns.
280
 It was agreed that Britain’s 
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delegation should not accept a statement which implied that the RTC would devise a 
Dominion constitution.
281
  
Hailsham’s views, therefore, had not moved forward beyond those of the Simon 
Report, despite the fact that many Indian leaders believed that Simon’s scheme of careful 
progress to self-government was out of date.
282
 Despite his broad measure of agreement with 
Hailsham earlier in 1930, these developments ensured that Lane-Fox now expressed his 
concerns to Irwin: ‘Hailsham, in spite of his talks with you, is I am afraid, very much against 
concessions, and the difficulty of preventing a party snap over India is going to be serious’.283 
Yet, despite Hailsham’s cautious approach, Hoare was aware that the former Lord Chancellor 
had accepted the necessity for reform and he recognised the importance of involving 
Hailsham in Indian policy. During the years 1929-31, Hailsham’s influence in the party had 
reached its zenith and Hoare attempted to include him amongst the Conservative 
representatives on the RTC, set to begin in November. ‘Could you not still... get Hailsham to 
serve’, Hoare asked Baldwin, ‘he is just the kind of mind that we want in the team.’ His 
presence 
would help steady die-hard opinion in the party, and particularly in the House of 
Lords. Without him... you may have great trouble with some of the members of the 
extreme right of the party. I would therefore say “get him if you possibly can”.284  
Viscount Peel, the former India Secretary, was of the same mind. While noting his ‘great 
legal skill’, he also observed that Hailsham ‘commands the confidence of the Party’. Peel was 
therefore, ‘very sorry... that Hailsham will not be a member’.285 Like Hoare, he was aware 
that Hailsham’s political influence could have a considerable effect on backbench 
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Conservatives. Although Salisbury advocated the participation of younger Conservatives at 
the RTC and criticised Baldwin for his ‘unduly restricted choice’ of ‘members of the late 
government’, he regarded Hailsham as an exception. The latter’s inclusion, Salisbury told 
Baldwin, was ‘most important’ because ‘You want for this supreme question the best brains 
and character you can find.’ Hailsham should be included because ‘he is very able and strong 
and very ready in argument and in resource’.286 
Hailsham, however, preferred to remain aloof from the India question and it appeared 
that he would have his way. It was ‘very generous of you to let me off’, he told Baldwin: 
Thank you so much! I don’t think I could have made a success of the job, with the 
feelings I have about it and... the ‘terms’ on which the Congress leaders would make 
peace have greatly added to my uneasiness. I certainly don’t regard the conference as 
called for the purpose of framing a constitution giving immediate Dominion Status to 
India, with or without temporary safeguards.
287
 
The forces of opposition had also recognised Hailsham’s importance in the 
Conservative ranks and had sensed his reluctance to implement far-reaching reform. 
Churchill, who had resigned from the business committee in January because of Baldwin’s 
progressive approach to the India question, asked Rothermere, the press baron, for greater 
news coverage of his crusade against reform and for his newspaper to pressure Hailsham to 
oppose the party leaders’ plans. Otherwise, Churchill complained, Baldwin, with the support 
of The Times, would be ‘master of the fate of India’. He noted that  
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Hailsham is going to speak in the Free Trade Hall on Friday... and an article in the 
Daily Mail urging him to speak out like a man in the cause of India may be very 
desirable. (I am just going up to London to see him).
288
   
Churchill, however, failed to persuade his former colleague to join him in outright opposition. 
Publicly attacking a policy which had been accepted by the party leadership was never 
Hailsham’s style and he restricted his speech to a denunciation of the Labour government’s 
forthcoming Trade Disputes Bill and its inability to solve unemployment.
289
 
Although Hailsham seemed to have avoided involvement in the RTC, Hoare 
continued to call for his participation. Anticipating a serious breach in the Conservative party 
if Hailsham was not involved, he pressed Baldwin to induce the former Lord Chancellor to 
join the British delegation:  
Willie Peel and I ought to be strengthened by the help of Hailsham. Not only is a 
Conservative constitutional lawyer indispensable, but without the backing of someone 
like Hailsham it will be most difficult to carry the right of the party with us in the 
event of constitutional changes appearing to be practical.
290
  
Under pressure from his colleagues and Sankey, the Labour Lord Chancellor, Hailsham 
became a delegate to the RTC in July, joining the Federal Structure Committee. Although 
Baldwin informed the Prime Minister that Hailsham’s ‘knowledge and experience will make 
him... a valuable member of the conference’,291 in practice the latter was compelled to join to 
prevent the Conservative party from falling apart.  
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Hailsham was unenthusiastic about this appointment and it was with some trepidation 
that he notified Beaverbrook about the changed situation: 
You’ll think that whom the Gods wish to destroy they first drive mad! I’ve agreed to 
join the India show. All the Business Committee said I ought to do it. Sam Hoare 
made it a personal matter, and Sankey had already begged me to help. Probably I shall 
destroy myself politically and perhaps physically! But if your friends say it’s your 
duty, it is hardly possible to slink out for personal reluctance... India is worth a 
sacrifice.
292
 
Hailsham knew the political risks he was running for a policy about which he felt, at 
best, lukewarm. ‘It comes as a great shock’, Beaverbrook lamented, 
you cannot possibly be taking this decision with your eyes open. It is a wretched 
decision to take and it will involve you in every sort of difficulty. All the reasons 
which Hoare and others have given in favour of your joining... I could state much 
more strongly against your doing so... I beg you to re-consider your course.
293
 
But Hailsham’s desire to maintain the unity of the Empire eased his acceptance. A further 
letter to Beaverbrook made this clear: 
I realise the trouble I am letting myself in for... and I begged the [Business] 
Committee to take my view... But they were unanimous that it was my plain duty... I 
think it is possible I may do some good, both in steadying Sankey, who would like to 
be pro-British if it didn’t mean too much of a fight, and in keeping the British 
delegation together which to my mind is the one hope of saving India. If I could save 
India to the Empire... it would be worth any personal sacrifice or risk.  
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Aware of the political importance of his own presence, Hailsham added: ‘As to our own 
party, the right-wing had decided to ask S.B. to nominate someone from their ranks... they 
ought not to be disappointed at my acceptance’.294 Significantly, he had not abandoned his 
convictions and he remained ‘singularly unenthusiastic about Irwin’s actions in India’,295 but 
he attached ‘importance... to keeping public opinion at home united’ and was willing to make 
some sacrifices to maintain a broad front.
296
 He braced himself for the criticism he would 
receive for apparently deserting his Conservative principles and his commitment to the 
Empire.  
At the conference Hailsham hoped to help craft a British consensus for reform 
through reconciling Indian claims for sovereignty with safeguards. With the minority Labour 
government finding it impossible to deal with Britain’s economic predicament, Hailsham 
soon found another motive to continue his association with the RTC. Concerned that the 
Conservatives might soon return to office without a cross-party plan for Indian reform, he 
feared  
the possibility of maintaining orderly government in India if we were left in office and 
both [Labour and Liberal] parties were supporting the Indian extremists in refusing to 
obey our rule or to co-operate in the form of government which we ought to 
impose.
297
 
The establishment of the National Government in August 1931 meant that this course of 
events never materialised. 
After refusing office outside the cabinet in August, Hailsham attempted to leave the 
RTC in the autumn. It required ‘unremitting attention and attendance’ at a time when his 
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immediate priorities were changing. With a general election looming, the conference ‘would 
preclude my participation in the campaign which... is essential if we are to save the country 
from complete socialist destruction’. Hoare, however, was determined to keep him involved. 
Once again, Hailsham gave way: 
I hate being on a committee and not doing my share, but Sam Hoare shares your 
[Salisbury’s] anxiety that I should remain a member of the conference... and so I have 
arranged with him that I shall not resign membership at present [but] be free to resign 
hereafter if I see decisions being taken of which I disapprove.
298
 
Following the National Government’s landslide election victory and his appointment as War 
Secretary and Leader of the Lords in November, Hailsham’s responsibilities in relation to 
India were extended. He became part of the cabinet’s ‘central core’ devising Indian policy. 
He served on its India sub-committee, whose membership included Hoare, Sankey and 
Simon. Sankey noted that Hailsham had ‘rather a lawyer’s mind, which is apt to say “wind, 
weather and circumstances permitting”’.299 But the War Secretary’s role would soon become 
more important than this comment suggests. 
Significant progress at the RTC proved elusive. The third conference that began in 
late 1932, soon collapsed. The Congress party refused to negotiate except on terms of 
guaranteed equality, while Hindus and Muslims could not agree on minority safeguards.
300
 
This left Hoare, now India Secretary, to introduce legislation of his own. The government’s 
eventual bill sought to create an all-India federation which would end diarchy and extend 
autonomy in the provinces. Safeguards would protect India’s credit, minorities, defence and 
law and order. Powers were reserved for the Viceroy who would hold ultimate authority over 
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the most important aspects of India’s domestic and external affairs. The federation would 
only come into being once a majority of the 600 princely states had agreed to participate. The 
Princes’ concurrence was crucial because their rule ‘imparted an air of stability’ and their 
presence in the federation would undermine the influence of the Congress party.
301
 Such an 
arrangement would provide limited independence, but protect minority interests and British 
influence. 
The extent of the proposed reforms may have fitted neatly with the sort of progressive 
Conservatism espoused by Baldwin and other leaders, but it went beyond what rank and file 
Tories were prepared to accept. Participation in what was, in practice, a coalition provided a 
convenient pretext for the policy which the government pursued and it is questionable 
whether a purely Tory administration could have pushed through such changes. Opposition 
led by Churchill and the India Defence League proved formidable. Notwithstanding 
Hailsham’s private objections, his public loyalty could be relied upon. He was determined to 
hold the Conservative party and the National Government together as his celebrated 
‘Agreement to Differ’ had shown in early 1932. His influence over the Tory centre-right was 
a powerful weapon in securing these objectives. 
As Leader of the Lords, Hailsham faced challenges to the government’s policy from 
Conservative and Labour peers alike. In December 1931 he spoke against Lord Lloyd’s 
amendment that rejected the government’s plan to introduce Indian constitutional reform. 
Lloyd alleged that the government could not yet ‘pronounce a final judgment regarding the 
solution of the Indian problem’.302 This was supported by a number of influential peers. 
Hoare informed Lord Willingdon, Irwin’s successor as Viceroy, that Salisbury had ‘made a 
great impression’ when he backed Lloyd’s amendment. ‘If there had been a division that 
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evening’, Hoare concluded, it ‘would undoubtedly have beaten the government.’ There was 
then a very real danger that the government could be defeated before its plans had even got 
off the ground.
303
  
Ahead of the final day of the Lords debate a group of leading Conservatives met to 
discuss the critical situation. The India Secretary outlined the group’s anxiety and Hailsham’s 
crucial role in the government’s ultimate success: 
So anxious... were some of our people that Irwin and several of them wished us to 
accept a motion for adjournment until February and not risk defeat. Hailsham and I 
were strongly against any such withdrawal. We took the view that if the House of 
Lords were against us, it would be better to have it out and a division at once.
304
  
The following day Hailsham made an important speech on behalf of the government, 
shrewdly minimising the importance of the resolution. ‘[Y]ou are not committing yourselves 
to any scheme at all’, he assured the Lords,   
you are committing yourselves to this and to this only, that you endorse the action of 
the Government in going on with their inquiries and negotiations... and you reserve to 
yourselves full liberty... when the solution is brought before you... to reject it.
305
 
Following the announcement that the Indian princes would participate in an all-India 
federation with sufficient safeguards, Hailsham disagreed with Lloyd and claimed that now 
was the time to act. He pointed out that the princes’ involvement would mean ‘a much more 
stable and much more safe, a much more conservative... form of government than you are 
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likely to achieve by any other method of advance’. It would, he held, be ‘a profound mistake 
if this golden opportunity should be thrown away’.306  
             The evidence suggests that the War Secretary convinced uncommitted peers and 
Lloyd’s amendment was quashed. The Daily Telegraph noted that the ‘remarkably forensic 
effort by Lord Hailsham... saved the Government from a defeat’.307 ‘As it turned out’, Hoare 
noted with some relief, 
we were right. Hailsham’s speech really turned the day, and Willie Peel gave us some 
very valuable help. The moral of all this is that we must go very carefully and 
constantly keep in mind not only the great strength but also the deep anxiety of 
Conservative opinion here.
308
 
Acceptance of the government’s resolution was more significant than Hailsham alleged. After 
it had passed through both chambers, critics could no longer claim that the government 
pursued Indian reform without parliament’s approval. The debates in both chambers, Hoare 
concluded, had ‘acted as safety valves... and I think our course will be easier as a result’.309 
Salisbury recognised this and privately accused Hailsham of misleading the second 
chamber.
310
  
Notwithstanding Hailsham debating success, Hoare knew that although the War 
Secretary had ‘put the government case with great force and courage’, he was ‘in his heart of 
hearts still doubtful about the practicability of All-India Federation’.311  The India Secretary, 
however, continued to use Hailsham’s support to his advantage. In a BBC broadcast in late 
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1932, he reassured listeners that his approach to Indian constitutional change tallied with the 
views of distinguished politicians with particular knowledge of Indian affairs. In addition to 
Hailsham the names of the Liberals Lord Reading and Simon were provided.
312
 Nonetheless, 
Hailsham, the man who had convinced uncommitted peers to support the government’s 
approach, remained unsure about the wisdom of such a course. The Churchillian wing of the 
Conservative party suspected that this was the case and its reaction to Hailsham’s advocacy 
was predictable. Brendan Bracken assured Churchill that  
All of your friends... turned up to vote, including Lord Carson. His comments on 
Hailsham would make a good page in an anthology of invective. All the Diehards... 
have finished with Hailsham. They agree with the graceful words of his stepson, 
Edward Marjoribanks, that Hailsham is not a Statesman, but one of the gentlemen of 
the long robe who can be hired to advocate almost any cause.
313
 
This assessment matched that of Lloyd’s wife who wrote that Hailsham’s speech was ‘a 
clever lawyer’s argument’.314 Despite his debating success, the War Secretary had not 
convinced all spectators that he sincerely believed in reform.  
For all that, the division lists suggest that mainstream Conservatives were happy to 
follow Hailsham’s lead. He himself had not abandoned his concerns and critics did not 
witness his conduct in the cabinet or the cabinet’s India sub-committee where Sankey 
claimed he was ‘difficult and reactionary’.315 The main difference between his approach and 
that of the government’s critics was that he remained open-minded about the possibility of 
reform, believing that British interests and Indian nationalism could be reconciled. He 
revealed to Salisbury that 
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Safeguards... are essential... no constitution which does not adequately provide for 
these can be accepted. Whether it is possible to frame efficient safeguards with a 
federal constitution remains to be ascertained – my difference with Winston’s view is 
that he assumes it to be impossible... If such a constitution can be framed, I should not 
refuse to enact it merely because it involves some degree of Indian responsibility at 
the centre; if it can’t be framed, then I should not accept a constitution which omitted 
the safeguards which I regard as essential.
316
 
The War Secretary hoped to plot a course between British imperialism and Indian 
nationalism. His willingness to engage with reform was motivated, as over Ireland, by a 
respect for existing agreements. Statements of policy embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford 
Report and the Irwin Declaration may not have been to his liking, but they had created 
expectations among Indians that could not be ignored. Hailsham believed that Britain’s 
Indian policy had ‘been wrong for a great many years’. But unlike those opposed to the 
government’s line, he recognised that ‘the policy has been adopted and publicly proclaimed 
and we have to deal with the state of affairs as it exists and not... as it might have been if we 
had not made the mistakes of the past’.317 Unlike his opponents, Hailsham would not violate 
previous commitments, however inconvenient he found them. The same approach he adopted 
in relation to Anglo-Irish affairs now worked in favour of altering the status quo rather than 
defending it. Past pledges meant that reform must be delivered. The best he could hope for 
was to prevent a permanent split in the Tory ranks whilst making the safeguards in the 
forthcoming bill as effective as possible. 
As Leader of the Lords, Hailsham was naturally concerned about opposition to the 
India Bill in a chamber suspicious of the government’s India policy and renowned for its 
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reactionary character.
318
 Warning the cabinet that the Lords ‘would probably be much more 
critical of a progressive policy in India than the... Commons’, he anticipated ‘great 
difficulties... in regards to the sufficiency of the safeguards, and it was certain that the Irish 
precedent would be quoted against the government’. Keen to restrain the government’s 
radicalism, he hoped that political constraints would ensure that Hoare ‘would not go beyond 
his existing commitments’.319 
This strategy was apparent in the cabinet sub-committee during 1932 and early 1933 
when Hoare’s plans for reform took shape. Hailsham and Simon were effective in limiting 
the scope for autonomy to the provinces and in deferring federation with sovereignty until an 
unspecified later date.
320
 This was the essence of the government’s final proposals which 
allowed for ‘a long de facto period between provincial autonomy and federation’.321 When 
the sub-committee considered the substance of what eventually became Hoare’s white paper, 
Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform, Hailsham frequently expressed concerns about 
India’s solvency, defence and legal system. He opposed the immediate transfer of financial 
control, ‘not only because we are such wonderful financiers and the Indians are stupid’, but 
because ‘there would be such a lowering of the credit... that India could not carry on’ and 
might fall into a ‘Bolshevik state of permanent insolvency’. Nonetheless, Hailsham accepted 
that past pledges meant that Britain should relinquish some financial control, otherwise ‘no 
Indian would play’ and the government could be accused of ‘a breach of faith’.322 He was, 
however, unwilling to accept Irwin’s argument that defence estimates should be dependent on 
votes from the Indian legislature, because the money voted on would be provided by India. 
Hailsham insisted that  
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defence was first and foremost among the reserved services and it must be for the 
Governor General to determine the amount to be spent. To give way in this matter 
would be to invite defeat in parliament... He was unwilling to contemplate urgent 
defence questions being held up pending the exercise of the Governor General’s 
powers of certification.  
On this occasion, his warnings were endorsed.
323
 His influence thus worked against the 
Diehards in public and his progressively-minded colleagues in private. But, despite limiting 
some aspects of the proposed scope of Indian reform, he remained uneasy. The Indian sub-
committee, he concluded, ‘had been working on the wrong lines’. He feared that provincial 
governments would be unable to administer law and order satisfactorily and that there was ‘a 
distinct possibility... of miscarriages of justice’.324 When Hoare sought the cabinet’s approval 
before his white paper was launched in March, Hailsham  
violently rejected [the idea]... that this was the minimum... required to satisfy our 
pledges... From the first he had had misgivings as to our Indian policy and he felt it 
would not be right for him to allow his colleagues to assume that he was satisfied. 
With the Irish parallel at the forefront of his mind, he questioned whether safeguards would 
be effective. Fearing that the Viceroy would be unable to use the powers he possessed, he 
doubted whether a ‘superman’ could be found to occupy that post. Although the bill would 
theoretically remain inoperative if the Indian Princes did not enter the federation, he warned 
that there would be ‘tremendous pressure to go on’ and form the central legislature without 
their presence. Under such circumstances, he concluded that safeguards were likely to break 
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down as India would be run ‘by Indians who were very clever, but not good administrators 
and often corrupt’.325  
These concerns were received sympathetically. Hoare shared many of his doubts, 
while Baldwin felt that Hailsham’s reservations ‘had some echo in the hearts of all of the 
cabinet’. The Tory leader reflected that ‘as a Conservative his fundamental creed was the 
preservation of the Empire... The present proposals might save India to the Empire, but if 
they were not introduced we should certainly lose it.’ Hailsham, determined to facilitate 
imperial unity, admitted that he ‘could not suggest a better scheme’ and accepted his share of 
responsibility for the proposals.
326
 The draft was agreed by the cabinet and presented to 
parliament ahead of its examination by a parliamentary Joint Select Committee [JSC].  
Yet, although the cabinet approved Hoare’s scheme, the government’s problems were 
only just beginning. The party rebels did not regard the white paper as a ‘Conservative’ 
policy at all. Led by Churchill, they ‘fought tooth and nail’ to block the bill and ‘at times the 
struggle was a near run thing’.327 In February 1933 Henry Page Croft’s hostile Commons 
motion claimed that ‘the transference of responsibility at the centre [in India] is inexpedient 
at the present time’.328 While only 42 Conservatives voted against the government, 245 MPs 
abstained. The government was concerned that this ‘group of uncommitted backbenchers 
[could] be converted to the Diehard cause’.329 A month later, at a meeting of the Conservative 
National Union, Churchill proposed a resolution declaring that Indian independence would 
harm both British and Indian interests. This was only defeated by 189 votes to 165. Hoare, 
understandably, feared the ‘making of a first-class crisis’ with ‘a breakaway of three-quarters 
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of the Conservative Party’.330 The mobilisation of pressure groups such as the India Defence 
League gave the India question extra-parliamentary exposure. Launched in June 1933, the 
League produced over 20 pamphlets and was supported by 85 parliamentarians, two of them 
former governors of Indian provinces.
331
 With Conservative opposition to the India Bill 
threatening to rip the party apart, Hailsham, as Hoare had astutely anticipated, became an 
indispensable instrument to allay the fears of the Tory right and promote party unity. 
While privately sympathising with many of the concerns of the opponents of reform, 
Hailsham attempted to gather as much Conservative support as possible. He looked beyond 
immediate issues, understanding that an enduring split in the Conservative ranks could lead to 
the collapse of the National Government and Labour’s return to office – the ultimate disaster 
for Britain and her Empire as far as Hailsham was concerned. Speaking at a Conservative 
meeting in mid-1933, he ‘appealed for greater loyalty to the National Government by 
Conservatives’. ‘Nothing is more distressing or paralysing’, he claimed, 
than the consciousness that your own friends, to whom you look for support, are 
lukewarm or doubtful, and that at a moment when you might have expected a wave of 
enthusiasm to carry you on you should find yourself stabbed in the back by a 
treacherous friend. 
Hailsham dismissed calls for a return to traditional party politics and the establishment of a 
purely Conservative government. Those Tories in the government, he claimed, were ‘not less 
good Conservatives than the rank and file’. Concluding on a note of defiance, he asserted, ‘I 
do not believe India is going to wreck the Conservative Party: I believe that the party is going 
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to hold together.’332 By publicly emphasising the limits of the government’s India proposals, 
he undermined his opponents’ arguments. In June 1933 he told one audience: 
It is said we are risking the credit and finance of India by the proposals. It is 
remarkable that the credit has gone up since they were made public. It is said the 
princes do not want these proposals and will not come into federation... [U]nless the 
princes do come in ... the scheme never comes into operation... It is said that the 
position of Lancashire will be prejudiced. The critics forget to add that fiscal 
autonomy is not put forward in this scheme... They say it is socialism. It is odd that in 
both houses of Parliament the Socialists object to the proposals just as strongly as the 
Diehards. They cannot both be right.
333
 
Later that month the War Secretary’s powers of persuasion were employed to address 
the Conservative dissidents directly at a meeting of the National Union. Although Baldwin 
has been credited with defeating the dissenters on this occasion,
334
 Hailsham played the key 
role. Although the exact terms of the India Bill were unknown until the JSC reported, a vote 
was called by the leadership’s opponents. This amounted to a vote of censure on the 
government’s Indian policy and defeat might have triggered its fall.335 Hoare, as the principal 
member of the JSC, chose not to defend his own policy. Baldwin introduced the subject and 
Hailsham wound up on behalf of the party leadership.
336
 In what was ‘by far the best’ speech 
of the meeting, the War Minister insisted that ‘we are not inviting a decision on the white 
paper... [W]hat we are asking you to approve is the action we have taken... in getting this 
problem properly handled, and... properly solved’. He accused Churchill and his supporters 
of making ‘wild statements’ to 
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get a resolution passed by assuring those who vote for it that they are not committing 
themselves, and then... [they would] go up and down the country telling the people 
that the government’s policy is discredited and has been disapproved by the 
Conservative party.
337
  
Despite his own doubts, Hailsham emphasised that Conservative ministers were united 
behind the government’s India policy:  
The policy which the amendment asks you to approve is the policy to which the 
whole of the Conservative members of the cabinet are committed. Is it too much to 
ask you to believe that we are not the misguided, treacherous idiots that some people 
imagine?
338
  
At the end of the debate the dissidents were defeated by 838 votes to 356. Amery 
noted that ‘Hailsham had no difficulty in mopping [Churchill] up with a devastating reply 
which George [Lloyd]... referred to as a masterpiece of advocacy’.339 Baldwin was naturally 
grateful: ‘You were quite excellent. No one could have done what was needed at that moment 
better.’340 Elibank concluded that Hailsham had ‘carried the meeting absolutely’. He could 
not ‘understand Winston... putting himself in the position he did this afternoon’. The latter’s 
‘chances of recovery grow less and less all the time’.341 Another observer agreed. Hailsham 
was ‘the star turn and he trounced Churchill thoroughly’.342 So effective was his speech that 
the Manchester Guardian was still applauding his ‘remarkable polemical energy’ three 
months after the event.
343
 Hailsham had secured the votes of many uncommitted 
Conservatives and helped deliver an important victory for the National Government’s policy, 
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despite his own lack of enthusiasm for it. He himself concluded that ‘Winston was 
disappointing’, but he was concerned that Edward Carson had spoken against the 
government.
344
 In October 1933 the Conservative leadership received another endorsement 
for their Indian policy at the annual conference by a comfortable, albeit reduced, majority. 
But, notwithstanding these setbacks, the Diehards ploughed on.
345
 As Hailsham noted, India 
was ‘being used as a stick to beat... the National Government with by a section of the 
Conservative Party’.346 
 The government awaited the report of the parliamentary JSC which began its sittings 
in April 1933. Hoare expected a conclusion in early 1934 but, after bolstering safeguards to 
carry the majority of the committee with him, it took longer than he anticipated. Then, in 
March, before the JSC’s findings were presented, the Diehards’ challenge took on a new 
form. Churchill accused Hoare and Derby of influencing evidence submitted to the JSC 
concerning the potential effects of the bill on Lancashire’s cotton exports to India. He alleged 
that both men had secured important alterations to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce’s 
statement to the JSC. Churchill claimed that Hoare and Derby had breached parliamentary 
privilege and the complaint was referred to the Committee of Privileges.
347
 This 
investigation, combined with the intervention of the summer recess, effectively delayed the 
JSC’s progress by six months.  
Hailsham, with his involvement in Indian reform and status as a legal luminary, was 
drafted in to advise Hoare and Derby. It has been speculated that Hailsham and Hoare 
withheld incriminating letters sent from the India Office to Derby.
348
 But Hailsham’s 
involvement was largely advisory, telling Derby how he should state his case to the 
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committee. A note from Derby’s lawyer exonerates the War Secretary who merely ‘expressed 
some anxiety as to the production of one letter, and when I explained to him that this 
particular letter would not be included in the file of correspondence produced by you, he then 
dropped the point’.349 Hailsham recognised that Derby would ‘be very anxious to claim the 
opportunity of being heard’ and believed that the accused would be exonerated.350 His 
confidence was vindicated. In June the committee tabled a unanimous report which cleared 
Hoare and Derby. The Commons accepted this conclusion without a division. 
Notwithstanding this positive result, Hailsham acknowledged that ‘The Indian 
problem is a long way from being solved yet; and I imagine we are going to have a serious 
fight when the Joint Committee reports’.351 This caution was justified. The India rebels were 
narrowly defeated by 543 votes to 520 during the party’s annual conference in early October. 
After this development there was a real fear that a substantial number of Conservative peers 
would vote against the government when the JSC Report was debated in the Lords. So 
serious was the situation that Lord Zetland, who went on to succeed Hoare as India Secretary 
in June 1935, even asked a group of leading Conservative peers whether it would be desirable 
to issue an unofficial whip appealing to peers, who ‘realise[d] how great the disaster would 
be if the government were beaten’, to attend the debates in December and support the 
government.
352
  
Hailsham did not take part in the debates during the Central Council meeting on 4 
December 1934. This was the occasion for the party’s debate on the JSC Report that had been 
published in mid-October. On the eve of the meeting, however, Hailsham, warning about the 
perils of disunity in the Conservative ranks, suggested that, if the Central Council accepted 
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the JSC Report and the government’s policy, ‘there would be a heavy responsibility on those 
who, however sincere, continued to fight against that [policy] which the Conservative Party 
had accepted as the Conservative cause’.353 The following day the vote was presented as one 
of confidence in Baldwin and the government. The meeting voted three to one in favour of 
the report.
354
 
While it has been argued that this approval of the government’s policy averted serious 
parliamentary opposition,
355
 there was still concern about the effects of a large minority vote 
against the report in the Lords. Ahead of the Commons debate Derby doubted if Churchill 
would receive the support of as many as 60 MPs. He was, however, more concerned about 
the situation in the second chamber. As he informed the Viceroy: 
In our house... there will be more who follow Salisbury. His amendment is cunningly 
worded, as people like myself will not support the Bill unless safeguards and 
recommendations are included, and what he apparently asks is that we should defer 
our judgement till we have seen whether they are so included.
356
  
It was important to carry the report with a large majority as an indecisive one could be used 
as a pretext by certain groups in India, most notably the Princes, not to join the federation. 
For this reason, Austen Chamberlain recognised that the government ‘must avoid a Pyrrhic 
victory’.357  
When the Lords debated the JSC recommendations and Salisbury’s amendment in 
mid-December, Hailsham assumed his accustomed role and wound up the debate for the 
government. He made another important contribution and now utilised the lack of a viable 
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alternative policy as a means to nullify residual resistance. Rejecting calls for delay, he 
asserted that India was a problem which had to be solved. Reassuring the Lords that the 
mistakes made in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty had been avoided, he was ‘sorry’ that de 
Valera’s government had ‘not lived up to those promises’, but insisted ‘that is not what we 
are relying on in the case of India’. Applying the very argument that helped guarantee his 
own acceptance of the proposals, he suggested that no-one should ‘vote against the 
Government unless... he has studied the problem for himself, and... has reached a solution 
which he is confident is a better one than the Joint Select Committee has been able to 
propose’.358  
Contemporary assessments suggest that this speech was crucial in persuading 
wavering peers who might have supported Salisbury’s amendment. As the Leader of the 
Lords spoke, ‘the Chamber filled rapidly’ until ‘there was standing room only’. His ‘rousing 
finish’ was a ‘formidable rejoinder’ to Lloyd’s support of the amendment.359 The government 
won the division decisively by 239 votes to 62. Those present credited Hailsham with helping 
to secure the government’s sizable majority. Lord Wakefield judged Hailsham’s contribution 
‘devastating – a great triumph for you and for the Government’.360 Lord Munster, the 
government’s whip, offered ‘very sincere congratulations on your brilliant speech’. He had 
‘seldom listened to a more clearly defined statement coupled with wonderful arguments 
which did so much to... bring about a great victory for the government’.361 Both chambers 
approved the report by wide margins, allowing Hoare to introduce his legislation in early 
1935.  
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Before the final bill was presented to parliament, the campaign against it strayed into 
the Wavertree by-election held in February 1935. Randolph Churchill, with the public 
support of his father, repeated his unsuccessful efforts at Altringham in 1933 and attempted 
to secure a Commons seat by opposing Indian reform.
362
 After the split Conservative vote 
allowed the return of the Labour contender, Hailsham ‘found it difficult to understand... those 
so-called members of the Conservative Party who sought to use the differences upon India 
policy as an excuse for an attack upon the leadership of the party and the government they 
were elected to support’.363 His chief frustration with the Diehard challenge derived from its 
negative criticism of reform coupled with its failure to devise any workable substitute policy. 
He concluded that the ‘Churchill-Lloyd Section of our party are very full of criticisms’ but 
had ‘no practical alternative’.364  
As the India Secretary finalised the bill, he decided against inserting a preamble 
stating that ‘Dominion Status’ was the ultimate aim of British policy. Hailsham agreed with 
this approach. Notwithstanding his public advocacy, he continued to oppose what he regarded 
as excessive reform. The War Minister informed his colleagues in early 1935 that ‘he could 
not contemplate that [Dominion Status] would be achieved in any measurable time.’ In tones, 
typical of the era, he argued that it was imperative to 
make clear that when we spoke of Dominion status being achieved we did not quite 
mean the same thing as being operative in other Dominions... Dominion status 
involved the right of the white man to rule the country. This was essentially different 
from what opinion in India had in mind. Furthermore, we had responsibilities in India 
which could not be neglected. It was most unlikely, therefore, that we could hand over 
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to India in the near future the same sort of self-government as had been given to other 
Dominions.
365
  
When introducing the second reading of the bill in February 1935, Hoare restricted his 
commentary on India’s future constitutional development to some ‘brilliantly imprecise’ 
remarks.
366
 India was not granted a timetable for its accession to Dominion status.  
The India Bill, the longest piece of legislation in British history, comfortably passed 
its second reading in both the Commons and the Lords. A relieved Hailsham noted that the 
bill ‘went through more easily than I had dared to hope’.367After becoming Lord Chancellor 
in May, he helped carry it through its third reading in July when no division was required. 
Although the legislation went further than Hailsham deemed necessary, he hoped that 
Britain’s interests would be adequately protected. He reassured one peer that ‘whilst we 
maintain our Army in India and insist on retaining the safeguards which are in the present 
Bill there will be no such outbreak of violence as you fear’.368  
Notwithstanding the efforts of Hoare and his colleagues to balance competing 
pressures and interests, the Act was largely still-born. The Princes decided, after all, that they 
could not join the federation. Whilst greater provincial autonomy was granted, the most 
important aspect of the Bill – federation at the centre – remained dormant. The target date of 
1937 was never realised and the limited independence the bill provided proved insufficient in 
the post-war world.
369
 It now seems that those who shaped Indian policy had been relying on 
some out-dated understandings. Hoare had promised that it was ‘almost impossible, short of a 
landslide, for the extremists to get control of the federal centre’.370 When provincial elections 
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were held in 1937 Congress emerged as the largest group in the Legislative Assemblies.
371
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of dragging much of the Tory right into accepting the 
government’s scheme, it did not satisfy enough Indian opinion.  
For all that, granted the level of opposition facing the government during 1931-5, the 
passage of the bill was a noteworthy achievement and it probably represented the greatest 
measure of agreement possible between British and Indian opinion.
372
 Hailsham’s 
involvement was, at times, crucial. He had, of course, always believed that the government’s 
proposals went further than was strictly necessary. Past promises, however, meant that 
legislation could not be avoided. Refusal to do anything would have prompted violence in 
India while endangering one of the chief objectives of Hailsham’s political career: imperial 
unity. As he had noted in 1932, ‘I am anxious about India; the situation is so much 
complicated by pledges of the past; we can only do our best... to reach a solution which will 
safeguard the interests both of India and the rest of the Empire.’373 Turning promises into 
reality was, he felt, the best means to ‘save India to the Empire’. To this end he was ready to 
subordinate his personal beliefs to imperial, national and Conservative party interests – 
particularly because he could not devise a better plan. His son later recalled how his father 
had ‘taught me a great deal about sinking my own personal prejudices and convictions in 
collective decisions and wisdom without... a genuine loss of integrity and honour’.374 This 
was never clearer than in Hailsham’s consideration of Indian reform. 
Hoare and Baldwin deserve credit for the passage of the Government of India Act and 
for their foresight in involving Hailsham in their chosen policy. A series of votes at 
Conservative meetings were won by narrow margins, and without the support of Hailsham, 
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with his able advocacy and influence over the right of the party, the government’s policy 
might have collapsed and with it the National Government itself. Out of loyalty to the party 
leadership and the government in which he served, Hailsham became an important supporter 
of a measure about which he was personally dubious. The Act may have failed to satisfy 
enough Indian opinion, but it reached the statute book without an enduring split in the 
Conservative ranks. Hailsham deserves credit for his part in preventing a lasting breach. 
Conclusion 
Hailsham’s desire to foster imperial unity was clear in his response to economic, 
Indian and Irish questions facing Britain during 1930-8. His enthusiasm for the Ottawa 
Agreements, which carried few immediate economic benefits for Britain, demonstrates this 
point. Hailsham believed that the two empires within the British Commonwealth – the white 
Dominions and the predominantly non-white dependencies – could remain united. His 
approach was in no way jaundiced and it did not amount to a reactionary attempt to impose 
Britain’s will. He recognised that the empire must change if it was to survive and he believed 
that imperial unity could be based around economic unity and consent. This was clear even in 
his consideration of Britain’s Irish policy in the 1930s. It would be easy to dismiss 
Hailsham’s stance as that of a non-negotiable reactionary but, as he told the Lords in mid-
1934, ‘Nobody suggests that a treaty – the Irish Treaty or any other international agreement – 
remains sacrosanct forever and is incapable of alteration’. But what he did believe was that in 
order to make an alteration to existing contracts ‘there must be an agreement between the two 
parties to the treaty’.375   
Although Hailsham’s response to Indian and Irish questions appeared very different, 
there was nothing hypocritical in defending the 1921 Treaty while simultaneously supporting 
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Indian reform. When steering the Anglo-Irish Treaty through the Commons in late 1922, he 
revealed the rationale which he applied to Indian reform a decade later. The question, he 
claimed, was ‘not whether we think this is a good or a bad Constitution, but whether we... are 
going to carry out the pledge which has been given to the Irish people’.376  
In both Indian and Irish instances, Hailsham was involved in ratifying constitutional 
reform about which he was never enthusiastic, but he supported it because he believed that 
‘an Englishman’s word was his bond’ and it was a case of sustaining existing agreements and 
delivering promises that had already been given. He accepted the 1921 Treaty as a pragmatic 
expedient and he expected the Irish government – whoever held power – to do the same. 
Hailsham and de Valera differed to the extent that the former believed that agreements 
between past governments – however inconvenient – were binding on their successors. When 
the 1921 Treaty was dismantled, Hailsham strove to defend safeguards in which he 
passionately believed. He recognised that upholding past agreements was vital to maintain 
imperial and international stability.  
After pledges were given to India in the inter-war years, Hailsham’s willingness to 
enact constitutional reform was another case of adhering to existing obligations. He accepted 
that reform was necessary and became an important – perhaps decisive – force in the 
Conservative hierarchy that successfully passed a bill which the majority of Conservatives 
would ordinarily have rejected. Behind each issue lay a determination to maintain the 
integrity and unity of the British Empire upon which Britain’s world-power status depended. 
Hailsham’s imperial views were of their age; but they merit careful consideration. To glibly 
dismiss him as a reactionary diehard does scant justice to his historical reputation. 
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Part III: Hailsham and Appeasement 1932-8 
During the 1930s Douglas Hailsham served successively as Secretary of State for 
War, Lord Chancellor and Lord President of the Council, but he had a wider input into the 
National Government’s policy than these departmental labels suggest. As War Secretary, he 
was amongst those British ministers called upon to respond to the threat of Nazism after 
Hitler came to power and, once disarmament began to seem unrealistic, he was one of a 
group of key ministers, civil servants and servicemen who implemented the first stage of 
Britain’s rearmament. Then, as a very political Lord Chancellor and as Lord President, 
Hailsham remained, until his retirement in October 1938, a prominent figure within the 
government’s foreign policy-making process as the international situation deteriorated. 
The historiographical neglect of Hailsham’s role during the 1930s should not be taken 
to indicate his relative insignificance. Although he supervised the War Office from 1931-5, 
his complicity within the ‘appeasing’ National Government was reduced by his retirement 
shortly after the Munich Conference and the rapid eclipse of his public life. No place then for 
Hailsham in Cato’s notorious ‘cast list’, of Guilty Men which did so much to determine the 
evolution of subsequent historiography. But, notwithstanding his consciousness of the 
emergent German danger, Hailsham is also missing from the recognised ranks of the ‘anti-
appeasers’ and even from his son’s response to Cato’s diatribe.1 Nonetheless, Hailsham was a 
major force in the National Government, well placed to influence British policy.  
His significance was rooted in the interconnected relationship between foreign, 
defence, economic, imperial and political issues, together with his membership of a number 
of specialist cabinet sub-committees. This ensured that ‘the making of British foreign policy 
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became a more collegial activity than ever before’.2 The ministerial heads of the service 
departments assumed an important role in the foreign policy-making process. ‘[E]ven the 
briefest glance at inter-war Cabinet papers and Foreign Office records shows how the War 
Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry took a sustained interest in diplomatic questions’.3 
In the years 1932-35, the Ministerial Committee on Disarmament, of which Hailsham was a 
member, became ‘a catchall for foreign policy and defence’.4 During 1931-5, he sat on the 
Committee of Imperial Defence [CID] and, with both political representatives of the Foreign 
Office in the Commons, he acted as foreign affairs spokesman in the upper chamber from 
1931 until 1934. Hailsham’s influence during 1931-5 was probably increased by the 
appointment of John Simon as Foreign Secretary. The latter’s willingness to seek the 
guidance of his ministerial colleagues was exaggerated by his own political weakness and his 
inability to strike up an intimate working relationship with his cabinet colleagues.
5
 Then, as 
Lord Chancellor, Hailsham became a founding member of the Foreign Policy Committee in 
March 1936.  
So prominent was Hailsham that in 1936 the American press speculated that, had he 
not sat in the Lords, he ‘might have succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister’.6 Contemporaries 
recognised that ‘under each of the three National Prime Ministers he [was]... one of the inner 
cabinet that shapes policy’.7 It is, therefore, surprising that his role in the development of 
Britain’s disarmament, rearmament and appeasement policies has been simplified or 
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overlooked.
8
 This neglect is even more startling granted that he was the first cabinet minister 
to conclude that a future war with Germany was all but inevitable. His prescient awareness of 
a German resurgence is a surprising gap in the literature. 
Hailsham’s foresight was founded upon his conviction that Prussian militarism had 
caused the First World War and that the outlook of German leaders had not fundamentally 
changed. His younger brother, Malcolm, was killed on the Western Front in 1914 and 
Hailsham was certain where the blame for the outbreak of the conflict, and thus for his 
brother’s death, lay. He was not tempted to jump on the revisionist bandwagon which made 
such progress during the decade after the armistice. In 1922, before his election to 
Parliament, he had informed the voters of Marylebone that ‘German reparation had got to 
stand: it was for the German people to pay for the damage they had so wantonly done’.9 
During the 1923 French occupation of the Ruhr, he declared that he ‘had never been one of 
the people who wanted to let the Germans off’. He would not accept a scheme whereby the 
victors of the Great War should ‘make good the damage which the wanton hands of Prussian 
domination had inflicted upon the World’.10  
Throughout the 1930s he remained suspicious of Germany’s long-term intentions and, 
early in the decade, showed that his gut instincts were both anti-German and ‘anti-
appeasement’. He believed that without a preventive war or a formidable deterrent, German 
expansionism was unavoidable. This underpinned his opposition to various disarmament 
schemes and his advocacy of accelerated rearmament to deter, or resist, German revisions of 
the peace settlement. But his failure to convince the cabinet that it should sanction the 
expenditure necessary to remove the most glaring deficiencies in Britain’s defence services 
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led to his ultimate acquiescence in appeasement. As the decade progressed he became an 
increasingly committed appeaser, converted by the compelling reality of Britain’s inability to 
meet the growing list of potential enemies. But his natural instincts re-asserted themselves in 
the final weeks of his political career when he played an important role in a celebrated 
cabinet revolt. 
Any assessment of Hailsham’s contribution to the National Government’s defence 
and foreign policy during the decade must acknowledge that Britain’s Empire stood at its 
territorial height and that the challenges to the status quo from Germany, Italy and Japan 
meant that Britain could not muster the resources necessary to defend its global interests. It 
had assumed responsibility for new territories and extended its commitments through the 
Treaties of Versailles and Locarno. It was also wedded, at least in theory, to the League of 
Nations, collective security and disarmament. Britain, as Hailsham recognised in 1933, ‘had 
responsibilities and obligations... greater than in its history’.11 With a shortage of reliable 
allies it became increasingly difficult to see how Britain could live up to its commitments.
12
 
Secretary of State for War 
During the inter-war years the ministerial appointment to the War Office was often 
subject to political rather than military considerations, but Hailsham’s supervision lasted from 
November 1931 until June 1935, making him the longest serving War Secretary of the 
decade. His decorated military service in the Boer War gave him combat experience which 
many War Ministers lacked and he proved to be a doughty representative of the department. 
Notwithstanding Hailsham’s farsighted awareness of the German danger and support for 
intensive rearmament, some of the limited discussion of his tenure of the War Office has been 
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unnecessarily critical. Basil Liddell Hart, the respected inter-war military strategist, claimed 
that Hailsham ‘had no idea’ of the state of the War Office.13 One advocate of disarmament 
even suggested that Hailsham was guilty of ‘strategic madness’.14 More informed 
contemporary commentary, however, was complimentary. Sir Henry Pownall, Military 
Assistant Secretary for the CID, believed that the Army was fortunate to have such an 
effective advocate.
15
 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff [CIGS] from 1933 to 1936, Sir 
Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, concurred, stating that the Army was ‘extraordinarily 
lucky’ to have a representative ‘who had the eloquence to put forward its cause’.16 Military 
historians are also sympathetic to Hailsham’s performance. Bond concludes that he 
championed the Army with ‘ability and authority’,17 while French notes that he helped 
oversee ‘the most far reaching programme of modernisation, motorisation and reorganisation’ 
of the inter-war years.
18
  
It must be remembered that Hailsham led a department in an unsatisfactory state 
amidst an economic and political atmosphere most unfavourable to its restoration. After the 
First World War the War Office’s budget fell each year until 1933. With economy the raison 
d’être of the National Government, the War Secretary’s role was dominated by the need to 
reduce military expenditure. Until 1934 the Army was theoretically prepared for war with 
Russia in defence of the Indian frontier. But post-war expenditure cuts and the ten-year rule 
meant that it could not even discharge this responsibility with confidence. Popular revulsion 
against the previous war ensured that the Army suffered from the ‘never again’ syndrome. 
The Chiefs of Staff [COS] review of 1932 highlighted ‘Complacent optimism in public 
opinion’ that ‘increase[d] the difficulty of taking the necessary steps to ameliorate the 
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situation.’19 Baldwin’s belief that the East Fulham by-election in late 1933 was lost ‘on no 
issue but the pacifist’ illustrates the point.20 The National Government candidate’s loss led 
him to conclude that ‘it was politically inadvisable for Britain to start rearming’ – a 
perception shared by many of his colleagues.
21
 
The Labour opposition, led by George Lansbury, had a radically different 
understanding of the means to secure peace. The pacifist policy he promoted combined with 
the seemingly pacific electorate did not bode well for re-equipping the Army. In March 1935 
one informed diarist suggested that the country ‘was never more pacific’.22 When the former 
War Minister, Lord Midleton, considered organising a public campaign to draw attention to 
the backwardness of the Army, Lord Derby, another former War Secretary, advised against 
this approach. He agreed that the Army’s position was unsatisfactory, but with the British 
people ‘so strong in their anti-militarist policy... showing our army strength so weak would 
really be applauded than otherwise’.23  
With limited resources for re-equipping the services, the ‘public cry’ was ‘all for the 
Air Force, [with the] Navy a distinct second and the Army a very bad third’.24 The 
development of air power also made a policy of ‘limited liability’ possible. Britain could, 
theoretically, intervene in a future European war, without risking a single Tommy. Claims 
popularised by Liddell Hart – that the First World War had departed from Britain’s traditional 
strategy in warfare – further hampered the Army’s claims for funding. In such a climate, 
Hailsham believed that the title ‘Minister for War’ was a ‘misnomer’. ‘The last thing that we 
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wish’, he informed an American correspondent, was to see Britain’s forces engaged in war. 
His role was 
to try and spread the limited funds available so as to make our citizen army as 
efficient as possible and to discourage attacks from those who covet our possessions... 
I don’t think even the most bitter Anglophobe imagines that this country is ever likely 
to attack anyone else.
25
  
 The restrictions placed upon the War Office were not matched by a reduction in its 
worldwide responsibilities. In early 1932, Hailsham pointed out that he could only keep 
within the reduced estimates ‘by a searching overhaul... [and] the postponement of a number 
of absolutely necessary services’. Future increases were inevitable as expenditure for 
essential services was long overdue. Even if the Disarmament Conference was a success, the 
War Secretary could not ‘accept our current expenditure... as a standard of limitation’.26 The 
special effort of 1932, his annual memorandum stated,  
cannot be maintained in future years. It has only been rendered possible either by... 
the loss of military efficiency or by the postponement of services which by the very 
fact of delay will ultimately become more expensive.
27
 
The Army, the War Secretary informed Neville Chamberlain, was ‘not in a satisfactory 
position either on a peace footing or as an instrument of policy in an emergency’. The 
Treasury accepted that it could not contest this view.
28
   
During his supervision of the War Office, Hailsham became convinced that a rearmed 
Britain, capable of defending its interests and fulfilling its obligations, was more likely to 
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facilitate peace than a disarmed Britain and a disarmament convention. The transformation of 
Japan from loyal ally into potential threat and the on-going resurgence of Germany, 
underpinned his conclusion. The arguments offered by advocates of unilateral disarmament 
were persuasive but if, as Hailsham believed, Germany was stealthily revitalizing itself and 
Japan’s ambitions were contrary to British interests, the National Government was right to 
prioritise its own security rather than accepting a flimsy arms limitation agreement.
29
 If a 
convention left Britain unable to make war on recalcitrant powers, peace would depend upon 
the goodwill of foreign nations. This was a chance Hailsham was not prepared to take.  
Disarmament 
The defeated powers of the First World War were required to disarm in accordance 
with the military clauses of the peace settlement. These restrictions, designed to initiate a 
general limitation of armaments, also compelled the victorious signatory powers to disarm. 
Clemenceau, the French premier, declared in 1919 that German disarmament was the ‘first 
step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments’.30 With the prevailing maxim ‘that 
great armaments lead inevitably to war’,31 the Disarmament Conference of February 1932 
aimed to secure peace through eliminating aggressive arms. Hailsham was amongst Britain’s 
delegation which included John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, J.H. Thomas, the Dominions 
Secretary, and the other service ministers.
32
  
In recent years the National Government’s contribution to the Disarmament 
Conference of 1932-4 has been heavily criticised. Writing in 2011, one historian suggested 
that ‘While feigning commitment to the project’ the British delegation ‘prevaricated, back-
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tracked and opposed the initiatives of others’.33 The leading authorities on inter-war 
disarmament question Britain’s sincerity and claim that the government attempted to use the 
conference ‘to improve Britain’s world-wide power positions’.34 But, granted that Britain had 
already undertaken a large measure of unilateral disarmament, any satisfactory convention 
would inevitably improve its position vis-a-vis other powers. Although the motivation for this 
disarmament was economic, Britain’s defence services had been reduced while expenditure 
on many continental forces had grown.  
Ahead of the conference, Hailsham declared publicly that ‘nobody could assert that 
this country was preaching what it had not practised’. The Royal Navy had been reduced to a 
one-power standard and ‘the limit of safety’. The Air Force, now ranked only fifth in the 
world, was ‘a mere fraction of its former self’ and the Army had been reduced to ‘an imperial 
police force’.35 This was not just public rhetoric. The reductions were startling. This was 
most obvious in the Army. By the early 1930s its peacetime establishment was considerably 
below the 1914 level. Hailsham notified the cabinet that, after the First World War,  
we were the first nation in Europe to revert immediately to our pre-war Army and 
voluntary service. Moreover, the Special Reserve, which had been an important factor 
in our pre-war mobilization arrangements, was abolished, including, in addition to 
other arms, 3 Special Reserve cavalry regiments and 101 Special Reserve infantry 
battalions.
36
  
In addition to these figures, he informed the Foreign Secretary of the loss of ‘9 cavalry 
regiments, the equivalent of 61 batteries and companies of artillery and 21 battalions in 
addition to technical units’. He might have added the loss of 21 companies of engineers and 6 
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battalions of colonial and native troops. Consequently, Hailsham warned that the Army could 
not ‘provide for the... protection of our overseas colonies and our essential lines of 
communication’. It was ‘impossible’, he concluded, to ‘contemplate stabilisation at that level 
forever’.37  
 Endemic shortages meant that Britain could not contemplate sweeping reductions at 
the Disarmament Conference or sincerely offer to defend foreign nations without 
endangering imperial security. The government’s room for manoeuvre was severely – 
perhaps hopelessly – limited. But, although British policy lacked ‘positive new proposals’, 
Prime Minister MacDonald felt that his government ‘had a magnificent case’ because Britain 
had not waited for the conference to begin disarming.
38
 In practice, however, British policy 
was inherently ‘reactive’.39 Simon’s Private Secretary noted that Britain’s delegation arrived 
at Geneva unable to make an ‘effective contribution’.40  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, those responsible for Britain’s disarmament policy 
have not escaped criticism. Kitching claims that the choice of personnel to lead the service 
departments was ‘unfortunate’. Hailsham, Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, and Lord Londonderry, the Air Secretary, ‘formed a massive hurdle to any 
constructive attempt to achieve success’.41 Older accounts suggest that Hailsham regarded the 
conference as a ‘mistake’, ‘scarcely tried at all’ and ‘contributed little but anxiety’.42 
Contemporary critics would have agreed with these assessments. Philip Noel-Baker, the 
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zealous advocate of disarmament who acted as Arthur Henderson’s assistant during the 
latter’s presidency of the Disarmament Conference, remembered that Hailsham, Eyres-
Monsell and Londonderry were all ‘dyed-in-the-wool hawks’. The War Secretary was 
‘obstinately in favour of keeping tanks and heavy mobile guns’.43 Anticipating difficulties 
before the conference began, the idealistic Lord Cecil of Chelwood noted that Britain’s 
delegation filled him ‘with a certain amount of anxiety’. After all, 
Hailsham has already intimated that he disagrees with me... What the views of Eyres-
Monsell and Charlie Londonderry are, I do not know, but I should not expect them to 
be very advanced... the prospect alarms me a little.
44
  
By 1933 Cecil believed that Hailsham harboured a ‘contempt and disapproval of 
disarmament’,45 while A.L. Kennedy of The Times noted that Hailsham was amongst those 
cabinet ministers who were ‘not fighting at all costs to get a convention through, but [were] 
diplomatically calculating to put blame on Germany’.46 A year later Kennedy observed that 
‘The cabinet has never really b[ee]n united on [disarmament], Hailsham & Londonderry 
being obstructionists, & Simon so timid’.47  
The existing coverage of Hailsham’s contribution to Britain’s policy has been 
dismissive and over-simplified. He was willing to agree to various, albeit limited, arms 
limitation proposals. He was not anti-disarmament per se, but would not accept a convention 
that left Britain’s security dependent upon the goodwill of other powers. Opposing various 
arms limitation plans was not necessarily ‘hawkish’ and his approach was not that of a blind 
warmongering reactionary. For Hailsham, the various schemes on offer during 1932-4 would 
not guarantee peace. After Germany first left the Disarmament Conference in July 1932, his 
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awareness of the emerging German danger meant that he opposed schemes that sanctioned 
German rearmament. Alongside the paradox of disarming while Japanese militarism was 
already underway, he concluded that Germany would probably not adhere to a disarmament 
convention. With Germany’s political situation unstable and developments in the Far East 
causing much anxiety, Hailsham’s prioritising of Britain’s security is understandable. He 
occupied a responsible position where he could not accept a slapdash settlement.  
As Hailsham had been drafted into the Conservative government’s Disarmament 
Policy Committee in 1927, the Geneva Disarmament Conference was not his first 
consideration of international arms limitation. Just two months before the General Election in 
May 1929, the sub-committee considered its policy towards the sixth session of the projected 
conference’s Preparatory Commission set to begin in mid-April.48 In terms of the proposals 
relating to the limitation of the Army’s land material, Hailsham, then Lord Chancellor, made 
‘the most important contribution to the debate’.49  
He steered the middle course in a dispute between Lord Cushendun, acting Foreign 
Secretary during Austen Chamberlain’s illness, and Worthington-Evens, the War Secretary. 
Cushendun wanted Britain’s representatives at Geneva to support budgetary limitation 
proposals, but the War Office calculated that this approach would undermine the Army’s 
mechanisation programme which sought to substitute men with life-saving devices such as 
tanks. It was also questionable whether the budgetary limitation proposals, which had been 
approved by the Preparatory Commission, would provide effective supervision of military 
expenditure. Hailsham suggested that Britain’s representatives at Geneva should not put 
forward specific proposals but declare that ‘we felt confident that we could… accept any 
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proposals which met with unanimous agreement on the part of others’.50 This compromise 
was accepted and settled the dispute. 
Although Richardson alleged that ‘Support for disarmament barely entered into the 
Lord Chancellor’s calculations’ and that Hailsham’s main objective was to undermine 
criticism from political opponents ahead of the general election,
51
 his approach was not 
cynical. During late 1928 and the spring of 1929 Hailsham was naturally concerned about the 
electoral repercussions of the government being associated with a lack of progress in 
international disarmament. He also recognised that it was unlikely that the other major 
powers would be able to agree to a scheme relating to land forces.
52
 But, as a man of his 
word, he was fully aware that Britain would be obliged to endorse an agreement if it was 
accepted by the other powers. Moreover, after Cushendun, Worthington-Evans and the 
cabinet had accepted the expedient, Hailsham, as in early 1932, engineered an unlikely 
compromise formula.
53
 It is an over-simplification to conclude that this episode demonstrated 
that he was an ‘orthodox sceptic’ as far as disarmament was concerned.54 Hailsham, as he 
would during the lifetime of the Disarmament Conference, warned against making proposals 
that other powers could use to mask their own objections to arms limitation schemes.   
During the years 1932-4 Hailsham demonstrated that he was neither an idealist who 
would disarm regardless of the consequences nor a determined obstructionist. His objective, 
shared with the campaigners for disarmament, was peace. Aware that Britain had much to 
lose if no workable convention was realised, he recognised that it was a British interest for 
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powers to reduce their arms to a level compatible with their own security. After all, economic 
weakness and colossal strategic responsibilities guaranteed Britain’s vulnerability in future 
conflicts. In May 1932, he stated that, if the conference failed, it would be ‘a disaster to the 
cause of civilisation, and... a set-back to the cause of peace in the world’. But, in the same 
speech, he calculated that peace would be endangered if disgruntled nations sensed that they 
could develop their ‘aggressive tendencies at our expense, free from any danger of retaliation 
on our part’.55 Already converted to the line that ‘unilateral disarmament is not a success in 
securing universal disarmament’, he complained that Britain’s disarmament, while the rest of 
the world remained armed, did not improve Britain’s standing in the world. He calculated that 
military strength, combined with the will to use it, outweighed idealism. In November 1932 
he outlined his views on disarmament to the Lords. It was ‘vital... that the nations of the 
world should... agree on a practical form of disarmament which will remove or lessen the 
threat of war’. The government was 
willing to go to the utmost limit consistent with the essential security of this people... 
but we cannot promise to surrender the security for which we are responsible in order 
to achieve a paper success which would infallibly result... in an actual disaster.
56
  
This neatly captured Hailsham’s approach to disarmament proposals during the lifetime of 
the conference.  
The prospects for reaching meaningful agreement at the conference should not be 
exaggerated. With land, naval and aerial weapons all under consideration by a large group of 
powers with very different strategic interests, the Geneva Disarmament Conference needed to 
overcome ‘staggering problems’ before workable agreements could be established.57 With a 
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host of governments struggling to deal with the international financial crisis, the political 
stability necessary to secure a disarmament convention was evaporating before the 
conference began. In Germany democracy was under threat. Heinrich Brüning, the 
Chancellor, regularly ruled by decree under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. 
Furthermore, the War Office was aware that the German government had already flouted 
various military clauses of the Versailles Treaty.
58
 Since 1930 defence reports had warned 
that patriotic organisations within Germany were conducting military training, that the 
German army had been reorganised so that it could rapidly expand and that German industry 
was producing prohibited war material.
59
 Even more disturbing was the progress of Hitler’s 
Nazi Party, pledged to tear up the Peace Treaties. By September 1930 it was the second 
largest party in the Reichstag. Before the end of 1931 one report sent to John Simon 
anticipated a Nazi landslide at the next election.
60
  
Hopes for disarmament were dealt a further – and arguably more significant – blow 
when Japan attacked Manchuria in the summer of 1931, beginning its conquest of the region 
which was completed in early 1933. Granted Britain’s interests in the Far East, Japanese 
aggression was disquieting. An even worse omen was the Japanese attack – which included 
aerial bombing – on Shanghai in January 1932, just weeks before the Geneva conference 
convened. While ‘collective security’ and the League of Nations were undermined, the attack 
‘dramatically brought home’ Britain’s vulnerability.61 Hailsham, alarmed by Japan’s 
aggression, told the Lords that 
Shanghai is a settlement which owes its inception to British enterprise and... has 
grown to its present position as one of the greatest ports in the world and the centre of 
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commerce in the Far East... Anything which imperils the safety of British lives... is 
naturally a matter of grave concern. 
Hailsham and his colleagues were concerned at the implications for Britain’s foreign policy. 
As Britain looked to the League as a bulwark of international peace, he claimed that 
‘anything which tends to throw doubt on the sanctity of the Covenant and to bring the League 
of Nations into disrepute must necessarily be a matter of the gravest importance’.62 
Accordingly, the COS surveyed imperial defence in early 1932. They recommended 
the abolition of the ‘ten-year rule’ which they blamed for the widespread deficiencies in 
Britain’s defences.63 The rule, the Chiefs claimed, was ‘contrary to the lessons of history’. 
With shortages rife throughout the services, they were not confident that Britain could resist a 
Japanese attack in the Far East or meet its imperial, Locarno or League obligations.
64
 The 
rule held that ‘for the purposes of framing the [defence] estimates... there will be no major 
war for ten years’.65 While ten years was a long time in international relations, it proved to be 
a relatively ‘short time for a largely disarmed and pacific democracy to rearm for a major 
war’.66  
Hailsham welcomed the Chiefs’ analysis, telling the CID that it was impossible to 
carry on working on the ten-year assumption. Therefore, as the Disarmament Conference was 
beginning, Hailsham had already recognised the need for rearmament. Despite hopes for the 
success of the conference, the CID accepted the ‘Writing on the Wall’ and the COS 
analysis.
67
 The cabinet immediately suspended the rule, but no plans existed to repair 
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Britain’s military deficiencies.68 The inability of Britain’s defence services to meet potential 
aggressors was realised, but deliberations began at Geneva with no plans to remedy Britain’s 
impotence.  
The Japanese attack on Shanghai was considered by the League Council and, 
somewhat ironically, delayed the opening session of the Disarmament Conference.
69
 The 
League’s indecisive response failed to contain Japanese aggression and, with the League’s 
ability to enforce its principles thrown into doubt, the chances of achieving a disarmament 
convention at the forthcoming conference were diminishing. Simon noted that ‘Japan was 
pursuing an ambitious policy’ that made the conference’s objectives appear ‘rather 
visionary’.70 Even leading critics of the National Government’s disarmament policy accept 
that by 1932 ‘the prospects of a successful outcome at the Disarmament Conference itself 
were receding’.71 ‘[T]he prospects for its success could hardly have been less favourable.’72  
With the conference finally underway in February 1932, procedural difficulties and 
the participating nations’ range of defence requirements presented a formidable barrier.73 
Geneva, according to Londonderry, was a ‘terrible place’ and he recommended that Hailsham 
should stay away.
74
 With little progress apparent during the first 10 weeks of the conference, 
in April Brüning attempted to break the deadlock and bolster his administration’s precarious 
domestic position after the Nazi party had made considerable gains at provincial elections. 
His moderate plan never got off the ground after André Tardieu, the French Prime Minister, 
failed to travel to Geneva to discuss the scheme and after his government was defeated in the 
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first round of the general elections two days later.
75
 With the German proposals buried, Earl 
Stanhope, Hailsham’s Under-Secretary of State, who generally represented the War Office at 
Geneva, saw few signs of progress in the Land Commission:  
I always thought I was rather a master of wasting time, but I have learned that I was a 
mere tyro. Our Committee on guns spent two hours... discussing whether we were 
justified in discussing a subject they had been talking about for two days, but even 
this was beaten by another committee who required a definition of the word 
definition.  
The air committee was ‘in the air and likely to remain there’, whilst he anticipated that the 
naval representatives would produce only a ‘wishy-washy document’.76 In such an 
atmosphere it was unlikely that a workable solution could be devised.  
In early June, Hailsham informed the cabinet’s sub-committee that he was appalled by 
the risk of the conference’s failure, but he ‘did not think that anyone who had been to Geneva 
could have formed any other opinion than that the situation looked very bad’.77 His analysis 
was correct. The problems in the Far East and Central Europe suggested that it would be very 
difficult to secure any meaningful agreements. He feared that if the conference failed the 
world’s powers would attempt to rearm and ‘Germany and France would renew their old 
competition’. Warning that ‘the only thing that might stop the world reaming would be that it 
would go bankrupt first’, he judged that ‘it was of vital importance to find some means of 
achieving real disarmament’. He supported the proposal that air forces should be disarmed to 
remove the threat of a ‘knock-out blow’. Although the Air Ministry claimed that this plan 
was unacceptable, Hailsham recommended that it should be pursued. This menace, he 
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understood, was frightening Europe and its removal would be ‘a big step in eliminating the 
risk of war altogether’. While Londonderry claimed that this proposal might leave Britain 
incapable of policing the Empire’s frontiers, Hailsham, whose department would assume 
further responsibilities in this sphere, did not consider this an insurmountable issue. Eyres-
Monsell and Snowden, the Lord Privy Seal, agreed with his analysis.
78
  
This proposal was consistent with Hailsham’s subsequent thinking about aerial 
bombing. He recited these thoughts in public, stating that he wanted to ‘protect all nations 
from the horrors of [aerial] bombardment’. He believed this ‘threaten[ed] the very existence 
of civilisation’, telling the Lords in November 1932 that ‘I should myself like to see a 
limitation put upon the use of the air weapon’.79 Even after the Disarmament Conference had 
collapsed, he advocated an international anti-bombing air pact, informing the CID in 1935 
that the dangers to the civilian population ‘were perfectly frightful’. Noting London’s 
particularly vulnerable position, he claimed that ‘anything that would... reduce or get rid of 
this menace would be a tremendous relative gain for the British Commonwealth’.80 
The next ray of hope at the conference came in June 1932 through the ‘Hoover Plan’. 
The Americans proposed the reduction by a third in numbers and tonnage of naval 
battleships, and the abolition of all tanks, large mobile guns and chemical warfare. The 
strength of land armies would be reduced by one third, and bombing planes and aerial 
bombardment would be prohibited. The Americans, without a global empire to defend, could 
offer various reductions without endangering their vital interests, but the plan did not 
consider the concerns of Britain, France and other powers.
81
 Hoover’s motivations for 
presenting the plan are also questionable. It seems that his main objective was not 
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disarmament but domestic popularity ahead of an election.
82
 At Geneva the plan met 
opposition because ‘it made no strategic sense’. In Britain’s case, it ‘undermine[d] the 
doctrine of absolute need’.83 The suggested reductions were unacceptable to the Admiralty 
and the Air Ministry and Hailsham expressed concern about Hoover’s plans for land forces. 
He informed the cabinet that reductions could be found in the size of the Army’s heavy guns 
and tanks, but further restrictions presented formidable problems. The Army, he maintained, 
was already disarmed and was ‘little more than an armed police force’.84  
On 26 June, Hailsham provided Simon with his view of Hoover’s plan and a draft 
statement that formed the basis of Britain’s public response to Hoover’s military proposals. 
This welcomed the spirit of the American plan and supported the proposals for abolishing 
chemical and biological warfare. Sensibly, Hailsham would accept restrictions on land guns if 
the same limitations could be applied to naval guns. But he also highlighted practical 
difficulties which would not, in the long run, facilitate disarmament ‘which we all have at 
heart’. Britain’s Army had already been reduced ‘substantially below the number necessary 
for the maintenance of internal order without making allowance for the protection of lines of 
communication’.85 He was also concerned about the precise meanings of ‘police component’ 
and ‘defence component’. In relation to the former he was worried about 
the very different character of police forces in different countries, the variation in the 
proportion of police to population, and the fact that, in certain cases, the defence 
element could be fully justified by political considerations, whereas in others it could 
not...  
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Attempts to limit the ‘defence component’ in relation to each nation’s population, he 
calculated, overlooked important factors such as political security and geographical position. 
The ‘immense sea frontiers’ of Britain’s Empire, for instance, rendered further reductions 
impossible.
86
  
The major departure from the US proposals came over the abolition of tanks. 
Hailsham agreed with his departmental advisors that, because the Army possessed only a 
handful of light-weight post-war tanks, Britain could scrap only those tanks which weighed 
20 tons or over.
87
 The rationale behind the limitation by weight rather than numbers was that 
tanks below 20 tons were not deemed offensive weapons. Hailsham suggested that 
lightweight tanks were actually a means of disarmament because they replaced manpower 
and other arms. Their light armour meant that they could not effectively attack well-prepared 
fortifications or cross enemy trenches, but in terms of defence, they were ‘of great value as a 
mobile reserve and in counter attack against troops which have pierced a defensive 
position’.88 For these reasons the government’s response held that the abolition of tanks 
would not contribute to international disarmament. Lightweight tanks, Britain’s declaration 
claimed, were not offensive weapons. But  
as a means of saving the life of the soldiers, as well as of economising man power, 
tanks are invaluable. In a small voluntarily enlisted army like our own they constitute 
an essential compensation for lack of numbers which it would be impossible to 
surrender.  
In Britain’s case the abolition of tanks would inevitably lead to an increase in manpower, and 
‘as a measure of disarmament [it] would tend to defeat its own ends’.89 The statement 
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acknowledged that the best way to reduce the risk of war was to weaken all powers’ offensive 
capacity while strengthening the power of defence. This was entirely consistent with Simon’s 
first speech to the Disarmament Conference in February.
90
  
While modifications to the Hoover scheme were debated, the cabinet considered 
budgetary restriction. Although Hailsham had indicated that the War Office ‘had been 
prepared to accept a total budgetary limitation figure for ground forces’,91 he reminded his 
colleagues of his earlier warnings about the inevitable increase in the Army’s future estimates 
– whatever the result of the conference. Hailsham, therefore, resisted attempts to limit the 
War Office’s future expenditure to its existing level. He could not entertain such a 
proposition. The estimates resulting from the emergency economies of 1931, had only been 
achieved 
by the non-replacement of munitions, the postponement of essential building 
programmes, and the abandonment for this year of training of the Territorials... [I]t 
was quite impossible... to continue at the present level of expenditure. The economies 
contemplated... were inapplicable to the United Kingdom since we were not building 
large tanks or spending money on... chemical or bacteriological warfare, while the 
personnel of the Army had been reduced below even the ‘police component basis’.92  
On 7 July Simon responded to Hoover’s plan, informing the conference that 
disarmament must take into account various powers’ strategic requirements. He presented 
Britain’s amendments that effectively rejected the proposals. The reductions Hailsham 
proposed undoubtedly suited the War Office but this was realism, not obstructionism. The 
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other services found their own objections to the plan. Quite simply, it conflicted with 
Britain’s minimum defence requirements as outlined by the country’s defence experts. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed on it by Noel-Baker nearly 50 years after the event, the 
Hoover plan did not facilitate wider agreement.
93
 It is also a matter of pure speculation to 
suggest that a convention in 1932 would have blocked Hitler’s rise to power. Furthermore, 
only wishful thinking could lead to the assumption that the Japanese would have accepted the 
plan. Many leading powers, including Germany, had only accepted it as a basis for 
discussion. The plan also ignored the conference’s other major conundrum: reconciling 
German claims for equality with French security.
94
 
With a lack of progress towards ‘equality of rights’, the German delegation withdrew 
from the Disarmament Conference for the first time in July 1932. Hailsham ‘regarded this as 
a watershed’ and it had major implications for his consideration of defence and foreign policy 
for the remainder of his ministerial career. It confirmed his lingering suspicions that the 
outlook of Germany’s leaders remained, at heart, aggressive. His son, recalled that his father 
had warned him  
of the danger from Germany ever since 1932, from which date he regarded war… as 
inevitable. He had told me of his opinion consistently since just before the Hitler 
regime came into power.
95
   
Quintin Hogg was, no doubt, motivated by filial loyalty, but official records confirm his 
recollections. 
Concern over Germany’s ultimate aims had clear implications for Hailsham’s attitude 
to disarmament. He waged a long battle against the Foreign Office’s efforts to, as he saw it, 
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undermine Britain’s military position at a time of mounting danger. If, as he feared, Germany 
was bent on dominating Europe, it would be foolish for Britain to disarm and compel other 
powers to do the same while sanctioning German rearmament to facilitate ‘equality’. This, he 
feared, would become a platform for accelerated rearmament which would make German 
hegemony possible.  
In an attempt to secure Germany’s return to Geneva, the cabinet agreed on 30 
September that the principle of ‘equality of rights’ for Germany and other disarmed powers 
should be approved. Hailsham did not dissent from this decision, but he revealed his concerns 
about German revanchism. He 
uttered a grave warning as to the consequences that might follow a few years hence 
when Germany, free from the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, was able 
to develop her armaments to the point where she could pursue, by force or threat of 
force, her undisguised intention of rectifying her eastern frontier.
96
 
From this moment, Hailsham became a ‘consistent pessimist about Germany’.97 Granted that 
his concerns existed before Hitler came to power, he has strong claims to being the first 
member of Britain’s policy-making elite to warn about the dangers posed by Germany. 
Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, is well-remembered 
for his foresight regarding the German threat. Although he had warned about the return of 
‘old Adam’ as early as 1930,98 it seems that he only fully appreciated the German menace 
after Hitler’s Chancellorship had begun.99 It is striking that Hailsham’s issued his first 
warning to the cabinet in September 1932.
100
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The War Secretary’s position quickly shifted from being willing to implement a 
measure of disarmament which did not conflict with Britain’s security interests, into making 
less constructive – but ultimately prophetic – warnings about German aims. Other leading 
members of the National Government were slower to appreciate the potential menace. In 
1934 Simon noted that ‘Hitler’s outlook was not aggressive or threatening to us’, while 
Samuel Hoare, his successor as Foreign Secretary, admitted being complacent about the 
international situation until late 1935.
101
 In March 1935 the German Ambassador reported 
that almost all of the cabinet supported Simon’s efforts ‘to bring Germany into a system 
safeguarding peace’. The only sceptics were Hailsham and, somewhat surprisingly granted 
later developments, Neville Chamberlain.
102
 The lack of awareness of Germany’s ultimate 
ambitions was widespread. Hailsham’s consciousness was certainly in advance of many of 
the so-called ‘anti-appeasers’ including Churchill, Anthony Eden and Duff Cooper. Lloyd 
George, the man who ‘won’ the First World War, was amongst those who completely 
underestimated the German threat.
103
  
As Britain’s policy changed in the summer of 1932 from advocating universal 
disarmament to accepting the principle of ‘equality of rights’ for Germany, Hailsham 
attempted to block plans that would sanction immediate German rearmament. When Simon 
presented the cabinet’s sub-committee with a proposal geared to secure Germany’s return to 
the Disarmament Conference, whereby Britain and other powers would abandon weapons 
prohibited to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, Hailsham, using ‘forensic eloquence... 
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absolutely smashed’ this plan. Hankey, who approved of Hailsham’s line, felt that the scheme 
was ‘a policy of disarmament but not peace’.104  
When similar proposals came before the full cabinet, Hailsham repeated that the 
government’s technical advisers had concluded that it was ‘impossible’ for Britain to 
abandon the weapons that were prohibited to Germany. This point applied to all three 
services but he reminded his colleagues that without tanks Britain’s Army would have to be 
increase in size.
105
 He presented a memorandum by Field Marshal George Milne, the CIGS, 
which claimed there was no reason why Britain ‘should accept the punitive measures applied 
to Germany in 1919’. In terms consistent with the War Office’s rejection of the Hoover 
proposals, Milne held that Britain’s tanks were essential weapons and ‘of the greatest value in 
maintaining order and in the policing of colonial territories and frontiers’.106 Instead of 
abolishing tanks, restricting their weight would ‘weaken the power of aggression and give 
real assistance to the defence’. As Hailsham told the Lords, lightweight tanks could only be 
regarded as offensive weapons if ‘helmets or cuirasses or suits of armour in the old days 
might have been regarded as offensive’.107 They were an ‘infinitely more humane answer’ to 
the machine gun.
108
  
After this put-down, disarmament down to the German level was deemed contrary to 
Britain’s security interests. Eden, Simon’s Under-Secretary of State, claimed that his chief 
‘will not say “boo” to Hailsham’ and ‘has no real courage of his own’.109 Already dejected at 
the course of events, Eden doubted if any progress was likely: 
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 Simon is very depressed about the whole thing... He has never fought for his own 
hand. I believe that the greater part of the cabinet is with [us] though Hailsham is 
adamant against and the PM in a state of woolly reaction.
110
    
The only other means to achieve equality would involve Germany acquiring restricted 
weapons. In October the cabinet agreed that German equality would be acceptable if ‘the 
tranquillity of Europe’ was not disturbed.111 But Hailsham delivered another stern warning. 
He doubted if France could accept this approach and suspected that Germany had not ‘the 
least intention of keeping her assurances’. Britain’s policy must be one that fostered peace, 
but he doubted if Simon’s policy would secure that objective. Feeling ‘bound to present a 
different point of view’, Hailsham continued: 
Germany’s avowed intention was to get rid of the Treaty of Versailles... She was 
aiming at this by a very plausible case that she had presented as equality of status. Her 
real aim, however, was to rectify what she believed to be the injustices of her Eastern 
Frontier, and, perhaps, later on, in the West.
 112
 
Hailsham, challenging the Foreign Secretary’s reassurances, questioned whether Germany 
cared at all about world opinion. The key to the situation was that  
Germany alone desired her armaments not for defence, but for aggression... If 
Germany was given the opportunity completely to re-arm after an interval of five 
years, it would make war certain a few years later on... Germany would not be able to 
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resort to force for another five years; but if, at the end of that time, she could re-arm, 
she would soon do so and use her armaments to alter the Treaty of Versailles.
113
 
Granted later events, it is striking that such warnings were issued to the cabinet in the autumn 
of 1932. 
For the War Secretary, granting Germany equality in armaments was a great blunder, 
tantamount to acquiescing in German expansionism. While he ‘would do anything in the 
direction of disarmament as a means of securing peace’, he concluded that it would be ‘a 
mistake to adopt measures which would send Europe up in flames ten or fifteen years hence’. 
To meet Germany’s grievances he would re-examine Hoover’s proposals. He felt French 
amendments to the American plan, offered a real advance in multilateral disarmament, 
although he again reserved his position in relation to tanks and heavy guns. When Simon 
asked what Hailsham would regard as an assurance of Germany’s good intentions, the War 
Secretary replied that he wanted to detect a clear change in the German leaders’ outlook. 
Pointing to disquieting speeches by General Kurt von Schleicher and other German 
leaders,
114
 he suggested that 
he would remind the Germans that 1914 was not yet forgotten; he would make clear 
that he was not satisfied that the armaments Germany desired were for purely 
defensive purposes. He would make clear that, once satisfied on that point, there 
would be no reason for Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, which had only been 
introduced as a safeguard against aggression.
115
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In response to another question from the Foreign Secretary: ‘Does the British Government 
admit the German claim?’, Hailsham bluntly responded that his answer would be ‘Not at 
present’. He would 
tell Germany that we would come down to her level when we were satisfied that she 
had no aggressive intentions. In the meantime he would take steps to advance towards 
the German level and to approach it by successive stages, which could be speeded up 
if and when Germany showed a change of heart.
116
  
Hailsham’s perception of German ambitions suggests that, as regards disarmament 
policy, he was far from a hawk guilty of strategic madness. He was willing to sanction 
disarmament which did not conflict with Britain’s essential military requirements and which 
other powers could realistically implement. But he was convinced that Germany hid 
expansionist aims under the cloak of ‘equality of rights’ and he was not prepared to agree to 
any scheme that could destroy the peace settlement. Warning against accepting the principle 
of equality simply to get Germany back to Geneva, he realised that once the claim had been 
admitted it would be impossible to control German rearmament if the conference failed. 
Neville Chamberlain supported an approach along these lines because ‘Everyone was afraid 
of reducing their armaments without some security that Germany was not re-arming while 
they disarmed’. Like Hailsham, he believed that a policy of ‘one step at a time’ was the only 
practical way forward.
117
  
Although Hailsham was not without supporters,
118
 the majority of the British cabinet 
backed Simon’s proposal to accept ‘equality of status’ if Germany returned to the conference. 
The Prime Minister was unsure whether Hailsham was satisfied; the War Secretary was not. 
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He admitted that Germany had a grievance as other powers had not disarmed more, but he 
warned that ‘recent events in Germany had not given us much confidence in the future’.119 
These events justified his caution. In addition to worrying pronouncements from leading 
Germans, in July the Nazis had become the largest party in the Reichstag. Yet, despite these 
developments, Simon informed the Commons in November that Britain would acknowledge 
Germany’s claim to equality providing Germany and other European powers pledged to settle 
differences peacefully. This principle was accepted by France and Italy in December and, 
before the close of 1932, Germany agreed to re-join the conference.  
By the time the conference reconvened in early 1933, Hitler had assumed power as 
German Chancellor. The Japanese had also begun their latest military operation against China 
which ended in their conquest of Jehol and, after refusing to accept the Lytton Report in 
February, Japan resigned from the League of Nations in March and would not be bound by 
any disarmament convention. These developments were accompanied by no tangible progress 
at the conference itself. It was now highly unlikely that any future progress would be made. 
There is little doubt that Hitler intended to take Germany out of the conference at a 
convenient moment and rearm on a vast scale. From the outset Germany had used the 
conference as a cover for the pursuit of rearmament.
120
 Hitler paid lip-service to a conference 
that he wanted to fail.
121
  
In early March Eden informed the sub-committee that the conference was ‘tottering to 
failure’ and that an adjournment seemed likely. He feared that a recess would be equal to the 
conference’s collapse and proposed that Britain should produce a plan – which became 
known as the ‘MacDonald Plan’ – to prevent the conference’s disintegration.122 Hailsham, 
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despite his fears of the consequences of failure at Geneva, felt that it was probably already 
too late. Germany, he concluded, was determined to rearm.
123
 Although he felt that the Prime 
Minister was probably the only man who had any hope of saving the conference, he 
concluded that ‘Britain could not make a bigger blunder than by producing a plan’. After 
Eden had admitted that France and Germany were at ‘loggerheads’ and that the Germans 
might walk out at any moment, Hailsham suggested that Germany was 
looking for a suitable excuse to effect her breakaway... [I]f we were to produce this 
plan he thought it would give Germany the very opportunity of leaving the conference 
which she had been seeking. 
He realised that the construction of a plan which Germany might accept would involve 
Britain in difficulties with France and the Little Entente. He feared that, if the plan failed and 
Germany left the conference, ‘everyone would turn round and blame us for having forced her 
to leave, and... we might be saddled with the whole responsibility for failure’. Britain would 
put herself wrong in the eyes of the world.
124
  
On behalf of his department, the War Secretary expressed further misgivings. Despite 
his repeated efforts to demonstrate the necessity of retaining tanks, Eden proposed their 
abolition. Hailsham claimed that on strategic grounds, ‘no Secretary of State for War could 
possibly accept’ the draft plan. Although Simon was ‘extremely disturbed’ by Hailsham’s 
attitude, the War Secretary maintained that Britain’s position would be impossible if tanks 
were outlawed.
125
 His resistance was partially successful. The sub-committee agreed that the 
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plan, should not be produced before the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had visited 
the conference.
126
  
The following week, Hailsham once again expressed his doubts about presenting any 
plan granted the prevailing mood in Germany. He reminded his colleagues that it was ‘quite 
plain that Germany intended to rearm’. That morning he had read a statement made in Berlin 
by Baron Von Neurath which substantiated his claim. The German Foreign Minister expected 
that the conference would fail and Germany ‘would be compelled to rearm’. Hailsham again 
warned that proposing a plan ‘would give Germany an opportunity to break away... and put 
the blame on us’. It was important not to give Germany an excuse for doing this.127  
At the cabinet on 13 March, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister again asked 
Hailsham whether ‘nothing more is proposed than that tanks of unlimited number shall not 
exceed sixteen tons’.128 Hailsham delivered a statement ‘of so secret a character’ that it had 
not been fully recorded in the sub-committee’s minutes. It repeated earlier arguments that the 
substitution of tanks for men in the Army ‘was a policy which [Britain] had initiated, partly 
as a result of the enormous reductions in personnel which had been effected after the war’. 
This meant that tanks had become absolutely essential in Britain’s scheme of defence.129 
Although Simon and MacDonald suggested that, if Britain could hold unlimited lightweight 
tanks, Germany must also enjoy such a freedom, Hailsham held firm.
130
 Restricting the 
number of tanks at the Army’s disposal was, he repeated, a policy for which no War 
Secretary could be responsible.
131
 Two weeks later, he reminded the Lords:  
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[I]f you have, as the British have, an Army reduced to the very limit of safety 
regarding numbers... then it is impossible for any responsible Government to 
adventure that Army into any form of modern warfare unless you... provide them with 
that measure of protection which the modern tank affords... [I]t is an essential interest 
of this country that tanks shall be maintained as one of our arms.
132
 
The plan also envisaged a ‘holiday’ in tank construction, but Hailsham pointed out 
that such a proposal was unacceptable because the Army’s mechanisation programme was so 
far behind what was needed that it would have to be pursued, irrespective of the tank 
construction of other powers, specifically Germany. He doubted whether the Germans could 
quickly build a large number of tanks because of their cost and Germany’s more immediate 
requirements, such as developing an air force. In light of Britain’s existing shortage of up-to-
date tanks, Hailsham warned that any ‘holiday’ would leave the Army unable to conduct 
warfare successfully for many years to come.
133
  
When Sankey, the Lord Chancellor, who felt that the War Minister was unnecessarily 
thwarting progress, suggested that Hailsham should go to Geneva and sample the atmosphere, 
Hailsham replied that ‘he was willing to go anywhere’, but that his department’s decision 
regarding tanks was final. He refused to replace tanks with an expanded army with alternative 
weapons.
134
 He also rejected proposals which would have allowed a disarmament 
commission to allocate powers the minimum number of tanks consistent with their national 
safety, fearing that the Russian representative would know how many tanks Britain used for 
the defence of the Indian Frontier.
135
 While Hailsham overlooked the fact that Britain might 
learn similar details about Soviet arms, his lack of faith in what he regarded as a potential 
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enemy and his prioritising of British security interests were clear. He had outlined a number 
of reasons why the plan should not be presented and he had blocked the proposals relating to 
tanks. He was backed by Chamberlain who stressed that it would be premature to ‘give up 
our whole scheme [of defence] on the chance of some success at Geneva’.136  
For all that, the plan was not shelved. After personally gauging the atmosphere at 
Geneva, the Prime Minister presented it at the end of March. As Hailsham had suggested, no 
figures were offered for Britain’s arms or effectives and the proposals only suggested that 
tanks should be restricted by their weight. Notwithstanding initial enthusiasm, the plan did 
not facilitate wider agreement. Eden returned to London in early May without news of 
progress. He informed the cabinet that the British delegation, as Hailsham had anticipated, 
were now asked to provide some definite figures for effectives. The War Office’s proposed 
increase of 50,000 left him in a difficult position when the effectives of other powers were 
being limited to existing numbers or even reduced.
137
 Britain’s position on tanks also 
presented Eden problems, as it would be difficult to deny Germany a token supply. While 
Hailsham’s attitude at this juncture has been described as one of ‘I told you so’,138 his earlier 
warnings about the complications involved in presenting the convention were justified.  
The War Secretary accepted that the near collapse of the conference had necessitated 
the production of the convention, but he reiterated that it was impossible for the War Office’s 
figures to be reduced. He assured the cabinet that the increase in Britain’s effectives was not 
as great as it might appear. They were substantially lower than those proposed in the Hoover 
Plan and, when compared with previous estimates sent to Geneva for actual strengths, there 
was only a difference of 20,000. MacDonald and the cabinet quickly accepted Eden’s 
suggestion that the 20,000 effectives should be offered as part of an international police 
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force.
139
 In terms of tank construction, Hailsham’s position was identical to that of March. 
After he had presented his usual arguments to a smaller group of ministers who assembled 
after the cabinet meeting, they agreed that it was impossible for Britain to agree to a truce in 
tank construction. Germany, therefore, would have to be permitted a token number of 
tanks.
140
  
Although Britain’s inflexibility regarding effectives, tanks, aerial bombing and 
verification did little to foster wider agreement,
141
 the major stumbling block with the 
MacDonald Plan was that French amendments, like Hailsham’s earlier suggestions, were 
designed to put Germany on probation. The French wanted to spread Britain’s five-year 
convention over eight years. The first four would be a trial period to test verification 
procedures before France would disarm. After the Germans dismissed the amendments, 
Hailsham concluded that this revealed their true intentions. ‘Germany was’, he claimed, 
‘doing her best to fix on us the responsibility for the failure to reach agreement in order that 
she might then go ahead with her re-armament plan’. He warned that ‘we must be extremely 
careful what we were doing’. Deflecting German claims that Britain’s retention of tanks 
obstructed progress, he suggested that Britain should insist on discussing more important 
points where Germany stood out – such as the standardisation of effectives. ‘It would’, he 
said, ‘be far better for the conference to break down on that point, than that we should be 
manoeuvred into a position of difficulty in regard to tanks.’142 Fearing that Germany would 
leave the conference blaming Britain on points of detail, he ‘was entirely opposed to the 
policy of granting concessions in the hope that... some other country might agree to do 
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something towards an agreement’. The other powers should come to Britain with concrete 
proposals after they had settled their own differences.
143
  
Meanwhile, German inflexibility had become clear away from the Conference. 
Konstantin von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, had announced in the Leipziger 
Illustrierte Zeitung that Germany would rearm whatever the results of the conference.
144
 
Following a question from Cecil in the House of Lords on 11 May, Hailsham, on behalf of 
the government, made an unprepared speech concerning von Neurath’s statement. He 
claimed that the MacDonald Plan would give Germany equality and he hoped that the 
German government would adopt a more reasonable approach. If the plan was rejected, 
however, Germany ‘would incur the responsibility for any failure which might ensue’. It 
would be impossible, he said, for other powers to sign a convention when Germany ‘was 
breaking loose from the Disarmament Conference’.145   
In ‘grave tones’, he then outlined his interpretation of the legal position should 
Germany rearm.
146
 Mirroring his response to Southern Ireland’s violation of the 1921 Treaty 
without a new agreement, he was keen to defend the status quo. Germany, he claimed, would 
remain bound by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty and ‘any attempt on her part to 
rearm... would bring into operation the sanctions which that Treaty provides’.147 Hailsham’s 
lack of preparation was apparent as his usually astute legal opinion was actually unsound. 
Versailles did not provide sanctions in the event of German rearmament.
148
 This error, 
according to Leopold von Hoesch, the German ambassador, ‘characterise[d] Hailsham’s 
speech as an improvisation which had not received detailed consideration’. His remarks, 
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therefore, ‘need not be regarded as a deliberate political statement’. Von Hoesch was correct. 
Although these words reflected Hailsham’s own fears of the realities of German rearmament, 
the Foreign Office had envisaged ‘a less far-reaching statement’ and Hailsham’s line 
commanded little support amongst his colleagues. Simon was ‘evasive’ when asked whether 
the speech reflected the government’s opinion. The ambassador claimed that 
Where taking a stand against Germany leads to the emergence of a serious danger of 
war, which is precisely the case in pronouncements of the kind indulged in by Lord 
Hailsham, serious opposition arises here and alarm is felt at the thought that France 
might possibly draw encouragement for rash actions from England’s anti-German 
attitude.
149
  
Predictably, Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister, approved of Hailsham’s analysis.150 
The German response came on 13 May and did not dispel Hailsham’s misgivings. Von 
Papen, Hitler’s supposedly moderate Vice Chancellor, asserted that Germany had ‘struck the 
word pacifism from its vocabulary’. He highlighted ‘the ancient German aversion to death on 
a mattress’, claiming that ‘the battlefield was for man what motherhood was for woman’.151 
Nevertheless, Hailsham’s stern words appeared to affect Hitler who made a conciliatory 
speech on 17 May.
152
  
The domestic reception of Hailsham’s statement was mixed. Lloyd George, whose 
Francophobia and pro-German instincts facilitated his development into an ‘arch-
appeaser’,153 claimed it was ‘foolish’ and ‘a monstrous thing to have done’.154 In response 
Hailsham suggested that the Welshman’s criticisms ‘only show that his opinion and mine as 
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to what makes a foolish speech differ profoundly’.155 The Times noted that, although some of 
Hailsham’s words ‘were ill-chosen’, his statement was more helpful than Lloyd George’s.156 
Brigadier Temperley, Britain’s chief military adviser at Geneva, felt that Hailsham’s ‘words 
were welcomed by all shades of informed opinion, which was fully aware of their 
implications’.157  
Granted Japanese expansionism and German intransigence, it was unlikely that the 
conference would produce a convention. The following month Eden informed the cabinet that 
the French attached much importance to supervision because they believed that Germany was 
already rapidly rearming. They were so sure of their evidence that, when it came to light, ‘no-
one would ask France to do very much in the way of disarmament’.158 France would 
contemplate disarmament only once the effectiveness of the supervision of German arms was 
guaranteed. But even if Germany had agreed to strict verification procedures, Britain’s 
unilateral disarmament again presented massive problems. Hailsham warned that effective 
verification would expose Britain’s ‘grave shortage of war supplies’ to the world.159 The 
vigorous supervision that France demanded would ‘only tend to show France that our 
obligations under Locarno were, in fact, of no use at all’. Disclosing the ‘nakedness’ of 
Britain’s land forces would undermine any value that the Treaty could have.160 Somewhat 
illogically, Kitching claims that Hailsham’s frank observation was disingenuous.161 Rather 
than these realistic remarks lacking sincerity, the War Secretary recognised that inspections 
of Britain’s inadequate land forces would make French disarmament less likely. Britain was 
in no position to live up to its existing obligations and its own military weakness again 
constrained disarmament policy.  
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Notwithstanding Hailsham’s warnings regarding verification, Britain eventually 
joined America and Italy in accepting the French plans to stiffen the MacDonald Plan. When 
Simon moved a compromise scheme at Geneva in October 1933, the German delegation 
withdrew from the conference for the final time and issued notice to leave the League. 
Although it has been alleged that Hitler ‘had good reason’ for withdrawal after his 
conservative predecessors had left the conference for similar reasons in 1932,
162
 he had, in 
fact, found the pretext to withdraw for which he had been looking. Although the Germans 
blamed the French amendments, they had refused to accept other aspects of the MacDonald 
Plan. While demanding equality, they opposed the standardisation of continental armies, 
demanded the maintenance of a long-service professional army and refused to include 
paramilitary organisations in assessments of Germany’s armed strength.163  
The German attitude was clearly unfavourable to a convention and Hailsham’s fear of 
German aims again surfaced when the cabinet considered the implications of an Austro-
German customs union in September 1933. Facing a possible Austrian Nazi coup and an 
immediate threat to Austria’s sovereignty, Hailsham stressed that it was in Britain’s interests 
to maintain Austria’s independence because Germany was already ‘too strong’. German 
assurances that their ambitions were limited cut no ice with the War Secretary. He believed 
that a customs union would lead to Anschluss and mark the beginning of a wider expansionist 
plan. He warned his colleagues that, if Austrian independence vanished, Germany would  
take the next step in tearing up the Treaty of Versailles, dealing first with the [Polish] 
Corridor as a prelude to other parts of the Eastern Frontier and then Alsace Lorraine 
and the Colonies.
164
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Resistance was the War Secretary’s instinctive reaction to German revisionism. This episode 
also revealed another typical – but ultimately fruitless – response: Hailsham’s faith in 
Mussolini’s Italy as a counter-balance against Germany. He was confident that the Duce 
would not acquiesce in German expansionism. The ‘stabilising factor’ which Hailsham 
desired was ‘rapprochement between Italy and France’.165  
Hailsham calculated that Anglo-French-Italian collaboration would prevent Anschluss 
and, after the League’s impotent response to events in the Far East, he preferred to resort to 
the Four Power Pact.
166
 ‘The Pact’, he claimed, was ‘Mussolini’s creation and he would be 
flattered by the use of this instrument in preference to the League... [It] would be difficult for 
Germany if Italian co-operation with France and Great Britain was secured.’167 This marked 
the beginning of Hailsham’s support for the courtship of Italy which lasted until his 
retirement. His son recalled that throughout the 1930s his father had ‘regarded Germany as 
the main enemy and Italy as a potential ally against her’.168  
Although this anticipation was ultimately unsuccessful, it was no forlorn hope. 
Hailsham, like Vansittart, was aware that Italy and Germany had competing aims in Central 
Europe. Notwithstanding the ideological similarities between the fascist powers, the Duce 
had welcomed Hailsham’s anti-German statement in May 1933 and the War Secretary had 
some reason to believe that competing interests over Austria presented an insuperable barrier 
to an Italian-German understanding.
169
 Before Hitler came to power, Mussolini had 
concluded that an Austro-German Anschluss could not be sanctioned. He had even invited 
Prince Starhemberg, the Austrian conservative, to ‘Come to me if you need help’. The Duce 
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believed that if Germany controlled Austria, Italy would ‘cease to be one of the great powers 
of Europe’.170 The hopes of Hailsham, Vansittart and others seemed to be vindicated in 1934 
when Mussolini rushed Italian troops to the Brenner Pass to prevent Anschluss. 
The Disarmament Conference limped on into 1934 but it existed in ‘name only’.171 
Hailsham understood that, without German participation, it was ‘dead but not buried’.172 The 
German withdrawal did not, however, prevent Hitler’s administration from making 
alternative proposals designed to legalise its own rearmament. Such proposals attempted to 
legitimate a process which was already underway and which Hailsham suspected would not 
stop at the agreed limits. When, before the end of 1933, the ministerial committee learnt that 
German rearmament had progressed further than had been presumed, Hailsham, once again, 
anticipated that Germany would seek territorial adjustments in the east, and he recommended 
a ‘heart to heart talk with France’ to form ‘a clear plan before we made any move’.173 He also 
favoured communicating with the Italians.
174
  
In October, Hitler sent proposals to Britain, France and Italy regarding German 
rearmament to facilitate ‘equality of status’. The Germans claimed that Britain had caused 
their withdrawal from the conference after they had allowed other powers to substitute a 
second draft convention for their initial draft which Germany had accepted.
175
 This was 
exactly the sort of allegation that Hailsham had hoped to avoid. After the German 
communication, he consistently denied that Britain could have done more to make the 
conference a success.
176
 He publicly claimed that it was Britain which had ‘found a way out’ 
of every crisis. He was ‘not in the least ashamed of the part which the Government... 
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play[ed]’.177 Britain had gone to the limit in its proposals and was guilty only of acting ‘with 
a courage almost amounting to foolhardiness in the way in which it has disarmed itself in the 
hope of persuading other people to do the same’.178 With its arms reduced to the ‘edge of 
risk’, no power in the world could reasonably regard Britain as a source of aggression.179 
The War Secretary’s defence of the government was accompanied by counterattacks 
on pacifist propaganda. He concluded that pacifism, unilateral disarmament or a disarmament 
convention with insufficient safeguards, were all likely to lead to war. Referring to the 
Oxford Union resolution ‘That this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and 
Country’,180 he felt that 
the only method by which he could see... war breaking out would be if any foreign 
nation believed that the silly chattering of some of our boys at the universities, with 
the mischievous utterances of some politicians, really meant that this country was 
down and out and no longer had the manhood or the courage to defend itself.
181
    
To Lansbury’s declaration that he ‘would close every recruiting station, disband the Army 
and disarm the Air Force... and say to the world: “Do your worst”’, Hailsham responded that 
those who advocated this course were ‘desirous of claiming the privileges of citizenship 
while divesting themselves of any responsibility for it’.182 He continued, 
If any one leader appealed to his friends not to join [Britain’s forces]... the party to 
which he belonged desired to shirk their duty while claiming their full share and 
benefit [of citizenship]... [T]he duty which they were too cowardly or too selfish to 
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take up must fall on the shoulders of more patriotic and more unselfish fellow 
citizens.
183
   
His consistent theme was that disarmament which depended upon the goodwill of 
dissatisfied, militaristic powers was not the surest way of maintaining peace. For Hailsham, 
disarmament was not necessarily synonymous with peace. As he later told the cabinet sub-
committee, ‘weakness in arms did not avoid war’.184 
In early 1934, the British government suggested a new arms limitation scheme based 
on a combination of French disarmament and German rearmament. Unsurprisingly, France 
refused to disarm while Germany rearmed to a comparable level without a British guarantee. 
The War Secretary was frustrated that the French ‘would not face realities’,185 but rather than 
accepting the German proposals or producing yet another compromise scheme, he warned 
against advocating proposals that would isolate France. Aware that the conference was on the 
verge of collapse and that ‘everyone would look for a scapegoat’, he suggested that Britain 
should hold fast to the amended MacDonald Plan and explain that ‘we had done our best to 
get agreement but so far with no success’. The Prime Minister agreed. Such an approach 
‘would certainly take the final responsibility away from us’.186  
In April the French finally declared that they could not accept any proposals which 
legalised German rearmament.
187
 This communication, Hailsham concluded, ‘could only 
mean that the Disarmament Conference had failed’. He felt that meetings at Geneva should 
cease and ‘the sooner the better’.188 In this new situation, he ominously anticipated that the 
only way of stopping German rearmament was ‘by force, that is to say, a preventive war 
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which France was not prepared to undertake’. After analysing the German proposals, 
apparently designed to facilitate ‘equality’, he concluded that ‘We had got a blunt statement 
by Germany that she was rearming and that she would not accept any agreement which did 
not authorise such rearmament’. With France against any German rearmament, he judged that 
‘It would obviously be impossible to negotiate any agreement’.189 The following month even 
Eden concluded that the conference was finished and, with no progress apparent, it adjourned 
in July.
190
 It never reconvened.  
Hailsham later voiced his scepticism about the conference’s ability to reach a 
settlement: ‘I have often heard’, he told the Lords, ‘that at Geneva there is a blessed means of 
solving all difficulties.’ He found that agreement was reached only when ‘you find a 
“formula” about which everybody agrees although everyone interprets it in a different 
sense’.191 For all his efforts during 1932-4, Eden recalled that his attempts to get the 
MacDonald Plan accepted were ‘like trying to force a bill through an international House of 
Commons with no whips and no government majority’.192 A convention could ‘only be... the 
outcome of persuading the French to make such an offer as can be reasonably forced down 
the German throat with an Italian spoon’.193 Hankey summarised the British experience: ‘an 
outrageous proposal is put forward, everyone accepts it with their tongue in their cheek, until 
we, with our natural sense of realities, turn it down. Then everybody starts to blame us as 
obstructing progress.’194 This sense of reality was clear in Hailsham’s consideration of 
various proposals. He could have followed the dishonest path of accepting plans while 
hoping, as others did, that the conference would break down on other points. But, for the 
conference to be successful, Britain had to be capable of implementing the agreements. 
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Proposals that demanded a military commitment which Britain could not confidently provide, 
or schemes which restricted Britain’s necessary arms, could not honestly be accepted.  
Notwithstanding Britain’s relative disarmament and requests to make further 
reductions, it has been alleged that the refusal to grant France a security guarantee means that 
Britain should ‘bear a much larger responsibility for the failure of the conference than has 
hitherto been assumed’.195 Yet the British were not blind to the consequences of such a 
course. Hailsham was aware that ‘Disarmament... had broken down owing to lack of 
security’.196 After Germany had finally withdrawn from the conference, he observed that 
security was ‘the crux of the problem’ as was ‘obvious from the first’. He understood that 
Unless you can find some way in which Germany’s sense of resentment at being 
placed in a position of inferiority is overcome, and at the same time France is given a 
feeling of reasonable security...  it is hopeless to expect... any real progress.
197
 
Hailsham was not just wise after the event. As early as March 1932, he had warned the 
ministerial committee that  
sooner or later we might have definitely to express an opinion regarding the theses of 
France and Germany... [H]e was still not at all certain as to what our attitude was to 
be when this debate broke out and if, as was highly likely, we were forced to 
intervene.
198
  
With Britain militarily incapable of defending its own interests or anyone else’s, this dilemma 
paralysed British policy. This understanding was held in informed circles across the political 
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spectrum. In 1930, Arthur Henderson had accepted that Britain had already ‘gone as far as it 
is possible to go in the way of meeting France in the matter of security’.199 What’s more, this 
predicament was not the only barrier to a convention. Japan would not sign one and the 
various powers had repeatedly failed to assess the strengths of different types and numbers of 
weapons.
200
  
Hailsham had frequently informed his colleagues that Britain was incapable of 
fulfilling existing obligations because its defences could not meet minimum requirements.
201
 
Even critics of Britain’s disarmament policy acknowledge that Britain was ‘vastly 
overcommitted’.202 Quite rationally, Hailsham concluded that strategic weakness was 
inconsistent with obligation. In March 1933 he and Cunliffe-Lister, the Colonial Secretary, 
warned against ‘deluding France into the belief that we were giving her security which...  we 
had no intention of providing’.203 It was, therefore, militarily impracticable, illogical and 
immoral to guarantee French security when Britain could not live up to the commitment. This 
policy had been effectively torpedoed in 1919 when Lloyd George made such a commitment 
dependent upon American participation which was not forthcoming. In the early 1930s it was 
a pledge which neither the British public nor the Dominions would accept.
204
 Critics also 
overlook the effect this would have had on Germany. That power would have been presented 
with another pretext to withdraw from the conference.  
By 1934, when a successful disarmament convention seemed far-fetched, Hailsham’s 
public remarks increasingly drew attention to the unpreparedness of Britain’s armed forces to 
meet a future attack. He told one audience 
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Some persons attacked us because they said that the one way of ensuring peace was to 
get rid of armaments altogether. There could be no more profound mistake. In a boys’ 
school the one thing that produced a bully was the existence of a type of boy who 
would never resist being bullied... We were never going to succeed if we said to the 
rest of the world: “Attack us, if you please, take away our possessions, and destroy 
our trade, we won’t resist.”205 
In November Hailsham explained to the Lords that the ‘cardinal feature’ which had 
underpinned the government’s disarmament policy was that ‘the best defence is to diminish 
the possibility of attack’. This however, did not mean that the  
reduction in the forces of this country alone [and] increasing our vulnerability 
diminish the risk of our being attacked. We have tried unilateral action, but I am 
afraid that an example which no one follows may... produce the very worst results.
206
 
With militant nationalism destabilising the international order, Hailsham concluded that, 
without adequate defences, Britain invited an attack on its coveted interests. Remedial action 
was necessary. 
Rearmament 
In November 1933, by which time the signing of a disarmament convention seemed 
highly unlikely after Hitler’s delegation had withdrawn from the conference, Hailsham 
suggested to the CID that each service should ‘prepare a statement of their requirements... 
and that some committee would then examine and co-ordinate these returns and see how they 
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could be reduced to practical proportions’.207 He had decided that German intransigence 
made British rearmament essential. Hailsham pointed out that ‘We were already below our 
margin of safety as a consequence of the ten-year rule and it was now necessary for us to 
begin to make some preparations to restore the balance.’ It was the government’s duty ‘to see 
that our defence arrangements were in a reasonable state of efficiency’, and consequently, an 
increase in certain weapons was unavoidable.
208
 
Later that month the formation of the Defence Requirements Committee [DRC], 
charged with producing proposals to remove the ‘worst deficiencies’ of Britain’s defences, 
met Hailsham’s request. Meeting until February 1934, its membership included the service 
chiefs, Chatfield (Admiralty), Montgomery-Massingberd (Army) and Ellington (R.A.F), 
Robert Vansittart and Warren Fisher, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Treasury, with 
Maurice Hankey, the influential cabinet secretary, filling his accustomed role. Somewhat 
ironically, its recommendations were considered by the cabinet’s unreconstructed 
disarmament sub-committee during the first half of 1934. The DRC’s amended proposals 
shaped Britain’s rearmament and influenced British foreign policy in the later 1930s.209  
While such an approach was a logical response to a threatening international climate, 
a major problem was that any rearmament programme would be expensive – perhaps 
prohibitively so. Britain’s services, most particularly the Army, had widespread deficiencies. 
Baldwin confessed that the Army had suffered more than any other Service from cuts and 
Hailsham had consistently warned about the state of his service.
210
 In early 1932, he accepted 
that the extraordinary economic situation postponed immediate re-equipment, but he was 
                                                 
207
 CAB 24/244, CID 9 Nov. 1933. This runs contrary to the interpretation that the DRC was formed ‘against the 
objections of the Service ministers.’ D.J. Wrench, ‘The Influence of Neville Chamberlain on Foreign and 
Defence Policy 1932-35’, Royal United Services Institute, vol.125, no.1 (1980), p.50.  
208
 CAB 27/505, 23 Nov. 1933. 
209
 For a discussion of the DRC and its impact on British foreign policy in the later 1930s, see: K. Neilson, ‘The 
Defence Requirements Sub-Committee: British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to 
Appeasement’, English Historical Review, vol.118, no.477 (2003), pp.651-684. 
210
 H of C Debs, vol.299, col.56. 
286 
 
‘shocked’ at the Army’s unpreparedness to meet its responsibilities.211 In June 1932, he 
presented the cabinet with a memorandum, calling for significant expenditure on the Army.
212
 
A year later, Montgomery-Massingberd, Milne’s successor as CIGS, warned that Britain was 
in no position to implement its responsibilities.
213
 Early calls to repair Britain’s deficiencies 
were, however, blocked by the Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain, who maintained that ‘the 
financial risk was greater than the war risk’.214 
By the autumn of 1933 there were signs that this situation would change. In October 
the COS rated Germany the biggest threat to Britain’s security within three to five years. 
Their review also noted the Army’s inability to engage in a continental war despite existing 
treaty commitments. This unpreparedness could not be quickly mended. The Army lacked 
weapons, ammunition and the industrial facilities to replenish these shortages. The Chiefs 
therefore recommended that deficiencies should be dealt with immediately if Britain was to 
be capable of meeting the latent German danger.
215
 The DRC Report echoed these 
conclusions, famously nominating Germany as ‘the ultimate potential enemy’. As Britain 
lacked the military capability to meet two first-class powers simultaneously, the committee 
recommended that the forces should be prepared to face a German attack in Europe, while 
Britain should come to terms with Japan, after ‘showing a tooth’ in the Far East by 
completing the defences at Singapore. After Russo-Japanese relations had deteriorated and 
Japan had become bogged-down in Manchuria, Germany was Britain’s major problem.216  
The DRC did not recommend a colossal rearmament programme. It suggested that the 
R.A.F. should be brought up to the 1923 standard of 52 squadrons and, with no decision 
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made on naval construction, that the existing fleet should be modernised. The Army’s 
requirements, however, were less certain. With fresh memories of trench warfare, political 
calculations were significant, especially amidst claims that aerial bombing made the use of 
ground troops redundant. Financial concerns were also important, as significant expenditure 
would be required to equip the Army for continental service. During the DRC’s deliberations, 
however, Vansittart and the CIGS effectively demonstrated the necessity of preparing an 
Army capable of continental intervention. This conclusion was embodied in the report.
217
 
This force was to be prepared within five years and would be composed of four infantry 
divisions, a cavalry division, a tank brigade, two air defence brigades and an R.A.F. 
contingent of 19 Squadrons.
218
 Rather than the advent of air power making the use of ground 
troops to hold the Low Countries unnecessary, the report found that the security of the Low 
Countries, ‘a cardinal point in our policy for hundreds of years’, was now of ‘even greater 
importance’.219 In addition to stopping a hostile power accessing the Channel Ports, Britain’s 
land forces could help prevent an enemy air force from operating from the Low Countries. 
This would give Britain 
that depth in our defence of London which is so badly needed... If the Low Countries 
were in the hands of a hostile power, not only would the frequency and the intensity 
of air attack... be increased, but the whole of the industrial areas of the midlands and 
the North of England would be brought within the area of penetration.   
To hold the Low Countries and to fulfil Britain’s existing continental responsibilities, the 
‘Field Force’ – so named to avoid association with the ‘Expeditionary Force’ of the previous 
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war – was regarded as ‘an essential first step’ and ‘the absolute minimum’.220 This was the 
Army’s main deficiency.221 Although smaller than its 1914 counterpart, the committee felt 
that the Field Force’s deterrent effect would ‘exercise an influence for peace out of all 
proportion to its size’. A total of £40 million was required to prepare the force within 5 years 
and remove the Army’s other shortages. The estimated cost of removing the ‘worst 
deficiencies’ across Britain’s services was £71 million.222   
In light of Britain’s intention to create, and if necessary, deploy an expeditionary 
force, the conventional view regarding Britain’s isolationism from the continent during the 
1930s has been challenged.
223
 ‘While separation from the continent and self-absorption might 
have been hallmarks of the late 1930s’, McKercher concludes that, ‘this was not the case in 
the dozen years after 1925.’ An integral part of the Foreign Office’s grand strategy during the 
1930s was a military commitment to the continent.
224
 In the DRC, the civilians, Vansittart 
and Fisher, seized the initiative and set out the priorities of Britain’s long-term defence policy 
and the former was the driving force behind the continental commitment.
225
  
The latest historiographical developments suggest that when Chamberlain challenged 
the DRC’s conclusion relating to the Field Force in the ministerial committee, he 
‘encountered stiff opposition orchestrated by Vansittart’. Through memoranda and lobbying, 
the Chancellor’s efforts to block the Field Force’s creation were ‘stymied by Vansittart’.226 
Simon, accepting Vansittart’s analysis, ‘pressed the [ministerial] committee about the 
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wisdom of a continental commitment’.227 But the understanding that MacDonald and 
Baldwin ‘dominated’ the ministerial committee and that Hailsham was amongst those who 
‘bowed’ to the Foreign Office and ‘sided’ with that department’s strategic views requires 
modification.
228
 The War Secretary was a leading critic of Chamberlain’s ‘limited liability’ 
approach and he also helped maintain the Army’s continental commitment in order to deter, 
or in the last resort resist, a German attack on the Low Countries. A closer look at Hailsham’s 
contribution does not undermine Vansittart’s role in establishing Britain’s defence priorities, 
but the War Minister’s experience shows that the existing historiography only tells part of the 
story.  
The ministerial committee discussed the report over thirteen meetings in mid-1934 
and made the ultimate decisions on Britain’s rearmament. It ‘provided an early test case of 
the Government’s willingness to... prepare for the worst’ and to inform the electorate of what 
was necessary.
229
 It is clear from the committee’s minutes that Hailsham was prominent in 
the discussions. He vigorously advocated the adoption of the DRC’s recommendations and, 
like Vansittart, his determination to implement the proposals was based upon his perception 
of the ‘German problem’. This potential threat was in his mind throughout the ministerial 
committee’s meetings. In mid-1934, he noted privately that: 
no one knows what the Germans are really up to except that it is pretty plainly 
mischief. The French are scared stiff and when you remember what they have had to 
put up with in the past, one can hardly blame them.
230
 
Consistent with his earlier warnings, Hailsham told the cabinet that the DRC Report 
‘disclosed an alarming situation’. The recommendations were ‘an absolute minimum 
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requirement’ and the shortages in the services could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. 
He had previously ‘accepted the position... because he had had to weigh the dangers of 
unpreparedness against the risks of financial catastrophe’, but he now believed that threats to 
Britain’s security superseded the financial danger.231 So serious were these shortages that the 
service ministers enquired ‘whether the leaders of the Opposition Parties should be called 
into our counsels’.232   
Hopes of a swift decision were soon dashed and the cabinet’s response proved ‘slow 
and inadequate’.233 In April, after almost a month’s procrastination on the part of their 
colleagues, the service ministers urged the cabinet to adopt the report and ‘enable their 
respective departments to make progress forthwith’.234 Hailsham, the most eloquent of the 
defence ministers, spoke on behalf of the services. He claimed that the Forces ‘were not 
efficient for the purposes for which they existed’ and he demanded a final decision on the 
Field Force to allow it to ‘take and keep the field’. He again suggested taking the opposition 
parties into the government’s confidence ‘as part of a process of educating the public’. Aware 
of the political risks attached to initiating the DRC programme, because there was little 
knowledge outside the cabinet of how serious Britain’s deficiencies were,235 he believed that 
the cabinet should still take a responsible step forward as national safety was at stake.
236
 His 
calls, however, had little effect on his colleagues. In June he complained that ‘the 
investigation of the cabinet had taken so long’.237 In all, the government took nine months in 
its deliberations with no improvement of Britain’s services during the intervening period. 
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While Hailsham’s advocacy could be dismissed as that of a typical minister 
attempting to squeeze funding from the Treasury in the narrow interests of his department, he 
was in fact determined to secure all-round rearmament to prepare Britain’s services for the 
worst. He called for an expansion in naval building to defend Britain’s far-flung empire and, 
as regards equipping the Air Force, Londonderry recalled that ‘I knew that if I was pressed 
[Hailsham] would invariably come to my assistance’.238 The War Secretary’s conduct 
undermines claims that the service departments competed ‘for the Chancellor’s favour, 
preventing the formation of a united front to counterbalance Chamberlain’s dominance’.239 
Regarding Germany as Britain’s likely adversary, Hailsham sought a proper balance between 
the services. His resistance to modifications of the DRC Report was underpinned by his 
conviction that Britain’s services would, sooner or later, be engaged in war. On this point an 
important difference emerged between the War Secretary and the Chancellor. Chamberlain 
believed that if Britain established an adequate deterrent, Germany would seek peaceful 
revisions to the Versailles settlement without resorting to force.  
In the summer of 1934 the Chancellor attacked the proposals relating to the Army. 
With the economic situation the rationale for the National Government’s existence, the 
Treasury had assumed an increased role in policy-making and the Chancellor proved that he 
could override the demands of the three service ministers combined.
240
 Although Fisher had 
approved the DRC’s expenditure and strategic rationale, Chamberlain was bent on reducing 
the spending contemplated. The Army was bound to suffer at the hands of a man who loathed 
the heavy casualties of the First World War and was ‘implacably hostile’ to continental 
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intervention.
241
 Although strategically untrained, Chamberlain’s authority allowed him to 
modify the proposals.  
The Chancellor challenged the DRC Report ‘in the light of politics and finance’,242 
concluding that, if Britain had a strong Air Force, Germany would be deterred from 
occupying the Low Countries and attacking Britain. This ‘limited liability’ policy would rely 
on other powers tackling the Germans on the ground, whilst expanding the R.A.F. and using 
the Royal Navy to prevent a cross-Channel invasion. He found it ‘startling’ to prepare the 
Army for continental war and doubted whether such preparations were necessary.
243
 Pownall 
found Chamberlain ‘obstinate and strategically undereducated’. He complained that: 
Chamberlain is under the impression that one can go to war with limited liability, i.e. 
air and navy cut out all land contribution. Deadly dangerous. His ideas on strategy 
would disgrace a board school.
244
   
The Chancellor was challenging the views of defence experts but, most dangerously, he had 
the political clout to impose his will. He found support from Cunliffe-Lister, Halifax, Simon 
and Thomas.
245
  
The War Secretary’s approach to disarmament policy had already demonstrated his 
intellectual independence and the fact that he did not necessarily follow Foreign Office 
views. Having uttered his first warning regarding the German danger almost two years 
earlier, he calculated that the best way to prevent German hegemony was British rearmament 
and a clear indication that Britain was willing, in association with other powers, to resist 
German expansion. Hailsham relied primarily upon the War Office for guidance and Pownall 
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noted a wider circle of advisors: ‘Great lobbying is going on over the D.R.C. report.’ General 
John Dill, assisted by Hankey and Vansittart, also briefed Hailsham.
246
 The War Secretary, 
however, was not merely his advisors’ mouthpiece. He was himself a distinguished soldier 
and he was capable of forming his own opinions. Chamberlain had tried similar ‘lobbying’ 
tactics the previous month to enlist Hailsham’s support for his ‘International Air Force’ 
scheme, but failed miserably.
247
 In the ministerial committee the War Minister bluntly stated 
that ‘unless the committee felt themselves better experts than their own military advisors... 
the scheme was impracticable’.248  
In a series of ministerial committee meetings, Hailsham employed historical and 
strategic arguments to dispel the Chancellor’s delusions and ‘put up an impressive, though 
largely unavailing resistance’.249 Noting Britain’s existing requirements, he stated that the 
services ‘were only trying to make effective a strength which had already received the 
government’s approval’.250 To Chamberlain’s claim that the expeditionary force was Lord 
Haldane’s novel invention before the First World War, Hailsham responded that ‘there had 
always been an expeditionary force’.251 He pointed out that Britain’s traditional strategy was 
to maintain the European balance of power and prevent a hostile nation from dominating the 
Low Countries.  
Fully briefed by the War Office, he argued that Britain required an army that could 
support allies to prevent Germany establishing submarine and air bases in the Low Countries. 
If Germany overran this territory, it could 
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bomb our cities and attack our trade... [W]e should be in a comparatively short range 
of air attack, which could be made very intensive... The only means to prevent 
Germany from doing this was to have an expeditionary force to keep her back.  
The Chiefs estimated that a German attack launched from the Low Countries would be 80 per 
cent stronger than one from Germany. The War Secretary also showed that his advisors were 
not alone in valuing land forces despite the advent of air power. After all  
it was clear that the Germans were preparing not only a strong efficient and up-to-date 
air force, but large quantities of troops to operate with that force. They did not 
contemplate the use of air forces unsupported on land.
252
  
To Chamberlain’s question about whether British troops could reach the Low Countries in 
time to meet an attack, Hailsham repeated the CIGS’s argument that the moral effect of 
Britain’s commitment to send troops to help the French and Belgian resistance would be 
‘enormous... [I]t might turn the scale.’253 Without such an assurance ‘the French fortifications 
might crumple up’.254 Rather than debating the need for an expeditionary force, Hailsham 
believed that the real issue was whether a force of four divisions was an adequate size. He 
did, however, accept that constraints limited the expansion of the Army and stated that the 
DRC programme ‘was all that could be reasonably asked for at the present, though... it would 
be very desirable if a larger force could be formed’.255 
The Army had a strong case for additional funding and Hailsham again drew attention 
to its widespread deficiencies. It was equipped with the same machine gun as in 1914 and 
possessed only three post-war prototype tanks. Significant expenditure was required now that 
the ‘ultimate potential enemy’ had been identified as a first-class European power. The 
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expenditure anticipated, Hailsham calculated, would merely give British troops ‘reasonable 
protection against a modern foe’ and enable the Army to mobilise quickly, which was 
essential if it was to be effective.
256
 As things stood, an Army of five divisions could only be 
mobilised over a period of six months. It was also a moot point whether the R.A.F. could halt 
a German land offensive in Western Europe. Londonderry admitted that circumstances could 
arise when the Air Force would be incapable of even attempting to guard the Low 
Countries.
257
 Hailsham’s logic, therefore, was strategically irrefutable258 and his powerful 
advocacy helped ensure that the ministerial committee accepted that the ‘Field Force’ was 
necessary and should be ‘effective if sent’.259 A relieved Pownall concluded that ministers 
had ‘got it into their heads at last’.260 
Despite Chamberlain’s opposition, Britain maintained its continental commitment. 
But this quickly became a pyrrhic victory as Chamberlain blocked the necessary expenditure 
to equip the Field Force. He noted at the end of July that ‘I succeeded in getting my defence 
programmes carried in the main’.261 The Chancellor relied upon the prevailing economic and 
political situations. Although agreeing that Germany was the major threat to Britain’s 
security, he believed that a strong economy ‘was a prerequisite to strong defence’.262 He 
judged that the DRC proposals would not command popular support and that the Army’s 
expenditure ‘bulks so largely in the total as to give rise to the most alarmist ideas of future 
intentions’.263 He suggested that, instead of providing an additional £40 million for the Army, 
the sum should be limited to £19.1 million.  
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 Hailsham was not blind to financial or political difficulties, but he felt that these 
factors did not validate Chamberlain’s parsimony. The War Secretary believed that the small 
force proposed by the DRC was affordable and he recognised that it would be premature to 
make any declaration committing British troops to the continent without a ‘good deal of 
education’. But for Hailsham essential rearmament and national security should not depend 
upon the whims of public opinion. The proposals should be presented as necessary ‘to put 
right deficiencies which had accumulated... owing to the ten-year rule’.264  
In May, the War Secretary had been the only minister to oppose Chamberlain’s 
suggestion that, in order to ‘inaugurate a more intensive air programme’, there should be a 
‘less intensive programme as regards the land forces’.265 The Chancellor sought to harness 
public enthusiasm for the R.A.F. to create a ‘deterrent force so powerful as to render success 
in attack too difficult to be worthwhile’.266 This approach was more tolerable for the Treasury 
as it would be cheaper, politically convenient and – so Chamberlain considered – provide a 
greater deterrent for the funds available.
267
 But the deterrent effect was debatable. The 
Chancellor skewed priorities in favour of home defence and omitted sufficient reserves. This 
ensured that the deterrent was a ‘shop window’ force, likely to survive combat conditions for 
only two weeks. This ‘add[ed] a dangerous twist to the deterrent principle; as the new 
squadrons were intended to prevent a fight, and... would not have to be capable of 
fighting’.268 These proposals highlighted a fundamental difference between Chamberlain and 
Hailsham. The War Secretary felt that the best deterrent was to prepare forces that could 
actually engage in war. The Chancellor, by contrast, hoped that an impressive paper force 
would intimidate possible enemies. 
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Hailsham attacked the Chancellor’s modifications and stated that he was not 
convinced that the proposed air force would deter Germany. Without adequate reserves, 
Londonderry felt the scheme was ‘better designed for public consumption than for real 
utility’.269 While Hailsham ‘fully appreciated the need for economy’,270 he claimed that his 
service was being treated as a ‘Cinderella of the forces’. Its funding was set not ‘according to 
requirements but to the other services’ expenditure’. This was, he protested, ‘no way to treat 
the Army’. The Chancellor’s figures were unjustified and ‘it was impossible to make the 
Army into the semblance of an efficient machine with anything like the sum suggested’. He 
was convinced that the arguments in favour of a continental commitment were sound, but 
even if the Army was not prepared for this role, Hailsham explained that much of the money 
was still required. The preparation of the Field Force was only part of the sum requested. In 
early 1933 the CIGS had asked for an additional £30 million to enable the Army to carry out 
the Defence of India Plan.
271
  
On 26 June Hailsham reminded the committee that the Army, having accepted the 
limits of the ten-year rule, ‘was not a fighting machine’. The sum of £40 million represented 
the lowest possible figure to remove the worst shortages. Other nations had modernised their 
forces, but Britain’s Army had outdated weapons and lacked ammunition reserves, while its 
ports at home and abroad required reinforcement. These were ‘minimum requirements’ and, 
if the Army was sent into the field without the rectification of these deficiencies, ‘it would be 
a massacre’. Countering the Treasury’s claim – which historians have repeated – that 
Britain’s limited industrial capacity meant that the War Office could not spend its money 
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effectively,
272
 Hailsham’s advisors did not doubt that it could be done and he offered to 
satisfy the Treasury that the money could be properly spent.
273
  
Hailsham’s next point exemplified his clear thinking. He questioned the rationale 
behind preparing the R.A.F. within five years while postponing the Army’s preparations. It 
was ‘illogical’, he pointed out, ‘to spend more on the Air Force and simultaneously not spend 
the money necessary to prevent Germany from launching an air attack from Belgium’. This, 
the DRC concluded, ‘constituted the greatest danger.’ He calculated that the most formidable 
deterrent that Britain could offer Germany was the prospect of a strong Air Force launched 
from the Low Countries. The Chancellor’s plan undermined ‘a unanimous report on the part 
of the three services, the Treasury and the Foreign Office’ and rejected ‘a carefully planned 
scheme for the simultaneous use of all three services in the kind of war which the 
Government’s professional advisors thought most likely’.274 Viscount Trenchard, the Air 
Ministry’s DRC representative, had accepted that a ‘spearhead’ expeditionary force capable 
of securing continental air bases should be amongst the first deficiencies to be repaired.
275
 
Hailsham protested that the ministerial committee was inclined to accept the view that 
since the public demanded a large Air Force... the expenditure necessary for its 
provision must be made. There were also similar views in regard to the one power 
standard and that, as a result, if there was anything left the Army might have it.
276
  
The War Minister’s opposition fell on deaf ears. He managed only to squeeze an extra 
£900,000 out of the Treasury, leaving the Army with an extra £20 million over the next five 
years. This minor increase was inadequate and Hailsham warned that a future leap in 
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expenditure was inevitable.
277
 While only half of the money needed to remove the Army’s 
‘worst deficiencies’ was provided, the Chancellor, amongst other subsidies, found £24 
million for a new Cunard liner.
278
 
The Army’s readiness for continental war was thus delayed beyond 1939 into an 
extended period, which Hailsham estimated at nine years.
279
 There might have been ‘every 
reason to suppose that the size of the army would be improved and expanded to ensure that... 
“Europe could not be kept guessing”’,280 but parsimony in 1934 made it easier to abandon the 
Field Force later in the decade.
281
 Although the Third DRC report maintained Britain’s 
commitment to send an expeditionary force to Europe and the cabinet sanctioned expenditure 
of £77.2 million on the Army in February 1936,
282
 the ‘Field Force’ was abandoned two 
years later when the cabinet accepted Thomas Inskip’s second report.283 While the 
continental commitment theoretically remained at the heart of Britain’s defence policy until 
early 1938, Chamberlain had ‘defeated the War Office in 1934 with the power of the purse, 
and it had never recovered’.284  
Only in March 1939, after the Prague Coup, did the cabinet sanction a full-scale 
continental army. But this hardly facilitated the Army’s preparations for war.285 
Montgomery-Massingberd had warned in 1934 that it was impossible to ‘neglect the Army in 
times of peace and yet turn out a thoroughly efficient and effective Force in times of war’.286 
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Field Marshal Montgomery judged that in September 1939 the British Army was totally 
unready to fight a first-class continental war.
287
 With this in mind, advocates of the 
continental commitment such as Hailsham and Montgomery-Massingberd have been praised 
by military historians.
288
 It has been speculated that better preparations might have sustained 
France against the 1940 German advance, which ‘would have greatly eased Britain’s air and 
trade defence problems’ during the Second World War.289 
Hailsham’s criticisms of the Chancellor’s amendments were not limited to the Army’s 
interests. Under the modified scheme, home defence prevailed and expenditure on the 
Singapore Naval Base was postponed. Therefore, Britain’s ability to contain the Japanese 
fleet was suspended.
290
 Although Hailsham agreed with Chamberlain that an Anglo-Japanese 
rapprochement was desirable, he doubted whether this could be achieved from a position of 
weakness. The Japanese, he concluded, wanted ‘to increase their exclusive orbit in China’, 
which would ‘inevitably lead to competition with us’.291 He was ‘entirely in favour of doing 
what we could to make friends with Japan’, but was concerned that the Japanese ‘might want 
us to acknowledge Manchukuo’ and were trying to capture Britain’s China trade.292  
Not surprisingly, Hailsham opposed Chamberlain’s plans to suspend expenditure on 
the Singapore Naval Base. He ‘did not see how the government could reconcile themselves to 
the idea of abandoning our Empire in the East... and leaving it to the mercy of Japan, on the 
chance of Japan not attacking it’. Granted Japan’s recent violation of a number of past 
agreements, he was amongst those cabinet ministers who saw little value in Japanese 
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pledges.
293
 He agreed with Eyres-Monsell’s warning that Chamberlain’s policy meant that 
‘New Zealand and Australia would be left to their fate and India would be abandoned’. This, 
the War Secretary judged, represented a fundamental change in policy. The strength of his 
conviction was apparent when he informed his colleagues that he would not ‘be party to any 
announcement which indicated so drastic an alteration’. He asked the ministerial committee 
whether it felt ‘justified on financial and political grounds in saying that we would not 
attempt to defend our Empire’. Such a suggestion was, he judged, ‘entirely unjustified’.294 He 
regarded the failure to reinforce Singapore as a policy of ‘despair and defeatism’ and 
questioned whether Britain was in ‘so rotten a condition’ that it could not face up to 
realities.
295
 
Reflecting his wider thoughts on deterrence, he believed that the defenceless state of 
Singapore represented ‘not only a temptation but perhaps a definite incentive to Japan’.296 He 
read out an extract from a paper by Vansittart which claimed that Britain’s moral stature was 
declining because of its military weakness. He then drew attention to a passage of the DRC 
Report which stated that the completion of its recommendations would ‘barely bring our 
defence forces to the lowest point consistent with national safety and... international 
obligations’.297 Significantly, this spirited, if unsuccessful, protest was in the interests of the 
Navy, not the Army. 
The deteriorating international scene, Britain’s unpreparedness to meet a combination 
of threats and the skewed nature of the revised proposals ensured that Hailsham supported a 
novel suggestion to ‘find the money to make good all the deficiencies’. Baldwin floated the 
possibility of a defence loan after a campaign to educate public opinion. Hailsham, Eyres-
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Monsell and Cunliffe-Lister immediately welcomed the idea.
298
 Although these ministers 
shared Chamberlain’s fiscal conservatism, they could not accept ‘a British retreat from world 
power’.299 Hailsham had concluded that the risk of financial collapse had been overtaken by 
the threat to Britain’s global interests. But Chamberlain regarded a defence loan as the ‘broad 
road which leads to destruction’. The adoption of unorthodox measures was ruled out by his 
conviction that rearmament should first be underpinned by economic recovery.
300
 Almost 
three years would pass before such a step was accepted.
301
  
When the revised DRC Report came before the cabinet in July 1934, Hailsham 
expressed his dissatisfaction and accepted the position only because the Chancellor ‘could not 
provide the money’. Avoiding misapprehensions, he warned his colleagues that the Army 
was in no condition to fight.
302
 Although only two-thirds of the expenditure in the original 
recommendations was sanctioned, the cabinet accepted the modified report. This setback left 
Hailsham rather ‘sulky’. The Army, Pownall noted, was ‘undoubtedly the Cinderella of the 
services, and he doesn’t like it.’303 The War Secretary admitted to the Lords that ‘We have to 
cut our coat according to our cloth... the result under present conditions is that the coat is not 
nearly big enough properly to fit the body which it is designed to cover’.304 
With the government’s rearmament programme falling short of Britain’s minimum 
requirements, Hailsham quickly exhibited a newfound defeatism in relation to the German 
menace. In late 1934, he joined another cabinet committee that considered British policy 
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towards German rearmament. It recommended that Britain and France should recognise the 
existing German arms, but restrict future rearmament through a multilateral agreement that 
would see Germany return to the League of Nations and be included in an ‘Eastern 
Locarno’.305 Yet there was nothing in the committee’s proposals that would compel the 
German government to accept this course. Hailsham did not play a constructive role in the 
proceedings and went along with the proposal only because he found ‘no alternatives’. 
Convinced of the dangerous ambitions of the Nazi regime, he remained sceptical about the 
value of negotiation with Germany and regarded the suggested policy as submission to 
‘blackmail’.306 Even if the German government assented to an agreement, he expected that it 
would ‘go straight ahead’ and continue to rearm regardless.307 He accepted that existing 
German rearmament had been of a defensive character, but predicted that Germany would 
soon ‘devote her energies to making her offensive arrangements behind a secure defensive 
screen’.308 He reluctantly accepted that appeasement was unavoidable, even if it was a 
gamble which would enable Germany to prepare for future conquest under the guise of 
equality. 
Although the War Secretary wanted the French to recognise existing German 
rearmament, he conceded that if he were in their place, he would follow the same course. He 
reiterated his belief that ‘it was worth a great deal to get Italy solid on our side’.309 Although 
this shows that Hailsham did not have all the answers, his attitude was at least realistic. The 
final recommendations, approved by the cabinet, accepted that the main object of British 
policy was to get Germany back to Geneva.
310
 There was, however, little confidence in the 
committee’s recommendations and this episode underlined the National Government’s 
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inability to deal effectively with the emergent German threat.
311
 Britain’s proposals were not 
taken up in Berlin. 
Hailsham’s newfound pessimism was again clear when the cabinet considered British 
policy to the Saar Plebiscite. Following the First World War the League had been given 
sovereignty over the former German territory for 15 years and France was given control of its 
coalfields. A plebiscite, under the supervision of an international commission, was scheduled 
for early 1935 to enable the inhabitants to choose their destiny within France or Germany. 
Following threats and propaganda from Nazi supporters, there were fears of a pro-German 
coup.
312
 Yet, notwithstanding Hailsham’s anti-German instincts, he opposed the suggestion 
that Britain should send 1,000 troops as part of an international peace-keeping force for the 
duration of the plebiscite.  
Hailsham attended a meeting at the Foreign Office in early December to consider this 
issue along with Simon, Eden and Stanhope on behalf of the Foreign Office.
313
 Eden stressed 
the importance of using British troops as part of an international police force to prevent 
potential skirmishes from escalating, but Hailsham thought that the risks of sending British 
troops to the Saar were ‘incalculable’. Despite having been a champion of the continental 
commitment six months earlier, he ‘disliked very much the idea of being mixed-up in the 
trouble... he was so very much afraid of the results if difficulties arose’.314 Two days later he 
told the cabinet that ‘the country would not want to see British troops on the continent again’. 
But once Simon and Eden had enlisted the support of Baldwin and Chamberlain, the War 
Secretary found himself overruled.
315
 British soldiers were despatched in January 1935 to 
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police the plebiscite alongside French, Italian, Swiss and Dutch troops.
316
 The poll passed 
peacefully with a huge majority in favour of returning to Germany. 
Before Hailsham left the War Office, the government sought parliamentary approval 
of their defence preparations through a new white paper in March 1935. Hailsham defended 
the modest increase in the Army estimates. His annual memorandum insisted that ‘much 
work and considerable expenditure’ was necessary to bring the Army up to efficiency. The 
annual estimate of £43 million was only £4 million higher than the previous year and still 
below the Army’s expenditure before the introduction of the ten-year rule. Although the 
informed press supported steps to remove ‘serious and widespread deficiencies’,317 the 
Labour party claimed that the government’s programme was excessive and contrary to 
collective security. In response, Hailsham and other government spokesmen stressed that 
rearmament was necessary if Britain was to fulfil its League responsibilities.
318
 His message 
had been consistent throughout his supervision of the War Office: peace would not be 
preserved, by ‘rendering ourselves incapable of defending ourselves or protecting other 
peoples’.319  
The government had hoped that the revised rearmament plan would enable the R.A.F. 
to maintain numerical parity with the Luftwaffe to act as a deterrent to Germany. After 
Baldwin had informed the Commons in March 1934 that the government would ensure, that 
in terms of air strength, Britain would ‘no longer be in a position inferior to any country 
within striking distance of our shores’, parity was a political necessity. During the second half 
of 1934 and early 1935, however, modifications were required to meet updated estimates of 
German air strength. In late March 1935, Hitler told Simon and Eden, now Minister for 
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League of Nations Affairs, that the Luftwaffe had already reached parity with the R.A.F. and 
would soon reach parity with France. In May the ministerial committee considered their 
response and Hailsham had another opportunity to criticise the government’s rearmament 
programme. While the 39 new squadrons to maintain numerical parity with Germany in 
‘Scheme C’ were accepted, Hailsham expressed his dissatisfaction with the government’s 
policy. He admitted that the expenditure was probably the most that could be afforded, but he 
felt that the claim of parity with Germany was ‘entirely fallacious’ as Britain could ‘not get 
true parity by this programme’.320 Parity, he pointed out, was not merely a matter of 
comparing numbers: 
Geographical factors were largely in favour of Germany and there were other forces 
of defence such as anti-aircraft defences, all of which could properly be taken into 
consideration... Comparison of numbers was only one element in assessing true 
parity.
321
  
Linking his opposition to Britain’s inability in the foreseeable future to send a land force to 
help secure the Low Countries, he stated that if the Luftwaffe operated from Belgium, 
our aircraft had to fly 300 miles to reach an objective similar to that within 100 miles 
of German aircraft... Consequently, they could do three times as much damage as we 
could in a specified time. If we were to get true parity... we ought to have three times 
the number of German bombers...  
The War Secretary noted that even if Britain had equal numbers of aircraft, the fact 
that they carried a smaller bomb load rendered them inferior. He then implied that the pursuit 
of parity was undermining Britain’s overall preparations for war. The 39 new squadrons 
would include bombers which were either obsolete or untested. Past experience suggested 
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that there was a good chance that the untried aircraft would prove ‘inferior to corresponding 
German aircraft’.322 Refusing to mince his words, he stated: ‘If this programme were to be 
approved merely as eyewash – well and good’, but as ‘a serious contribution to the problem 
of defence... it went no further than that’. Although the House of Commons might be fooled, 
the proposed policy was ‘a snare and a delusion... entirely on the wrong lines’.323  
The War Secretary accepted that Britain needed an expanded air programme, but 
deplored panic-stricken attempts to maintain parity. He felt that the government’s policy 
gambled on the deterrent value of a force which included obsolete and untested aircraft. He 
pointed out that large orders for outdated aircraft with existing manufacturers would not 
improve Britain’s rearmament capacity. He suggested that an alternative plan should be 
devised, spread over five or six years, the first step of which would be government 
intervention to manage industrial organisation. Such a step would involve the government 
shifting Britain’s peacetime economy into something analogous to war measures.324  
With the R.A.F. set to gain another 3,800 aircraft by April 1937, he told his 
colleagues that the government seemed to be preparing Britain for a war which might begin 
in two years. With this in mind he again questioned whether equipping the Field Force on a 
nine-year basis was still safe. If this was a genuine attempt to prepare for war in 1937, ‘the 
immediate organisation of industry was required, and we must make such alliances with other 
countries that would give us a chance of survival’. Granted the unfolding events, these were 
insightful proposals. Such policies, however, lay in the future. Although MacDonald regarded 
Hailsham’s comments as ‘an effective study of the absolute’, his warnings had little effect on 
his colleagues. The Prime Minister observed, that ‘in political matters it was not possible to 
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deal with absolutes’.325 Increased government intervention in industry was rejected in the 
Inskip Defence Reviews of 1937-8 and firm alliances were not pursued until 1939. What’s 
more, parity with Germany proved to be ‘a chimera’.326  
*** 
The fear of a German resurgence had clear implications for Hailsham’s consideration 
of both disarmament and rearmament policy. He was the first cabinet minister to express 
disquiet about German intentions and he resisted disarmament schemes that he calculated 
would undermine the effectiveness of Britain’s services without controlling German 
rearmament. Perhaps most significantly, when disarmament became unfeasible, economic 
and political considerations secured priority over defence policy. Hailsham and the other 
service ministers failed to extract sufficient funding for the first stage of rearmament. While 
Chamberlain’s conduct during these years has been described as unavoidable granted 
Britain’s ‘declining power’ status,327 Hailsham’s experience shows that the Chancellor’s 
meddling in defence strategy was unwelcome. With rearmament based upon what Hailsham 
regarded as ‘eyewash’, Chamberlain was responsible for establishing policies which made 
appeasement ‘seem the only logical line’.328 This helps explain why Hailsham, a minister 
convinced of the expansionist aims of German leaders, was driven to support appeasement 
during 1935-8.  
Granted the difference in opinion between the Chancellor and the War Secretary, the 
reminiscences of Hailsham’s son are misleading. He claimed that during 1931-5 Chamberlain 
and his father were the chief sponsors of rearmament. The Chancellor was his father’s ‘most 
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reliable ally’ in advocating ‘massive scaled’ rearmament.329 But these are mistaken 
recollections. Chamberlain, the man who restricted military and naval preparations and 
skewed the R.A.F.’s preparations to inflate frontline strength, was not a genuine protagonist 
of rearmament. Heuston’s conclusion that, ‘Whatever was done to maintain our defences 
between 1931 and 1935 was due to the joint efforts of Chamberlain and Hailsham’, is equally 
illusory.
330
 Granted Hailsham’s protests at delay and attacks on revised defence programmes, 
it is also impossible to sustain the conclusion that ‘Chamberlain’s critics showed no sense of 
urgency’.331 Hailsham’s strategic arguments won out and there was little more that he could 
have done to hasten rearmament. He eloquently presented logical arguments but lacked the 
political influence to impose his will. Notwithstanding the recognition that Germany was 
Britain’s ‘ultimate potential enemy’,332 there were few points of agreement between 
Chamberlain and Hailsham on defence matters and rearmament. Hailsham anticipated a 
future war with Germany and wanted to prepare the services accordingly. Chamberlain 
believed that war could be averted through creating a formidable deterrent. 
A clear distinction should be drawn between Chamberlain’s financing of rearmament 
in the closing years of his Chancellorship and his earlier involvement in defence planning. He 
did not abandon his preference for a balanced budget until early 1937.
333
 While it has been 
contended that the implementation of the DRC Report would have enabled Britain to ‘face 
the dictators from a position of some strength’,334 the unfolding strategic nightmare that 
became apparent during the second half of the decade meant that the DRC’s proposals would 
still have been inadequate. Nevertheless, the implementation of the original DRC Report 
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would have been a good start and the failure to remove the most glaring deficiencies had a 
significant psychological impact on Hailsham. He was convinced that, sooner or later, Britain 
would be confronted by German expansionism that it could not accept. But, once the 
government failed to implement the DRC Report, he exhibited an increasingly sceptical 
outlook concerning Britain’s ability to face challenges to the international status quo. This 
underpinned his acquiescence in appeasement for the remainder of the decade.  
Appeasement 
Although Neville Chamberlain suggested making Hailsham one of two new ministers 
in a re-structured Foreign Office,
335
 the latter returned to the Lord Chancellorship as a ‘matter 
of course’ following the cabinet reshuffle in June 1935.336 He replaced a bitter Sankey who 
retired after Ramsay MacDonald preferred his National Labour contingent to be represented 
in the cabinet by his own son. Although this was theoretically a promotion for Hailsham, he 
had, despite a number of setbacks, been ‘very happy at the WO... [and] liked the leadership of 
the House of Lords’.337 He left with regret and his wife was ‘miserable at the change’. He 
could not, however, refuse the Woolsack – ‘a very great office’.338  
Hailsham’s narrow departmental concerns shifted to the domestic arena. He presided 
over a number of appeal cases in the House of Lords
 
 and the last trial of a peer by his fellow 
peers when Lord de Clifford was acquitted of manslaughter.
339
 He was amongst the chosen 
handful of Privy Councillors on 20 January 1936 who, with the King’s consent, formed 
a Council of State to undertake necessary duties during what proved to be the last days of 
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George V’s life.340 More generally, Hailsham demonstrated ‘perfect competence’ during his 
final occupation of the Woolsack, but his eagerness to maintain an active political role 
probably ensured that his legal judgements were ‘unexciting’.341 Had serious illness not 
intervened, Hailsham would have been central to the government’s response to the 
Abdication Crisis in late 1936. The legal challenges this presented would have afforded a 
fitting climax to his career in the law.  
In the wider re-shuffle, Baldwin became Prime Minister after swapping portfolios 
with the exhausted MacDonald and Simon became Home Secretary after an undistinguished 
term at the Foreign Office. He was replaced by Samuel Hoare. Chamberlain continued at the 
Exchequer, while Cunliffe-Lister replaced Londonderry as Air Secretary. It was only after 
Hailsham’s intervention that Londonderry was not dropped completely.342 The former Air 
Minister became Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the Lords. Londonderry, however, soon 
realised that he was a passenger and Hailsham found himself advising his colleague against 
resignation, fearing that it might be interpreted as a protest against the government’s handling 
of the ensuing Abyssinian Crisis.
343
 When Londonderry was finally dropped after the general 
election in November, the return of the National Government with a large, albeit reduced, 
majority was a consolation for Hailsham. Yet, the burden of consistent service took its toll. 
The government, Hailsham complained, had been ‘condemned... to four years hard labour’.344 
The Lord Chancellor did not envy Baldwin’s task, noting that ‘the one need is for clear and 
definitive leadership... Thank God it isn’t for me to give it.’345  
                                                 
340
 Nicolson, King George V p.530; Simon, Retrospect, pp.217-8. 
341
 For Hailsham’s role as Lord Chancellor during this period see: Heuston, Lord Chancellors, pp.480-487, 
quotation at 482.  
342
 Fleming, Marquis of Londonderry, p.168.  
343
 Londonderry Papers, D/3099/2/17/7b, Hailsham to Londonderry, 17 Sept. 1935. 
344
 HAIL 1/3/8a, Hailsham to Stella Gwynne, 10 Dec. 1935. 
345
 Londonderry Papers, D3099/2/17/75a, Hailsham to Londonderry, 8 June 1936. 
312 
 
With an Italian attack on Abyssinia imminent, the government’s preoccupations were 
ever more concerned with foreign affairs. As Hailsham confided to a relative: 
Italy and Abyssinia are being very difficult; Japan’s gradual assimilation of China is 
most disquieting: I see no hope in the Naval Conference; and there is always the 
menace of German rearmament to make one think.
346
  
During the last three and a half years of his political career, Hailsham’s strong interest in 
foreign policy continued and he remained at the heart of Britain’s foreign policy-making 
process until October 1938. It was to be a testing finale to his cabinet career. 
*** 
The historiography of British foreign policy in the 1930s is a vast and still growing 
industry, offering ever more nuanced interpretations of the policies of the ‘appeasers’ and 
their opponents.
347
 The opening of the British archives in the late 1960s led to a period of 
revisionist writing in which the restrictive parameters within which policy-makers operated 
were emphasised. At least in academic circles, this led increasingly to the perception that 
appeasement was the only viable option for Britain in the later 1930s. For some, appeasement 
emerged as a wise and noble policy and its leading proponent, Neville Chamberlain, a far-
sighted and wrongly maligned statesman.
348
 More recently, the post-revisionist school, while 
rejecting the ‘posthumous libels’ of Guilty Men, argued that the government did have viable 
alternative policies and that these were mistakenly rejected.
349
 Yet a recent in-depth analysis 
has concluded that no alternative offered a realistic prospect of success.
350
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But if the historiographical debate over the efficacy and the morality of the 
appeasement of Nazi Germany still rages, historians have at least reached a consensus that 
attempts to draw a clear line of distinction between the unprincipled ‘appeasers’ and their 
courageous opponents are no longer tenable. ‘Appeasement’ covered a range of approaches 
to the German problem and there were few, if any, leading British politicians who did not 
have a limit of concession beyond which they were not prepared to go. Likewise, the so-
called ‘anti-appeasers’ recognised the value of acquiescing in certain acts of aggression, be 
they perpetrated by Germany or by other countries challenging Britain’s worldwide position 
in the 1930s.
351
  
The reputation of none of the prominent government critics has survived unscathed. 
Churchill showed no inclination to resist aggression over Manchuria, Abyssinia or Spain.
352
 
Vansittart was at the forefront of efforts to buy off Mussolini’s ambitions in East Africa,353 
and Eden, as late as 1938, was hopeful of productive talks with Nazi Germany.
354
 As one 
diplomat, regularly positioned in the ‘anti-appeasing’ camp, noted: ‘The truth is everybody 
was an “appeaser” of Germany at one time or another – “appeasement” began at Locarno 
under Austen... but it was carried on too long’.355 Hailsham’s experience during the closing 
years of his ministerial career clearly illustrates these complexities and offers a significant 
addition to the historiography.  
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During 1935-8, Hailsham’s underlying perception of Britain’s major problem had not 
changed. ‘The international situation’, he complained in mid-1935, ‘does not seem to get any 
better’:  
It really looks as if Germany were still pining for that world domination which 
brought about the last war, and that she is gambling on the unwillingness of the 
western powers to face another conflict to enable her to arm so strongly as to be in a 
position of definite superiority over the rest of the world. I wish I could see more 
clearly the right policy.  
The one alternative that Hailsham concluded was unacceptable at this stage was armed 
intervention: ‘The lesson which we have learnt from the Great War is a profound conviction 
of the senselessness and cruelty of warfare as a means of settling international differences’.356 
His suspicion of German intentions persisted. ‘It is difficult to make a Treaty with a nation’, 
he wrote in March 1936, that ‘never keeps its word unless it pays to do so.’357 Yet, despite his 
awareness of the German threat and his gut instinct to resist, his inability to find a solution 
short of war combined with Britain’s military weakness in the face of an unfolding strategic 
nightmare, compelled him to acquiescence in a policy he found humiliating. He had no 
optimism about Britain’s ability to resist an increasingly likely three-pronged attack on its 
coveted global interests. 
Although the threats from Germany and Japan were apparent during Hailsham’s 
supervision of the War Office, after his transfer to the Woolsack the international atmosphere 
quickly deteriorated. In October 1935, Italy’s attack on Abyssinia disrupted the Anglo-
Franco-Italian front which Hailsham had eagerly supported since early 1934. With Italy a 
potential enemy, Britain, with insufficient allies, was threatened by a deadly combination of 
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powers which operated in three different theatres. From 1936 Britain’s defence experts 
repeatedly warned that, even with French support, Britain could not win a war against 
Germany, Italy and Japan combined.
358
  
In addition to the Italian attack, Hitler ordered the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 
March 1936 and July saw the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, carrying with it the danger 
of a Europe-wide conflagration. Confronted by this predicament, Hailsham was compelled to 
swallow numerous violations of the international order and drifted into the mainstream of the 
government’s appeasement policy. At nearly all the key junctures during 1935-8, he 
supported the government’s foreign policy, and ultimately, Chamberlain’s brand of 
appeasement. His motivation was a mounting realisation that there was little else that Britain 
could do.  
Before Mussolini ordered the Italian attack on Abyssinia, Hailsham was most 
concerned about the consequences of Italian aggression. After all, British policy was still 
theoretically based on collective security through the League of Nations’ and Abyssinia, a 
League member, had appealed to that body before the Italian attack. In September the Lord 
Chancellor told Londonderry: 
The Abyssinian trouble looks as bad as it could be... [T]o be involved in war with 
Italy would be a tragic blunder and how to save the prestige of the League and yet 
avoid that disaster is not very obvious.
359
 
He was, at this stage, ‘a very great admirer of Mussolini’, understanding that ‘the co-
operation of the three western powers was an essential feature for stabilising peace in 
Europe’. Although Hailsham was worried about the consequences for the League if Italy 
embarked on any military adventure in Africa, he calculated that the Italians’ capacity to 
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maintain a favourable balance against Nazi Germany made it imperative that they remained 
on-side.
360
 His view coincided entirely with Vansittart’s: Anglo-French-Italian cooperation, 
not the League, was ‘the only real bulwark for peace’.361 
Italian bellicosity presented the National Government with a real dilemma. As Hoare, 
the Foreign Secretary, reflected, ‘Italy was part of the western front, and the Covenant of the 
League [was] the basis of our foreign policy. We could not sacrifice either without grave 
danger.’362 When Britain, France and Italy had established the ‘Stresa Front’ in April 1935, 
the powers agreed to uphold the Locarno Agreements, the demilitarised status of the 
Rhineland and the independence of Austria. But the Italo-Abyssinian War that began in 
October undermined this prospect. With Britain pledged to support the League, Italy 
suddenly became ‘the wrong adversary at the wrong time in the wrong place’.363 A hostile 
Italy could endanger Britain’s communications with the Empire, threaten possessions in the 
Mediterranean and North Africa, and facilitate an Italo-German rapprochement which could 
end Austrian independence. Once Britain imposed League-sponsored economic sanctions, its 
policy stood between ‘provoking and avoiding war’.364  
Hoare had the unenviable task of pursuing a double policy of using the League 
machinery to secure a peaceful compromise while satisfying Italian appetites. Following his 
speech at Geneva in September, which reaffirmed that the British would be ‘second to none 
to fulfil... the obligations which the Covenant lays upon them’,365 Hailsham, worried over 
Britain’s responsibilities under collective security, noted     
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I am very uneasy lest a major difference may arise over Italy; we are not in a position 
to fight, and yet we seem to be running some risk of finding ourselves at war. Sam’s 
speech was admirable but... a bluff because we have no force to back it. I think he... 
had to take that risk, but I don’t like it. Italy could probably beat us today if we fought 
single-handed and I think she knows it.
366
 
Hailsham’s estimation of the military position was perhaps overly gloomy, but, even if the 
Italians were quickly defeated, damage to Britain’s Mediterranean Fleet was inevitable in any 
conflict and Britain’s already overstretched naval arm would have been materially 
weakened.
367
 
The conflicting aims of British policy were neatly captured in Hailsham’s public 
remarks during October. While acknowledging that Britain was bound to carry out the 
League’s behests, he also claimed that this did ‘not necessarily mean that we have any 
individual quarrel with Italy’.368 For Hailsham, the future of Abyssinia was not a fundamental 
concern: ‘We have not troubled about the war because of Abyssinia but because the war is an 
attack upon the whole system of the Covenant of the League of Nations, upon which we 
rely’.369 He emphasised that Britain would only act in support of the Covenant which the 
major powers (Italy included) had signed in 1919. But following the Japanese and German 
withdrawals and America’s non-participation, the Lord Chancellor was aware that the 
‘deterrent effect of the Covenant was much less than it was intended to be, and... the 
security... was now much less than it was hoped’. He judged that the Italian invasion had 
challenged the whole basis of the League. If she is successful she is destroying the 
whole groundwork upon which confidence in the post-war system has been built up, 
                                                 
366
 Londonderry Papers, D 3099/2/17/75b, Hailsham to Londonderry, 17 Sept. 1935. 
367
 See A. Marder, ‘The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36’, American Historical Review, vol.75, 
no.5 (1970), pp.1327-1356. 
368
 The Times, 10 Oct. 1935. 
369
 Manchester Guardian, 26 Oct. 1935. 
318 
 
and unless we can find some new plan we are back again in the bad welter of the old 
days of alliance, of the balance of power and ultimately of a trial of military 
strength.
370
 
Hailsham’s public statements during the election campaign again reflected the 
paradoxes behind British policy. As the League had only voted for limited sanctions, he 
claimed that British policy was restricted. ‘To instruct our fleet to blockade Italy’, he pointed 
out, ‘would have produced war... and I will never be a member of a government which under 
the pretence of collective peace is going to bring about war between England and another 
country.’371 When asked if Britain should close the Suez Canal to Italian ships, he claimed 
that such unilateral action conflicted with the League’s principles. ‘You cannot’, he said, 
stop an Italian ship going through the canal unless you send your own warship to 
prevent it by force. If you do that, you are departing from the whole conception of 
collective security... we were not going to commit an act of war and commit 
ourselves... to a war with Italy single-handed and in breach of the Covenant.
372
  
Without French support, Hailsham agreed with his colleagues that Britain’s own 
unpreparedness and vulnerability ruled out military sanctions.
373
 Effective Anglo-French co-
operation was not helped by mistrust emanating from the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 
negotiated in the first half of 1935. Moreover, the French perceived the Abyssinian conflict as 
‘an old-fashioned imperial dispute’ and were only willing to agree to ineffective economic 
sanctions.
374
 The National Government, fearful of provoking Mussolini into a ‘mad dog’ 
attack on British interests or driving him irrevocably into Hitler’s arms, acquiesced in this 
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approach.
375
 Rumours amongst informed pressmen suggested that even this approach went 
too far for Hailsham.
376
 
In an attempt to square the circle a botched Anglo-French compromise was 
concocted. The plan was Vansittart’s inspiration and was negotiated by Hoare and Laval, the 
French Foreign Minister, in December. It sought to produce an Italian victory but maintain an 
independent Abyssinia. Italy would gain significant territory, while the rump of landlocked 
Abyssinia would be compensated by British territorial concessions allowing access to the Red 
Sea. But, after the plan was leaked to the press, it met with a howl of protest and Hoare and 
Laval resigned.
377
 Aware of the complex problem which confronted Hoare, Hailsham, unable 
to offer a better policy, regarded the resignations as ‘a misfortune and not a fault’.378  
The cabinet’s response failed on three fronts. The limited sanctions did not prevent 
the fall of Abyssinia in May 1936, ‘collective security’ and the League had, once again, 
failed, and the limited sanctions against Italy meant that hopes of establishing an Anglo-
Franco-Italian front were dealt a serious blow. Unsurprisingly, Hailsham, in an attempt to get 
back on good terms with Italy, was amongst the first inside the government to call for the 
removal of sanctions. Ever mindful of the German menace, he felt that the loss of Abyssinia 
was a small price to pay if the ‘western front’ could be restored. On 8 May, after ‘thinking a 
good deal’, he informed Eden, Hoare’s successor as Foreign Secretary, that he did not think 
that the maintenance of sanctions would serve any useful purpose. With almost callous 
realism he calculated that sanctions 
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were imposed not to punish Italy, but to help Abyssinia in her fight; today that fight is 
over and there is no Abyssinia to help... There will be no negotiations for terms of 
peace; I do not even know with whom they could be negotiated. Mussolini has... 
declared that Abyssinia is Italian.
379
 
Hopes that Britain could restore cordial relations with Italy were not the result of blind 
optimism. Four days earlier, Grandi, the Italian ambassador in London, had informed Eden 
that Mussolini wanted to re-affirm the ‘Stresa Front’. In the weeks following Abyssinia’s 
capitulation, the Duce made a number of conciliatory statements towards Britain suggesting, 
as Vansittart noted, that he was not keen to take ‘the high road to Berlin’.380  
But getting back on terms with Mussolini would not be straightforward. Hailsham 
was aware of this. He anticipated that ‘sanctions would become an absurdity... [and] damage 
our trade with Italy’. He wanted to avoid making Italian ‘hostility a much more bitter and 
permanent thing’.381 But, fearing that if the National Government unilaterally called for the 
removal of sanctions, Britain would ‘be accused of having destroyed collective security’, he 
wanted to spread the responsibility for dropping them across the international community. He 
suggested that Eden, who was due to chair the Council of the League of Nations the 
following week, should state that the Italian conquest meant that ‘an entirely new situation’ 
had arisen, before inviting representatives ‘to express their own views’. The Lord Chancellor 
hoped that sufficient members would want to drop sanctions, but he accepted that, if this was 
not the case, Britain would have to maintain them.
382
 Significantly, he had accepted the 
futility of maintaining sanctions before Chamberlain, who is generally credited with leading 
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the cabinet’s reversal.383 The Chancellor adopted this line at the end of May,384 and his 
‘blazing indiscretion’ on 10 June, in which he labelled the continuation of sanctions ‘the very 
midsummer of madness’, 385 came a month after Hailsham had informed Eden of his views. 
The Lord Chancellor’s thoughts again mirrored those of Vansittart. To prevent 
Mussolini falling into the opposing camp, both men believed that Britain should quickly 
come to terms with Italy. Hailsham sought to appease Mussolini not out of sympathy with 
Italian objectives, but in a pragmatic attempt to avoid lengthening Britain’s list of potential 
enemies. The following month he told the cabinet that he wanted sanctions removed as soon 
as possible, warning of ‘the grave danger of a Hitler-Mussolini rapprochement’.386 In June 
the cabinet decided to take the initiative at Geneva and propose abandoning sanctions.
387
 
With French concurrence, they were dropped in July.  
Hindsight, however, suggests this was too little too late. Britain’s adhesion to 
sanctions went on too long to bring Mussolini back into the ‘western front’. The result was 
the Italo-German rapprochement that Hailsham had feared. With the two fascist powers 
assisting Franco’s nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War which began in July, Italo-
German relations improved.
388
 Therefore, the very course of events that Hailsham had hoped 
to avoid was unfolding in front of him. Although he believed that Britain’s response to the 
Abyssinian Crisis was ‘discreditable’,389 he was aware that Hitler might exploit the situation, 
and he unequivocally backed attempts to avoid alienating Mussolini. 
While the National Government observed the Italian absorption of Abyssinia, the 
German army reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936. Although Lord Lothian famously 
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claimed that ‘the Germans are only going into their back garden’, the action violated the 
Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Treaty which Germany had freely accepted. German 
troops moved westwards by around one hundred miles and it became difficult to envisage 
how France could fulfil obligations to Central and Eastern Europe. What’s more, a German 
attack on France and the Low Countries was now feasible.
390
  
Although Hailsham had wanted to maintain the demilitarised zone, he knew that 
Britain was in no position to resist what Hitler had done. He joined a sub-committee of 
leading ministers who monitored the Rhineland situation. In what was the forerunner to the 
cabinet’s Foreign Policy Committee, he told his colleagues that he ‘wanted the French to be 
informed that Britain would only mobilize the Royal Navy and send to France what aircraft it 
could spare in the event of a German attack on France’.391 This reaction appears timid, but he 
had not changed his mind about the nature of the problem, seeing Hitler’s coup as ‘a typical 
instance of German mentality’. He ‘wonder[ed] what is the point negotiating a treaty with a 
nation which... will tear it up when it is inconvenient; the 1914 “scrap of paper” attitude 
seems singularly apposite today’.392 His mistrust of the German government remained clear: 
Hitler’s actions... only show once more that Germany regards a treaty as a scrap of 
paper to be torn up when it ceases to suit her purpose; and the arguments by which 
she justifies her action seem actually to proclaim that the sovereign right of every 
nation to disregard its promises when it finds them inconvenient is an essential 
element of international relations. No wonder the French are frightened.
393
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Hailsham was unimpressed when Londonderry, naively thinking he could improve Anglo-
German relations, entertained von Ribbentrop at Mount Stewart in May 1936, three months 
before the latter became Germany’s Ambassador in London. Hailsham had regarded 
Londonderry’s earlier support for Germany’s equality in arms as ‘a complete surrender to 
German policy’ and he remained convinced that Britain could not come to terms with 
Germany.
394
 He informed his former colleague that he was  
quite sure that the Germans won’t be satisfied till they have hegemony in the old 
world... I dislike them because I honestly believe that peace is the predominant 
interest of this country and the Germans are the main... obstacles to its 
achievement.
395
 
In response to the ever-threatening international situation, the National Government 
produced a fresh Defence white paper in March 1936. Hailsham’s earlier advocacy of 
accelerated rearmament had now been justified by events. He wound up the debate on the 
government’s plans in the Lords. These foresaw the creation of a Ministry for the Co-
ordination of Defence and an expansion in the service budgets. He described the Opposition’s 
hostility as ‘a policy of utter despair’. Their approach, Hailsham claimed, was 
to say that this country declares that it is unwilling to take any steps to defend itself, 
and that it refuses to make any attempt to create a combination of nations strong 
enough to support peace and to deter the aggressor.
396
 
With the League’s credibility undermined after Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia, his message 
was subtly different from six months earlier. While Hailsham continued to believe that the 
Covenant was an ‘ideal at which we must continue to aim’, he now felt that the best way to 
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maintain peace was through the co-operation of ‘this great League of Nations, which we 
know as the British Empire’.397 As he told a Chinese correspondent, ‘a strong England is... 
the strongest guarantee of peace in the world’.398  
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War reinforced Hailsham’s conviction that Britain 
must not be dragged into a wider conflict for which she was still unprepared. He supported 
the government’s policy of non-intervention and was desperate not to offend Italy, hoping 
that power could still become a useful ally – despite the decreasing chances of such a 
development. The government’s ‘main preoccupation’, he understood, was preventing the 
conflict ‘from spreading into a general European war, which certainly seemed not unlikely 
when Russian and French communists were joining on one side and when the Italians and 
Germans were joining on the other’.399 Like many Conservatives, he had little sympathy for 
the Spanish ‘popular front’ government, concluding that ‘Spain ought to have a government 
neither Fascist nor Communist’ but, as things stood, he doubted whether that power would 
‘get any government at all’.400 
Although he followed the government’s line of strict neutrality in public, his long-
standing revulsion towards communism meant that he saw a Franco-led nationalist 
government as the lesser of two evils. His ‘own sympathies’, he noted, were ‘very strongly 
against the communist gangsters’.401 Hailsham did not regard the conflict as a fight between 
the elected Spanish government and fascism, but as part of a wider struggle against 
Bolshevism. This widely-held perception was understandable. The Spanish Ambassador had 
warned Eden that ‘if the government wins in Spain, they will be superseded by the 
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communists to whom they have issued arms’.402 Recognising that a Bolshevik world 
revolution required the destruction of the British Empire, Hailsham concluded that it was 
‘tragic’ that ‘our left wingers are clamouring for the removal of non-intervention and 
attacking the Italians for supplying war material, while the French and Russians are both 
sinning infinitely more than Franco’s supporters’.403  
For all that, Hailsham was no fascist sympathiser. He deplored the polarised political 
situation on the continent: 
Unhappily... the nations seem to be largely grouped into opposing camps of 
Bolsheviks and Fascists, each of which seems based on autocratic Government and 
deny what we regard as essential liberties to their citizens.
404
 
He hoped that ‘our people will never turn from our free institutions to adopt the blind tyranny 
or the crass materialism of any Marxist philosophy... or turn to the intolerance and 
suppression of Nazism’.405 The Lord Chancellor had also identified differentiations between 
Franco and the fascist powers that supported his case. With Franco’s forces nearing triumph, 
Hailsham deplored  
the folly of the Foreign Office in refusing to recognise Franco and in indentifying him 
with the dictator powers... If they hadn’t taken up the attitude they did, the victory of 
Franco over the Reds would not have been identified with a victory of the dictator 
states over the democracies as I am afraid it must be now.
406
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To a certain extent the distinction that Hailsham drew between Nationalist Spain and the 
fascist powers was reasonable. After Franco consolidated power, he never fully aligned 
himself with Hitler and Mussolini and Spain remained neutral in the Second World War.  
While the Spanish conflict progressed, Hailsham suffered a serious stroke and was 
absent from government during the second half of 1936. The seriousness of his condition was 
not revealed publicly and The Times reported that he was suffering from a chill.
407
 His son 
recalled the true extent of Hailsham’s illness. The latter’s mind remained ‘as clear as a bell’ 
but he was ‘paralysed all the way down his right hand side [and]... appallingly 
handicapped’.408 The Lord Chancellor had probably over-burdened himself. The sixty-four 
year-old had combined all the duties of a senior cabinet minister with the workload that 
accompanied the Woolsack.
409
 On the eve of his collapse, Hailsham outlined his weekly 
routine: 
I sit judicially from 10.30-4.00; I preside on the Woolsack from 4.15 until the House 
rises; I have on average I suppose a dozen cabinet committees as well as the cabinet 
itself to attend, and I have all the administrative work of a big office.
410
  
He acknowledged that ‘Life in office is not easy just now’ and had even considered stepping 
down. ‘I am tempted sometimes to... join you in retirement’, he confessed to Londonderry, 
‘only I don’t like to go as long as... [the cabinet] think I’m any use.’411 After his stroke, 
Hailsham offered Baldwin his resignation but this was turned down. He remained in office 
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only ‘on the condition that I got the leave of the House of Lords to absent myself until the 
next session’.412  
During his absence, Hailsham informed the Prime Minister that he was ‘ashamed’ to 
leave his colleagues to carry the burden of so many difficult problems.
413
 He was particularly 
disappointed that he could not return to deal with the Abdication Crisis. Although Hailsham 
felt that King George VI and Queen Elizabeth were ‘very worthy successors of King George 
and Queen Mary’, he could not hide his ‘very great disappointment [at]... sitting idly by when 
my cabinet colleagues were facing the recent crisis’.414 Nonetheless, Hailsham remained in 
touch with his colleagues. He saw Chamberlain and Claude Schuster, the Lord Chancellor’s 
Permanent Secretary, and his foresight had not left his colleagues entirely unprepared.
415
 
Eighteen months earlier he had anticipated that ‘some such difficulty might arise and... had 
worked out for the Prime Minister the constitutional position in such an event’.416 Baldwin’s 
statement in the Commons on the 10 December ‘tallied exactly’ with the course of action 
Hailsham had suggested.
417
  
The Lord Chancellor was touched by the consideration he received from his 
colleagues and he particularly appreciated the support of Neville Chamberlain. His wife 
wrote to the latter: 
Douglas is so touched by your letter and I am so grateful to you for helping to 
reassure his mind by your understanding sympathy. It is a burning grief to him that he 
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is failing you all in these difficult times and your letter has helped so much. Neville, 
he is so fond of you.
418
  
This was not Chamberlain’s only gesture. Hailsham was buoyed by the Chancellor’s visit in 
October and thanked his colleague ‘with all my heart for all you have done, and are doing for 
me’.419  
Hailsham returned to his duties in January 1937 and received a ‘cordial welcome’ 
from the cabinet.
420
 Before his return to the Lords, Lord Denman, former Governor General 
of Australia, informed him that ‘I for one will be very glad to see you back in your rightful 
place in the House, and I’ve not met anyone who was not of the same opinion’.421 It was 
typical of Hailsham’s performance as Lord Chancellor that when he returned he prioritised 
his political commitments over judicial duties. He told Bennett, the former Canadian Premier, 
that although he had attended his first cabinet, he would not ‘tackle any judicial work for 
some weeks to come’.422  
Although Hailsham resumed his political responsibilities, it seemed probable that he 
would quickly retire. Oliver Harvey, Eden’s Private Secretary, later suggested that he ‘should 
have been dropped’.423 Halifax, the Leader of the Lords, also expressed concerns about the 
Lord Chancellor’s fitness for office, but was relieved after Hailsham ‘made an admirable 
speech’ in the upper chamber ‘with more of his old self in it than I had hitherto seen’.424 If 
Hailsham had desired retirement, the ideal opportunity presented itself when Neville 
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Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin after the latter stepped down in May 1937, but the Lord 
Chancellor was eager to serve until the end of the parliament. 
While Hailsham’s recovery was never complete, he was not yet finished as a political 
force. He retained the Lord Chancellorship in Chamberlain’s administration, participated in 
key cabinet committees and helped guide legislation through the Lords.
425
 But as far as the 
government’s foreign policy was concerned, he now appeared to be an unreconstructed 
Chamberlainite. Despite deploring Japanese aggression in the Far East, and hoping that the 
Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Germany and Japan in November 1936 would not 
threaten Chinese independence,
426
 he acquiesced in Chamberlain’s policy of resisting the 
imposition of sanctions against the Japanese after their latest intrusion into China precipitated 
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in mid-1937. Hailsham agreed with the Prime 
Minister’s assessment that sanctions would not be effective and might cause a retaliatory 
attack on British possessions in the Pacific. With trouble in Europe a distinct possibility, 
Chamberlain had told the cabinet that it was ‘not safe to send the fleet to the Far East’.427 
Hailsham continued to accept the policy of appeasement because Britain’s military capacity 
meant that the country could not contemplate fighting simultaneous wars in two or more 
theatres. He became a reluctant appeaser simply because he could see no viable alternative.  
At the time of Anthony Eden’s resignation in February 1938, Hailsham was amongst 
the Prime Minister’s supporters after the cabinet overrode the Foreign Secretary’s wishes in 
its response to Roosevelt’s ‘Peace Initiative’ and then supported Chamberlain’s courtship of 
Italy.
428
 These two episodes demonstrated that the Foreign Secretary carried little weight 
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amongst his colleagues. Eden’s authorised biographer describes the Lord Chancellor as one 
of the Foreign Secretary’s ‘principal opponents’.429 Harvey noted that Eden’s cabinet 
supporters were ‘flabby and unassertive’, whilst ‘his opponents’, including Hailsham, were 
‘important and effective’.430  
The Foreign Policy Committee considered Roosevelt’s four-point plan designed to 
relax world tension in early 1938 while the Foreign Secretary holidayed on the French 
Riviera. Hailsham was intimately involved in Britain’s response to the American President. 
He suggested that the government should endorse Roosevelt’s ‘aims and initiative’, but point 
out the proposal’s drawbacks and explain Britain’s own plans in relation to European 
policy.
431
 This was the basis of the telegram sent to Washington which caused Eden such 
concern. The committee’s belief that the initiative was something of an empty gesture was 
probably correct. ‘Cloudy formulae were no substitute for concerted action’. Even Roosevelt 
had made it clear that the plan would still give the United States ‘the traditional policy of 
freedom from political involvement’.432 Therefore, the significance applied to this episode by 
Churchill and Eden in their memoirs appears exaggerated.
433
 Although Chamberlain expected 
nothing from the Americans but ‘words’ and his anti-American impulses might explain his 
rejection of the plan,
434
 Hailsham was openly pro-American and keen to involve the United 
States in international security.
435
 Quite simply, he suggested turning down the plan because 
he believed it had no prospects for success. 
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Like Churchill, whose mother was American, Hailsham shared an American 
connection. His first wife was from Nashville, Tennessee, and he was ‘heartily in favour of 
the closest collaboration between the two nations’.436 In 1935 he had publicly asserted that 
Anglo-American co-operation was a ‘solution of the problem of peace and war’. If Anglo-
American solidarity could be secured, ‘no other country... would attempt to disturb the peace 
of the world.’437 In 1936 he outlined his views to an American correspondent: 
[I]f only the British Empire and the United States were to collaborate it would render 
each of them invulnerable to the rest of the world. But I don’t think it is possible for 
Britain to make such a proposal since we are naturally in a position of greater 
liability... and it would seem as if we were asking America to... give us her 
protection.
438
 
Hailsham had drawn a reasonable conclusion. In 1935, the first of a series of neutrality acts 
was forced on Roosevelt by the US Congress and American diplomacy became inherently 
constrained. It became ‘pointless to count on the United States involvement in any European 
security system, tied to the League or any other body’.439  
Eighteen months before Roosevelt’s plan arrived, Hailsham had informed a friend: ‘If 
only the United States and the British Empire could have agreed that there shall be no more 
war, the world would be at peace, but unhappily that is an unattainable dream’.440 In 
September 1937 Hailsham told his younger son, Britain’s Third Secretary in the Washington 
Embassy, that he hoped that the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War would ‘stir the 
Americans up about the Japs’.441 This suggests that if Hailsham had believed that there was a 
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chance of Roosevelt’s plan leading to concrete results, he would have supported it. But he 
calculated that it was less likely to reach a satisfactory conclusion than Britain’s own 
negotiations. Only a month before Roosevelt’s plan arrived, the Lord Chancellor wished that 
his son 
could have persuaded the US to come in with us; that is the only thing which would 
bring the Japanese to their senses, but alas your American continent seems to have 
become even more sentimental and pacifist than these benighted islands.
442
  
With Roosevelt’s scheme buried, in February Eden and Chamberlain discussed the 
question of negotiations with the Italian government. The Foreign Secretary believed that the 
government should aim to improve Anglo-American relations and continue discussions with 
Germany, but not approach Italy for ‘every instinct was against recognition of conquest of 
Abyssinia at this time’.443 Hailsham, by contrast, shared Chamberlain’s conviction and 
adopted a line consistent with his conclusions dating back to early 1934. Convinced that 
Germany was the main enemy and that Britain should attempt to get Italy back on side, he 
believed that ‘this was an opportunity that might never occur again, and not to embrace it 
would not only be unwise but criminal’.444 Britain’s continuing military weakness and the 
need to secure allies dominated his thinking.  
 The crisis cabinet meetings of 19 and 20 February revealed the gap between the 
Foreign Secretary and the majority of Chamberlain’s government, Hailsham included. The 
Lord Chancellor could not accept Eden’s calls for delay before negotiations began. He felt 
the issue  
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was solely one of time. If we rejected conversations now, negotiations might not be 
easier thereafter. If we were to turn [Mussolini’s] proposals down now, it would be an 
inducement to Italy to launch into some undertaking, whatever it might be... He could 
not see what we had to lose by going forward... Whether [conversations] took place 
tomorrow or a month hence, we were equally exposed to the risk of bad faith.
445
  
Hailsham did not want to impose pre-conditions on any Anglo-Italian talks. His belief that a 
meaningful long-term agreement with Germany was impossible made Anglo-Italian 
rapprochement essential. Italo-German talks were scheduled for May and Hailsham, and the 
majority of the cabinet, judged that the time was now ripe for conversations.  
In this situation Eden moved inexorably towards resignation. Harvey recorded that 
‘nearly all [of Eden’s colleagues] were against him, especially... the older ones, P.M., Simon, 
Sam Hoare, Hailsham, Swinton’.446 At the emergency cabinet meeting the following day, the 
Foreign Secretary refused to ‘recommend to Parliament a policy with which he was not in 
agreement’. Eden felt that there was ‘a difference of outlook on foreign affairs generally 
between himself and some of his colleagues’. This Hailsham questioned. He wanted to record 
that ‘he had not been aware of any difference on the Foreign Policy Committee of a 
fundamental character’ and appealed to Eden not to resign. The Lord Chancellor recalled an 
episode from the 1920s when the then Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, had opposed 
sending British troops to Shanghai. Ultimately, those troops were sent out, but Chamberlain 
had not resigned.
447
 In the knowledge that Austen Chamberlain had been Eden’s first mentor 
in foreign affairs, but also aware that Eden’s resignation could seriously, some thought 
fatally, damage the government, Hailsham concluded:  
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Austen Chamberlain was a man of scrupulous honour and fine judgement... [A] 
resignation might jeopardise the Italian conversations and lead to a grave weakening 
of the National Government, who might lose much support from people who thought 
that the Government had dropped the principles of the Foreign Secretary – support for 
the League of Nations, and so forth. It would be in the nature of a major disaster.
448
  
Eden, however, was unmoved and tendered his resignation. Hailsham was perplexed as to 
why Eden had taken his objections to this extreme. ‘I can’t tell you why Anthony resigned’, 
he wrote to his son, ‘because I couldn’t make it out myself.’ He appeared irritated that a 
narrow point of disagreement had produced this outcome: 
The actual difference between him and the P.M. and the bulk of the cabinet was that 
the P.M. wanted conversations to start with Italy immediately and that Anthony 
wanted to postpone them. [Eden] definitely had agreed to the conversations to start at 
some time as long ago as last July.
449
 
While Eden later claimed that he had been ‘right’ not to trust Mussolini, Hailsham’s response 
was conditioned by his hopes that Italy would not become allied to Hitler’s Germany. He 
recognised that ‘recent events... made it much more difficult for us to conclude agreements 
with Dictators’, but for Hailsham this meant that it was ‘much more necessary for us to have 
an agreement with Italy and so prevent Italy from throwing herself finally and irretrievably 
into the hands of Germany’. While appeasing Italy was not attractive, Hailsham concluded 
that it was ‘necessary’ to attempt to prevent the formation of such a formidable 
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combination.
450
 After Eden’s departure he noted that ‘we are busily preparing for the Anglo-
Italian conversations, which I hope will be successful’.451 
When Halifax succeeded Eden as Foreign Secretary in February 1938, Hailsham 
willingly stepped into the former’s non-departmental post of Lord President of the Council. 
He was ‘installed in Whitehall with a very nice room’, hoping ‘the job will prove quite 
interesting’.452 The press were unsurprised by his decision. The Manchester Guardian 
explained the transfer as ‘the price of continual high office since 1931’.453 Hailsham’s 
younger son, now Britain’s Second Secretary at Lisbon, was pleased with his father’s move 
into this less demanding post. He instructed Hailsham to ‘relax’, hoping that he would no 
longer be ‘so intimately involved, and... compelled to labour at the thankless and vain task of 
straightening the inherently crooked’. Alluding to his father’s complaints about defence 
preparations earlier in the decade, he noted: ‘No one can devise a correct policy – there just 
isn’t any such thing, the mischief having been done long ago in spite of your vigorous and 
longsighted efforts.’454 But, although Hailsham retired six months later, he did not gracefully 
fade away. He remained at the centre of Britain’s foreign policy-making process and soon 
complained that ‘in these strenuous days’ he had ‘practically no time for my private 
affairs’.455  
Notwithstanding his catalogue of earlier warnings about German intentions, by early 
1938 Hailsham gave every impression of being a fully-fledged ‘appeaser’. He could find no 
suitable alternative to appeasement. This, however, was not because he failed to consider 
alternatives. As regards an alliance with Soviet Russia, a policy that Chamberlain’s detractors 
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suggest should have been more vigorously pursued,
456
 Hailsham calculated that such an 
arrangement would be a ‘mistake’. After his retirement, when it seemed that an Anglo-Soviet 
alliance might be concluded, he informed his son that ‘if there is one thing that I hate more 
than a Nazi Hun it is a Bolshevist Communist, so that I am well out of the government’.457 
His long-standing anti-communist impulses were undoubtedly a factor in his dismissal of 
such an approach, but Hailsham was also convinced that the value of an alliance with Russia 
was uncertain. He was irritated by ‘all these left-wing people, aided by Winston, clamouring 
for a grand alliance against the fascist powers’.458 In 1938 he complained: 
The Opposition parties are making great play with foreign policy... and I am afraid are 
making a lot of ground over their defiance of dictators and reliance on the League of 
Nations. The country doesn’t realise that it would have been plunged in to war in a 
week if they had had their own way.
459
   
The Lord President ‘hate[d] being associated in any way with Bolshevik Russia’,460 and 
feared that, rather than acting as a deterrent, such an alliance would ‘hasten an attack’.461 
Although in the future, Britain and Russia would share a common foe, Hailsham, fearful of 
Moscow’s long-term ambition to destroy the British Empire, regarded Russia as ‘a potential 
menace’.462 He even expressed doubts over a non-aggression pact as that ‘depend[ed] on 
Russia’s good faith’.463 This assessment matched that of the vast majority of Conservatives, 
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who agreed ‘that many of the world’s troubles could be attributed to communism, and they 
argued that Hitler and Mussolini had come to power because of it’.464 
 Churchill’s readiness to use the Soviet Union to restrict the Nazi threat has been 
applauded, but Hailsham recognised the enormous gamble that this involved. The Nazi-
Soviet Pact and the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939-40 revealed the inherent dangers and the 
military drawbacks of such a course. It was with this in mind that Hailsham’s elder son felt 
that the judgement of Chamberlain and his father was justified. In 1975, he noted that  
Those who put their faith in Russia were, as subsequent events showed, completely 
deluded. Russia was suffering from the astonishing purges of 1937 which could be 
seen... to render reliance on her completely futile.
465
  
Hailsham preferred to take his chances with Mussolini. Here subsequent events show 
that he misjudged the Duce’s objectives. Hailsham might have discarded the faith he had in 
Italy following the Italo-Abyssinian War or after Austrian Anschluss seemingly removed the 
barrier to Italo-German rapprochement. But, his failure to appreciate Italian duplicity, his 
understanding that it was impossible to come to terms with Germany and his determination to 
reduce the list of Britain’s potential enemies, meant that he supported the appeasement of 
Italy to the last. When ratification of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938 was brought 
forward to reward Mussolini for his apparently constructive role in the Munich Agreement, 
the Lord President even asked Chamberlain ‘to hold back my resignation until I had the 
pleasure of sharing responsibility for that decision’.466 Hailsham, like many Conservatives, 
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drew a clear distinction between appeasing Italy and Germany.
467
 Although Italy eventually 
entered the Second World War against Britain, Hailsham’s desire to pacify the apparently 
more rational and reasonable European dictator is understandable and was his imperfect 
solution to a perhaps intractable problem. 
The lack of feasible policy options was readily apparent in Hailsham’s attitude 
towards the Anschluss in March 1938. He was, of course, previously hostile to Austro-
German union, maintaining that the relative ‘destruction of Austria was one of the big 
mistakes of the peace treaty’. In early 1934 he feared that ‘if we don’t do something it looks 
very much as if Austria will be swallowed by one or both of her big neighbours, and that 
would be the worst thing of all’.468 But, although Anschluss was prohibited under the Treaty 
of Versailles, and although Germany had pledged not to use war to solve international 
disputes under the Kellogg Pact, less than a week before Austria was absorbed into Hitler’s 
Reich, Hailsham was ‘impressed by Herr Hitler’s threats to use force to vindicate the rights of 
Germans in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia’. In the cabinet he readily supported Halifax’s line 
that existing difficulties should be settled ‘by peaceful agreements [and] by peaceful 
means’.469 While this was less than heroic, appeasing a potential enemy without threatening 
Britain’s interests was in line with traditional policy and Hailsham was not alone in his 
conversion to appeasement.
470
 Even Vansittart accepted that the Anschluss was not a reason 
to declare war on Germany.
471
 But Hailsham was never a natural appeaser. He was not 
convinced that appeasement would remove tensions as his sustained, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, opposition to concessions to Southern Ireland had already revealed.
472
 
                                                 
467
 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p.112. 
468
 HAIL 1/3/2, Hailsham to the Marchioness of Londonderry, 26 Feb. 1934.  
469
 CAB 23/92, 9 March 1938. 
470
 McKercher, ‘Our most Dangerous Enemy’, p.753 and P.M. Kennedy, ‘The Tradition of Appeasement in 
British Foreign Policy, 1885-1939’, British Journal of International Studies, vol.2 (1976), pp.195-215. 
471
 See: Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, 11 March 1938, p.60. 
472
 For more details, see Part II, ‘Hailsham’s Irish Question 1932-38’. 
339 
 
That Hailsham was ready to make a stand on the Irish issue, yet acquiesce in other 
acts of appeasement is readily explained. The threats posed by Nazi Germany and Eire were 
not comparable and Britain could safely stand up to the latter. While Hailsham judged it 
inopportune to precipitate a European war against Germany, his approach to the idea of 
returning Germany’s former colonies again advertised his ‘anti-appeaser’ credentials. He ‘did 
not think that Germany had any intention of making a settlement... which we could 
contemplate’.473 He hinted that he would resign if such an agreement was crafted for he 
‘would never be a party to any agreement to this end’.474 Showing awareness of Nazi 
methods, he concluded that ‘any such policy would make war all the more certain as 
Germany would take these territories and then proceed to make more and more extensive 
demands’.475 His stubbornness on the colonial issue revealed that, when circumstances 
permitted, Hailsham would resist what he believed was futile surrender. He acquiesced in 
appeasement only when he felt that it was necessary. Britain had to accept much at the hands 
of Hitler which Hailsham found distasteful, but his gut instinct to resist meant that there was 
a point beyond which he could not go.  
Hailsham’s Last Hurrah  
The German-Austrian Anschluss obliged the government to consider the future of the 
German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia in March 1938. With Austria now in German 
hands, an undefended frontier opened up along the south-west border of Czechoslovakia. As 
Austen Chamberlain had warned in 1936, ‘if Austria goes, Czecho-Slovakia is 
indefensible’.476 Halifax recommended that Britain should ‘induce the government of 
Czechoslovakia [to produce] a direct settlement with the Sudeten-Deutsch... [and] persuade 
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the French to use their influence to obtain such a settlement’. The COS concluded that Britain 
and its possible allies could not prevent the defeat of Czechoslovakia,
477
 and with 
Hungarians, Rumanians and Poles also voicing claims to self-determination, Czechoslovakia 
was regarded as an artificial state whose frontiers required amendment.  
During the early stages of the Czech Crisis there were few signs that Hailsham would 
dissent from Halifax’s line. He argued that ‘we could not... afford to see France over-run’, but 
with an eye to Britain’s – arguably disastrous – policy of 1914, he timorously suggested that 
Britain should refuse to offer France a firm commitment to ‘keep France and Germany 
guessing’. This, he hoped, would restrain both powers.478 Hailsham raised no objections 
when Chamberlain sent the former cabinet minister, Lord Runciman, to act as a mediator 
between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech government in the hope of resolving Czech-
German tensions peacefully.
479
 But, with negotiations deadlocked, the Prime Minister 
recalled his colleagues from their summer vacations. When the cabinet gathered on 30 
August, Hailsham was on a Mediterranean cruise and was among three absentees. It was, 
thought Inskip, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, no great loss as Hailsham was 
now ‘no more than a passenger’.480 Events would prove otherwise.  
On his return on 13 September, Hailsham met Chamberlain at Downing Street, 
presumably to be up-dated on developments in Central Europe and to learn of the Prime 
Minister’s ideas for a personal solution to the Czech crisis.481 The following day, 
Chamberlain told the cabinet that he had invited himself to Germany to meet the Führer to 
thrash out a workable solution. This initiative was enthusiastically welcomed. Hailsham 
endorsed the Prime Minister’s policy ‘wholeheartedly’. His only reservations related to 
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Chamberlain’s willingness to accept a plebiscite to resolve the minorities question and to 
offer the reconstituted Czechoslovakia a British guarantee. His caution derived from 
recognition that Britain could not fulfil this obligation and that plebiscites might initiate 
Czechoslovakia’s disintegration.482 
  With Chamberlain’s proposal accepted by Hitler, Hailsham joined fellow members of 
the cabinet in seeing the Prime Minister off from Heston Airport on the morning of 15 
September. Two days later, in the cabinet after Chamberlain’s return from Berchtesgaden, 
Hailsham accepted the terms that the Prime Minister and Hitler had agreed. These amounted 
to conceding the Sudeten Germans’ transfer to the Reich. Although, as Cadogan later noted, 
‘we moved (or were pushed) from “autonomy” to cession’,483 Hailsham’s attitude was 
indistinguishable from Chamberlain’s. He urged the cabinet to ‘endorse the attitude which the 
Prime Minister has taken in his negotiations with Herr Hitler’.484 When the cabinet 
reconvened after lunch, Hailsham was amongst those who defended the Prime Minister. To 
the claim of Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that it was in Britain’s interest to 
prevent one power dominating Europe, Hailsham, with chilling realism, insisted that this ‘had 
come to pass’ as Germany already dominated the continent. The government, he claimed, 
‘had no alternative but to submit to… humiliation’. Hailsham felt this surrender was 
debasing, but he fell back on Britain’s inability to meet a multitude of global challenges. ‘The 
position of the Empire’, he argued, ‘had to be considered. The Congress Party in India might 
take advantage of the position; there might be an Arab revolt in Asia and armed neutrality, if 
not war, on the part of Japan.’485  
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The Lord President’s attitude at this stage, judged Cooper, was that of a ‘coward’.486 
Nevertheless, Chamberlain’s proposals were accepted by the cabinet and by the French and 
Czechoslovak governments.
487
 It appeared that a peaceful solution to the Sudeten problem 
had been forged and that Hailsham was prepared to cajole the Czechs into making major 
concessions to avoid war with Germany. He even put aside his reservations about a British 
guarantee of the rump of Czechoslovakia. He ‘regretted that this step had been forced on us’ 
as it ‘would be impossible to carry out, and might make a wedge between us and the 
Dominions’. But he accepted that a guarantee was an essential part of the agreement.488  
Chamberlain flew back to Germany on 22 September to meet Hitler at Godesberg, 
with the authorisation of the British, French and Czechoslovak governments to relinquish the 
Sudetenland to the Reich. He expected to finalise the details of a peaceful transfer of 
territory. Up to this point, Hailsham had actively supported Chamberlain’s appeasement 
policy, even though their motivations were subtly different. But, at Godesberg, Hitler upped 
his demands, insisting that German forces should occupy the German districts of the 
Sudetenland immediately. ‘[N]o delay was possible [and] a settlement must be reached 
within a few days either by agreement or force.’489 This was not the orderly transfer for 
which Chamberlain or his colleagues had hoped. Nevertheless, he recommended to the 
cabinet on 24 September that Britain should accept Hitler’s new terms and compel the French 
and Czechs to do the same. The principle of cession had already been agreed and the 
remaining issue, however painful, was presented as one of timing. The discussion was 
adjourned until the following day. 
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This episode shows that Hailsham was not always the ‘loyal supporter of 
Chamberlain’ that Heuston claimed.490 The Berchtesgaden terms bordered on the limit of 
surrender in which Hailsham could acquiesce. While Chamberlain was still at Godesberg, the 
Lord President attended a meeting of ministers who were concerned about the direction that 
the negotiations with Hitler might take.
491
 The feelings of the group were conveyed by 
telephone to the Prime Minister by Lord Halifax: 
the great mass of public opinion seems to be hardening in sense of feeling that we 
have gone to limit of concession and that it is up to the Chancellor to make some 
contribution… [Y]ou should not leave without making it plain… [that] for him to 
reject opportunity of peaceful solution in favour of one that must involve war would 
be an unpardonable crime against humanity.
492
 
Hitler’s new demands had transformed Hailsham’s position. After Chamberlain had 
presented the new Godesberg terms, Hailsham knew that he would have to break ranks. As 
Duff Cooper recorded: 
It was pouring with rain when we came out from the cabinet and Hailsham gave me a 
lift as far as the Admiralty. I said that I didn’t think we could ever get the Prime 
Minister’s policy through the House of Commons. To my surprise he said at once, 
“Of course you can’t”, and went on to tell me of the strength of feeling at Oxford, 
where his son was standing as a parliamentary candidate.
493
       
For Hailsham, Hitler’s demands had crossed the line. The Germans, Hailsham 
informed Londonderry, ‘could have got everything they legitimately wanted from 
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Berchtesgaden’. The ‘method of force instead of reason’ embodied in the Godesberg terms, 
however, was ‘absolutely inadmissible for the future of democracy and civilisation’.494 With 
the Lord President opposed to further surrender to Nazi demands, the stage was set for the 
crucial cabinet meeting on 25 September. ‘Pray God there will be a revolt’, penned Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, Vansittart’s successor at the Foreign Office.495 The Permanent Under-
Secretary’s appeal was answered. Chamberlain pressed for the acceptance of the new terms, 
but suffered a rare reversal.  
Credit for the cabinet’s readiness to stand up to Chamberlain on 25 September has 
usually been accorded to the Foreign Secretary.
496
 Halifax, ‘by opposing Chamberlain in 
cabinet over the Godesberg terms, took Europe to the brink of war’.497 When the cabinet first 
discussed Hitler’s terms on 24 September, however, he had been ready to accept them, ‘quite 
happily défaitiste-pacifist’.498 The background to his conversion to a line of resistance has 
been untangled by Peter Neville – though this was revealed with publication of the diaries of 
Alexander Cadogan, almost 30 years earlier.
499
 On the evening of 24 September, Cadogan 
drove Halifax home, ‘gave him a bit of my mind’ and at the following morning’s cabinet, the 
Foreign Secretary ‘plumped for refusal of Hitler’s terms’. As Halifax explained to his 
somewhat bemused official, ‘Alec, I’m very angry with you. You gave me a sleepless night. I 
woke at 1 and never got to sleep again. But I came to the conclusion that you were right.’500  
Notwithstanding the prompting received from Cadogan, Halifax’s position was not 
entirely clear on 25 September. He told the cabinet that he ‘had found his opinion changing 
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somewhat in the last day or so, and even now he was not too certain of his view’. The 
previous evening he had judged that Hitler’s new scheme ‘did not involve a new acceptance 
of principle’. He was ‘not quite sure, however, that he still held that view’. Halifax ‘did not 
put this forward as a final conclusion, but his reflections through the night had provisionally 
led him to the conclusion that the present proposals involved a difference in principle’. The 
Foreign Secretary pointed ‘tentatively to the conclusion that it would be very difficult to put 
any pressure on Czechoslovakia’.501 This intervention fell some way short of the act of 
‘political bravery and self-confidence’ portrayed by Halifax’s biographer.502 While 
Chamberlain described Halifax’s uncertainty as ‘a horrible blow’, it is unlikely that his words 
alone shifted the balance of the cabinet.
503
 Cadogan also noted a wider circle beyond the 
Foreign Secretary: ‘Seems [the] cabinet anyhow wouldn’t allow P.M. to make any further 
concessions’.504  
The forces of opposition had secured a second ‘unexpected ally’.505 Chamberlain’s 
policy was suddenly questioned by Hailsham, his longest-serving cabinet colleague and, until 
this moment, steadfast supporter of the government’s appeasement policy. Yet ‘little attention 
has been paid to Hailsham’s criticism of appeasement at the fateful cabinet meeting’.506 
Unlike Halifax’s contribution, Hailsham challenged Chamberlain’s policy in no uncertain 
terms and buttressed his arguments with evidence calculated to undermine the Prime 
Minister’s judgement. Without what has been described as his ‘devastating indictment’,507 it 
is open to question whether those in favour of rejecting Hitler’s terms would have deflected 
Chamberlain from his course. Granted the ‘provisional’ and ‘tentative’ character of Halifax’s 
remarks, he might have swallowed his misgivings if opinion inside the cabinet had been 
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unfavourable to resisting Hitler’s demands. Unlike the Foreign Secretary, Hailsham’s mind 
was made up and he arrived fully prepared to state his case, having brought a newspaper 
article to remind him of the key points of his intervention.
508
   
Immediately after Halifax’s statement, Hailsham began his attack, making almost his 
last cabinet intervention. Consistent with his warnings earlier in the decade, his case was 
based upon the bad faith of German leaders and their insatiable militaristic appetite. While 
Chamberlain believed that Hitler was speaking the truth when he said that his ambitions were 
limited to ‘racial unity and not the domination of Europe’, Hailsham stated bluntly that ‘he 
could not trust Herr Hitler’. He then listed successive statements by Nazi leaders that denied 
‘territorial claims in Europe’. In May 1935, Hitler had claimed that his government would 
‘respect unconditionally... the territorial provisions’ of Europe, and that revisions would only 
occur through ‘peaceful understandings’. The Lord President then turned to Hitler’s 
announcement during the reoccupation of the Rhineland: ‘We have no territorial demands to 
make in Europe… [W]e hope that human wisdom will… remove causes of tension by way of 
gradual evolutionary development in peaceful collaboration.’ As Hitler threatened the use of 
force following the mobilisation of the German army, Hailsham had exposed Hitler as a liar. 
He pointed to two statements made after the Anschluss. Göring had told the Czech 
ambassador in Berlin that Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia. ‘I give 
you my word of honour… and I can add that we wish only for better relations.’ Baron von 
Neurath, whose belligerent remarks Hailsham had highlighted in 1933, gave the ambassador 
the same story: ‘Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia’. After this 
catalogue of broken promises, Hailsham concluded his denunciation of Chamberlain’s policy:  
These undertakings had not been adhered to. He did not feel that we could trust Herr 
Hitler’s declarations in future. The Germans differed from us in that to us a promise 
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was a binding obligation, whereas to them it was a statement of intention. He thought 
the right thing to do was to put the facts to the Czechoslovak Government, and if that 
Government rejected the German demands and France came to Czechoslovakia’s 
assistance, we should come to the help of France. No pressure… should be put upon 
Czechoslovakia to accept.
509
 
Through contradicting Chamberlain’s assessment of Hitler’s intentions, he undermined the 
case for surrendering to his demands. This was a compelling argument, delivered by an able 
advocate in a decisive tone. Despite Hailsham’s previous support for Chamberlain’s policy, 
his anti-German and ‘anti-appeasement’ tendencies suggested that such a stand was always 
possible. Once Hailsham had challenged the Prime Minister, a succession of younger 
ministers voiced their misgivings. If Chamberlain had insisted upon accepting the Godesberg 
terms, it seemed that up to six members of the government would have resigned.
510
 With this 
level of opposition, the Prime Minister could not force through his policy. Hailsham was 
amongst the group of dissidents who tipped the balance against Chamberlain. Even if 
Halifax’s intervention had been decisive, Hailsham’s contribution is worthy of note.  
The revolt had important implications. On the morning of 27 September, Horace 
Wilson, Chamberlain’s personal envoy, told Hitler that if the French became engaged in 
hostilities against Germany after fulfilling obligations to Czechoslovakia, ‘Britain would feel 
obliged to support them’. The next day the cabinet agreed that Chamberlain should deliver 
the same message to the Commons.
511
 The revolt also revealed important truths about 
Chamberlain’s administration. The Prime Minister was no dictator. He could not force 
through his own will against his colleagues’ wishes.512 Chamberlain’s setback marked a 
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decisive shift in the balance of power within his government. The Foreign Office soon 
achieved an ascendancy it had not enjoyed since the formation of the National Government, 
with the accompanying supremacy of the Exchequer. This did lead to a significant change in 
policy direction as Halifax could now confidently challenge Chamberlain’s line.513 The 
Foreign Secretary soon ‘succeeded in building a new consensus for resistance’.514 
Consequently, by March 1939, one prominent critic of Chamberlain’s foreign policy who had 
resigned office with Eden, conceded that the government was ‘now doing what we would 
wish’.515 
Following the rejection of the Godesberg terms it seemed, albeit briefly, that Britain 
would go to war because of ‘a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we 
know nothing’. In the event, Hitler, prompted by Mussolini, agreed to meet Chamberlain for 
a third time and Hailsham hoped that ‘Neville will bring back peace from Munich and I hope 
it will be peace with honour’.516 The Munich Settlement was signed and postponed war for 
eleven months. The new terms negotiated on 29 September, in which Hailsham acquiesced, 
were not greatly different from the Godesberg proposals which he had vehemently opposed. 
Yet the agreement did maintain a limited measure of British credit. The German occupation 
of the Sudetenland was delayed by ten days and the German-controlled plebiscite of disputed 
areas was replaced by an international commission. Hailsham, in very different terms from 
those voiced by Chamberlain, reverted to justifying appeasement because of Britain’s 
inability to resist German aggression:  
I am still sceptical about Hitler’s good intentions. My defence of the government 
policy would be not faith in Hitler so much as distrust in our allies and of our 
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preparedness to meet his attack, coupled with the consciousness that nothing we could 
have done would have availed Czechoslovakia. It would have brought more disaster 
upon that unfortunate country.
517
     
There was no triumphalism. The rapid change in British public opinion about the 
‘achievement’ of Munich did not surprise Hailsham. As he wrote in early December: 
I always told my colleagues after Munich that the country would be profoundly 
grateful for peace but very anxious to find a scapegoat for what they would regard as 
humiliating terms; and unfortunately it seems that I am right.
518
 
By the time of the Munich Settlement Hailsham had only a month left as a member of 
Chamberlain’s administration and his retirement coincided with his elder son’s entry into 
politics. Although Hailsham had been ‘rather anxious to keep Quintin back from the H of C 
until he had established himself at the Bar’, after suffering a stroke he was not optimistic 
about his own longevity and concluded that ‘it was time now that [Quintin] started in the 
Commons... before the inevitable happened’.519 Hailsham wanted his son to gain some 
political experience granted that his acceptance of a peerage in 1928 had doomed his son to 
the House of Lords. The death of the Conservative MP for Oxford City in August 1938 
presented Quintin with the opportunity to secure a Commons seat. Hailsham felt that his son 
had ‘an excellent chance of being adopted, and... a fine chance of becoming an M.P.’ But this 
was, of course, ‘all dependent on the incalculable whims of Herr Hitler and his Sudeten 
Germans’.520 
The by-election held on 27 October was dominated by the Munich Agreement and 
amounted to a referendum on Chamberlain’s foreign policy. Although Oxford was normally a 
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safe Conservative seat, once the Liberal and Labour candidates withdrew in favour of a single 
Independent Progressive, A.D. Lindsay, the Master of Balliol, Hogg’s return was far from 
inevitable. Lindsay stood explicitly against the Munich terms, claiming that ‘A vote for Hogg 
is a vote for Hitler’.521 The straight contest, Hailsham told his son, meant ‘a much stiffer fight 
for you, because Lindsay is a very formidable opponent, and naturally would rally some 
dissident Conservative opinion’.522  
In the event, Hogg was returned with a reduced majority of nearly 3,500. The Prime 
Minister ‘look[ed] forward with special pleasure to your entry into the House of Commons, 
as the son of my old friend and present colleague who has rendered such long and valuable 
service to his country’.523 During the campaign, Hailsham spoke in support of his son but it 
was striking that he made no real attempt to defend the Munich Agreement. He 
acknowledged that the electors of Oxford ‘were the first to have the chance to express their 
view on ... Mr. Chamberlain’s conduct of our policy in the crisis’, but limited his remarks to 
an endorsement of his son’s readiness to become an MP.524  
Once the by-election was over, it was revealed that Hailsham had already offered 
Chamberlain his resignation. This had been accepted a week earlier, but an announcement 
was delayed at Quintin’s request pending the result of the Oxford contest. His resignation 
letter stressed that he stepped down, not because of ‘any difference of opinion’, but to enable 
the Prime Minister to reinforce his cabinet.
525
 While this was true, Hailsham’s departure was 
not voluntary. Chamberlain had requested his resignation. As he wrote to his oldest 
colleague: 
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I have been wrestling during the last few days with the problems arising out of the 
necessity for making various changes in the cabinet. There are only two places vacant 
but I have been very conscious... that some additional strength is required... I turned to 
Walter Runciman whose personal reputation has been greatly enhanced by his work at 
Prague and whose assistance in the cabinet would undoubtedly be of the greatest 
value... but he tells me that he does not feel equal to the strain of departmental 
administration.  
The Prime Minister suggested that Hailsham should vacate his sinecure office to allow 
Runciman to re-join the cabinet. Although ‘the idea of parting is hateful’, Chamberlain 
requested ‘a last service to an old friend by making way for Walter’.526 Hailsham duly 
tendered his resignation, but was keen to stress that it was not for reasons of failing health.
527
 
The Prime Minister’s attempt to create a broader base of support for his administration 
resulted in an insignificant reshuffle. With Hailsham becoming an increasingly difficult 
colleague after his determined opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it is possible that 
Chamberlain was keen to dispense with his services following his criticism of the Prime 
Minister’s foreign policy in September.  
Hailsham’s retirement from politics was almost total. But his disapproval of 
unnecessary acts of appeasement led him to contemplate fronting a national campaign to stop 
Britain handing Tanganyika, the former German East-African colony, back to Germany in 
late 1938. While the government still seemed willing to discuss areas of dispute with Hitler, 
Hailsham, convinced of Germany’s bad faith, thought that negotiations could only lead to 
futile surrender. ‘I could not’, he told Londonderry, ‘contemplate surrendering any non-
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Germanic peoples to Nazi rule.’528 He concluded that appeasing Hitler was useless as the 
Führer’s incessant appetite could not be satisfied. So determined was Hailsham that he 
planned to travel to Tanganyika and ‘spend five days there flying around the territory and 
meeting prominent people’, before returning to ‘stump the country here against any surrender 
of Tanganyika to Germany’. He had been ‘agitating my Conservative friends in the House of 
Commons to declare publicly that they would not support any cession’. The news of 
Kristallnacht, however, was enough to stiffen the government’s resolve – ‘one good thing 
that those unfortunate Jews have done for us’ – and Hailsham dropped his plans.529 
Nevertheless, this episode highlighted the gap between Hailsham and some of his 
former colleagues.
530
 After the government’s declaration ruled out any cession, he ‘warmly 
congratulated’ Malcolm MacDonald, the Dominions Secretary, but Hailsham noted that ‘I 
don’t think he was particularly pleased’.531 With immediate acts of surrender seemingly ruled 
out, Hailsham continued to support the government. Even though he expected that ‘the policy 
of appeasement’ would eventually ‘be dished by the Nazis’, he hoped that ‘it won’t bring 
down Neville with it’. At least while Britain was at peace, he believed that any alternative 
government would be ‘infinitely worse’.532  
In the years following his resignation, Hailsham, as a means of protecting his former 
colleagues, refused to comment on political matters.
533
 He ‘knew the dreadful responsibilities 
of office and would not add to the burden’.534 But, after the outbreak of the Second World 
War, he became a founding member of Lord Salisbury’s Watching Committee in April 
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1940.
535
 This body monitored the government’s wartime performance and has been regarded 
as a key factor in the destruction of Chamberlain’s premiership, not least because he could 
not head the sort of all-party administration for which the committee campaigned.
536
 
Hailsham joined those committee members who were received by Halifax at the Foreign 
Office towards the end of April 1940. The views of the group were conveyed by Salisbury 
who, after hearing the Foreign Secretary’s explanation of the government’s war strategy, 
replied ‘we are not satisfied’.537 
 Yet, while it is tempting to speculate that Hailsham’s membership owed something to 
the line he had taken in September 1938, Salisbury was careful to include a number of 
Chamberlain loyalists to emphasise the group’s impartiality. The Watching Committee 
embraced a broad range of opinion. This was clear when the ‘War Effort Sub-Committee’ 
discussed Lord Trenchard’s memorandum on air policy. Amery, who was keen to unseat 
Chamberlain, penned in his diary: 
We were all in agreement... to the necessity of putting an end to this discreditable air 
truce, except Hailsham, who urged that we should be blamed by the whole world and 
that the United States would stop selling us munitions. I was not surprised for I had 
long ago summed Douglas up as an arrant coward.
538
 
Despite Amery’s vicious assessment, Hailsham had a point. Following President 
Roosevelt’s appeal for belligerents to refrain from bombing civilian areas, Hailsham, with a 
view to future supplies and allies, concluded that the most prudent course was to retaliate 
against a breach of the truce rather than shoulder the responsibility for unleashing 
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unrestricted bombing. The truce soon ended when the Luftwaffe unintentionally bombed 
London in August 1940. When retaliatory attacks followed, Britain’s hands were clean. 
Hailsham’s membership of the committee indicates that he was reconciled to the 
necessity of a reconstructed government. But, although he regularly attended its meetings, he 
was not amongst those keen to oust Chamberlain during the celebrated parliamentary debate 
which led to the all-party coalition. Following Chamberlain’s resignation in May 1940 and 
his decision to serve in Churchill’s war cabinet as Lord President, Hailsham informed his 
former colleague with ‘unswerving loyalty and affection’ that 
I am proud to be your friend and to have worked with you. You have deserved well of 
your country... and given unstinted service to your fellow citizens and the Empire; but 
I think that your willingness to serve still in the cabinet is the greatest service that you 
have ever rendered. Nobody but a big man and a great patriot could or would have set 
such an example.  
He was ‘sad’ that Quintin had voted against the government in the Norway Debate but 
Hailsham assured Chamberlain that this was not a vote of ‘no’ confidence. Quintin had 
‘register[ed] his protest on the eve of embarkation with his battalion at the total failure of the 
War Office to provide for their equipment or training’.539 Hailsham remained on good terms 
with Chamberlain and he paid the former Prime Minister a warm tribute in the Lords after his 
death in November 1940.
540
  
Conclusion 
Hailsham has strong claims to have been the first member of the National 
Government cabinet to recognise the grave threat posed by Germany and to attempt to 
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formulate British defence policy on the basis of this recognition. Having failed, however, to 
convert the government to his point of view about the remedial action that had to be taken, he 
found himself reconciled to the policy of appeasement as the only way of coping with the 
combination of Britain’s inherent weakness and the country’s over-extended responsibilities. 
But while considerations of Realpolitik regularly overcame Hailsham’s gut instinct to resist, 
he doubted whether meaningful discussions were possible with the German government. In 
1936, he complained that it was ‘very difficult to find that one is dealing with a people whose 
mentality and outlook are not on the same plane as ours.’541 Unlike Chamberlain, he regarded 
British and German interests as irreconcilable. For this reason, Hailsham’s acquiescence in 
the appeasement of Nazi Germany was always conditional. This was clear with the Diktat-
style Godesberg terms. Londonderry, whose personal record in regard to Germany was hardly 
unsoiled, told Hailsham that he was ‘quite right in your opinions in regard to the Germans’. 
After Hailsham’s retirement, the former Air Secretary recognised that ‘your record stands 
forever and I doubt... that you could have remained with any feelings of self respect”.542  
In the second half of the 1930s, the National Government may not have been mere 
puppets ‘of circumstantial constraints,543 but Hailsham and his colleagues were severely 
restricted by Britain’s international predicament. Hailsham’s experience illustrates the 
impossibility of dividing ‘appeasers’ and ‘anti-appeasers’ into two neatly separate categories. 
He foresaw the near inevitability of the Second World War, but he could not devise a viable 
alternative to Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. At only one critical moment did 
Hailsham demur from Chamberlain’s foreign policy, but he quickly fell back into line. 
Perhaps no practical alternative existed. 
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Conclusion 
Retirement  
Hailsham’s retirement was another example of meeting the request of his party leader 
regardless of his own wishes. The retiring minister was ‘very sorry to give up my job, which I 
thought I could have carried on certainly throughout this parliament’.1 This willingness to 
subordinate his own interests had been clear with his acceptance of the Lord Chancellorship 
in 1928, his intimate involvement in Indian constitutional reform and his appointment as 
Conservative Leader in the Lords in 1931. This final gesture was not lost on his cabinet 
colleagues. Samuel Hoare commended Hailsham’s ‘patriotic sacrifice’, while Lord Halifax 
felt that Hailsham had provided another ‘very good example to follow of public spirit’.2 
Hailsham lived on for a further twelve years but his retirement was unremarkable. Plagued by 
ill-health, he played little part in public life.  
Although Hailsham had for so long predicted the near inevitability of war with 
Germany and the likelihood of Japan seizing the opportunity to expand its own territory and 
influence while Britain was pre-occupied in Europe, Italy’s eventual involvement in the 
Second World War against Britain would have bitterly disappointed him. Like other figures 
in Britain’s policy-making elite, he had sought to prevent the country facing the nightmare 
scenario of three powerful enemies in three different theatres of war. By contrast, he would 
have welcomed America’s active involvement from 1941. But, apart from his limited 
interventions in the Watching Committee, Hailsham could do no more than watch the 
unfolding of the worldwide conflict, which on one occasion came uncomfortably close. In 
October 1940 a German bomb struck the Carlton Club where he was dining. As Harold 
Nicolson recorded: 
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There was a loud crash, the main lights went out and the whole place was filled with 
the smell of cordite and the dust of rubble ... [T]hrough the fog [came] the figure of 
Quintin Hogg escorting old Hailsham from the ruins, like Aeneas and Anchises.
3
 
It seems that the former Lord Chancellor was determined to recover a new suitcase that he 
had left in the club’s basement.4 
After the conclusion of the Second World War, Hailsham served as an Honorary 
Colonel in the Inns of Court Regiment until 1948 and, after assuming the chairmanship of the 
British Empire Cancer Campaign in 1936, he held that responsibility until his death. He 
attended sittings of the House of Lords and was Chairman of the Personal Bills Committee 
until 1950. In January 1944, after the death of Sir Kenneth Studd, the Chairman and President 
of the Polytechnic, Hailsham assumed these responsibilities. But a second stroke left him ‘a 
very sick and a very tired man’. He refused to be formally elected President of the 
Polytechnic because his physical condition debarred him from attending many of its evening 
functions.
5
 Hailsham’s deteriorating health also prevented him from making political 
interventions in the post-war era, although the Conservatives’ loss of the 1945 General 
Election and the beginnings of decolonisation were obvious points of distress. As he told his 
son in 1948: 
I see you have been active in the House but unfortunately there is no prospect of 
convincing the majority... these days, and I am afraid they will go on dissipating the 
Empire and destroying our standard of living here regardless of argument.
6
  
Hailsham died at his home, Carter’s Corner Place in Sussex, on 10 August 1950 in his 
79
th
 year. His deteriorating health led his son Neil to write that it was ‘only the parting that is 
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 HLSM 8/2/2/4, Hailsham to Quintin Hogg, 6 Dec. 1948. 
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bitter. There is no doubt he was ready to go.’7 Hailsham lies buried near his home, in the 
churchyard of All Saints, Herstmonceux, next to Edward Majoribanks, his stepson who 
committed suicide in 1932. Quintin Hogg was inundated with letters of sympathy and regret 
after Hailsham’s passing and many survive in his archival collection in Cambridge. One letter 
from William Speers, a Conservative backbencher and KC, typified their tone: ‘In my early 
days at the Bar’, Spens recalled, ‘I always rejoiced to be led by him… and later when I 
ventured into politics, he was immensely kind to me. A great and kindly man and a loss to us 
all’.8  For another correspondent Hailsham was ‘an example to his generation’.9 Such was his 
contribution that he inspired respect from political opponents. Clement Attlee, Leader of the 
Labour party from 1935-55 and Prime Minister at the time of writing, noted: ‘I was in the 
House with Lord Hailsham for many years and always appreciated the keenness of his 
intellect and his straightforward way of putting his case.’ Attlee would miss ‘friendly 
conversation with him on measures with which we were largely in agreement’.10 One friend, 
whose association with Hailsham dated back to their days at Cheam School during the 1870s, 
noted that the deceased had ‘had a long and useful life, having done well in everything he 
took up, and he has left promising sons to succeed him’.11 
While Neil Hogg continued his career in the diplomatic service, Douglas Hailsham’s 
hereditary peerage meant that his death removed Quintin Hogg from the House of Commons 
and transferred him to the upper chamber. By 1950 the latter was already recognised as ‘one 
of the most able and liveliest of Conservative backbenchers’.12 The name of Hailsham thus 
lived on in the person of his flamboyant elder son, who enjoyed a cabinet career even longer 
than his father’s, and who, like his father, served twice as Lord Chancellor. He only stepped 
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down from the cabinet in 1987 at the age of almost 80. The second Viscount emulated his 
father in coming close to the premiership in 1963, by which time a reluctant peer had the 
right, which he exercised, of renouncing his title. Douglas Hailsham has been eclipsed in the 
narrative of twentieth-century British history by the record and personality of his elder son. 
Yet the first holder of the title was almost certainly the more significant figure. 
Assessment  
The proper province of the historian is what actually happened rather than what might 
have happened. But, in this instance, a word of counter-factual speculation is surely in order. 
This thesis has shown that Hailsham was an important figure in British political history 
during the inter-war years. But it has also suggested that he came tantalisingly close to 
emerging as a pre-eminent figure. If Lord Cave’s health had held out for a further year, it 
seems unlikely that Hailsham (or Hogg, as he would have remained) would have been 
induced to accept a peerage during the lifetime of the second Labour government. His future 
claims to the Tory leadership would have been consequently enhanced. If Baldwin had 
succumbed, as he very nearly did, to the pressures which confronted him in 1930-31, 
Hailsham would most probably have emerged as Conservative leader. In this situation it is 
possible that he would have resisted calls for an all-party National Government. More 
probably, like those actually charged with the responsibility for the negotiations of 1931, he 
would have been persuaded by the entreaties of the monarch and put aside his anti-coalition 
instincts in the broader national interest. But as Tory leader, at the head of the huge majority 
accorded by the electorate in the 1931 General Election, he would probably have claimed the 
premiership from the failing Ramsay MacDonald somewhat sooner than did the more self-
effacing Baldwin. A Hailsham-led government in the early 1930s would have had obvious 
implications for British policy, most notably in defence preparations and in the foreign arena. 
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Almost certainly, rearmament would have been given a higher priority in these years, 
notwithstanding the country’s dire economic situation.  
But Hailsham’s importance does not rest upon such historical reconfigurations. This 
thesis has shown that an investigation into Hailsham’s career is justified and valuable. He 
made significant contributions to British political history in three key areas, all largely 
overlooked or even completely ignored by earlier writers. Despite a relatively late start, he 
made a remarkably rapid ascent up the greasy pole of political advancement, aided by the 
unique circumstances surrounding the fall of the Lloyd George coalition in October 1922. 
Within five or six years he was being seriously considered as a future Conservative leader. In 
the same period he was an active participant in that re-shaping of Conservatism that enabled 
it to become the dominant force in British politics until the electoral debacle of 1945. 
Hailsham identified the potential dangers posed by an avowedly socialist party. His strident 
anti-socialism and unswerving defence of the constitution and traditional British institutions 
made a clear appeal not only to his own party but to sections of the wider electorate. He may 
have been ‘one of the leaders of the more conservative part of the Conservative Party’, but 
his vision was broader than that of a ‘thinking Diehard’.13 There was a liberal streak in 
Hailsham’s political creed, seen most clearly in his work on the Trades Disputes Act, but also 
more generally in his readiness to use the power of the state to the benefit of the country at 
large, which helped extend the Tory appeal way beyond its core vote.  
In the field of Imperialism, Hailsham was a key player in the development of the 
Empire and Commonwealth during a period when Britain’s imperial legacy was under 
considerable challenge. His contribution was clearly far more than that of a right-wing 
reactionary. He believed that Britain, the white Dominions and the predominantly non-white 
dependencies that formed the British Empire could remain united. This approach was not an 
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out-dated attempt to impose Britain’s will. Imperial unity was to be based primarily upon 
consent and economic inter-dependence achieved through voluntary agreements. With his 
influence over government policy and a well thought-through vision of how the British 
Empire could be consolidated in an era of rapid transition, he deserves to be recognised as a 
major figure in inter-war Imperial history. His contribution explains why, in 1932, Mackenzie 
King, the leading Canadian politician, described Hailsham as one of ‘the world’s great men 
of today’.14 Hailsham’s part in securing the longstanding Conservative goal of Imperial 
Preference was as important as that of Neville Chamberlain, to whom credit has usually been 
accorded. Despite personal misgivings over the extent of the National Government’s plans 
for Indian self-government, he played a vital role, virtually unnoticed in earlier 
historiography, in selling its schemes to the right wing of the Tory party – a task which 
perhaps only he could have fulfilled. And he led a resolute, if ultimately unsuccessful, 
campaign to resist concessions to Irish republicanism, a campaign whose wisdom was vividly 
illustrated during the course of the Second World War.  
Perhaps most importantly, Hailsham has claims to have been one of the most 
perceptive of British politicians in his attitude towards Nazi Germany. Unlike many of his 
colleagues, he never shared the illusion that meaningful and lasting agreements with Nazi 
Germany were possible. He became one of the first cabinet ministers, if not the first, to 
recognise the futility of pursuing a conciliatory policy towards an increasingly revanchist 
Germany. Widely condemned for an obstructive line on international disarmament, he was in 
fact already aware that Britain needed to embark upon a wide-ranging programme of 
rearmament. Although the Army suffered during the early 1930s, without Hailsham’s 
heavyweight influence and able advocacy as War Secretary, it is likely that the ‘Cinderella 
Service’ would have been even less fortunate. 
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Rather than losing his case in an internecine struggle between the three armed 
services, Hailsham looked for a balanced plan to benefit the Royal Navy and the Air Force as 
well as the Army. His willingness to implement state-imposed industrial re-organisation in 
1935 well illustrates the depth of his convictions. But, having lost this battle to the bigger 
battalions of the Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain, Hailsham found himself acquiescing in the 
policy of appeasement as the decade drew on, because of the absence of a viable alternative. 
He did so out of necessity, but without enthusiasm. The implementation of what he and the 
government’s defence experts believed was an inadequate rearmament programme in 1934, 
meant that the country was less ready to resist the German menace. Hailsham’s perception of 
Hitler’s Germany did not change and that power remained, in his view, a threat to the peace 
of the world and one that would eventually have to be faced. For this reason he was, at heart, 
an innate anti-appeaser, as his conduct during the Czechoslovakian crisis of September 1938 
revealed. 
Although this thesis demonstrates that politics, rather than the law, was Hailsham’s 
priority during 1922-38, his legal training had clear implications for his consideration of 
political matters. He had an innate respect for the primacy of existing legislation, agreements, 
obligations and the pledges made by governments and their representatives. He believed that 
these undertakings were binding on those governments and on their successors. Hailsham 
was no hypocrite and his own actions were entirely consistent with what he expected from 
the leaders of other countries. He accepted that Britain must fulfil its commitments even if he 
personally bore no responsibility for entering into them and even when he disagreed with 
them. In instances where he approved of these pledges, such as the Equalisation of the 
Franchise in 1928, delivering them posed no difficulty. But, in cases where assurances 
conflicted with his own opinions, Hailsham submerged his prejudices and held fast to 
Britain’s undertakings. While this belief led to him advocating courses he might have 
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ordinarily opposed, he was not an unprincipled lawyer arguing to any brief as some critics 
suggested.  
Quite simply, Hailsham calculated that the delivery of one’s own side of a bargain 
was the best means to secure domestic, imperial and international stability and to maintain 
Britain’s pre-eminent position in the world. His belief that an Englishman’s word was his 
bond was at the heart of his determination to act on past agreements. This was most clear in 
his involvement in the Irish Free State Bill in late 1922 and in the process that led to the 
passage of the Government of India Act of 1935. Significantly, this principle could act in a 
progressive manner, as with the creation of the Irish Free State and the implementation of 
Indian reform, but it could also serve to defend the status quo. This explains Hailsham’s 
uncompromising stance towards what he perceived as threats to Britain’s constitution during 
the 1920s and 1930s, despite his sympathy with the working classes. His belief that socialism 
would end in disaster and worsen the condition of the very people it was supposed to help 
was combined with a sincere fear of political extremism and Bolshevik communism in 
particular. He was anxious that if a majority Labour government were elected, it might 
undermine Britain’s constitution and implement a revolutionary policy that the nation did not 
want. It should also be remembered that Hailsham’s constitutionalism went further than 
attacks upon the political left. His conduct during 1930-1 showed that he was frustrated with, 
and willing to oppose, what he regarded as the unconstitutional power of the press.  
The primacy of the law was also at the forefront of Hailsham’s consideration of the 
violations of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty during the years 1932-8. He sincerely believed that 
there was no legal or moral basis for de Valera’s flouting of past agreements – agreements 
that his predecessors had accepted. The same attitude influenced Hailsham’s response to the 
German menace during the 1930s. He became one of the first ministers to publicly condemn 
the actions of German leaders. He was frustrated by their attitude, which amounted to 
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regarding international treaties as ‘scraps of paper’. This realisation helped Hailsham reach 
the conclusion that Germany’s pledges could not be trusted and that its challenges to the 
status quo were geared not towards a peaceful revision of the restrictive aspects of the Treaty 
of Versailles, but towards hegemony in Europe. 
Without Hailsham’s contribution to British politics, the inter-war scene might have 
been markedly different. He was an important unifying force in the Conservative ranks from 
1929-35 and he helped hold the National Government together in the difficult days after the 
1931 General Election. Throughout his political career Hailsham was aware of political 
realities and conscious that politics is the ‘art of the possible’. He showed an ability to adapt 
pragmatically to changing circumstances. He was also a tremendously loyal colleague who 
put wider interests ahead of his own. In the interest of the Conservative party, he undertook a 
number of responsibilities that he did not desire. Even in retirement his self-imposed silence 
and refusal to write memoirs demonstrated his instinctive sense of loyalty to his colleagues 
and the governments in which he had served. Ultimately, while Hailsham’s understanding of 
the challenges Britain faced during the inter-war years was usually most perceptive, he 
proved powerless to prevent what was perhaps inevitable: the descent into the Second World 
War and the resulting decline of Britain and its empire.  
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